The Canadian Rangers @ 75

Key Documents, 1947-2022

Compiled and introduced by

P. Whitney Lackenbauer
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Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................ v

The Documents

Doc. 1: General Order 320, 12 August 1942 ...................................................... 3
Doc. 2: “Historically Speaking…,” The Ranger (October 1945) .................... 5
Doc. 3: Chief of the General Staff, “Formation – Canadian Rangers,” 17 June 1946 ................................................................. 8
Doc. 5: P.C. 1644, 23 May 1947 ...................................................................... 16
Doc. 8: Headquarters Eastern Command, “Canadian Rangers,” 15 May 1952 ... 36
Doc. 12: Major R. Liboiron, Canadian Rangers: Re-Assessment of Raison d’Etre, 7 November 1966 ................................................................. 76
Doc. 13: Major L.R. Boyd, Brief: Canadian Rangers, 29 November 1966 ....... 81
Doc. 14: LCol R. Berubé, Canadian Rangers Organization, 1 November 1967 .. 86
Doc. 15: Col R.A. Reid, “Canadian Rangers,” 8 February 1968 ....................... 90
Doc. 17: Minutes of a Conference to Discuss the Canadian Rangers and Working Group Report, 5 May 1969 ......................................................... 111
Doc. 45: Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence on the Canadian Rangers in Quebec,” 1 October 1991 .............................................................. 295
Doc. 46: Maj G.S. Rust, Aide-Memoire on the Canadian Rangers, 3 January 1992 ........................................................................................................... 299
Doc. 51: “Canadian Rangers Ontario – South of 60 Degrees Study,” May 1995
Doc. 54: Maj B.A. Sutherland, “Service Paper on the Unit Organization of the Canadian Rangers,” 30 June 1995 ............................................................... 363
Doc. 60: Director General Reserves and Cadets, “CAN RAN 2000,” 27 January 2000 ............................................................................................................. 403
Doc. 64: Joint Task Force (Central)/Land Force Central Area, “Operationalization of Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups,” 16 October 2006 .......................... 504
Doc. 65: Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, “Canadian Rangers National Authority Transfer Instruction,” 31 May 2007 ................................................................. 507


Doc. 68: Vice Chief of Defence, “Transfer Instruction - 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group,” 15 October 2008 ........................................................................ 519


Doc. 70: LFCO 11-99: Canadian Rangers, 1 December 2010 ................... 526

Doc. 71: Col D.A. Patterson, “Role of the Canadian Rangers National Authority,” 14 August 2013 ......................................................................................... 536

Doc. 72: Commander Canadian Army Master Implementation Directive – Canadian Ranger Organization, 27 April 2015 ........................................................ 538

Doc. 73: DAOD 2020-2, Canadian Rangers, 21 May 2015 .......................... 550


Doc. 75: Commander Canadian Army Planning Guidance - Canadian Ranger Enhancement, 13 January 2021 ................................................................. 586

Further Reading .............................................................................................. 592

About the Editor .............................................................................................. 595
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Introduction

Canada’s extensive coastlines and vast northern expanses have presented security and sovereignty dilemmas since the Second World War. With one of the lowest population densities in the world, and one of the most difficult climatic and physical environments in which to operate, maintaining a conventional military presence throughout the country is prohibitively costly. As a result, the Canadian Rangers have played an important but unorthodox role in domestic defence for more than seven decades. Often described as the military’s “eyes and ears” in remote regions, the Rangers have come to represent an important success story for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as a flexible, inexpensive, and culturally inclusive means of having “boots on the ground” to demonstrate sovereignty and conduct or support domestic operations. The Rangers have evolved to represent a successful integration of national security and sovereignty agendas with community-based activities and local stewardship. This practical partnership, rooted in traditional knowledge and skills, promotes cooperation, communal and individual empowerment, and cross-cultural understanding.1

The documents in this collection provide insight into how and why the Canadian Ranger organization took shape and evolved as it did. Based on the model of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) created during the Second World War,2 the Canadian Ranger concept was debated and defined in the early postwar period. Since that time, popular, political, and military interest in the Rangers has mirrored the “surges” of military interest and involvement in the Arctic.3 As I have described in previous writings, the oscillating cycles of (dis)interest and commitment reveal that the historical relationship between the Rangers and the military establishment was marked as much by uncertainty and neglect as by the support and respect that it enjoys today.

The Canadian Rangers were conceived as an inexpensive way to carve out a military space for citizens living in isolated coastal and northern communities who would not otherwise be suitable for or interested in military service. Early expectations were low, and support was limited. Over the last seven decades, however, the Department of National Defence (DND)/CAF have developed an awareness and acceptance of how residents of remote regions can make meaningful contributions to both the military and their communities, without leaving their homelands. The Canadian Rangers embody a unique form of military service created and adapted to Canada’s remote regions. As the documents in this collection attest, the Ranger concept has been debated since the early postwar period. Enduring questions help to frame this history. What should the Canadian Rangers be expected to do? Where should they be located? Who should participate?
How should they be organized? And how does Ranger service fit with evolving military and civic identities?4

What should the Rangers do?

The documents reveal a longstanding debate about what the military could or should expect Canadian Rangers to do. The Rangers’ basic mandate – “to provide a military presence in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada that cannot conveniently or economically be provided for by other components of the Canadian Forces” – has remained remarkably consistent since 1947. The tasks that they perform in support of this mission have changed and become more complex. Their initial focus was on supporting national security – protecting their communities from enemy attack in the early Cold War. By the 1970s, their role became directly linked to the armed forces’ role in support of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. Since the 1990s, the Rangers have also played a more visible nation-building and stewardship role in remote regions across Canada, particularly in Aboriginal communities.

The original Ranger concept was framed around the basic idea that they were the “eyes and ears” of the armed forces in sparsely settled regions. Postwar realities dictated new responsibilities for continental defence, and politicians and defence planners had no desire to position garrison forces across Canada’s northern expanse. They turned to modest solutions like the Rangers. Military officials debated the usefulness of minimally trained and largely unsupported Rangers even before they were officially formed in 1947. Their primary role was to detect and report anything unusual in their local areas while they went about their daily lives. In wartime, they would be expected to serve as coastwatchers, guides, and guerrillas to prevent an enemy from securing a foothold on Canadian soil. Their tactical role was limited: they were not trained for it and were only intended to engage an enemy until regular troops could respond. Their contribution was modest, but so was their cost. “As an exercise in risk management,” one report concluded, “the establishment of the Rangers was a sound and well thought out mitigation strategy. Although the likelihood of invasion was not high, the consequences of a successful invasion were significant.”5

Early debates about whether the Rangers should be “eyes and ears,” focused on surveillance and reconnaissance, or “home guard” units, trained in guerrilla tactics and equipped for “immediate retaliation” against an attacking force, persisted into the 1950s and beyond. Despite repeated official exhortations that the Canadian Rangers were not intended to re-incarnate the wartime PCMR, the Canadian Army’s Western Command pushed for a strong operational and tactical role through the 1950s. By contrast, liaison officers in Quebec and Eastern Commands were apprehensive about the emphasis on the Rangers in combat scenarios, believing that this would set up false expectations about purpose and capabilities.
Instead, they emphasized grassroots surveillance and reconnaissance. Although these specific debates were unique to the Rangers, they related to the experiences of other formations within the armed forces.

Military historian Bernd Horn’s analysis of Canada’s airborne forces in the early Cold War offers some striking parallels with the early history of the Rangers. “To keep the Americans out of Canada’s North, the federal government realized it must show not only the intent, but also the capability to guard the back door,” he observed. “An ill-defined threat to the north, a paranoid giant to the south, and a tight-fisted government which traditionally held the military in disdain, created the quintessential marriage of convenience.” The Mobile Striking Force was an inexpensive solution to Canada’s sovereignty and security dilemma, but the paltry resources dedicated to manpower and training made it a “paper tiger.” In due course, the government’s inability to rationalize the role, structure, and relevance of airborne forces contributed to their decline after political and military leaders downgraded the idea of the North as a gateway to invasion in the mid-1950s.6

The Rangers faced similar problems, and the lack of a clear, credible requirement led to a similar decline in the 1960s. As the nature of the nuclear threat shifted, so did perceptions about what citizens and soldiers could contribute to defence. The military value of the Rangers’ surveillance and tactical roles became less apparent, paralleling trends in Canadian Militia service and civil defence planning more generally. Training regimens focused on “national survival” tasks proved unpopular, and the bureaucratization of civil defence planning pushed out grassroots community organizations.7 The Rangers’ practical roles as coastwatchers, advisors, and guides to the military persisted (particularly along the Atlantic coast), but more official weight was given to their importance as a simple “military presence” in northern regions than to their potential for engaging a foreign adversary using guerrilla tactics.

The Rangers had always served an implicit sovereignty function: Canadians representing the military in remote parts of the country. A growing government preoccupation with the need for a symbolic military presence in support of sovereignty in the 1970s accentuated this role. The Rangers were an inexpensive answer to the government’s perceived “boots on the ground” dilemma: to be able to claim sovereignty, popular logic suggested, a government must demonstrate knowledge of what is happening within its territory and respond where required. When Canadians worried that their sovereignty over the Arctic was in jeopardy, the Rangers served as a fitting example of control over isolated areas, both directly and as advisors and teachers of southern troops sent to the region to demonstrate “effective occupation.”8

By the late 1990s, political scientist Rob Huebert observed that the effects of military operations on northern peoples and ecology had become central considerations and that sovereignty (rather than conventional military security) was
the primary focus of Canadian defence activities in the Arctic. Debates over the militarization of the Arctic region illuminated the environmental and social impacts of military activities, and policy-makers could no longer ignore the “human security” dimensions of their decisions. This helps to explain why socio-political and “human security” considerations validated the expansion of the Canadian Rangers in remote regions alongside government commitments to address more traditional sovereignty and security concerns.

While the Canadian Rangers were increasingly celebrated as “sovereignty soldiers,” military officials, journalists, and politicians began to acknowledge in the late 1980s that the Rangers had a social impact beyond simply representing a “military presence.” Many Rangers enjoyed prominent positions within their communities, and patrols were respected and valued as grassroots organizations that provided essential services in cases of emergency. They regularly took a leadership role in local search and rescue activities and were held up as role models, leading Northern Indigenous leaders to repeatedly acknowledge the Rangers’ contributions to healthy, resilient communities. The creation of the Junior Canadian Rangers in 1998 formalized a nation-building role, using the Rangers as a way to support a culturally appropriate youth program in remote communities where children were “at risk.”

The ongoing debates about the appropriateness of Rangers’ roles and responsibilities reflect the relative weight that commentators give to operational and representational functions. The Rangers are valued for their military contributions to sovereignty, national security, and domestic operations, and some pundits believe that they should be given more formal military training and responsibilities to ward off potential enemies. Other commentators believe that their socio-political value is paramount, and that resources should be redirected to enhance their contributions to Indigenous communities. This debate transcends the national to the local in remote communities across Canada.

Where should they be located?

A persistent “myth” associated with the Canadian Rangers is that they all live and serve in the Arctic. Since the 1970s, the mystique of the “Arctic Ranger” – a misnomer popularized by ill-conceived political statements – has dominated media and policy debates. In my larger history of the Canadian Rangers, I sought to expand awareness of how and why the Rangers exist from coast to coast to coast and across the provincial norths. As the documents in this volume reveal, the geographical parameters of “sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas” have been interpreted in different ways by different people in different contexts. Looking at the Rangers simply as an “Arctic” organization is limiting and distorting.
Although the Canadian Rangers form a “national” organization, they have developed with distinct regional and local cultures. The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) were confined to British Columbia and Yukon during the Second World War, which explains why the first peacetime Canadian Ranger units were created in Western Command. Distinct regional approaches to organizing units and the roles assigned to them reflected the priorities of regional army commanders, demographic and socio-economic realities, and geographical constraints. By the 1950s, the Ranger footprint extended across the territorial and provincial norths, along the Newfoundland coastline, and into the far reaches of the high arctic. Challenges related to organizing units and sustaining relationships were exacerbated by the minimal resources devoted to the Ranger organization. Regional commanders supported the Ranger units with varying degrees of commitment, and local activities and success depended upon the initiative and creativity of the company and platoon commanders.

The Ranger organization contracted in the 1960s and 70s and was divided between a new Northern Region headquarters in Yellowknife and Maritime Command (the navy) in Halifax. The increasing Aboriginal and sovereignty focus of Ranger patrols in Northern Region, and the coastwatching orientation of the predominantly non-Aboriginal companies and platoons in Atlantic Canada, reflected the influences of their respective commands as well as changing socio-political realities. The next sovereignty crisis in the 1980s generated renewed political and media interest in the Rangers, prompting expansion and generating debates amongst military officials about whether growth should be directed “north of 60” (where the Rangers were believed to have a clear operational role in support of sovereignty) or “south of 60” (where Rangers made visible socio-political contributions). Despite the popular association of the Rangers with Inuit living in the Arctic, the most vigorous growth over the last three decades has occurred in British Columbia, northern Ontario, and the northern prairie provinces. This expansion has enriched the demographic diversity of the organization and integrates the expertise of Canadians from an array of cultural and employment backgrounds.

Who should participate?

Participation in the Rangers represents an alternative form of military service for Canadians who live in remote areas and do not want to join the Regular Force but still want to serve their country – and their communities. The perceived military value of the Rangers has always been linked to civilian experiences and practices. The basic premise was and is to recruit individuals who have lived in an area for a long time; who are intimately familiar with the local people, terrain, and weather conditions; and who possess skills and expert local knowledge valuable to their patrol. Ideally, the person works on or near the land or sea. There is no
upper age limit, as long as an individual can still perform his or her duties. They are not deployable overseas, and they are not expected to serve outside of their local areas (with some recent qualifications). Accordingly, Ranger service is distinct from Regular Force and Primary Reserve units.

The iconic status of Inuit in news media coverage of and documentaries on the Canadian Rangers has generated a persistent misconception that the Rangers are an Inuit or Indigenous program. They are more properly defined as a sub-component of the Canadian Forces Reserves with a high degree of Indigenous participation. Accordingly, misrepresenting the organization as an Indigenous program fails to accommodate the diversity of the Rangers and the varied forms of service from coast to coast.

While the history of the Canadian Rangers references some examples of the themes of racism, marginalization, and neglect typically associated with Indigenous peoples’ experiences with militarization in the twentieth century, the dominant narrative in the documents reveals a growing military acceptance of Indigenous people and their constructive role in defending Canada and asserting sovereignty. Although some early critics questioned whether First Nations and Inuit could make a meaningful contribution to the military, others recognized that Indigenous traditional knowledge, survival skills, and land use patterns had potential military value. Close observers embraced this “otherness” and promoted Ranger service as a culturally appropriate way to sustain a military presence in remote communities. By the late 1970s, new sovereignty and security discourses made efforts to accommodate Indigenous peoples in the armed forces all the more significant. During exercises, military officials saw operational value in traditional skills, realizing that diversity can serve as a force multiplier (increasing a combat force’s operational effectiveness) rather than as a liability. Over the last four decades, this understanding has allowed the Rangers to flourish in northern Indigenous communities and has attracted significant positive media attention. Acceptance not only fosters positive Indigenous-military relations but also allows the Rangers to support self-governing and sustainable communities in unexpected ways.

How should they be organized?

On the national scale, the Canadian Rangers have always been shaped by political and military priorities. Politicians set the broad political direction for the military, determine budgets, and help to frame popular expectations about the roles and legitimacy of the armed forces, which affects every layer of the defence establishment. In this particular case, general threat assessments and high-level decisions (political and military) about how much interest and effort the military should devote to the defence of remote regions had a direct bearing on various expansion and enhancement plans. Since 1994, political and national media
interest in the Rangers has ensured sustained growth, with primary emphasis on Indigenous service. Broader efforts to restructure the military in light of shifting geopolitical, economic, technological, and socio-cultural environments also influenced the form and pace of Ranger development.

Within National Defence Headquarters, senior officials have long deliberated over where the Rangers fit into the broader direction of national defence and how the organization can meet operational and political objectives without draining budgets or losing overall coherence. Various organizations have executed command and control of the Canadian Rangers since 1947: the Army; Maritime Command (the navy); Northern Region Headquarters/Canadian Forces Northern Area; the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, through the Land Force Areas; and the Chief of the Land Staff. In practice, central authorities devolved responsibilities for the Rangers to the regional level, where area commanders had to chart a course for their companies, platoons, and patrols with little national direction and shoestring budgets. Accordingly, although the Canadian Rangers are a national organization in name, their historical development clearly reflects the priorities of regional commanders and their staffs, Ranger liaison officers and instructors, and the Rangers themselves more than any central direction. As the documents in this volume reveal, the recent appeals to a historical Ranger “corps” as a justification to re-cast the Ranger organization under that military organizational terminology has little foundation in past practice.

The Canadian Rangers were envisaged as a regionalized organization. National authorities intervened in debates about Ranger roles and policy but recognized that a “one size fits all” mentality would suffocate the ability of regional commanders to generate and sustain interest in the Rangers in their areas. Accordingly, officers outside of National Defence Headquarters had ample leeway to creatively interpret national directives. This flexibility accommodated diverse human and physical geographies, and over time it facilitated innovative approaches to Ranger training and operations that were sensitive to local conditions and priorities. Contrary to the common conception that decentralized, community-based partnerships in remote regions are prohibitively costly, the Rangers were very inexpensive compared to other military options. The formal reorganization of regional elements into Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups in 1998 marked a continuation of this longstanding regional evolution, and these units remain in place today.

This decentralized approach, however, has also generated persistent concerns about the Canadian Rangers’ lack of coherence as a national organization. Rigid management and a misalignment of structure and socio-environmental realities can lead to organizational decline or collapse. So too can unfettered growth and the liberal interpretation and implementation of mandates when there is no central coordination or stability. A military review noted in 2003 that, over the preceding six decades, the Rangers had “spent longer as a number of regional entities than as
a national program. Patrol Groups were simply set up to suit their own natural environment, cultural makeup, operational needs and political situation at the time.” Although many of these differences were “perfectly valid” and should be accommodated (particularly those related to cultural differences), in other cases regional commanders had simply taken “different paths to achieve an end” or had “interpreted guidelines or even directives differently.” 16 The challenge lies in balancing flexibility and diversity with coherent direction and constraints to preserve the credibility and sustainability of the overall organization. Achieving this requires careful management of competing agendas and personalities across the various scales.

Although the Ranger organization has changed over time, the basic principle of rooting it in local populations has remained constant. The original company-platoon structure, overseen by officers from the local area, reflected a traditional military structure – at least on paper. In practice, however, the characteristics of local leadership, widely dispersed units, and relationships with the military hierarchy were highly unorthodox. As northern and coastal residents concentrated into settlements, the Rangers evolved into a simplified patrol structure, first in the territorial north and later along the Atlantic coast. This organizational structure reflected and encouraged community-based stewardship, ensuring that the needs, aspirations, and values of local people were reflected in military practices.

The Canadian Ranger organization is without parallel in the military world. Other countries have created unconventional military units to defend remote regions, but most have formal training and service requirements more comparable to Canada’s Regular Forces or Primary Reserves than the Rangers. 17 This uniqueness means that the Ranger organization remains an enigma to defence planners who do not comprehend why or how it has taken its particular form. Repeated pressures to reconstitute the Rangers as a more typical or formal military organization, similar to conventional units, have been stymied by fiscal constraints, high-level military restructuring, and debates about feasibility and desirability. Consequently, most organizational change has been incremental and slow. Although unintentional, this pace allowed the Rangers to develop an inclusive governance structure that balances national and regional direction from headquarters staff with elected leadership at the patrol level. The ongoing search for balance between local, regional, and national priorities allows the Canadian Rangers to operate simultaneously on multiple scales – and also invites persistent questions about the appropriate role for the Canadian Rangers in military and civilian-led efforts to enhance security and resiliency.

**How does Ranger service fit with evolving military and civic identities?**

DND’s policy challenge questions for 2022 note that “the CAF require a creative, agile, and responsible approach to recruitment and retention that
capitalizes on the unique and comprehensive skills of Canada’s diverse population.” To reflect and “leverage the diversity and values of Canadian society,” the military “must engage and attract the best and brightest, incentivize retention by adapting to individual situations, and ensure a culture of respect and inclusion, while offering competitive benefits and remuneration.” How, then, does Ranger service fit within the broader context of Canada’s evolving military and civic identities? What are the ties that bind Canadian Rangers with the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian state? How do the Rangers fit within the broader military community, and, in turn, how does the military fit within the broader network of societal relations in remote regions?

In the late 1980s, sociologist Terrence Willett examined the bias towards professionalism that downplayed Reservists’ connection to the cultures and communities from which they sprang. In his assessment, the Canadian militia or Reserves are a “social and civic institution” that should not be considered subordinate to full-time professional soldiers. “There are jobs that the militia person can do better than the regular soldier, with his or her knowledge and links with the host community,” he insisted. Although professional soldiers often dismissed “social defence” roles in responding to natural disasters and other crises as poor examples of “proper soldiering,” these responsibilities exposed soldiers to risks and stresses they would encounter in wartime and reinforced public perceptions that “a useful body of disciplined men” had civic relevance at home. If Reservists are citizen soldiers who embody the “link” or “bridge” between the military and civil society, their perception of where they fit within Canada is integral to understanding their sense of patriotism and civic responsibility.

Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, highlights that our country’s diverse, multi-cultural population is one of its greatest strengths. Nonetheless, recent efforts to address systemic misconduct and advance positive cultural change in the CAF reinforce that there is an institutional “gap … in our desired and professed culture versus the one which we practice.” Civilian and military cultures are not inherently aligned. For example, modern military institutions are quintessentially assimilationist. Systems of rank and promotion, uniforms, and standardized training and operating procedures all serve to reinforce collective identity and hierarchy. Traditional military socialization “aims to eradicate individual difference, and to imbue a sense of tradition and the importance of commitment to the unit, to the nation, and to national symbols.”

The Canadian Rangers do not fit this description, however, and thus require a different analytical framework. Military sociologists ascribe five fundamental characteristics to postmodern militaries. First, civilian and military spheres interact on structural and cultural levels. Second, postmodern militaries place less emphasis or differentiation on service, rank, and specialization. Third, missions will focus less on warfighting and more on low-intensity humanitarian and constabulary
missions. Fourth, postmodern forces will carry out missions with multilateral rather than unilateral authorization. This idea extends to the fifth characteristic: that there will be an internationalization of military forces themselves. Applying these theoretical traits to a domestic-oriented force like the Canadian Rangers requires creative interpretation, but they help to explain the vitality and success of the organization in recent decades. To some extent, the Rangers are exceptional within the military, but they are members of “One Army” and the CAF all the same.

As Canada’s political self-image has shifted to a multicultural mosaic enriched by gender, sexual, and other social and intersectional identities, military personnel policies have changed accordingly. Strategic documents emphasize that the Canadian Armed Forces must be a “visible national institution” that reflects the country’s geographic and cultural diversity. By encouraging Canadian Rangers to function in a manner appropriate to diverse cultural and environmental conditions, the military has accommodated local and individual identities and articulated tasks that advance national resilience and are informed by the intersectional needs of Canada’s diverse population. The organization also reflects regional identities in its command structure, liaison efforts, training, operations, and representational activities. Accordingly, the historical documents in this collection yield insights from the Ranger organization into evolving conceptions of diversity and inclusion, organizational cultures, and initiatives or practices that can positively influence cultural practices and outcomes within the Canadian defence team.

As recent Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) policy challenges highlight, “DND/CAF must think about the force mix necessary to deliver and operate across the spectrum of competition, tension, and conflict. This entails ensuring we have the right personnel … with the necessary capabilities to succeed in an unpredictable security environment.” The documents in this collection offer insights that can inform answers to a range of persistent policy questions:

- How will Canada ensure its approach is consistent with its commitment towards reconciliation and meaningful consultation with its Indigenous peoples?
- How can the CAF best connect with Indigenous communities and improve their representation and integration?
- What actions can the military take to address the specific barriers experienced by Indigenous people when joining, remaining in, and thriving in the CAF?
- How can the military recruit and train a force with the diverse expertise needed to operate effectively in all domains and missions?
- How can DND/CAF maximize the output and impact of the Canadian Rangers?
• How can DND/CAF better integrate the Reserves into overall CAF culture, including identity, inter-group relations, and cohesion among units?
• How can DND/CAF make Reserve units more applicable to the needs of local communities?
• What role can the Canadian Rangers play during future public health and national security emergencies?²⁷
• What is and should be the role of the Canadian Rangers in continental defence, and what measures are necessary to maximize their effectiveness?²⁸

The Documents

The documents that follow are intended to facilitate a more robust, historically informed discussion about the past, present, and future of the Canadian Rangers. Readers will note that I have included a few documents on the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR), even though this organization predated the Canadian Rangers. I have only included a sprinkling of documents from the period to 1960, when official historian and chief archivist of the Army Historical Section J. Mackay Hitsman produced a useful overview of the Rangers’ development to that time. I have reproduced many documents from the 1966-1971 period, when officers substantively debated the Rangers’ future, and again from 1989-1995, when the Ranger organization underwent dramatic growth and enhancement. Readers will also note that I have only reproduced a few documents from the last decade, given that people directly involved with the shaping of Ranger policy will have access to recent material, some of which remains sensitive owing to ongoing Canadian Ranger enhancement efforts.

Note to Readers

The documents in this volume reflect the era in which they were produced. For example, various documents include the terms “Indian” and “Eskimo,” which were still in common usage when the documents were written. Furthermore, certain documents contain gendered language and what the Library and Archives Canada describes as “historical language and content that some [readers] may consider offensive, for example, language used to refer to racial, ethnic and cultural groups.” I have retained the language from primary sources “to ensure that attitudes and viewpoints are not erased from the historical record,”²⁹ with full anticipation that this material may invite and stimulate further discussion.

Notes

Sections of this introduction are drawn from P. Whitney Lackenbauer, The Canadian Rangers: A Living History (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), and Lackenbauer, “The North’s Canadian Rangers,” in Strengthening the Canadian
Armed Forces through Diversity and Inclusion, eds. Alistair Edgar, Rupinder Mangat, and Bessma Momani (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), 67-86.


6 Bernd Horn, Bastard Sons (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2001), 16, 99.


8 The legal concept of effective occupation (the right of a state to claim a territory not subject to the sovereignty of another state) is often misapplied to uninhabited islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. See, for example, John Gellner, “The Military Task,” in The Arctic in Question, ed. Edgar Dosman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 95, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, eds., The Canadian Forces and Arctic Sovereignty (Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military and Strategic Disarmament Studies/Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010).


10 CRS Review, doc. 62.


12 For an introduction to the historiography, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Scott Sheffield, “Moving Beyond ‘Forgotten’: The Historiography on Canadian Native


15 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada’s Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005,” in *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives*, eds. Lackenbauer and Craig Mantle (Kingston: CDA Press, 2007), 171-208. As the Indigenous profile of the Rangers organization has grown, non-Indigenous contributions – particularly in British Columbia and Yukon, along the Lower North Shore in Quebec, and in Newfoundland and Labrador – have been pushed to the margins of popular awareness.

16 See CRS Review, doc. 62.


28 MINDS Policy Challenge Questions 2022-23.

The Documents
Doc. 1: General Order 320, 12 August 1942

1. Pursuant to Section 20 of the Militia act the Governor General in Council names as a Corps of the Active Militia the undermentioned Unit:-
   “Pacific Coast Militia Rangers”

2. The said Pacific Coast Militia Rangers shall be comprised of such Reserve companies, organized on such War Establishments and localized as shall from time to time be authorized by the Minister of National Defence.

3. The Laws, Regulations and Orders which apply to Reserve Units of the Canadian Army and to the members thereof shall apply to the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers subject to the following limitations and variations:-
   
   i. Membership will be limited as to age or physique but will be open to any who are considered suitable or can be of use.
   
   ii. Suitable persons may be given provisional commissioned rank but before appointments are confirmed must qualify.
   
   iii. Officers will not exercise command over officers and men other than those of their own Corps.
   
   iv. Drill and training will be voluntary, will entail no expense to the public, and will conform to local requirements.
   
   v. The corps will be supplied with Steel Helmets and distinctive arm bands.
   
   vi. Arms and ammunition for the Corps will include such as are available from private ownership supplemented by service weapons and ammunition which may be issued if considered necessary and supplies are available.
   
   vii. Except as specified, the Crown will not undertake to provide the Corps, except when called out on Active service, with horses, vehicles, accoutrements, clothing or other articles of equipment, personal or regimental.
   
   viii. Officers and men of the Corps will not be entitled to transportation, subsistence, pay or allowances except while on Active Service provided however, that if an Officer or man incurs an injury, disease or illness while undergoing duly authorized training or while on duty, or service, he shall be granted compensation under the provisions of Part XVI, Pay & Allowance Regulations, for the Permanent and Non-permanent Active Militia 1937, to the same extent as if he were a member of the Non-permanent Active Militia.
ix. Except while on Active Service,
   a. An officer may resign his commission…
   b. A man may claim his discharge after 30 days' notice, in writing
to his Commanding Officer

4. The Minister may at any time disband the Company of the Corps, or
portion thereof, if he considers it advisable to do so.

5. Where the provisions of the King’s Regulations and Orders for the
Canadian Militia, 1939, as amended are at variance with the special
provisions and limitations governing the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers such
special provisions as proved for here in as aforesaid shall apply and govern.

6. Such special provisions, limitations and variations as aforesaid shall cease to
apply to the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers or any company or sub-unit
thereof when such Corps, Company or sub-unit is called out on Active
Service.
Doc. 2: “Historically Speaking…,” *The Ranger* (October 1945)

The following brief official history of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers was read by Major H. W. Adams, G.S.O. 2, Pacific Command, over public address systems at ceremonies which marked the “Stand Down” of the PCMR as part of Canada’s armed forces.

The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers has been one of the most colorful organizations in the whole history of Canada.

As defeat after defeat marked the early days of the war with Germany, and the full meaning of modern all-out warfare was gradually made clear, army officer and man on the street alike, realized that no place on the globe was immune or safe from attack.

When the [Japanese] war machine was finally unleashed on the Democracies, service men and civilians on the Pacific Coast became increasingly alert to the impending danger of attack. Here was an area, larger than the combined areas of Belgium, Switzerland, France and Italy, with over 5,000 miles of rough, rugged coast line and with vital roads and railways stretching for miles through the Interior. How could it be defended? An attack might be expected at any time, and would be guided by Japanese who knew the coast and country intimately.

The lessons of Crete, of Hong Kong and of Singapore had been learned, and it was realized that coast defence guns and garrisons alone were helpless. The only solution was an organized home defence force, built along guerilla lines. The call went out for volunteers.

Within two weeks 40 Companies, with a strength of over 5,000, were on their way to organization, and within a few months the Rangers, 10,000 strong, were distributed along the coast, adjacent to vulnerable points, and along the main roads and highways. All over the area the Rangers were organizing and training in preparation for possible raids or attacks. Preparing, if needs be, to fight on their own initiative, or to assist the regular forces.

They trained in rifle shooting. Before the war there were only five rifle ranges for the whole area, soon there were one hundred and sixty-three. Where their rifle shooting was good they made it better. They trained in reconnaissance, map reading and field sketching. Much of the area was unmapped. The Rangers made their own maps, which proved invaluable in training manoeuvres and also in organizing searches for lost aircraft.

They trained in guerilla tactics, in scouting and they guided the more regular forces whenever required. They trained in bush craft and first-aid work, and they trained to counter any possible fifth column activities. Travelling instructors were sent around the country, to outlying coastal points and outposts in the Interior,
and the Rangers gathered from miles around to attend lectures and demonstrations. A Ranger training camp was established near Chilliwack and Rangers came from all parts to attend this camp, from Vancouver Island and the Queen Charlottes, from the Naas and the Skeena Rivers, from the Cariboo and Chilcotin, from the Peace River and the Yukon, and from the Okanagan and the Koot-enays.

The Rangers did this work voluntarily and without remuneration. There is not a Ranger who did not dig deep into his own pocket or suffer some loss of employment. The women, too, played no small part in the Ranger scheme of things. They went to work looking after farm, ranch or office when their men were away training or out on some Ranger activity.

Rangers as civilians were engaged in all walks of life. They were loggers and timber cruisers; millmen and land surveyors, prospectors, trappers, miners, hunters, ranchers, farmers and homesteaders; they were railway section men, right-of-way scalers and fishermen.

The P.C.M.R. was of necessity a great “leveller” — the labourer and the banker worked together. The logging boss found himself in a group or detachment commanded by one of his truck drivers. All had just the one idea. They were “Rangers” — all working together toward the one common end — the end which they achieved so well. A fellowship of man was created in the Rangers and it will carry on.

With this work, and the enterprise, zeal and enthusiasm behind it, it was not long before the P.C.M.R. assumed a vital role in the defence of Pacific Command.

No attack or raid developed but the Rangers were ready at all times, day or night, to quit their civilian work or to go out on some important duty. In all outlying areas, wherever personnel were available, the Rangers were represented. At nearly 600 points in this vast area, Rangers have trained hard, worked hard, and given up all their leisure time to P.C.M.R. activities. No other military force has had the same scope or covered the same ground.

Their work has been carried out without glamour or pageantry —sometimes without much recognition, and many people in city areas have had little idea of the organization that was safeguarding their homes.

Perhaps the menace from Japanese balloons proved the Ranger organization more than anything else. The Rangers were the first to be given the full information in confidence and immediately ten thousand Rangers, and the many other thousands throughout the area as associated with P.C.M.R. Companies. were on the alert and taking what practical action was necessary.

The whole organization has been characterized by team work and team spirit. Team work not only in the organization but team work outside the organization.
Team work with the Active and Reserve Armies, the Navy and Air Force. with provincial and municipal authorities and officials. Team work with industry, the logging industry. lumbering industry and fishing industry — teamwork throughout the length and breadth of the Pacific Command.

While the Rangers are now being disbanded, the Ranger idea will not die, and, if this land of ours is ever again, threatened, to make it solid in total defence, it will be the Rangers who will fill the gaps and supply the link to fit the regular soldier to this rough, rugged country which we love.
Doc. 3: Chief of the General Staff, “Formation – Canadian Rangers,” 17 June 1946

General Officers Commanding, All Commands.

Formation – Canadian Rangers

1. It has been suggested that it would be advantageous to form across Canada a part-time volunteer body to be known as the Canadian Rangers. Such an organization would be confined to the sparsely populated areas of Canada along the coasts and along the fringe of the northern limits of population. Personnel belonging to this organization would be trained to act as guides and scouts, to increase their local knowledge of the surrounding country, and to act as guerillas if required.

2. Such an organization in war would be of value. The extent to which it can be implemented in peace is limited by many factors.

3. Attached as Appendix A is a paper which presents some aspects of the problem.

4. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the Conference of Commanders to be held late this year.

5. This project is only in the initial planning stage and the fact that such a proposal is being considered should not be made known to the public at the present time.

       [C.G. Mann] MG.
       for Lieut.-General,
       Chief of the General Staff.

APPENDIX “A”

CANADIAN RANGERS

OBJECT

1. The object of this paper is to discuss the factors affecting the organizing and trading in peace, of a part time volunteer body to be used in the protection, in time of war, of sparsely populated areas of Canada.
GENERAL

2. In 1942, when the danger of sabotage and infiltration by Japanese or Japanese supporters became apparent on the West Coast, a body known as the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) was raised. This was composed mainly of civilian residents of coastal areas and sparsely populated parts of British Columbia. These civilians had a good knowledge of the country due to their occupations, such as woodsmen and loggers. They were organized in companies which were formed according to available personnel in an area, were issued with rifles, ammunition, steel helmets, arm bands and waterproof clothing, and given certain training in map reading, shooting and means of countering fifth-column activities. Training was all carried out in the Rangers' leisure time and without remuneration. Their duties briefly were to patrol the coastal areas and later inland areas where the population was small and widely distributed or non-existent, to report any findings of a suspicious nature and to fight, if required, as guerilla bands against any invading force.

3. Although never called out on active service, the PCMR was most valuable in coast watching and keeping isolated parts of British Columbia under surveillance. By utilizing the spare time of these volunteers who, for various reasons were not eligible for the Army proper, a considerable saving of manpower was effected.

4. Although authority was given for the formation of a similar body in the area of the East Coast, a rather different method was adopted and the Reserve Army was utilized for the performance of roles similar to those of the PCMR. However, efficient as this solution might have been, its application, in the future might result in the employment of a great portion of the Reserve Force for this role. This would be at a variance with present thought regarding the proper role of the Reserve Force and consequently it is doubtful if a solution of this kind would be acceptable.

NEW PROPOSAL

5. The question has now been raised as to the possibility and desirability of forming a somewhat similar organization which, unlike the PCMR which was confined to the Pacific area, will be nation-wide and which will perform similar tasks on both coasts and in the area between. For the purpose of the remarks which follow, this proposed organization will be referred to as the Canadian Rangers.
SUGGESTED ROLES OF CANADIAN RANGERS IN WAR AND IN PEACE

6. (a) **Roles in War**

- Provision of guides to troops.
- Provision of reconnaissance screen.
- Coast watching.
- Fighting as guerilla bands, if required.
- Assisting the RCMP in the discovery and apprehension of small groups or numbers of enemy agents.
- Reporting and locating friendly aircraft in distress and rendering assistance to the aircrew of such aircraft.
- Reporting approach of enemy aircraft (Supplementary to RCAF arrangements).

(b) **Roles in Peace**

- Collection of detailed information about the country likely to be of use in future planning.
- Provision, where required, of rescue parties.

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

7. (a) **Manpower**

The Canadian Army Reserve Force is the first line of defence. The organization of the Canadian Rangers, therefore, must not be allowed to interfere with it in any way. Consequently any overlapping geographically between the two organizations would be undesirable.

(b) **Location**

The greatest value of the roles of the Canadian Rangers lies in their performance in sparsely settled districts where communications are not good and the ground is not normally under surveillance. Therefore, units of this organization should be limited to such areas.

(c) **Training**

(i) In order to carry out roles suggested, each man must have a good knowledge of the following subjects:

- Military map reading and field sketching.
- Rifle shooting.
- Field craft.
- Small scale demolitions.
Elementary aircraft recognition (general types).
A detailed knowledge of the area in which he lives, including
buildings, roads, bridges, and the effects of seasonal climactic
variations.

(ii) As this training takes time, and as such an organization will be most
valuable from the beginning of any war, at least a portion of this
training any have to be carried out in peace.

(d) **Equipment and Accounting**

Personnel of the PCMR were issued with a limited amount of equipment
which was all accounted for by their Officer in Charge of Administration
on Headquarters, Pacific Command. In the case of a nation-wide
Canadian Rangers, the accounting arrangements would be, of necessity,
more complex and, possibly, so complex as to make any peacetime issue
impracticable.

(e) **Organization**

Because the personnel will be found from residents of the lightly
populated parts of the country, the largest practicable unit would be the
Company. In some cases even a company would encompass too much
territory to be workable, in which case the unit would have to be the
Platoon. It is suggested that where the latter obtains, the platoon be an
independent platoon and not included in a widespread and unwieldy
company organization. The size of the units and geographical boundaries
can only be decided upon after a study of the available manpower i.e.,
men who are acceptable and who are volunteers.

(f) **Command and Control**

Although the PCMR was widely dispersed when compared to any purely
military formation, it was confined to the boundaries of the Pacific
Command and it was controlled and administered by a staff officer (Lt-
Col) on strength of HQ Pacific Command. The conception of the
Canadian Rangers as a nationwide organization, however, presents
greater problems of command and control both from the training and
administrative point of view.

(g) **Cost**

Although the personnel would receive no pay not allowances, there
would undoubtedly be considerable expense involved in its organization
and administration in peace ($10,000 per month was allowed for the
PCMR in war time, in addition to the cost of equipment).
CONCLUSION

8. A corps such as the Canadian Rangers would be of value in time of war. The problem of the extent to which it should be organized in peace would appear to admit of three solutions.

(a) To organize the force completely. Theoretically this would seem to be desirable to obtain the greatest value in war. However, the training and administrative implications of such a solution must be fully realized and plans be devised which are practicable.

(b) To organize a nucleus of such a Corps to form the basis on expansion in time of war. Here again problems will arise but their solution will present less difficulty.

(c) To limit any action to the preparation of plans for organization in war, which could be kept under review and implemented in the event of an emergency.
OBJECT

1. The object of this paper is to suggest an outline plan for the formation in peace of an organization to be known as the “Canadian Rangers”.

OUTLINE PLAN

2. The Canadian Rangers will be formed, on a restricted basis, across Canada for the purpose of operating in the thinly populated parts of the country which are not normally traversed nor under surveillance and where it is impracticable to organize units of the Reserve Force.

3. Military Status

The Canadian Rangers will be included in the Reserve Militia. Service will be voluntary and in accordance with KR (Can) 1939, Appendix X. In view of the nature of this organization, special consideration will be given to physical standards and age limits. Issue of equipment and reimbursement for services are dealt with below.

4. Command

Units of the Canadian Rangers will be formed in all Commands and will be under the command of the GOsC concerned, who will implement the overall policy laid down from time to time by Army Headquarters. GOsC may delegate to DOsC such administrative control as they deem desirable.

5. Location

Units of the Canadian Rangers will be located in the sparsely populated coastal areas and in the area to the North of the main belt of population across Canada. This organization must not conflict geographically with units of the reserve force.
6. Roles in War and in Peace

(a) Roles in War

Provision of guides to troops.
Provision of a reconnaissance screen.
Coast watching.
Fighting as guerilla bands, if required.
Assistance to the R.C.M.P. and, where applicable, the Provincial Police in the discovery and apprehension of small groups of enemy agents.
Reporting and locating friendly aircraft in distress and rendering assistance to the crew of such aircraft.
Reporting the approach of enemy aircraft. (Supplementary to RCAF arrangements.)

(b) Roles in Peace

Collection of detailed information about the country likely to be of use in future planning.
Provision, if required, of rescue parties.

7. Organization

The unit in the Canadian Rangers organization will be the Ranger Company, which will be subdivided into Ranger detachments. It is impracticable to create a standard establishment for all companies. The strengths will have to be determined individually and will be based on the degree of population in the area concerned. Decisions on the location and number of companies to be formed in Command can only be made after considerable study by Commanders.

8. Organizational Restrictions

It is not practicable to completely organize the Canadian Rangers in peace for its war-time role due to the frequent changes in the bulk of the civilian personnel inhabiting the northern parts of the country. The most that is feasible is the forming of a nucleus which is capable of rapid expansion when required. Rather than restrict the size of companies, the number of Companies should be restricted, and the key personnel should be selected from the permanent residents of established ports or communities. The peacetime strength will not exceed 1000 all ranks in each Command.
9. **Training**

The Rangers will not be organized on fixed military lines and will not be trained as soldiers. Such training as is necessary for them to have to properly carry out their roles will probably be best given under their own arrangements. Some instruction in military topography, military message writing and the use of wireless will, however, have to be furnished by Command Headquarters. The feasibility of summer and winter exercises, consistent with their roles, should be considered.

10. **Training Equipment**

Except for a sporting rifle (obsolete U.S. .30 type) together with a suitable annual issue of ammunition, no training equipment will be issued in peace. Special temporary issues will be made as required for exercises.

11. **Clothing**

No clothing will be issued to the Rangers in peace. A distinguishing arm band should be devised, bearing a suitable badge, for issue to each serving Ranger.

12. **Accounting**

Such stores and equipment as may be issued permanently or temporarily to Ranger units will be accounted for under Command arrangements.

13. **Financial**

(a) Normal service in the Canadian Rangers will be unpaid.

(b) Rangers formally participating in manoeuvres with the Active or Reserve Force will be paid on the same scale as the Reserve Force.

(c) Individuals attending authorized courses at schools of instruction will be paid on the same scale as the Reserve Force.

(d) Reimbursement will be made to unit commanders for necessary out-of-pocket expenses incurred in administration and training. (An alternative is an annual grant to Command Headquarters, to be accounted for at the end of each fiscal year.)
Doc. 5: P.C. 1644, 23 May 1947

P.C. 1644

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report dated 22nd April, 1947, from the Minister of National Defence, stating as follows:

(a) War experience has proven the necessity of providing a military organization to assist in coast watching, internal security, reporting the presence of agents or other hostile activities, guiding, the safeguarding of vulnerable points and other similar aspects of home security.

(b) These duties are a military responsibility which cannot conveniently or economically be performed by the Active and Reserve Forces, whose function it is to train, during peacetime, for military duties other than of a local nature.

(c) A potential source of men for the duties defined in sub-para (a) exists in that part of the population living in the more sparsely settled coastal and northern areas. It is desirable that this element of the population, who are by their circumstances precluded from service in the Reserve Force and Supplementary Reserve, should be given this opportunity of national service. A desire so to serve has been made evident from communications received by the Department of National Defence from many sources.

(d) It is essential to ensure that personnel who would be required to undertake these military duties in an emergency should be organized and trained for those duties during peacetime.

(e) The Reserve Militia is an authorized element of the Army within which the required organization can be developed and for which separate regulations have been approved by Your Excellency in Council which suitably provided for the organization, command and administration of those who would be engaged in the duties detailed in sub-para (a).

(f) It is consequently intended to organize the Canadian Rangers as a Corps of the Reserve Militia for the purpose of performing military duties of a nature similar to those detailed in sub-para (a).

(g) There are no financial implications.
The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence submit for Your Excellency’s approval the order attached hereto as Appendix “A”.

Approved
DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL
MAY 23 1947

APPENDIX “A”
(Referred to in paragraph 2 of submission to Council, dated 1st April, 1947.

- Order –

Pursuant to the provisions of the Militia Act, His Excellent, The Governor-in-Council authorizes the formation of the Canadian Rangers to be a corps of the Reserve Militia not exceeding in total numbers 5,000 officers and soldiers. The organization, composition and duties of the Canadian Rangers shall be as may be laid down from time to time by the Minister.

(Effective date of approval)

CONFIDENTIAL
HQC 604-18 (DMO & P)

CANADIAN ARMY POLICY STATEMENT NO. 26 (DMO & P)
CANADIAN RANGERS
OTTAWA, 12 AUG 47.

GENERAL

1. As notified in Supplements to Canadian Army Orders No 110-5 dated 9 Jun 47, the formation of a new corps to be known as the “Canadian Rangers” has been authorized within the Reserve Militia element of the Canadian Army.

2. The purpose of this General Staff Policy Statement is to set forth the role, organization and instructions concerning the formation of the Canadian Rangers.

3. Officers Commanding the Commands now are authorized to proceed with formation of Ranger units as set out hereunder.

PURPOSE OF THE CORPS

4. The Canadian Rangers will provide a military force to perform the military duties defined in para 5 below, which cannot be conveniently or economically performed by other elements or the Canadian Army. In general, these duties will be restricted to the area within which each company will operate.

ROLE

5. The role of the Canadian Rangers will be as follows:

(a) Provision of guides to organized troops within own area.

(b) Coast watching.

(c) Assistance to the RCMP and/or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs. The reporting of other suspicious activities.

(d) Immediate local defence against sabotage by small enemy detachments or saboteurs and to assist and augment civilian protective arrangements against saboteurs within the area in which the organization is authorized to operate.

(e) Reporting, locating and rescue work including first aid treatment in connection with aircraft in distress.
In Peace
   (a) Provision of guides to troops on exercises, when required.
   (b) The preparation of local defence schemes referred to in para 5(d) above.
   (c) Collection of detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance to them in carrying out their roles in war and the documenting of such information with any necessary sketches.
   (d) Provision of rescue parties for civilian or military purposes, where required.

LOCATION OF UNITS

6. The Corps provides against a military requirement only in the sparsely settled northern and coastal areas; consequently, units will be located only in the sparsely populated coastal areas and in the area to the north of the main belt of population across Canada. Units of the Canadian Rangers will NOT be located in localities in which Reserve Force units exist or are contemplated.

7. The initial organization of the Canadian Rangers will proceed in localities indicated on the map attached as Appendix “A”. At the discretion of the General Officers Commanding Eastern and Western Commands, approval may be given to the location of units in the coasts in a coast watching role, outside those included in the corps areas shown in Appendix “A”, but care will be taken that any special arrangements do not in any way interfere with or binder the activities and development of Reserve Force units.

STRENGTH

8. The overall strength of the Canadian Rangers is limited by law to 5,000 all ranks. The maximum strength authorized for each command is as follows:-

   Eastern Command  550
   Quebec Command  550
   Central Command  300
   Prairie Command  1000
   Western Command  2600

MILITARY STATUS

9. The Canadian Rangers will have military status within the Canadian Army consistent with and within the limits of the regulations detailed in KR(Can) 1059 Appendix X, copy of which is attached as Appendix “B”. All ranks of the Canadian Rangers are to be made familiar with the provisions of that Appendix.
ORGANIZATION

10. It is impossible to create a standard establishment for Ranger units because of variations in roles, locations, and terrain. The following organization will be adopted as a general guide:

(a) The largest Ranger unit will be the Ranger Company commanded by a Reserve Militia Captain, and will comprise a headquarters and not more than five platoons.

(b) Each Ranger Platoon will consist of not more than thirty all ranks commanded by a Reserve Militia Lieutenant and will be sub-divided into sections, each section being commanded by a Sergeant.

11. The organization of the Canadian Rangers will proceed in four phases, as follows:

   Phase I
   The selection of company and platoon areas.

   Phase II
   Proposals to Army Headquarters by the Officer Commanding the Command concerned, detailing:
   (i) The number of companies to be formed
   (ii) The designation of each company (para 14 refers)
   (iii) The localization of headquarters of each company and platoon.

   Phase III
   Following notification by Army Headquarters of the approval for the formation of the respective companies; company, platoon and section commanders will be selected. Recommendations for the appointment of officers will proceed in the manner applying to the appointment of officers for other elements of the Canadian Army.

   Phase IV
   Following the appointment of company and platoon commanders the strength of units will be completed by local recruitment up to the total numbers (including all ranks) authorized for each command as in para 8 above.

12. Complete instructions concerning appointment of officers, attestation and documentation of all ranks are being issued separately.

13. Companies of the Canadian Rangers will NOT be formed without the authorization of The Minister of National Defence.
UNIT DESIGNATION

14. Companies will be designated numerically on a national basis. Platoons will be designated numerically within each company. Localities will not be included in company or platoon designations.

COMMAND

15. Units of the Canadian Rangers will be under the command of the Officer Commanding the Command and staff and command responsibilities will be exercised through the normal command Channels of the Canadian Army.

As amended by amendment No 2
d/3 Feb 49.

16. Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs will exercise command in accordance with “Regulations for the Reserve Militia” at Appendix “B”.

TRAINING

17. Rangers will NOT be trained in or expected to perform close order or arms drill. Commanders of Canadian Rangers units and sub-units will be responsible for the training of their commands, which will be based upon broad direction to be issued by Commands. These directions will be consistent with the roles of the units and will be varied as necessary to suit the climatic conditions and terrain within which each unit or sub-unit is to operate.

PERSONNEL

18. Great care is to be exercised by all concerned in the selection of leaders. Men who are well established and permanently located in the area in which the unit operates should be encouraged to assume leadership of the companies, platoons, and wherever possible of the sections. The officers and NCOs selected to command will be instructed to recruit only the most suitable and desirable personnel from their areas. Security inquiries into the background of leaders and potential leaders will be arranged through intelligence channels. Commands will forward such background material as is necessary for such inquiries at AHQ attention DMI.

19. Personnel should be drawn mainly from those who for reasons of age, category or other conditions would not be available on mobilization for active service in other elements of the Canadian Army. However, there will be no objection to the recruitment during peace of personnel who would be expected to depart for service elsewhere with a mobilizing unit, except that no substantial portion of any unit will comprise personnel in this category. The larger
proportion of the strength will comprise personnel who will be expected to remain in the unit area during peace and war.

20. No definite limitations are made in respect of the standard of age and physical fitness of officers and other ranks in the Canadian Rangers. The standards will be those judged by the Officer Commanding the Command as suitable for the performance of the task of the unit.

CLOTHING

21. Clothing will NOT be issued to the Rangers during peace. However, a distinguishing arm-band will be devised and notified by Army Headquarters for the Canadian Rangers, bearing a suitable badge, for issue to each serving Ranger.

As amended by Amendment No 1
d/29 Aug 47.

EQUIPMENT

22. As the roles of the Canadian Rangers in peace and in war are so closely allied to their civilian pursuits, equipment requirements will be limited. Each Command Reserve Force training weapon pool will be increased to permit the individual issue of one Rifle .303-in No. 4 Mk 1, with bayonet, to each Ranger and an annual training allotment of 100 cartridges SA .305-in Ball Mk 7 per Ranger is authorized. No other equipment will be provided except on loan from within normal Command resources. All equipment will be accounted for under Command arrangements.

FINANCIAL

23. Service in the Canadian Rangers will be unpaid except as detailed in “Regulations for the Reserve Militia” attached as Appendix “B” in which case they will receive payment and reimbursement from the Reserve Force vote.

24. Expenditures from Reserve Force votes for training of Canadian Rangers will NOT be incurred without the prior approval of the Director of Military Training at Army Headquarters.

(Sgd)(W.J. Megill)
Brigadier,
for Chief of the General Staff.

JGS/4972

…
Appendix 10

Delete all detail
and
Substitute the following
“Regulations for the Reserve Militia”

1. Staff and Command responsibilities in respect of the Reserve Militia will be exercised through the normal channels of Military Command applicable to the Canadian Army.

2. Appointment or enlistment into the Reserve Militia will be from those ceasing to serve in the Active Force. The Reserve Force or Supplementary Reserve or from civilian sources; and such appointments and enlistments will be for the same periods of service as are applicable to the Reserve Force, except that resignation of commission or discharges will be as hereinafter detailed. The age limits and physical standards applying to the Reserve Militia will be such as may be laid down from time to time by the Minister.

3. Officers of the Reserve Militia will be commissioned in, and soldiers enlisted into, the Canadian Army, Reserve Militia.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 below, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia will have military status corresponding with, but within each rank, junior to, officers and soldiers of equivalent rank in the other components of the Army.

5. Officers Warrant Officers, and non-commissioned officers of the Reserve Militia will exercise command, in accordance with their respective ranks, over officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia only, except when, having been called out for service or placed on Active Service the exercise of command over officers and soldiers of any other element of the Canadian Army similarly on service or Active Service may be specifically ordered by the General Officer or Brigadier Commanding in the Command.

6. In time of emergency, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia will be liable to be called out for service or placed in Active Service.

7. The Minister may authorize the provision of such arms ammunition, cloths and other equipment to the Reserve Militia as may be required for training or other purposes.

8. (a) Except as provided by sub-para (b) of this section, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia will not be entitled to pay, transportation or other allowances except when called out for service or. placed on Active Service,
(b) Drill and training of the Reserve Militia will be without expense to the public except that:

(i) The Minister may authorize attendance at courses and schools of instruction and, when so authorized, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia attending schools and courses of instruction may, when so doing, be paid pay and allowances, including travelling allowances for their rank at the rates then applicable to comparative officers and soldiers of the Reserve Force.

(ii) Reimbursement may be made to Commanding Officers of units of the Reserve Militia for expenses incurred in connection with training when such expenses have been previously authorized by the Minister.

9. Except when called out for service or placed on Active Service -

(a) An officer of the Reserve Militia may resign his commission at any time.

(b) A soldier may claim his discharge after thirty days notice in writing to his commanding Officer.

10. Regulations applicable to the Reserve Force in respect of the wearing of uniform by commissioned officers will apply to the Reserve Militia. Other ranks may wear the uniform of their Corps when on duty and at such other times as may be authorized by the Officer Commanding the unit concerned.

11. The oath as prescribed in Section 21 of the Militia Act shall be subscribed and taken by every officer and man of the Reserve Militia.

(HQ 22-1-13, FD 1(DSD))

(General Order) (PC 60/1787 of 7 May 47)
Doc. 7: Western Command, Canadian Rangers Instruction No. 2, 12 May 1952 and amendment, 15 October 1952

RESTRICTED
WC 2001-1999/0 (Int)
12 May 52

WESTERN COMMAND

CANADIAN RANGERS INSTRUCTION NO. 2

(This Instruction cancels Canadian Rangers Instruction No. 1)

OBJECT

1 The object of this Instruction is to provide a guide for Company and Platoon officers concerning the role, organization, administration and equipment, etc., of the Canadian Ranger Companies in Western Command.

…

(C VOKES)
Major-General
GOC Western Command

… DISTRIBUTION:
No. 1 Coy, Canadian Rangers, MAYO, YT
No. 2 Coy, Canadian Rangers, WHITEHORSE, YT
No. 7 Coy, Canadian Rangers, YELLOWKNIFE, YT
No. 8 Coy, Canadian Rangers, Fort SMITH, NWT
No. 15 Coy, Canadian Rangers, Fort ST. JOHN, BC
No. 20 Coy, Canadian Rangers – AKLAVIK, NWT
No. 21 Coy, Canadian Rangers – NORMAN WELLS, NWT
No. 37 Coy, Canadian Rangers – DAWSON CREEK, BC
HQ NWT & Y RC Sigs
RCAF Tac Air Gp (for info)
DMO & P (for info)
HQ BC Area
HQ NWHS
All Heads Branches and Services
Camp
CANADIAN RANGERS INSTRUCTION NO. 2
SECTION 1
Based on CAPS No. 86 (DMO & P))

PURPOSE
1  The Canadian Rangers will provide a military force to perform duties as described below, which cannot be conveniently or economically performed by other elements of the Canadian Army. In general, these duties will be restricted to the home locality within which each Company is organized.

STATUS
2  The Canadian Rangers will have military status within the Canadian Army consistent with and within the limits of regulations detailed in QR (ARMY) paras 2.03 (6) and (7) and 3.295.

“The Reserve Militia shall consist of officers and men who volunteer to hold themselves in readiness for service in the event of an emergency but are not required to undergo annual training. Former officers and men of the Canadian Army and civilians may be enrolled in the Reserve Militia”.

“The Governor in Council when acting in pursuance of the powers vested in him by The National Defence Act has power to place any officer or man of the Reserves on active service”.

“No officer or man of the Reserve Militia shall have power of command over officers and men of a component other than the Reserve Militia except when:

(a) he is called out for service or place on active service; and

(b) the officer commanding the command so directs”.

ROLE
3  The role of the Canadian Rangers will be as follows:

(a) In War
   (i)  To report to the appropriate army Command Headquarters any suspicious activities occurring in their Ranger areas.
   (ii) Provision of guides to organized troops within own area.
   (iii) To assist in immediate local defence against sabotage by small enemy detachments or saboteurs and to assist and augment civilian
protective arrangements against saboteurs. This does not include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence.

(iv) Observer Corps duties within their own localities as required to supplement the RCAF Ground Observer Corps.

(v) Coast watching.

(vi) Reporting, locating and rescue work, including first aid treatment in connection with aircraft in distress.

(vii) Assistance to the RCM Police and/or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs when requested by RCM Police, or by reporting information as citizens in the normal manner.

(b) In Peace

(i) Provision of guides to troops on exercises, when required.

(ii) Collection of detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance to them in carrying out their roles in war or of value to Canadian Intelligence organizations, and the documenting of such information with any necessary sketches.

(iii) Provision of rescue parties for civilian or military purposes, where required.

COMMAND

4 Units of the Canadian Rangers in Western Command are under the command of Headquarters Western Command, EDMONTON, Alberta. Staff and command responsibilities will be exercised through normal channels, i.e., Platoon to Company – Company to Command or Area Headquarters. Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs will exercise command in accordance with QR (ARMY) para 3.295.

“No officer or man of the Reserve Militia shall have power of command over officers and men of a component other than the Reserve Militia except when:

(a) he is called out for service or placed on active service; and

(b) the officer commanding the command so directs”.

ORGANIZATION

5 (a) It is impossible to create a standard establishment for Ranger units because of variations in roles, locations and terrain. The following organization will be adopted as a general guide:
(i) The largest Ranger unit will be the Ranger Company commanded by a Reserve Militia Captain, and will comprise a headquarters and a number of platoons.

(ii) Each Ranger platoon will be commanded by a Reserve Militia Lieutenant and may be sub-divided into sections, each section being commanded by a Sergeant.

(b) It is emphasized that Ranger roles will normally be carried out by individuals and that company and platoon organization is required only for control, and collection and dissemination of information.

TRAINING

6 Rangers will NOT be trained in or expected to perform close order or arms drill. Training policy will be laid down by Headquarters Western Command and will be varied, as necessary, to suit the climatic conditions and terrain within which each unit or sub-unit is to operate.

SECTION 2

REGULATIONS FOR THE RESERVE MILITIA

1 Staff and Command responsibilities in respect of the Reserve Militia will be exercised through the normal channels of Military Command applicable to the Canadian Army.

2 Appointment or enlistment into the Reserve Militia will be from those ceasing to serve in the Active Force, the Reserve Force or Supplementary Reserve, or from civilian sources; and such appointments and enlistments will be for the same periods of service as are applicable to the Reserve Force, except that resignation of commission or discharges will be as hereinafter detailed. The age limits and physical standards applying to the Reserve Militia will be such as may be laid down from time to time by the Minister.

3 Officers of the Reserve Militia will be commissioned in, and soldiers enlisted into, the Canadian Army, Reserve Militia.

4 Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 below, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia will have military status corresponding with, but within each rank, junior to, officers and soldiers of equivalent rank in the other components of the Army.

5 Officers, Warrant Officers, and non-commissioned officers of the Reserve Militia will exercise command, in accordance with their respective ranks, over officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia only, except when, having been called out for service or placed on Active Service the exercise of command over officers
and soldiers of any other element of the Canadian Army similarly on service or Active Service may be specifically ordered by the General Officer or Brigadier Commanding in the Command.

6 In time of emergency, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia will be liable to be called out for service or placed on Active Service.

7 The Minister may authorize the provision of such arms, ammunition, clothing and other equipment to the Reserve Militia as may be required for training or other purposes.

8 (a) Except as provided by sub-para (b) and (c) of this section, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia will not be entitled to pay, transportation or other allowances except when called out for service or placed on Active Service, when they will receive pay and allowances for their rank at rates then applicable to the Reserve Force.

(b) Drill and training of the Reserve Militia will be without expense to the public except that:

(i) The Minister may authorize attendance at courses and schools of instruction and, when so authorized, officers and soldiers of the Reserve Militia attending schools and courses of instruction may, when so doing, be paid pay and allowances, including travelling allowances for their rank at the rates then applicable to comparative officers and soldiers of the Reserve Force.

(ii) Reimbursement may be made to Commanding Officers of units of the Reserve Militia for expenses incurred in connection with training when such expenses have been previously authorized by the Minister.

(c) (i) Officers and men of the Canadian Rangers who suffer from an injury, disease or illness attributable to the performance of duty shall be entitled to medical care and pay and allowances in accordance with the provisions of QR (ARMY) 34.07, 34.08 and 210.72. …

(ii) All cases of injury, illness, or disease suffered by members of the Canadian Rangers whilst on duty will be immediately reported by fastest means to Headquarters Western Command, or Headquarters BC Area, as applicable.

9 Except when called out for service or placed on Active Service:

(a) An offer of the Reserve Militia may resign his commission at any time.
(b) A soldier may claim his discharge after thirty days notice in writing to his Commanding Officer.

10 Regulations applicable to the Reserve Force in respect of the wearing of uniform by commissioned officers will apply to the Reserve Militia. Other ranks may wear the uniform of their Corps when on duty and at such other times as may be authorized by the Officer Commanding the unit concerned.

11 The following oath shall be subscribed and taken by every officer and man of the Reserve Militia:

“I.....................(full name), do swear (or in the case of a declaration, “solemnly declare”) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Her heirs to and successors according to law. So Help me God.”

ENLISTMENT

12 (a) OFFICERS

(i) CAFB 287 will be prepared in quadruplicate, Confidential Information Relating to Government Employment in single copy, and all copies forwarded to appropriate Headquarters. (see para 14).

(ii) When approval of the above has been notified, Officers Declaration Form (HFE) 235F (Eng) will be completed in duplicate, the original being forwarded to appropriate Headquarters, the duplicate being retained by the Rangers Company Headquarters.

(b) OTHER RANKS

(i) Other Ranks will be attested on CAFB 235 (Canadian Armed Forces Engagement, Attestation and Re-engagement Form), in duplicate. The original will be forwarded to appropriate Headquarters, the duplicate. The original will be forwarded to appropriate Headquarters, the duplicate being retained by Rangers Company Headquarters.

MEDICAL STANDARDS

13 (a) No definite limitations are made in respect of the standard of age and physical fitness of officers and Other Ranks in the Canadian Rangers. The standards will be those judged by the respective Rangers Company Commanders as suitable for the performance of the task of the unit.
(b) Medical attention will be provided only when Ranger personnel are called out for Service. (see para 8(c)).

ADMINISTRATION (HQ RESPONSIBLE)

14  (a) Canadian Rangers Companies will be administered by the following Headquarters:

(i) HQ BC Area, VANCOUVER, for Companies in British Columbia, except No. 37 Company.

(ii) HQ Western Command, EDMONTON, for all remaining Companies in the Command.

(b) All correspondence and documentation will be conducted through these Headquarters, as appropriate.

DOCUMENTATION

15 (a) Part II orders will be published by Western Command or BC Area Records Officer, based on information forwarded by Rangers Company Headquarters. This information will include particulars of appointments, enlistment, promotions, retirements and discharges.

(b) Samples of all forms referred to hereunder are attached. It will be noted that the words “Canadian Rangers” are to be inserted on all forms above the printed words in the heading.

DISCHARGE

16  (a) OFFICER (Section 2, para 9(a)

Four copies of CAFB 287 will be completed, indicating the officer’s intention to resign. Part II Orders will be published by Western Command or BC Area Records Officer authorizing the retirement.

(b) OTHER RANKS (Section 2 para 9(b)

Other ranks may be permitted to retire on application to their respective Company Commander. Names of Other Ranks who have retired and date of retirement will be forwarded to Headquarters Western Command or HQ BC area as applicable. Part II Orders will be published to show effective date of release.

DRESS

17 Canadian Rangers are authorized to wear the official Ranger arm band when on duty or called out for Service.

SECTION 3
EQUIPMENT – GENERAL

1 As the role of the Canadian Rangers in peace and in war are so closely allied to their civilian pursuits, equipment requirements will be limited. A list of equipment authorized for issue to individual Ranger personnel is shown at para 6.

METHOD OF ISSUE

2 (a) British Columbia

Ranger Companies or Platoons located in British Columbia will submit their demands to Camp Commandant, Headquarters BC Area, VANCOUVER, giving detailed shipping addresses and equipment required in accordance with the number of personnel actually taken on strength in Part II Orders.

(b) Yukon Territory

Officer Commanding, 14 Company, RCOC, WHITEHORSE, will be responsible for issue of authorized equipment to No. 1, 2, 15, and 37 Rangers Companies.

(c) North West Territories

Rangers Companies or Platoons located in the North West Territories will submit demands to Headquarters Western Command, EDMONTON, giving detailed shipping addresses and equipment required in accordance with number of personnel actually taken on strength in Part II Orders.

RECEIPTS

3 (a) Each member of the Canadian Rangers will acknowledge receipt of equipment issued, in duplicate, on a pro-forma as shown at Appendix “A”. One copy will be retained by the individual, the other by the Ranger Company Commander.

(b) Receipt of stores issued by Ordnance, whether to Ranger Companies, Platoons, or individuals, will be acknowledged by endorsing packing notes “Stores received in good order”. Receipted packing notes will be returned to the authorities referred to in para 2(a), (b) and (c) above.

AMMUNITION

4 Annual allocation of ammunition will be issued automatically through respective issuing authority based on the strength of the Rangers Company as at 31 December.
RETURN OF EQUIPMENT

5 Should the services of an individual Ranger be terminated, equipment issued will be returned to Company or Platoon Command and receipt, as shown at Appendix “A” hereto will be given by the latter. In the event of another individual assuming duties as Canadian Ranger to replace the one whose services have been terminated, equipment may be handed over to such individual and receipt obtained.

EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZED FOR ISSUE

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<tr>
<td>0002) Rifles No. 4 Mk 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>0003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 6260 Bayonets, No. 4 Mk 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA 6320 Bottles, Oil Mk 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA 0571 Covers, Breech, Rifle No. 2 Pullthroughs</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA 0518 Single Mk 4 B</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA 0521 Gauze</td>
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<td>BA 8354 Scabbards, Bayonet, No. 4 Mk 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA 1657 Slings, Rifle, Web</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA 0174 Cartridges, SA .303 in Ball, Mk 7</td>
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<td>1A 2500 Belts, Waist, WE Patt 37</td>
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<tr>
<td>1A 15280) or 15290) Frogs, Web Bayonet, No. 4 Mk 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1A 6450 Carriers, Cartridge, WE Patt 37</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 4

COMMUNICATIONS

1 (a) PEACE TIME

Ranger personnel are authorized to make use of existing Canadian Army signals systems in the Command, including the North West Territory and Yukon Radio System, where such is necessary in the course of their duty.

(b) WAR TIME

In the event of an emergency any method of communication immediately available may be used.
SECTION 5

REIMBURSEMENT OF TRAVELLING EXPENSES

1  Army Headquarters have granted authority for Ranger Officers in Western Command to claim costs of travel incurred on organizational tours. Authority HQC 2001-1999/0 TD 6 dated 25 Jun 52.

2  The funds for this travel are limited to approximately $100.00 per Company per year.

3  Col GS is the authorizing officer. Officers Commanding Ranger Companies wishing to make a liaison tour will wire or write to Headquarters Western Command requesting authority to make a liaison VISIT. They will state:

   (a) Purpose of VISIT.
   (b) Place to be visited and names of Rangers to be contacted.
   (c) Method of travel.
   (d) Approximate cost (which will NOT exceed $50.00 for any one liaison trip).

4  Once authority has been granted for the trip, CAFD 811 (Travel Claim) will be forwarded to be completed by the liaison officer making the trip. On completion the claim will be returned to this Headquarters for payment.

5  The visits should be for the purpose of obtaining recruits, delivery of training material, weapons and ammunition, and liaison with Ranger Platoon Commanders, or for special tasks assigned by Headquarters Western Command.

6  As a guide to making out CAFD 811 Travelling Expense Claims, applicable sections of Queen’s Regulations (ARMY) 209 and Canadian Army Order 273-1 are attached. Sections dealing with allowances for periods of more or less than 24 hours, gratuities, taxi fares and meals should be particularly noted.

7  Government quarters and rations should be used on authorized travel when possible.

8  Upon completion of a trip the CAFD 811 will be forwarded to HQ Western Command. It should be signed by the claimant. A complete statement of expenses should be attached and this Headquarters will arrange to complete the CAFD 811 for the claimant within his entitlement.
CANADIAN RANGERS INSTRUCTION NO. 2
Amendment No. 1
The following amendment will be made to Canadian Rangers Instruction No. 2 issued under WC 2001-1999/0 (Int) dated 12 May 52.

Section 2 para 16 (a)
Delete para 16 (a)
Substitute the following:
“Officers seeking release from the Canadian Militia Rangers will forward to Headquarters Western Command a letter requesting their release and stating the reasons why release is required.”
On publication of the Release in Western Command Part II Orders, action will be taken by Command Records Officer to effect the officer’s release.

Insert new SECTION 5 (attached) Canadian Rangers – Reimbursement of Travelling Expenses.

… It is noted that the Regulations are designed for use where regular means of transportation exist and do NOT cover dog teams, etc. Para 3 of the Instruction is particularly drawn to your attention in that authority must be granted by this Headquarters prior to a journey under these Regulations being made.

(C VOKES)
Major-General
GOC Western Command
GENERAL INFORMATION

1 The two main parts of the Canadian Army consist of the Active Force, which is the Regular Army, and the Reserve Force, which is composed of citizens who devote part of their time to Military training and are available to help the Active Force in times of emergency.

2 In a sparsely settled country such as Canada there are vast areas where the population is so thinly distributed that it is not possible to raise units of the Reserve Force although some form of military organization is definitely needed. This is especially true in the North of Canada.

3 To meet this requirement a third part of the Canadian Army, the Canadian Rangers Reserve Militia, has been organized and it is the purpose of this paper to describe it and define it’s [sic] duties.

OBJECT OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

4 The duties of the Canadian Rangers are as follows:

   IN WAR
   (a) To report any suspicious activities occurring in their Ranger Areas.
   (b) The provision of guides to organized troops within their own area.
   (c) To assist in immediate local defence against sabotage by small enemy detachments and to assist civilian protective arrangements against saboteurs. This does NOT include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence.
   (d) Observer Corps duties within their own localities as required to supplement the RCAF Ground Observer Corps.
   (e) Coast Watching.
   (f) Reporting, locating and rescue work, including first aid treatment in connection with aircraft in distress.
   (g) Assistance to the RCMP or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs.
IN PEACE
(a) Provision of guides to troops on exercises, when required.
(b) Collection of detained information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance to them in carrying out their duties in time of war or of value to Service Intelligence organizations, and the documenting of such information.
(c) Provision of rescue parties for civilian or Military purposes where required.

5 ORGANIZATION
(a) The largest Ranger unit is the Ranger COMPANY which is Commanded by a Reserve Militia Captain.
(b) Each Company is made up of a number of PLATOONS.
(c) Each Ranger Platoon is commanded by a Reserve Militia Lieutenant and may be sub-divided into SECTIONS.
(d) Each Ranger SECTION is commanded by a Sergeant.

6 Units of the Rangers will be under the command of the Officer Commanding the Command in which they are situated.

7 Rangers will NOT be required to be trained in marching and rifle drill.

PERSONNEL

8 Great care is to be exercised by all concerned in the selection of leaders. Men who are well established and permanently located in the area in which the unit operates should be asked to assume the leadership of Companies, Platoons and, wherever possible, of Sections.

The officers and NCOs selected to command should recruit only the most suitable and desirable personnel from their areas. Security inquiries into the background of leaders will be arranged through Intelligence channels.

9 Recruits should be drawn mainly from those who, for reason of age or other conditions, would not be available on mobilization for active service in the Canadian Army.

However, there is no objection in times of peace to recruiting men who might be expected to be called up in time of war, provided that the larger proportion of the unit consists of men who will probably remain in the unit area during in peace and war.

10 No definite limitations are made in respect of the standard of age and physical fitness of officers and other ranks in the Canadian Rangers. The standards will be
those judged by the Officer Commanding the Command as suitable for the performance of the task of the unit.

11 Clothing will NOT be issued to the Rangers in peace-time. However, a distinguishing arm-band will be issued to each serving Ranger.

EQUIPMENT

12 Each Ranger will be issued with a rifle and an annual training allotment of 100 rounds of ammunition.

FINANCIAL

13 Service in the Canadian Rangers will be UNPAID except that if Rangers are officially “called-out” to undertake some particular service they are entitled to the pay and allowances of whatever rank they hold for the duration of the call-out.

LIAISON

14 From time to time Ranger Company and Platoon Commanders will be visited by a staff officer appointed for that purpose and given such advice and assistance as they may require. Every effort will be made to maintain contact between this Headquarters and the Ranger Companies and Platoons.

CONCLUSION

15 In view of the present dangerous state of world affairs, the valuable nature of the work undertaken by the Rangers needs no stressing.

HALIFAX, NS
15 May 52
Aim
1. To set forth the policy governing the Canadian Rangers.

Purpose
2. The Canadian Rangers will provide a military force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Army.

Role
3. The role of the Canadian Rangers will be as follows:
   (a) to report to the appropriate army headquarters any suspicious activities occurring in their respective areas;
   (b) provision of guides to organized troops within the area assigned to the unit;
   (c) to assist in immediate local defence against sabotage by small enemy detachments or saboteurs. This does not include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence;
   (d) air observation duties within their own localities, as required to supplement the RCAF Ground Observer Corps;
   (e) coast watching;
   (f) reporting, locating, and rescue work in connection with distressed aircraft and the provision of rescue parties for civilian or military purposes, where required;
   (g) assistance to the RCMP and/or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting, and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;
   (h) collection of detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance to them in carrying out their role or of value to the armed forces.
Strength

4. The maximum strength of the Canadian Rangers is limited to 5,000 all ranks. The maximum strength authorized for each command is:

- Eastern Command.........................................................850
- Quebec Command.........................................................550
- Central Command.........................................................300
- Prairie Command.........................................................700
- Western Command.......................................................2,600

Military Status

5. The Canadian Rangers will have military status within the Canadian Army consistent with and within the limits of regulations detailed in QR (Army) 2.03 (6) and (7) and 3.295.

Organization

6. The Ranger organization is divided into companies, each with a headquarters and a number of platoons. The company commander will be a Reserve Militia captain, and platoon commanders will be Reserve Militia lieutenants. Platoons may be sub-divided into sections and will be commanded by sergeants.

7. It is emphasized that action required in accordance with the role of the Canadian Rangers will normally be carried out by individuals. Company and platoon organization, therefore, is required mainly for control, administration, and the collection and dissemination of information.

Unit Designation

8. Companies will be designated numerically on a national basis. Platoons will be designated numerically within each company. Localities will not be included in company or platoon designations.

Command

9. Units of the Canadian Rangers will be under command of the officer commanding the command or area in which the unit is located, unless otherwise authorized by AHQ.

10. Officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers will exercise command in accordance with QR (Army) 3.295.

Training

11. Commanders of Ranger units and sub-units will be responsible for the training of their commands, which will be based upon broad direction issued by
command headquarters. These directions will be consistent with the role of the Rangers.

**Personnel**

12. Personnel should be restricted mainly to those who for reasons of age, category or other reasons would not be available on mobilization for active service in other components of the Canadian Army. The standards of selection of personnel will be those judged by the officer commanding the command as suitable for the performance of Ranger tasks.

**Arms and Equipment**

13. The entitlement of arms and equipment together with the accounting and repair procedures is detailed in CAO 6-9.

**Financial**

14. Service in the Canadian Rangers will be unpaid except as detailed in QR (Army) 2.03 (7) in which case payments will be charged against the Reserve Force vote.

15. Expenditure from Reserve Force votes for training of Canadian Rangers will not be incurred without the prior approval of the Director General of Military Training at AHQ.

Date of Issue: 17 Feb 54

(HQC 2001-1999/0 TD 21) (DMO&P)

Distribution...

** ISSUES TO CANADIAN RANGERS **

1. The following may be issued to Canadian Rangers:

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<tr>
<th>Cat No</th>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Issue Per Man</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B/BA 10050</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk 1—with bantam butt, or</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/CR 27GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk 1—with long butt, or</td>
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<tr>
<td>1B/AA 0571</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pullthrough:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1B/BA 0518</td>
<td>Single, Mk 4 B</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/BB 0521</td>
<td>Gauze, wire</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Issue of Stores

2. Ordnance depots will:

   (a) voucher stores to the applicable command or area composite stores QM account;

   (b) ship stores direct to HQ Ranger units; and

   (c) forward ordnance depot copy of the Issue Voucher to composite QM stores.

3. Command or area composite stores QM account will maintain the records for stores issued to the Ranger units.

4. On receipt of stores, the commanding officer of the Ranger unit will:

   (a) issue the stores and obtain a receipt from each individual concerned;

   (b) forward the packing note copy of the Ordnance Issue Voucher to the composite QM stores with the following certificate shown thereon: “Certified that the stores listed on this voucher have been received in good order.”.

5. On receipt of the certified packing note, the composite QM stores will:

   (a) sign the applicable ordnance depot copy and return it to the ordnance depot responsible for the inspection of the composite stores;

   (b) show on distribution the stores issued to the applicable Ranger unit.

Verification of Stores on Distribution

6. Every six months, where possible, but not less than once a year, the quartermaster of the command or area composite stores will request verification from the Ranger unit that the stores shown on distribution are still being held.

Ammunition

7. Ammunition entitlements for Ranger units will be calculated by command headquarters, based on the latest strength return received from each Ranger unit.
The quantity of ammunition authorized in paragraph 1 will be issued on the basis of:

(a) 100 rounds per man per annum for training and operations;

(b) 200 rounds per man per annum for annual classification shoot. Such ammunition will only be issued where the annual classification shoot can be carried out on existing range facilities under command supervision. Command headquarters will advise the applicable composite stores of the quantity of ammunition to be issued.

8. The composite stores will indent on the applicable ordnance ammunition depot and will show on the indent where the ammunition is to be shipped. The ammunition will be vouchered to the composite stores. (It will not be necessary for Ranger units to return fired cartridge cases.)

**Repair and Inspection of Equipment by RCEME**

9. Periodic inspection will be carried out by RCEME inspection teams on equipment which can be concentrated at a central point for inspection. However, it will not be possible to inspect individual rifles at remote localities.

10. Equipment requiring repairs in RCEME workshops, will be returned to the headquarters composite stores by the Ranger unit. Headquarters composite stores will prepare a Request for Repair Services (CAFC 2149) and forward the equipment to the RCEME workshop.

**Loss and Damage**

11. In the event of loss, damage or theft of stores while on distribution to Canadian Rangers, the officer commanding the command will convene a Board of Inquiry in accordance with the provisions of QR (Army) 21.71. In the case of firearms, the loss will be reported immediately to the nearest RCMP detachment by the commanding officer of the Ranger unit in accordance with CAO 166-2. Every reasonable attempt will be made to recover the stores and to protect the interests of the Crown against theft and carelessness. However, if the stores cannot be recovered, the officer commanding the command, in dealing with the deficiency under the provisions of QR (Army), will take cognizance of the adverse conditions under which Rangers operate.

12. Supersedes CAO 6-9, issued 2 Feb 53.

Date of Issue: 1 Nov 54

(HQC 6001-1999/0) (DOS)

CANADIAN RANGERS

Aim
1. This order sets forth the policy governing the Canadian Rangers.

Role
2. The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Army.

Basic Concept
3. Basically it is intended that the Canadian Rangers will function as individuals as opposed to formed bodies and that they will perform their approved tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations. Such tasks, other than in times of emergency, where emergency is defined as war, invasion, riot or insurrection, real or apprehended, will be performed on an entirely voluntary basis and without pay.

Military Status
4. The Canadian Rangers is a corps of the Reserve Militia. Members of the Canadian Rangers have, therefore, military status consistent with QR(Army) 2.03(7), (8) and (9) and 3.295. Thus they are:

   (a) liable to serve only in an emergency;

   (b) not required to undergo annual training;

   (c) liable for service when placed on active service by the Governor in Council.

5. Notwithstanding the above, Canadian Rangers may volunteer to perform tasks as set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 in peacetime, other than in times of emergency. They may also, in accordance with the terms of QR (Army) 2.03(9), be employed with the Regular Army.

Normal Tasks
6. The normal tasks of the Canadian Rangers, which are to be performed under ordinary as well as emergency conditions, are:
(a) to report any suspicious activities occurring in their respective areas, to the appropriate army headquarters by the best means available;
(b) to provide guides to army units operating within their area;
(c) to assist in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces. This does not include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence;
(d) to perform aircraft spotting duties to supplement the RCAF Ground Observer Corps, including the locating and reporting of crashed aircraft and the reporting of aircraft apparently in distress within their area of responsibility;
(e) to carry out coast watching;
(f) to provide rescue parties for military purposes as detailed by officers commanding commands;
(g) to assist the RCM Police and/or provincial police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;
(h) to collect detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance in their other tasks or of value to the armed forces generally.

7. It is emphasized that the above NORMAL TASKS and the SPECIAL TASK detailed in paragraph 8 are the only ones to be performed by Canadian Rangers in their military capacity. Any others would be undertaken, in peacetime at least, as private citizens and not as members of the armed forces.

**Special Task**

8. Where it can be established that a locality requires a defence force and it is not feasible to employ a Regular Army or Militia unit for such a purpose, officers commanding commands may recommend to AHQ that this task be assigned to a Canadian Ranger unit.

**Strength**

9. The maximum strength of the Canadian Rangers is limited to 5,000 all ranks. The maximum strength authorized for each command is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Maximum Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Command</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Command</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie Command</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Command</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organization

10. It is emphasized that action required in accordance with the role of the Canadian Rangers will normally be carried out by individuals. Unit and sub-unit organization, therefore, is required mainly for control, administration and the collection and dissemination of information. In specific cases, however, where Canadian Ranger units are assigned local defence tasks their organization will, of necessity, be on a tactical basis.

11. The Canadian Ranger organization is accordingly divided into companies, each with a headquarters and a number of platoons. The company commander will normally be a Reserve Militia captain, and platoon commanders will be Reserve Militia lieutenants. Platoons may be subdivided into sections, which will normally be commanded by sergeants.

Unit Designation

12. Companies will be designated numerically on a national basis. Platoons will be designated numerically within each company. Localities will not be included in company or platoon designations.

Command

13. Units of the Canadian Rangers will be under command of the officer commanding the command or area in which the unit is located, unless otherwise authorized by AHQ.

14. Command by officers and other ranks of the Canadian Rangers will be exercised in accordance with QR(Army) 3.295.

Training

15. Commanders of Canadian Ranger companies and platoons will be responsible for the training of their commands; such training will be based upon broad direction issued by command headquarters. These directions will be consistent with the tasks of the Canadian Rangers.

Personnel

16. Personnel should be restricted mainly to those who, because of age, category or other reasons, would not be available on mobilization for active service in other components of the Canadian Army. The standards of selection of personnel will be those judged by the officer commanding the command as suitable for the performance of ranger tasks.
Arms and Equipment

17. Appendix “A” to this order sets out the Canadian Ranger entitlement for arms and equipment, together with accounting and repair procedures.

18. Issue of rifles and ammunition to Canadian Rangers will be restricted to actual requirements as determined by officers commanding commands, within the scale shown in Appendix “A”. Canadian Ranger units having a special task as outlined in paragraph 8 above may be issued with automatic weapons subject to the conditions set out in Appendix “A”.

19. Uniforms will not be issued to Canadian Rangers. Appropriate winter clothing may be provided by commands on a temporary basis subject to the conditions set out in Appendix “A”.

Financial

20. Service in the Canadian Rangers will be unpaid except when such service is rendered under the conditions set out in QR(Army) 2.03(8) and (9). Participation in northern exercises and attendance at Regular Army schools of instruction are examples of employment under QR(Army) 2.03(9) and payment for such employment will be charged against the Militia vote.

21. Expenditures from Militia votes for the training of Canadian Rangers will not be incurred without the prior approval of AHQ(DGMT).

22. In accordance with QR(Army) 210.81, officers commanding Canadian Ranger units may, with the prior authorization of the Minister, be reimbursed for travelling expenses when visiting their units for administrative and training purposes.

23. Entitlement to medical care at public expense is governed by the provisions of QR(Army) 34.07. In this connection Canadian Ranger duty will be construed as consisting only of those tasks set in paragraphs 6, 8 and 15.

24. Canadian Rangers are entitled to disability compensation under the terms of QR(Army) 210.72 for any injury, disease, or illness attributable to the performance of Continuous Army Duty or Special Duty.

(HQC 2001-1999/0 TD 7185) (DMO&P)

Date of Issue: 24 Mar 58 (Supersedes Issue of 17 Feb 54 and CAO 6-9)

Index-Ordnance Services
Reserve Militia
Stores & Equipment
### ACCOUNTING AND REPAIR PROCEDURES FOR STORES ISSUED TO CANADIAN RANGERS

#### Entitlements

1. The following items may be issued to Canadian Rangers, at the discretion of officers commanding commands, up to the maximum quantities shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat No</th>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Issue Per Man</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1A 2500</td>
<td>Belt, waist, WE, patt 37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A 6450</td>
<td>Carrier, cartridge, WE, patt 37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 308623</td>
<td>Armlet, Khaki, Canadian Rangers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/BA 10050</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 bantam butt, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/CR 27GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 with long butt, or</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/CR 28GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 with normal butt, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/CR 29GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 with short butt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/SM 52A</td>
<td>Bottle, oil, Mk-5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/AA 0571</td>
<td>Cover, breech, rifle, No 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/BA 0518</td>
<td>Pullthrough single, Mk 4B</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/BB 0521</td>
<td>Pullthrough gauze, wire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B/AA 1657</td>
<td>Sling, rifle, web</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Q/QA 0174</td>
<td>Cartridge, .303-in ball, Mk 7</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Ammunition entitlements for Canadian Ranger units will be calculated by command headquarters, based on the latest strength return received from each Canadian Ranger unit. The quantity of ammunition authorized in paragraph 1 will be issued on the basis of:

(a) 100 rounds per man per annum for training and operations;

(b) 200 rounds per man per annum for annual classification shoot. Such ammunition will only be issued where the annual classification shoot can be carried out on existing range facilities under command supervision.

Command headquarters will advise the applicable composite stores of the quantity of ammunition to be issued. It will not be necessary for Canadian Ranger units to return fired cartridge cases.

3. In addition to the above items the following may be issued subject to the conditions shown:
(a) **Automatic Weapons**—Where a Canadian Ranger unit is assigned a special task, as set out in paragraph 8 of this CAO, automatic weapons (LMGs and SMCs) may be issued subject to the approval of AHQ. The numbers of automatic weapons issued will be based on recommendations by officers commanding commands. Automatic weapons will be held at the unit headquarters and before an issue can be authorized a safe storage place must be available;

(b) **Winter Clothing**—Stocks of appropriate winter environmental clothing may be held by commands for issue to Canadian Ranger units in emergencies and for exercises at the discretion of officers commanding commands.

### Issue of Stores

4. Command or area composite QM stores will maintain the records for stores issued to Canadian Ranger units.

5. Ordnance depots will:
   
   (a) voucher stores to the applicable composite stores QM account;
   
   (b) ship stores direct to Canadian Ranger unit headquarters;
   
   (c) forward the ordnance depot copy of the issue voucher to the composite QM stores.

6. On receipt of the stores, the commanding officers of the Canadian Ranger units will:
   
   (a) check the stores to the packing note copy of the ordnance issue voucher and place the following certificate thereon: “Certified that forward the stores listed on this voucher have been received in good order.”;
   
   (b) forward the packing note to the composite QM stores;
   
   (c) issue the stores and obtain a receipt from each individual concerned.

7. On receipt of the certified packing note, the composite QM stores will:
   
   (a) sign the ordnance depot copy and return it to the ordnance depot responsible for the inspection of the composite stores;
   
   (b) show on distribution the stores issued to the Canadian Ranger unit.

8. When requested, ordnance will voucher and ship stores to the composite stores and subsequent issue to Canadian Ranger units when needed.

### Repair and Inspection of Equipment by RCEME

9. It will not be possible to inspect individual small arms at remote localities. Normal annual inspection by RCEME will apply however, where it is possible to
concentrate weapons at a central point, under arrangements to be made by command or area composite stores.

10. Equipment requiring repairs in RCEME workshops will be returned to the composite stores by the Canadian Ranger unit. The composite stores will prepare a Request for Repair Services (CAFC 2149) and forward the equipment to the RCEME workshop.

**Loss and Damage**

11. Loss of firearms and other equipment will normally be reported immediately to the officer commanding the Canadian Ranger unit who will inform the nearest RCM Police detachment and the command or area headquarters as applicable, in accordance with CAO 166-2. Where local conditions are such that the individual member concerned can report a loss earlier to the RCM Police than to his OC, such action will be taken and the OC informed accordingly.

12. The officer commanding the command will investigate the loss of or damage to stores on issue to the Canadian Rangers in accordance with QR (Army) 21.71. In the case of firearms, individual members of the Canadian Rangers are to be held financially responsible for loss, damage and unauthorized modification.

13. Every reasonable effort must be made to recover deficiencies and to protect the interests of the Crown against theft and carelessness. In dealing with deficiencies under the provisions of QR(Anny), the officer commanding the command will take cognizance of the adverse conditions under which the Canadian Rangers operate.

Date of Issue: 24 Mar 58.
The Canadian Rangers

1. This Report describes the organization in 1947 of the Canadian Rangers as a Corps of the Reserve Militia and traces its development until the end of 1954. As a consequence of the American lead in nuclear weapons over the only potential enemy whose economy was recovering slowly from the destruction inflicted by the German Army during the Second World War, there did not seem to be any great urgency to defensive preparations in North America prior to the outbreak of fighting in Korea in 1950 and the Intensification of a state of “cold war” elsewhere. Even then the general public refused to get excited. Indifference rather than faith in the efficacy of the United Nations organization seeming to govern the attitude of the man-in-the-street towards world problems.

Antecedents

2. In an effort to reassure an alarmed populace in British Columbia and to copy Britain’s Home Guard, Maj.-Gen. R.O. Alexander G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command had suggested early in February 1942 the formation of a voluntary organization of Coast Defence Guards. On 5 March authority was granted for both Pacific and Atlantic Commands to form such units as part of the Reserve Militia. Although priority was to be given to the west coast. During the following weeks, while action was being taken to create such independent companies, the official view changed. The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers was named as a Corps of the Active Militia (by General Order 320 dated 12 August 1942), but the reserve companies intended for Atlantic Command were actually authorized as supernumerary to existing Reserve Army units. Increasing German U-boat activity in the lower St. Lawrence resulted in enough additional companies being recruited along the Gaspe coast of M.D. No. 5 to justify an additional Reserve battalion for Lee Fusiliers du St.-Laurent.1

3. Companies of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were organized primarily in the isolated areas of British Columbia - along the coast, on Vancouver Island, on the Queen Charlotte Islands and near the mountain passes of the Interior. By March 1943 there were approximately 15,000 trappers, loggers and fishermen organized in 196 companies, which reported to a special staff increment headed by Lt.-Col. T.A.H. Taylor at Pacific Command Headquarters. Equipment initially consisted only of sporting rifles, steel helmets and armbands.
Subsequent issues were waterproof jackets and trousers, Sten guns, .30/06 Enfield rifles and pistols. Training of a very limited nature was conducted during leisure time and without remuneration. Duties were to patrol the local area, to report any findings of a suspicious nature and to fight, if required, as guerrilla bands against any enemy invader. A one-time officer in the Irish Republican Army and now resident of British Columbia, Brendan Kennelly, was appointed to instruct in guerrilla warfare.

4. During the autumn of 1943 the overall strength of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers was reduced to about 10,000 by streamlining the then-existing 123 companies. A proposal to reduce all but the 29 companies in coastal areas north of the top of Vancouver Island was approved by the Minister of National Defence in December 1944. No action was taken, however, because the Japanese then began to launch free, unmanned balloons carrying small explosive charges against North America. Fortunately, only 90 of these balloons landed on Canadian soil and no damage was done.

5. On 25 August 1945 Lt.-Gen. Charles Foulkes, newly appointed Chief of the General Staff, recommended to the Minister of National Defence that the 123 continuing companies of Pacific Coast Militia Rangers should be reduced to nil strength. He argued as follows:

It is possible that in another war, valuable Local Defence tasks such as Goad Watching, cooperation with police forces on anti-sabotage duties in remote regions and in armed action (pending arrival of Army units) against enemy raids on isolated localities, would be performed by units organized along the lines of the PCMR. Under peace conditions, I feel that it is very doubtful that there will be a requirement for a Force of this nature, but it is difficult during the present period of transition to determine whether or not this will be so. However it may be found desirable at some future date to form a Reserve Militia along the general lines of the PCMR. In the meantime until conditions become more stabilized, it is considered the PCMR should be disbanded.

In this connection, personnel desirous of maintaining their interest in the Army might do so by joining the Reserve Army in the meantime, if and where sufficient numbers would warrant the necessary localizations of units or sub-units.

6. The Minister agreed. On 30 September he officiated at an official “stand down ceremony at Vancouver. All companies were disbanded with effect from 15 October. In recognition of their voluntary and unpaid services, ex-members were allowed to purchase their rifles for the nominal sum of $5.00.
Plans for a new corps

7. A Pacific Coast Militia Rangers Association was formed shortly thereafter and Incorporated under the Societies Act of British Columbia. Its managing director, Lt.-Col. T.A.H. Taylor, began bombarding Cabinet Ministers and other Members of Parliament from British Columbia with requests to assist in obtaining military status and recognition. Legally, of course, this was impossible because the Association was a purely civilian organization. Consideration was, being given by D.M.O. & P. to the possibility of retaining the experience gained for the post-war Canadian Army, which was still in the planning stages.8

8. On 18 April 1946 Maj.-Gen. F.F. Worthington, G.O.C. Western Command, sent a personal letter to the V.C.G.S. describing the considerable military interest encountered by Brigadier T.E. Snow, D.O.C., M.D. No. 13, during a recent trip to the Northwest Territories. Transportation difficulties and the smallness of the scattered communities mitigated against the establishment of units of the Reserve Army, but General Worthington suggested that rifle clubs might be authorized.9 The V.C.G.S. replied that there would be difficulty exercising any form of military control over rifle clubs, whose training must also be of a restricted nature.10 But he directed that studies be made envisaging an organization along the lines of the wartime Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. The D.C.G.S.(A). felt that the areas to be covered should Include both coasts and the northland - small, isolated communities where there would be no competition with Reserve Force units. His understanding was that statutory authority already existed for such a force as part of the Reserve Militia. An appropriate name would be “Militia Rangers”.11

91 D.M.O. & P. got busy and on 17 June 1946 a paper was circulated to the several G.Os.C. indicating that the formation of such a part-time volunteer organization of Canadian Rangers would be discussed at the Conference of Commanders slated for the end of the year. Such an organization would be confined to the sparsely populated areas of Canada along the east and west coasts and along the fringe of the northern limits of population where there would be no Reserve Force units of the Canadian Army. Personnel would be trained to act as guides and scouts, to increase their local knowledge of the surrounding country, and to act as guerillas if necessary.12 Answers to a questionnaire subsequently circulated were embodied in the outline plan placed before the Conference of G.Os.C. with the C.G.S in Ottawa on 5-6 December 1946. Service should be voluntary and unpaid, in units of the Reserve Militia. Obsolescent .30/06 Enfield rifles and an annual issue of ammunition would be the only stores issued. Training should include elementary military topography, message writing, use of wireless and other basic essentials consistent with the
envisaged role. Organization and accounting should be handled by individual Commands.\textsuperscript{13} The Conference agreed on there being a requirement for such an organization, but it was left to the discretion of Individual G.Os.C. to recommend the formation of units in areas where it was considered desirable and practicable.\textsuperscript{14}

10. Legislation was drafted to amend Appendix I of The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia so that such units could be formed as part of the Reserve Militia. During the Minister of National Defence’s visit to Western Canada in March 1947 information was released to the press that a Canadian Ranger organization would be announced shortly. Order in Council P.C. 1644 of 23 May 1947 authorized the formation of the Canadian Rangers as a Corps of the Reserve Militia, but considerable difficulty was experienced drafting a satisfactory policy statement. Commenting on an early draft, one officer at Headquarters, Western Command wrote:

\begin{quote}
We don’t want, and we don’t need, further organized military bodies supplementing Active and Reserve Force but what we do need is that small groups of specially adapted people take an interest in the defence of their country in order that we may derive the greatest benefits from their knowledge and particular facilities and it is necessary that they be organized to some extent; but I am afraid that it we try to make them too military we will certainly stand to lose by it. I can understand that the powers that be will wish to retain the strictest possible control over anyone with firearms, particularly when issued by the Department and I can see the reason for it but I also suggest that if the vetting is properly done and interest taken by the respective Commanders that the organization can be kept in line and a great deal of benefit will accrue to the Forces and the country in general.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

11. Only on 12 August was a satisfactory General Staff Policy Statement ready for issue. This stated that units were to be organized and function only in the sparsely populated coastal areas and in the area north of the main belt of population across Canada; they would not be located in areas where Reserve Force units either existed or were contemplated. Overall strength was limited to 5000 all ranks, broken down as follows:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lc}
Eastern Command & 60 \\
Quebec Command & 550 \\
Central Command & 300 \\
Prairie Command & 1490 \\
Western Command & 2600 \\
& 5000 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
Because of variations in roles, location and terrain it was impossible to create a standard establishment. The largest unit would be the company, with a headquarters and not more than five platoons. Each platoon would consist of not more than 30 other ranks and be commanded by a Reserve Militia lieutenant. It would be divided into sections commanded by sergeants. These officers and sergeants would exercise command only over personnel of the Canadian Rangers, except when called out for service or placed on active service. when they would have military status junior to those of equivalent rank in the other components of the Canadian Army. In war the role of the Canadian Rangers would be:

(a) Provision of guides to organized troops within own area.
(b) Coast watching.
(c) Assistance to the RCMP and/or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs. The reporting of other suspicious activities.
(d) Immediate local defence against sabotage by small enemy detachments or saboteurs and to assist and augment civilian protective arrangements against saboteurs, within the area in which the organization is authorized to operate.
(e) Reporting, locating and rescue work, including first aid treatment in connection with aircraft in distress.

Its peace-time role was envisaged as:

(a) Provision of guides to troops on exercises, when required.
(b) The preparation of local defence schemes referred to in (d) above.
(c) Collection of detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance to them in carrying out their roles in war and the documenting or such information with any necessary sketches.
(d) Provision of rescue parties for civilian or military purposes, where required.16

Companies would be designated numerically within each Command, followed by the locality concerned; but platoons would be designated by locality only. Control would be vested in the G.O.C. of the particular Command.

12. Leadership was to be sought from “well established” men permanently located in an area, after “security checks” had been made. No definite limitations were made in respect of age or physical fitness for officers and other ranks; what was desired were the most suitable and desirable residents of an area. Furthermore:
Personnel should be drawn mainly from those who for reasons of age, category or other conditions would not be available for mobilization for active service in other elements of the Canadian Army. However, there will be no objection to the recruitment during peace of personnel who would be expected to depart for service elsewhere with a mobilizing unit, except that no substantial portion of any unit will comprise personnel in this category. The larger proportion of the strength will comprise personnel who will be expected to remain in the unit area during peace and war.

Rangers would not be trained in, nor expected to perform close order or arms drill. Clothing would not be issued in peacetime, merely distinctive armbands. No equipment would be provided, except Rifles No. 4 Mk 1* on loan. Rangers would serve without pay, except when attending courses of instruction, when called out for service, or placed upon active service.

13. The organization of the Canadian Rangers was to be conducted in four phases under individual Command arrangements: selection of company and platoon areas; acceptance of these by Army Headquarters and authorization of companies; selection of company, platoon and section commanders; local recruitment of other ranks to the strength authorized.

14. General Worthington had been busy planning the organization of Ranger companies within Western Command but, as he subsequently made clear in a letter to Army Headquarters, considered it better to progress slowly and not attempt overall coverage at the outset. Many of the men selected as leaders, for example, would not understand the necessity for long delays in obtaining military authorization. Therefore, careful scrutiny by the R.C.M.P. in Alberta and the Northwest Territories and by provincial police in British Columbia was given each potential officer before his services were sought. General Worthington hoped that the former captain of Pacific Coast Militia Rangers at Dawson City would take on a company: “He has been carefully vetted and in actual fact is the brother-in-law of the RCMP Inspector - a very reliable man”.17

First companies formed

15. On 22 August 1947 General Worthington requested authority to form the first two companies – at Dawson City and Whitehorse. On 4 September the Minister of National Defence authorized, under the provisions of Section 20 of the Militia Act, the formation of:

No. 1 (Dawson City) Company. with platoons at Mayo, Keno, Selkirk and Dawson City.
16. General Worthington’s plans called for the subsequent organization of 13 more companies. The result would be coverage of localities along the Mackenzie River and North-West Highway System, where it would not be economical or desirable to station operational troops in the event of an emergency. Exposed coastal localities of British Columbia where communications were poor, and protection for certain vulnerable points along lines of communication in the interior. Although approved at Army Headquarters, Maj.-Gen. O.C. Mann who was acting for the C.G.S. emphasized two basic principles in his reply dated 4 October:

(a) that when selecting locations the emphasis should be on the Northern and Coastal areas, where the necessity for these units is more apparent;

(b) that as no funds have been provided for this purpose, expense to the public should be avoided.

About this time Sir Patrick Ashley Cooper, Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company, expressed surprise that the Army had not sought the assistance of his organization. In view of the fact that nowadays there were oil companies, mining companies, and other trading organizations in the north, however, Col. L.M. Chesley, A/B.G.S. did not consider it wise to link local companies of Canadian Rangers too closely with Hudson’s Bay Company factors. Thus General Foulkes wrote Sir Patrick Ashley Cooper on 5 November merely asking that General Officers Commanding be permitted to contact Hudson’s Bay Company representatives in the various projected unit areas and seek their cooperation in the organization of the Canadian Rangers.

17. Brigadier R.O.G. Morton, Officer Commanding the Prairie Command subsequently interviewed Mr. P.A. Chester, Managing Director of the Hudson’s Bay Company at Winnipeg. The latter welcomed the suggestion that Hudson’s Bay Company factors at isolated posts should act as platoon commanders. Senior officials of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways promised similar assistance in forming detachments at small isolated stations along the transcontinental lines. R.C.M.P. officers in Winnipeg also made useful suggestions. So soon as the required unit locations should be firm. Brigadier Morton planned to ask officials of the three companies to suggest leaders.

18. Officers of Quebec Command sought assistance from large mining and paper companies, the clergy and other organizations operating in the north in planning a tentative organization of four companies with a total of 11 platoons. These were:
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

No. 1 (Mingan) Company
   Anticosti Platoon
   Harrington Harbour Platoon
   Blanc Sablon Platoon

No. 2 (Seven Islands) Company
   Clark City Platoon
   Nichicun Lake Platoon
   Bale Comeau Platoon

No. 3 (La Tuque) Company
   La Tuque Platoon
   Chibougamau Platoon

No. 4 (Fort Chimo) Company
   Fort Mackenzie Platoon
   Fort Harrison Platoon
   Rupert House Platoon

These were authorized on 27 February 1948.26

19. On 10 March 1948 Western Command requested authority to form a company headquarters at Yellowknife with four platoons to be located (probably) at Snare River, Fort Providence, Fort Simpson, and Wrigley. Although 24 Field Squadron. R.C.E. of the Reserve Force was being relocated at Yellowknife it was not considered that there need be any competition or confusion because:

(a) The type of personnel most desirable for the work characterized by the Canadian Rangers is not generally acceptable to the Reserve Force due to physical standards, mainly age.

(b) It is considered necessary to establish the Coy HQ in YELLOWENIFE because it the communication factor. There is no intention of enlisting the services of any personnel potentially useful to a unit or the Reserve Force.

(c) It is considered that the establishment of a Canadian Ranger H.Q. in Yellowknife will assist in drawing to the attention of the residents the fact that the Department of National Defence is progressing with plans for the defence of the NORTH, and thus increase their interest in the Reserve Force.27

Moreover, Yellowknife was the main supply and transportation centre to a large area of the Northwest Territories, with bush pilots, prospectors and trappers using it as a base. On 15 March Western Command requested authorization for a further company headquarters at Fort Smith with platoons probably at Fort Resolution, Hay River, Chipewyan, Embarras and Fort McMurray.28
Appointment of Colonel Commandant

20. On 6 April 1948 the Minister of National Defence queried the C.G.S. as to whether it would be “a good thing to make General Worthington Honorary Colonel of Canadian Rangers and give him work to do in connection with their organization?” General Worthington had been retired from the Canadian Army during the previous autumn, but during his tenure of Pacific and Western Commands had been keenly interested successively in the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers and the Canadian Rangers. Therefore his appointment as Honorary Colonel Commandant of the Canadian Rangers was recommended, and approved by the Minister of National Defence on 27 April 1948. General Worthington did not remain long in retirement, however; effective 1 October 1948 he became Special Adviser to the Minister of National Defence as Civil Defence Co-ordinator.

Growth on Paper

21. Since the Canadian Rangers would be undertaking operational activities at their peace-time locations only, unlike units of the Active and Reserve Forces, the interests of security suggested that such locations should not form part of the unit designation. On 3 May, therefore, the acting C.G.S. requested approval from the Minister of National Defence to delete such territorial designations and to number all companies consecutively across the country, as they were formed, instead of separately for each command. This having been agreed to, the following was notified with effect from 10 May 1948:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Designation</th>
<th>Redesignation Authorized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 (Dawson City) Company,</td>
<td>No. 1 Company, Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Rangers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 (Whitehorse) Company,</td>
<td>No. 2 Company, Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Rangers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 (Mingan) Company, Canadian</td>
<td>No. 3 Company, Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 (Seven Islands) Company,</td>
<td>No. 4 Company, Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Rangers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 (La Tuque) Company,</td>
<td>No. 5 Company, Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 (Fort Chimo) Company,</td>
<td>No. 6 Company, Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Rangers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nos. 7 and 8 Companies were now authorized at Yellowknife and Fort Smith respectively. (Effective 3 February 1949, platoons were designated numerically within each company and localities dropped from their designations also.)

22. During May 1948 Western Command sought authorization for further companies; after study by D.M.O. & P., approval was sought from the Minister of National Defence on 25 June for:

- No. 9 Company with H.Q. at Tofino, B.C.
- No. 10 Company with H.Q. at Alert Bay, B.C.
- No. 11 Company with H.Q. at Belle Coola, B.C.
- No. 12 Company with H.Q. at Ocean Falls, B.C.
- No. 13 Company with H.Q. at Terrace, B.C.

With the exception of No. 13 Company and two platoons of No. 11 Company, sub-units if the above would be employed primarily in a coast watching role. This submission emphasized that:

... certain of these proposed locations, such as Ucluelet, Sooke and Terrace, are sites where it was found necessary to station operational troops in the last war. The presence of, such units as the Canadian Rangers at these exposed posts would be invaluable and would ease the demands on manpower in an emergency.

Approval having been given, with effect from 28 June, authority was sought on 21 July for No. 14 Company, with headquarters at Smithers, B.C. and platoons also at Ootsa Lake and Nazko, and No. 15 Company, with headquarters at Fort George, B.C. and platoons also at McBride and Hudson Hope. These were designed to give additional coverage to the main communications axes connecting Prince Rupert with the interior and the south. Although a company of the Rocky Mountain Rangers was already localized at Prince George, its importance as a communications centre and the fact that the Reserve Force sub-unit would be withdrawn on mobilization made it desirable to position Canadian Rangers there.

23. On 12 August 1948 Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez wrote from Winnipeg that, following extensive liaison with the R.C.M.P., C.N.R., C.P.R. and the Hudson’s Bay Company, Prairie Command had selected four company and 18 platoon locations. The headquarters of companies were to be at Nelson House and Norway House in Manitoba, Carrot River in Saskatchewan and Kenora in Ontario. Although Kenora, Ignace and Sioux Lookout of the last-mentioned company area infringed on Reserve Force territory, their inclusion was
recommended as being extremely vulnerable communications centres. Furthermore:

It is unlikely that Ranger units will clash with the Reserve Force units which are finally established and draw a younger set centred in the city. The Ranger personnel would be older and of the trapper, guide and hunter class whose work excludes them from participating in Reserve Force activities. This can be carefully watched from this Headquarters.35

The long delay in taking action was blamed on the paucity of road and rail facilities, a situation aggravated by unusual floods that spring, but Brigadier Bernatchez now hoped to proceed right ahead to phases III and IV. Their formation as Nos. 16, 17, 18 and 19 Companies was authorized with effect from 8 September 1948.36

Reality vs Appearance

24. When a stocktaking was attempted during October 1948 of the progress actually made, however, the B.G.S. (Plans) received a severe jolt. After an existence of 15 months there were only 44 officers and 57 other ranks actually belonging to the Canadian Rangers, of whom 27 officers and 53 other ranks were in Western Command.37 Because of his pro-war familiarity with the Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System operated by the Royal Canadian Signals, Brigadier W.J. Megill, D.C.G.S., did try to inject a rational note on 17 November:

I agree that the strength of the Canadian Rangers is most disappointing, but consider the most such an organization can hope to accomplish in time of peace is preparation of a suitable organizational structure. Unless the habits of the average Canadian change in a marked degree, I would be very much surprised to find any large proportion of the personnel of an outpost prepared to join the organization in peace – whereas they would come in 100% in war.

It might of course be possible to increase the interest by provision of a uniform; certain additional equipment, notably binoculars, compasses and other gear useful in the bush; and by issue of pay for training. However, I consider that acceptance of a commitment of this type would not be in accordance with the basic principles behind the organization of the Rangers. They are intended essentially to be individuals who report and act on such information as they are able to acquire when going about their normal tasks. The only occasion on which they would be expected to act Be a formed body would be in an emergency.
One major difficulty with the Rangers will of course be that of intercommunication - both physical and the passage of reports. In war it will probably be necessary to provide suitable simple wireless sets for intercommunication from isolated platoons to Company HQ and from Company HQ to a Report Centre, which might be a regular station of the CASS [Canadian Army Signal System] or NWT & Y Radio System. Provision of such sets in peace might serve to stimulate interest, and would provide personnel with experience in operating them as well as providing a means of normal contact from isolated localities to the outside. However, this would mean acceptance of a commitment both for provision and maintenance which might well grow beyond reasonable bounds, and which would undoubtedly result in some added problems for the Army wireless stations operating at the end of such networks as it would very difficult to eliminate personal traffic.\(^\text{38}\)

The result, however, was that the C.G.S. wrote personally to each G.O.C. on 3 December, for reports and suggestions.\(^\text{39}\)

25. During the summer season the G.S.O. II (Intelligence) of Quebec Command had been flown north by the R.C.A.F. to make a survey of the areas where it was proposed to locate units of the Canadian Rangers. Because of poor means of communications between the northern trading posts, it was recommended to Ottawa on 7 December that company headquarters should remain dormant until there should be an emergency when wireless sets should be provided so that they might maintain contact with their platoons.\(^\text{40}\) Maj.-Gen. R.O.G. Morton agreed with his staff that, so long as peace prevailed, it would be preferable to supply and administer most platoons direct from Headquarters, Quebec Command. In a further appreciation dated 17 December, the G.O.C. elaborated. Small arms training might possibly be done on a platoon or section level, but the Eskimos and Indians living in isolated communities were excellent marksmen and probably would use the annual 100-round allotment of ammunition (the only remuneration received) for hunting seal and reindeer. Companies had been organized at Mingan, Baie Comeau and Fort Chimo, with 11 of their 14 platoons, and the Port Harrison company would form in 1949. Officers had been appointed and recruiting was proceeding under platoon arrangements, but a strength return had been delayed by communication difficulties. General Morton further emphasized that it would never be easy to keep in touch with the other ranks, many of whom were Indians and Eskimos of migratory habits.\(^\text{41}\)

26. On 8 December Maj.-Gen. H.W. Foster replied from Halifax that, although nominal rolls had not yet been compiled, a Ranger organization was
well in hand. An allotment of 60 all ranks was not enough for Eastern Command, however, and authority had already been requested to raise 200 in Nova Scotia and 100 in New Brunswick. Zone representatives in Nova Scotia of the (Dominion) Department of Fisheries were all ex-officers of the armed forces and enthusiastic about the Ranger idea. Through them local fishermen had been instructed in the duties required. Many of these men had belonged to the civilian Aircraft Detection Corps during the Second World War and performed similar duties for the R.C.A.F. However:

We have not issued any rifles or ammunition because these men already possess their own firearms and are not particular in that respect of it. They are, however, very keen to be issued with a uniform.42

At the moment negotiations were under way in New Brunswick with Department of Fisheries representatives and the larger lumber companies to produce an organization similar to that of Nova Scotia. Prince Edward Island had been ignored because it was cultivated throughout to the shoreline and there were no industrial targets to interest saboteurs. Nothing had been attempted in Newfoundland or Labrador; however, Newfoundland was not to become Canada’s 10th province until 31 March 1949.

27. On 9 December Maj.-Gen, C. Vokes explained in his reply to the C.G.S. that nothing had been attempted because correspondence received by his staff from Army Headquarters suggested that the “formation of units of the Canadian Rangers is not anticipated in Central Command.”43 Having twice travelled the Cochrane-Mooseonee-James Bay branch line of the Ontario Northland. Railway, General Vokes realized that some sort of Ranger organization could be organized. But:

The population is for the most part CREE Indian, some with Scotch names and blue eyes who exist by trapping and guiding for goose and duck hunters. In the Autumn, they are most indolent and unreliable and born lazy. Hunger is the only motivating force, plus the propagation of their race, at which they are very adept .... I doubt the value of these Indians in a para military organization.

I don’t really think there is any need to organize in this area. Nothing goes on in the JAMES BAY area which is not quickly known through the natural curiosity of the natives. The [Hudson’s] Bay factor and the missioners plus the RCMP pretty well know everything which goes on between ALBANY and MOOSONEE through the mocassin telegraph and their private wireless.
Moreover, enemy operations would be most difficult because of the muskeg, interspersed by rivers navigable only by canoe. If desired, however, he would endeavour to organize small units of white inhabitants at Moosonee, Moose Factory and Fraserville.

28. In his letter dated 15 December, Brigadier Bernatchez explained that a recent survey of what had been attempted in Prairie Command had led to the submission of an entirely new plan to D.M.O. & P. After two companies, involving seven officers and 11 other ranks had been organized around Hudson’s Bay Company posts, it was realized that, except for town of the proposed company locations, the complete Ranger organization envisaged for his Command could be super-imposed on the Hudson’s Bay Company network of fur trading posts. The factors at these posts could serve as platoon commanders and use their own wireless for intercommunication.44

29. Maj.-Gen. M.H.S. Penhale’s letter of 30 December indicated that although 11 companies had been authorized for Western Command, only that at Dawson City had undertaken any training; the others were still appointing officers and/or endeavouring to recruit men. The reasons for slow progress were not difficult to find:

Except at larger centres, such as Dawson City, Whitehorse, Yellowknife, etc., personnel selected are generally operating as prospectors, trappers, surveyors, etc. in the bush for months at a time and are difficult to contact. Such contact by a visiting Officer from this Headquarters is necessary at least twice a year for guidance and encouragement and to spur on the organization. Distances in this Command are tremendous and the time required to accomplish the purpose would require full time employment of one Staff Officer. With my present limited establishment and other heavy commitments I cannot provide for this scale of visitation. It was partially for this reason that I requested an addition to the establishment of my GS Branch which was not granted although I had been given previously to understand by yourself that you would look favourably upon such a request.

Another reason for slow progress is the lack of any authorized funds from which to reimburse appointed Ranger officers for out-of-pocket expenses entailed in organizational duties such as visits to outlying points and routine items of postage, telegrams, stationery. etc. As a general rule journeys must be undertaken by air which is expensive and few, if any, are prepared to shoulder such items without compensation. My view is that Commands should be given an allotment from which to expend funds at
discretion of GOCs on a basis of straight out-of-pocket expenditure and piece work remuneration according to a sliding scale for tasks accomplished, or alternatively, upon a basis of straight pay and allowances with transportation and travelling expenses at special northern rates.45

However, he considered that the organization was well conceived and would pay off in time of emergency, as had the wartime Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. He did not think there need be too much worry about strength:

A reliable individual, be he officer or Ranger, a small group at an outlying point such as Eldorado or even a single man at some far distant post, might well prove very useful in undertaking the tanks envisaged within the present policy both as regards intelligence and security.

But he considered that training courses should be operational during the coming year, for about two weeks each at regional centres, and that an effort should be made to glamorize the Canadian Rangers, both by providing some distinctive item of uniform and by a publicity promotion campaign.

30. In his capacity as Honorary Colonel Commandant of the Canadian Rangers, General Worthington had received two replies to a Christmas circular letter sent to all companies for which captains had been appointed. These indicated willingness, despite an ignorance of military procedures. Early in January he emphasized in a letter to the C.G.S. that:

A point which must be borne in mind when dealing with these people is that they are not military and must be regarded as partisans. I am convinced that a great value can be obtained providing they are handled right which will not take a great deal of time, but they must not be left simply to hibernate with nothing to do. Furthermore, such administration as they may have must be simple to a degree as writing is not one of their long suits.46

31. D.M.O. & P. prepared a consolidated report and appreciation from the above correspondence and the V.C.G.S. then directed that a “go slow policy” be followed for the time being. In consequence, Quebec Command was advised on 20 May 1949 that authority would not be given for a further company and that delay in completing the Canadian Ranger organization would have to be accepted. On 29 June, however, the V.C.G.S. decided that further requests should be decided individually on their respective merits. Therefore a submission from Western Command to form Nos. 20 and 21 companies at Aklavik and Norman Wells was acted upon.47
32. At the request of Eastern Command the question of future organization and employment of the Canadian Rangers was discussed during the C.G.S. Conference with G.Os.C. on 9 January 1950. According to the minutes:

The CGS advised that no changes were contemplated. The organization should remain as simple as possible. In respect to the proposal to use the Hudson’s Bay Co. organization, he agreed that their facilities should be connected with those of the Army’s wherever practicable. However, he was opposed to the establishment of a rank structure within the Hudson’s Bay organization.48

33. The paucity of actual accomplishment is well illustrated by the comments made by Captain C.H. Chapman of No. 1 Company to an officer from Army Headquarters visiting Dawson City in another connection on 28 February 1950. This officer noted that Captain Chapman, who operated a general store, was a member of good standing in his community and appeared to be a capable conscientious officer. The following summary of Captain Chapman’s remarks was subsequently submitted to D.M.O. & P.:

(a) Up to the present time no activities, or training had been authorized for the organization. As a result, he considered that interest was decreasing, and that it would soon become impossible to maintain an effective organization.

(b) He deplored the fact that the Rangers were not invited to participate in Ex SWEETBRIAR in some role or other; also that they have not been used in connection with the searches carried out at various times for missing aircraft.

(c) He questioned the advisability of issuing rifles to Rangers - in his estimation most members were in possession of better rifles than those issued.

(d) He submitted that the issue of army wireless sets would be very beneficial in order that Coy Comds could establish closer liaison with platoons or sections living in outlying and often remote areas.49

Further Development

34. On 30 September 1950 the Canadian Rangers had an actual strength of 50 officers and 472 other ranks, organized in 21 companies, of which 13 were in Western, four in Prairie and four in Quebec Commands.50 Authorized Ranger strengths had been reallocated to provide more vacancies in Eastern Command, which now controlled a Newfoundland Area coinciding with the boundaries of Canada’s tenth province. Consideration was being given to the authorization of
two companies there – one in northern Newfoundland and the other in Labrador. Prairie Command had requested authorization for four additional companies and a complete reorganization of the existing set-up, which would provide a screen of Rangers across the entire northern portion of that Command. On 8 November Western Command was authorized to call up Capt. J.R. Woolgar for employment as Command Canadian Ranger Liaison Officer until 31 March 1951. This officer had been an R.C.A.F. pilot during the Second World War and, since 1 August 1948 commanding No. 7 Company of Canadian Rangers at Yellowknife.51 By this time, however, a Canadian Army Special Force was now being trained for service with United Nations intervention forces in Korea and thought was being given to what would be Canada’s military commitment in Europe to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

35. Effective 10 February 1951, 22 and 23 Companies were authorized: the former, with headquarters at St. Anthony, had five platoons covering Northern Newfoundland and the Labrador side of the Strait of Belle Isle; the latter, with headquarters at Cartwright, had five platoons spread along the coast of Labrador.52 Effective 8 March, five new companies and 24 new platoons were authorized, one company and nine platoons disappeared, and command of five existing platoons was transferred to other companies within Western Command: No. 18 Company headquarters was transferred from Carrot River to Seven Sisters Falls; headquarters of Nos. 24, 25, 26 and 27 Companies were located at Fort Albany, Big Beaver House, Brochet and Fond du lac.53 On 27 April special authority was given Headquarters, Western Command to issue 12 Bren guns and 12 Sten guns to each of the Fort Radium Platoon, Canadian Rangers and No. 7 Company at Yellowknife because:

(a) Fort Radium Platoon is composed of employees of the Eldorado Mining and Smelting company (a crown company) and will defend the uranium mine in an emergency.

(b) Yellowknife would be an important forward base in the event of operations in the North.54

On 21 June Western Command was authorized to issue six Bren guns and six Sten guns to No. 21 Company at Norman Wells, where there was an oil refinery, R.C.A.F. landing strip, aviation fuel storage tanks, radio and weather stations.55 Effective 21 August 1951, Nos. 28 and 29 Companies were authorized for South and North Baffin Island respectively: because of travel difficulties facing prospective company commanders, only the four platoons of the former and three platoons of the latter were organized initially; localization of company headquarters were left until later. It was hoped to recruit personnel from among
the Eskimos and induce Hudson’s Bay Company factors to act as platoon commanders.\textsuperscript{56} Seven further Companies, numbered 30 to 36, were authorized for the Newfoundland Area of Eastern Command effective 28 November: headquarters were to be at Lewisporte, Bonavista, New Perlican, Grand Bank, Channel, Port Saunders and Hopedale.\textsuperscript{57}

36. On 6 December 1951 a new Canadian Army Policy Statement was Issued. Distribution of authorized strength was now:

- Eastern Command: 550
- Quebec Command: 550
- Central Command: 300
- Prairie Command: 1000
- Western Command: 2600

At the discretion of the G.Os.C. Eastern and Western Commands, approval might be given to the location of units on the coasts in a coast watching role, so long as there was no interference with the activities and development of Reserve Force units. The role of the Canadian Rangers in war now read:

(a) To report to the appropriate army Command Headquarters any suspicious activities occurring in their Ranger areas.

(b) Provision of guides to organized troops within their own area.

(c) To assist in immediate local defence against sabotage by small enemy detachments or saboteurs and to assist and augment civilian protective arrangements against saboteurs. This does not include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence.

(d) Observer Corps duties within their own localities as required to supplement the RCAF Ground Observer Corps. [Authorized 15 October 1951; disbanded April 1961]

(e) Coast watching.

(f) Reporting, locating and rescue work, including first aid treatment in connection with aircraft in distress.

(g) Assistance to the RCMP and/or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs.\textsuperscript{58}

37. Although Capt. A.H. Shea initially had been called out for duty as Canadian Ranger Liaison Officer at Headquarters, Eastern Command only for the period 30 January–31 March, 1951, his tour was extended and he subsequently received a short-service commission in the Active Force.\textsuperscript{59} At the request of Prairie Command, early in May Capt. W.J. Cobb, a Hudson’s Bay Company official nominally in command of No. 18 Company, was temporarily appointed its
Ranger liaison officer.60 The same month saw Lt.-Col. T.A.H. Taylor called out in Western Command in an effort to revive dwindling interest in British Columbia.61

38. General Worthington was pleased to learn of this last and suggested that the “reactivation of the P.C.M.R. into the Canadian Rangers would be invaluable.”62 His comment that “Taylor is a very unorthodox man although a graduate of R.M.C.” proved, however, to be premonition. After circularizing former officers of the Pacific Militia Coast Rangers in June, Lt.-Col. Taylor visited those interested during July and left the impression that they could go ahead and begin organizing companies on the wartime basis. But D.M.O. & P. was not impressed with this reorganization plan, submitted by Western Command on 10 October 1951.63 He termed it a “strong effort” to reactivate former units of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers and pointed out that “little or no attention is being paid to existing policy. For instance five of the places selected for Ranger Companies now have Reserve Force Units. Furthermore, the isolated Northern part of the province has been completely ignored.”64 Consequently the recommendation was turned down and it was pointed out to Western Command that Canadian Rangers must not be considered Home Guard units.65 Shortly thereafter, however, the Minister of National Defence received letters from irate individuals who had taken Lt.-Col. Taylor seriously enough to organize potential companies of 70 to 90 all ranks, merely to discover that only five to 10 men would ever likely be enlisted in any one locality.66 In his replies the Minister of National Defence emphasized that there had been “some misunderstanding” and went on to point out:

There is considerable difference between the purpose and scale of organization of the Canadian Rangers and the former Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. The latter were organized on a fairly extensive basis and included in their terms of reference such roles as assisting to repel major attacks, employing guerilla tactics against a possible invader and anti-sabotage measures. The Canadian Rangers are organized on a limited scale to provide assistance on an individual basis to formed bodies of troops which may be required to operate in coastal areas, to act as coast watchers, and to provide information on any unusual occurrences in their local areas. It is not intended to employ the Rangers as guerrillas, in organized defence tasks, in protection of vital points or in any role that is the assigned responsibility of other elements of the Army or of other government agencies.67

39. The Canadian Legion, at its Dominion Convention at Montreal on 18-23 May 1952, passed a resolution that a non-paid Citizen Militia, modelled on the
wartime Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, should be organized in British Columbia - but to no avail.68

40. Meanwhile the work of expansion continued. Effective 8 January 1952, No. 31 Company was authorized. with headquarters at Dawson Creek and platoons elsewhere at Kiskatinaw and Peace River.69 Effective 15 May, authorization was given for No. 38 Company, with headquarters at Island Lake, Ontario, in Prairie Command.70 Only on 29 July 1953 were Nos. 39 and 40 Companies with headquarters at Brooks Brook and Destruction Bay in Yukon Territory, authorized.71 No. 41 Company, with headquarters at Fort Nelson, B.C., was added on 15 April 1954.72 Canadian Army Order 246-3 dated 11 February 1954 had replaced the previous Canadian Army Policy Statements governing the Canadian Rangers. The maximum authorized strength for each Command now read:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Command</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Command</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie Command</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Command</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual strength of the 41 companies on 31 December 1954 was 139 officers and 2351 other ranks; locations of these companies and individual strengths are given in Appendix “B”.

41. Ranger Liaison Officers continued to function at the headquarters of each of Western, Prairie, Quebec and Eastern Commands. Yearly visits were paid by R.C.A.F. aircraft to the more remote companies. Paper work was held to a minimum and Headquarters, Western Command tried to include much of the desired instructions in the form of a periodic newsletter. In 1954, as in 1951 and 1952, authority was granted officers commanding Ranger companies to incur travelling expenses, not exceeding $300.00 to tour their own company areas.73

Training

42. Early in June 1952 Western Command conducted Exercise “GABRIEL” to practise its Ranger companies in reporting relevant and accurate information to headquarters in Edmonton. Each company received the same messages of fictitious enemy movements on which to base their reports, but there proved to be wide and misleading variations in the information reported to Edmonton. The mistakes, and possible remedies, were discussed in the Canadian Rangers Liaison Letter No.2 distributed on 19 June.74
43. During 15 February - 1 March 1953, No. 4 Company, Canadian Rangers formed part of the friendly force engaged in Exercise “BULL DOG” which was held around Fort Norman in the Northwest Territories to test an airborne battalion group built around 2 P.P.C.L.I. and the R.C.A.F. in a Mobile Striking Force role. The following paragraphs discuss the “lessons learned” as they affected the Canadian Rangers:

10. No knowledge existed as to what the Rangers intended to do when their settlement was attacked. Thus immediately after the initial paratroop drop, a fire fight took place between the Rangers and the friendly force. The general plan of action of each Ranger Company should be known and appreciated by the Command concerned.

28. It is an essential part of the Army plan that local Ranger organizations give early warning of enemy activity or lodgements. This was done on the exercise as the enemy were slow in attacking the wireless facilities. Rangers must be thoroughly trained to appreciate the importance of passing early and accurate warning to the Command concerned.

34. Rangers were used to accompany friendly patrols and act as guides. However, their advice was sometime misleading as they did not appreciate the problem of troop movement at night with heavy sleds. Active cooperation with Rangers is the only solution to the learning of each other’s problems.

60. 21 Ranger Company was not too effective in applying guerrilla tactics to the situation. The opportunity for such action is salt evident. Training in small scale raids and ambushes should be given to Ranger groups.

63. When a state of emergency was declared steps were taken by the Rangers to block the runway; these steps could be countered by the enemy by capturing a bulldozer. There is a requirement, therefore, to prepare fuel stooks so that they could be rendered unusable very rapidly. This might be achieved by releasing into the fuel a chemical already contained in a small tank built within the main storage tank. Opening drain cocks is too slow and unreliable.

66. It was found that the Rangers easily outdistanced and outpaced the enemy. This was partly due to the narrower snowshoes used by the former. During various patrols and on the approach march many snowshoes were broken. It is possible that storage or maintenance of the snowshoes is at fault as well as lack of practice by individuals.
44. No. 4 Company, Canadian Rangers provided the local defence force in the Seven Islands area for Exercise “LOUP GAROU”, which was held during the period 18 February-1 March 1954 to test Quebec Command and No. 1 Tactical Air Command staffs in their roles for possible Mobile Striking Force operations. The friendly force was built around battalion headquarters and two company groups of 1 R.22eR. while a company of 1 R.C.R. acted as the enemy.

45. Individual Ranger companies held their own simulated training exercises from time to time. In June 1954, No. 2 Company of Whitehorse won the North-West Highway System Service Rifle Competition by beating 19 other Army and Ranger units. The most interesting item in the Canadian Militia Rangers Newsletter No. 8, issued by Western Command in September 1954, describes how No. 40 Company had helped the R.C.M.P. to capture three bandits during the previous April:

A report that three armed bandits, driving south on the NORTHWEST HIGHWAY in a stolen ALASKA Vehicle, had broken down and held up and stolen a second oar at Mile 1165 was received by CAPT DON BAKKE, Officer Commanding 40 Coy, DESTRUCTION BAY, YUKON TERRITORY.

Don alerted his Company and the progress of the vehicle was closely followed and reported on by his Rangers to the RCMP detachment at HAINES JUNCTION.

Three Rangers were detailed to proceed to the Airport Lodge at Mile 1095 in order to take such action as might be necessary to protect the owner’s family. These Rangers watched the criminals enter the lodge peaceably so held their fire and allowed them to proceed as per CAPT BAKKE’s instructions.

The RCMP Detachment Commander at HAINES JUNCTION had meanwhile requested further Ranger assistance for the actual apprehension of the bandits. LIEUT WAILY WANDGA, the Ranger Platoon Commander and Camp Foreman at Mile 1016, mustered ten Rangers and placed a road block of two road graders with a third vehicle throwing its lights across the highway. The ten Rangers took up a defensive position and covered the block. The bandits approached the block and looking down the business end of ten 303’s realized that the game was up. A RCMP Constable covered by the Rangers, then stepped forward and quietly effected the arrest.
Assistance to the RCMP is part of the Ranger role and in this case the action was firmly and sensibly carried out, forcibly illustrating the Rangers are suitable and available in type or an emergency.

We wish to congratulate CAPT BAKKE, LIEUT WANDGA and the Rangers of 40 Coy, for a ticklish job well done!78

Conclusion

46. During 1955 discussion raged over proposals again put forward by Headquarters Western Command that certain Ranger companies should be given a local defence role and additional weapons to become virtual Home Guard units. But it is too close to the present to make possible an objective historical appraisal, of this and subsequent events.

47. This Report was written by J. Mackay Hitsman.

... 

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67. Claxton to Ashby, 13 Feb 52, ibid.
68. D.Org. to D.S.D., 10 Apr 53; Turcot to D.Org, 24 Apr 53, ibid
72. Sd 1 Letter No. 54/41, 27 Apr 54, ibid.
75. Lessons Learned Winter and Summer northern Exercises, (H.S.) 400.033(D3).
76. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

Doc. 12: Major R. Liboiron, Canadian Rangers: Re-Assessment of Raison d’Etre, 7 November 1966

7 Nov 66

Lt Col R. Bérubé
SSO NA Ops
Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Que.

CANADIAN RANGERS
RE-ASSESSMENT OF RAISON D’ETRE

BACKGROUND

1. The Canadian Rangers were organized shortly after World War II. After our experience in the Aleutian Islands, where Japan had implanted itself there without our immediate knowledge, it was felt that an organization of some kind should be set up to lessen this possibility. Hence the Canadian Rangers (Reserve) Militia organization was established. The Role, Basic concept, tasks etc are as detailed in CAO 246-3 which is attached for reference.

RANGER ORGANIZATION

2. Generally, the Ranger units and sub-units were established in strategic locations; normally near the water. Units of company size were grouped on a regional basis and were commanded by personnel representing various agencies operating in the North, such as Department of Northern Affairs, Department of Transport, RCM Police and missionaries. The Rangers themselves are Indian, Eskimos.

3. Being a Ranger in no way upsets one’s normal routine. While hunting/fishing, the Ranger is on the lookout for anything unusual, such as the presence of unknown persons, ships submarines etc. In such instance, these are to be immediately reported to the unit/sub-unit commanders who in turn pass the information to the closest military authorities as instructed from time to time by the Ranger LO.

REASONS WHY RANGERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST

4. Notwithstanding the fact that there are now better communications with the Canadian North, it should not be a reason to disband the Ranger organization. In fact the present system of communication has simply improved the speed in reporting. The Raison D’Etre for the Rangers still exists:
a. The unit, sub-unit commanders very seldom leave the community. Their Rangers go out hunting/fishing etc, supply information and intelligence. Furthermore the country is so vast that it would be impossible for one man to know what is going on in the surrounding areas without the help of an organization of some sort in the community. In turn the RLO becomes the link between the commanders and the CA(R).

b. Since the establishment of the Ranger organization, the Eskimos especially, realize more than ever that the Northern part of Canada is Canadian Territory, that they are Canadians and that people down South are very much concerned that this part of the territory, which is also their’s, should not be encroached upon by unfriendly nations. As such Rangers have taken great pride in doing this task.

c. The Eskimos, Indians are proud of being Rangers; to disband the Ranger Organization would upset them considerably and cause much concern.

d. Each locality is proud of its Rangers. Upon the reading of the Proclamation and changing of the flags (Red Ensign to Maple Leaf) most localities had their Rangers on parade. At the opportune moment these fired the Feu de Joie.

e. In many localities DNA organizers bring out the fact that the Welfare and Economy of the Eskimos have improved considerably by the Ranger Organization. (Therefore any action taken to disband this organization could bring out some political pressure).

f. By nature the Eskimos [sic] is not a leader. The Ranger Organization has taught him much in that sphere. In some localities, Sgts (Eskimos or Indians) are in charge of sub-units and are doing a good job.

g. The Eskimos have had modern weapons since a short while. The Ranger Organization has taught these valuable lessons on how to take care of army and own weapons including the handling of these. There is yet much to be learned.

h. With the disbandment of units/sub-units, the CA(R) would lose initiate contact with the North. In a reference to this point the RLO is a vital link. He is very well known and accepted by the Rangers and communities. Through him, immediate contact and response by the community can be established. For example, a wireless exercise took place last year at [Schefferville] and Fort Chimo, P.Q., upon being requested by the RLO to give the personnel taking part in the exercise
the full northern welcome, these communities went all out in view of giving maximum support and welfare to the personnel concerned.

j. If ever the Canadian Army is called upon to operate in the North it could not do so effectively without the help of guides. The Rangers who know their territory inside out would prove invaluable in this role. Quite a few now can speak English fairly well.

RE-ORGANIZATION

5. Over the years this organization has somewhat become unwieldy. Also experience has taught valuable lessons. As such, the following points are recommended:

a. The company commanders have not been able to exercise control and command their respective sub-units. The reasons for this are as follows:

   (1) Too great distance between sub-units.

   (2) To visit each locality would necessitate much time. The Coy Comd is normally the head of an organization of some [kind] and his job does not permit long absence.

   (3) Lack of doctors. The prerequisite physical examination prior to a call out period (even for 15 days) is difficult to achieve. In one instance where one officer is called out every year on the St Lawrence North Shore, the RLO has to go through terrific gyrations to get this on the level. As such, the company commanders could be dispensed with, and the platoon commanders (see commanders in some localities) would deal directly with the RLO.

b. Except for the leaders (platoon and section commanders) Ranger should by trade be hunters or fishermen. In many instances on the St Lawrence North Shore the Ranger platoon is a “façade” for what one might call “Club de Chasse”.

c. That the Scale of Issue for the [Rangers] should be modified to the following:

   1 303 rifle
   1 sling
   1 pull through
   1 breech cover
   1 oil bottle
   1 arm band
   200 rounds of 303 ammunition per year and cleaning material.
d. That the least number of weapons be brought back for repairs. The RLO should be give a short course on doing minor repair; the repairs to be done in situ. All weapons beyond repair to be condemned and destroyed in situ. This would lessen the danger of unserviceable weapons being used that could not be brought back immediately for some reasons. This would also reduce costs of air freight charges etc.

e. That platoons and sub-units in some localities be reduced in size. For example, platoons could be reduced to a section and still achieve its purpose.

f. That all facilities be made available for the RLO to visit units/sub-units 2 times a year. If the territory to be covered is too vast, assistance should be given to him. It is essential that frequent visit be made, otherwise disorganization quickly sets in.

g. That exercise (even on a very limited scale) be conducted in the North. Ranger units sub-units have always been looking forward to this. As Rangers are out during periods of the year, advance warning should be given. When exercises take place, the Rangers should not be called out but paid a daily fee for their wages and the use of their dog teams.

CONCLUSION

6. It took years of labour and planning to properly set up the Canadian Ranger Militia Reserve; an organization that costs little money to the tax payers. If ever the policy permits this organization to become dormant, a long period of time would be required to re-activate again in case of need.

7. These notes are my views brought about by the experience I have had as CRLO with the defunct HQ Quebec Command. (Attached is the general layout of the companies localities).

R. Liboiron Major
EX CRLO

Present coy dispositions as was with Quebec Command now under the control of Eastern Quebec District.

No 3 Coy – St Lawrence North Shore including Anticosti Island.
No 4 Coy – St Lawrence North Shore including [Schefferville].
No 5 Coy – James Bay area and East Coast of Hudson Bay.
No 6 Coy – Hudson Strait – Ungava Region.

No 28 Coy – Lower Part of Baffin Island.

No 29 Coy – Upper Part of Baffin Island,
1 det of Ellesmere Island,
1 det at Cornwallis Island.
Doc. 13: Major L.R. Boyd, Brief: Canadian Rangers, 29 November 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared by: Maj LR Boyd SO FR
Advice from: HQ East QUE Dist
SSO Land Ops
Major Liboiron, former RLO.
SSO Inf.

BRIEF
CANADIAN RANGERS

AIM

1. The aim of this brief is to provide a basis for a reply to CFHQ concerning Mobile Command’s concept and recommendations on the requirement for, role and organization of, the Canadian Rangers.

BACKGROUND

2. CFHQ on message D Res 1381 of 271330Z OCT (Flag A) has requested Mobile Command to examine the current organization of the Canadian Rangers with a view to altering it to give recognition to the changing times; taking into consideration that the Command may consider the original tasks no longer appropriate. The Command has therefore been asked to:

   a. State views on Canadian Rangers;

   b. Advise whether there is continuing need for Rangers;

   c. For what purpose would the Rangers be required;

3. During World War 2, the Japanese occupied the Aleutian Islands unknown to the American or Canadian Governments. It was basically to Guard against the possibility of a future enemy establishing himself in the Canadian North without the knowledge of the Canadian Defence Forces that the Canadian Rangers were set up as a corps of the Reserve Militia shortly after World War 2.

4. CAO 246-3 (Restricted) (Flag B) Canadian Rangers — gives the role to provide a military force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Army”. The role was to be carried out voluntarily, without pay
in conjunction with the civilian occupation of the Ranger, except in times of emergency. Provision was made for pay while Rangers were participating in Northern exercises or attending Regular Army Schools.

5. The normal tasks of the Cdn Rangers (to be performed under ordinary as well as emergency conditions) were:

   a. To report any suspicious activities;
   b. To provide guides to army units in area;
   c. To assist in local defence by containing or observing small enemy forces pending arrival of other forces;
   d. To perform aircraft spotting duties, including location and reporting of crashed or distressed aircraft in area;
   e. To assist RCMP etc in discovering, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;
   f. Coast watching;
   g. To provide rescue parties;
   h. To collect detailed information concerning local area which would be of value to Armed Forces.

6. The only detailed information immediately available concerning Canadian Rangers was that of former Quebec Command, now held by the District Ranger LO at Quebec City: Copies of the information were made and are at Flag C.

7. The District Ranger Liaison Officer, Capt J. Bourdeau, was interviewed along with an infantry sergeant who is his assistant. The following points were made:

   a. The company organization does not function satisfactorily as the Company Commanders cannot visit the platoon except on rare occasion when there are on employers’ business.

   b. In the Quebec District Ranger LO’s Area (which covers three Districts) all the platoons, with the exception of those on the North Shore of the St Lawrence River from Anticosti Island and West, are composed of Indians and Eskimoes who still are mainly hunters and fisherman. The civilan population in the Anticosti-Baie Comeau Area has increased the extent that perhaps a Militia Infantry Unit would serve a more useful purpose than the Rangers. In any event there are few, if any, of the type of man required as a Ranger in this area.
c. At least two officers and two or more senior NCOs are required to adequately cover the area of responsibilities.

d. Ranger units must be visited at least once per year if they are to be effective.

e. The Indians and Eskimoes are keen members of the Rangers and are looked upon with respect in their communities.

f. Training in the reporting and passage of information and general knowledge of their tasks is required.

g. Ranger LO and staff in Eastern Canada must be completely bilingual.

h. An issue of one battle-dress to each officer and man is recommended for wear during assemblies of the Rangers for instruction, inspection or local ceremonies. (This may be practicable upon adoption of a new uniform by the Cdn Forces).

8. A memorandum by SSO NA OPS, at Flag D, states:

   a. Mobile Comd Defence plans for Canada require Cdn Rangers for the roles given in CAO 246-3.

   b. While the disbandment of the Rangers would not completely deprive the force of information it would decrease the effective information.

   c. There is no other organization, with comparable maintenance and operating costs, capable of carrying out the role.

   d. The present organization needs overhauling.

   e. Three courses possible for control of Cdn Rangers by Mobile Command are set out.

9. The last CRLO at Quebec Commend, Major Liboiron, has submitted a memorandum (Flag E) based on his experiences.

10. A copy of a letter from Comd East Que District to CFHQ (at Flag F) on 28 Jun 66 concludes by stating that the Cdn Rangers are a valuable force which is operational at all times, and that it is a loosely organized force which if not under good control is liable to degenerate.

COMMENT

11. This brief is not complete as only one segment of Canada (though a very large one) has been considered, however, until more detailed information is available the data attached to the brief indicates that:
a. There is still a requirement for a force such as the Canadian Rangers to carry out the roles set out in CAO 246-3.

b. The company organization, at least in Quebec and Ontario, has never been effective, it therefore should be abolished.

c. That considering the amount of administration and training required by Rangers, and the actual Command responsible for employment of the Rangers in an emergency, there are now too many headquarters involved.

d. These are too many Ranger units, spread out over too great a distance in time and space for the present staffs to carry out effective liaison and control.

e. During conversations with the District Ranger LO it became apparent that when he was present in the small District HQ, that he was and is often employed on other more apparently pressing duties in the undermanned HQ. This was not the case in the former Quebec Comd HQ which was large enough to ensure that adequate staff was always available.

f. The nature of the individual Ranger in Northern Ontario and Quebec has not essentially changed in most of the locations where there are Ranger platoons.

RECOMMENDATION

12. It is recommended that:

a. Commander Mobile Command, on the information currently available to his Headquarters considers that there is a continuing need for the Canadian Rangers to carry out the same roles now shown in CAO 246-3 (less any reference to the RCAF Ground Observer Corps). There is a need for re-organization of the Canadian Rangers including the Command and control by the Regular Forces; and that he so inform CFHQ.

b. This study be expanded to include information on the Ranger organization in the remainder of the Canadian North and East before a final solution is proposed to CFHQ.

c. If the complete study confirms the trend apparent from the study of the Quebec District responsibilities, the eventual organization might well be along the following lines:
(1) The company organization of the Canadian Rangers be abolished, instead a number of platoons, and in some cases sections, which report directly to the appropriate Ranger LO take the place of the Companies.

(2) That Mobile Command take over complete responsibility for the Ranger organization, dividing Canada into two sectors, the sector East of a line running North from the west boundary of James Bay be administered from CFB Valcartier; the other segment from CFB Calgary.

(3) That an appropriate Ranger Liaison Officer Staff be added to the operations staff of the two CFBs. These LOs to report, through the base commander, to the Operations and Intelligence Staff at HQ Mobile Command. (It should be noted that CFB Valcartier is already providing administrative support to the District Ranger LO at Quebec City).

(4) That Ranger LOs be from the same Regiment or Unit that is to operate in the Ranger platoon area and that, at least in Eastern Canada, they be completely bilingual.

(5) That the Ranger sub-Units at Anticosti Island, Baie Comeau, Longue Pointe, Trinity Bay be considered for reduction to nil strength and disbandment.
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
FMC 1901-1999/0OPS
1 Nov 67
A/COS O&T

CANADIAN RANGERS ORGANIZATION


B. FMC 3185-2 Comd of 13 Jul 67 “Comd’s views to CFHQ on specialized reserve units - strike companies for DCF Ops”

1. Reference A invited Mobile Command to attend a conference at CFHQ to study the role and basic concept of the Canadian Rangers with a view to establishing its validity and/or its tasks. The undersigned, Lt Col R. Berube SSO Land represented Mobile Command.

2. The commander’s views on Canadian Rangers were given to SSC Land. They are:

   a. The Rangers, amongst other means, are a necessary element in Northern Canada to observe and report any unusual activities in time of peace and war.

   b. Should the Canadian Ranger organization continue to exist, and if placed under operational command of Mobile Command in time of war, we envisage using them as guides, observers and for limited local defence tasks as stated in CAO 246-3.

   c. Canadian Rangers, because of their low O&M costs, are a very inexpensive para-military asset.

   d. As long as the Armed Forces are organized on a quasi-functional command basis, Mobile Command is not prepared to assume responsibility for Ranger organization, administration and training in peace time.

3. Early in the meeting, DC Res representative, Lt Col T Haynes, SSO Plans, stated that the meeting had truly been organized because of Reference B, which states in part that “Mobile Command does not support the [existence]/requirement of specialized reserve units.” DC Res interpreted this statement as
encompassing the Rangers. Therefore, based on their interpretation, they could see no future use for the Rangers and as such, wanted to categorically confirm the need to disband or (if a change of mind was presented) to maintain them.

4. SSO Land immediately corrected Lt Col Haynes in that the Commander’s statement was referring to that part of the Regional Reserve tasked to form “strike companies” for Regional defence operations. Further discussion ensued during which SSO Land stated Commander’s views as outlined in para 2.

5. Consequently, the meeting from then on redirected its discussion to:
   a. The current organization, its O&M cost and tasks.
   b. The changing face of the North and possibility of more effective military representation.
   c. Recommendations for the near and distant future with regards to Rangers.

   a. Org:
      Overall control: DC Res
      CRLO Prairie Region – 598 – auth 600.
      CRLO Quebec Region – 685 – auth 600.
      CRLO Atlantic Region – 524 – auth 500.
      1916
      [3]. Ranger org into Coys and Pls.
      NOTE: 1. CRLO’s on part time duty with Rangers.
      2. Western Comd/Pacific Region reduced their effort in recent years due to increased development of North West and possible disbandment of Rangers. Adm in poor shape.
      b. O&M Cost:
         Ammo - $18,400 (100 rds per man per year) (200 in Que Region)
         Wpn – 1,000 (rifle replacement 30 at $50.)
         Travel – 10,000 (mostly atlantic region)
         CRLO Pay – 42,000 (4 Capts)
         CRLO Travel – ?
         ?
         Approx - $40.00 per Ranger -
c. Tasks

(1) Security – Observe and report
(2) Operation – Guides and local defence
(3) Humanitarian – Search and Rescue.

7. Changing face of the North.

a. No need to expand on this subject. The population and the industry has multiplied ten-fold or more since World War II. The deduction presented by SSO Land is that we should exploit this advent by educating all agencies, organizations, individuals that it is their duty as Canadian citizens to maintain watch over the Northern regions and report any unusual activities. As stated earlier, the Rangers are only a part of the potential observer corps. All members agreed that there is a need for DGIS/JIR to show more concern with this aspect of intelligence – after all, the defence of the country is the primary task of the forces – and early intelligence is the principal criterion. The present system of reporting, if any, is most inadequate.

b. Thought be given to eventually extend the Canadian Militia to the Northern developments, and in the process, absorb the Ranger organization. The North is becoming more and more “part of the developed Canada” and military representation, in austere form, will bear some influence to the new communities and to the forces as a whole.

8. Recommendations

a. The Canadian Ranger organization, for the time being, should continue in its present form and receive the necessary financial support to maintain itself to the administrative and operational standards laid down in CAO 246-3.

b. JIB, through DGIS, be requested to organize a system whereby all sources of intelligence and communications in Northern Canada be used for observing and/or reporting.

c. DG Plans and DG Ops study the requirements for the location of semi-active military elements in Northern Canada, in relation to the threat and their recommendation will be the basis for the relocation/reorganization of the Ranger elements, pending the possible development of Militia units.
d. Indirectly in support of c above, DG Ops as a member of a newly formed governmental committee on vital points make recommendations to DC Reserve on the possible location of [Militia] units in Northern Canada, with a view to tasking them for this role.

9. Conclusion. The Canadian Rangers are one source of intelligence and operational support and are to be retained; we must exploit other resources in Northern Canada; and finally, through the years to come, extend a more positive military presence in the North.

10. Follow-up Action. CFHQ will publish minutes of the conference and will staff the recommendations contained herein.

R. Berubé
Lieutenant Colonel
SSO Land
584
Doc. 15: Col R.A. Reid, “Canadian Rangers,” 8 February 1968

RMQ: 1901-1999/0 (Rangers)

Headquarters
Quebec Region
Edifice Casault
Parc des Champs de Bataille
Quebec, P.Q.
08 Feb 68

Chief of Defence Staff
Canadian Forces Headquarters
Department of National Defence
Ottawa 4, Ont.

Attention: D Ops

CANADIAN RANGERS

References: Ops 385 dates 15 2000Z Jan 68

AIM

1. To justify the continuation of the Canadian Rangers.

BACKGROUND

2. Shortly after World War II, it was decided that a threat to this country existed from an enemy using the Arctic approaches with the aim of bombing built-up areas of Canada and U.S.

2. It was, at that time, appreciated that an enemy force could be used for the purpose of seizing an air-strip, communications centre as weather station for the purpose of enabling enemy aircraft to land, refuel, obtain weather information to carry out their mission.

4. To offset this sort of lodgement, it was decided to organize a force, with parachute capability, to dislodge any such enemy. This was to be known as the MSF.

5. Initially, it was agreed that several requirements were desirable in order to ensure the prompt employment of the MSF.

   a. Early warning of enemy lodgements.

   b. The enemy strength, weapons and objectives.
c. Knowledge of DZ’s and local terrain, and preparation of target folders for likely enemy target areas.

6. In the summer 1948, authority was granted for Quebec Command to proceed with the formation of a Rangers Corps.

DISCUSSION

7. Proposals have recently been put forward recommending changes in the terms of reference of the Canadian Rangers whereby their military effectiveness can be geared up to a state in which they can provide a force more suitable for the tasks they may be asked to perform.

8. Obviously, these proposals were impelled by the rapid growth of defence and important industrial installations in areas which were formally isolated. These areas now require more adequate protection than that capable of being provided by the Rangers.

9. The most satisfactory solution to this problem, however, seems to be the activation of militia units or sub-units rather than the formation of a new type of corps under name of Rangers.

10. One of the unfortunate aspects of the Rangers, in our experience, is the lack of understanding of the limited capabilities of this force. For instance:

   a. No funds are available from Region resources for Ranger training.
   b. By virtue of the CAO 246-3 outlining the terms of reference, Rangers are deliberately chosen from personnel who for reasons of age, category or other reasons, would not be available on mobilization for active service in other components of the Canadian Army.
   c. There are no service or civilian prerequisites.

11. Among others the following items disclose some of the favourable factors on which a better understanding of the Rangers can be based.

   a. They are permanent residents of their locality and district.
   b. They are familiar with local terrain.
   c. They are mostly experienced hunters, trappers, fishermen and guides.
   d. They are capable of living off the country for considerable periods without a fixed base.
   e. They are experienced all-weather travellers on land and water, ice and snow.
12. There are two most important considerations in favour of continuing the Rangers:

   a. They could be the insurance against surprise air or sea landed nuisance raids in isolated areas.
   
   b. They are the means by which residents of isolated settlements can be indoctrinated against docile or even helpful action to a potential enemy.

CONCLUSION

13. If the limitations of Rangers capabilities which are covered in this paper are clearly understood, it is quite easy to see that good use can be made of them to assist in the defence of Canada.

14. A study should be made to establish the necessity of activating Militia units or sub-units in areas that were formerly isolated.

15. They are the best source of information because while hunting, making excursions; they are always doing surveillance work.

16. Insofar as early warning of enemy aircraft is concerned, of course, reliance must be placed on radar. However, an actual landing or drop of an enemy force in isolated areas can be quickly confirmed by ordinary existing comms.

17. Rangers know the type of information wanted by the Region and are quite capable of doing this task well.

18. In spite of the fact that they should not normally be expected to engage the enemy, they are capable of causing the enemy to exercise extreme caution in his movements by threats of ambush sniping and such like tactics.

19. They should not be regarded as trained or experienced troops capable of carrying out military operations or to act as formal soldiers.

20. Rangers should be given an area of operational responsibility, based on the existing comms system: …

21. Individual post should be formed in lieu of vastly dispersed companies.

22. $100. bonus per year should be authorized for the detachment commander if we are to keep them interested.

23. Ranger detachments should be located in following places within Quebec Military Region Boundaries.

   a. Havre St-Pierre, Que.
   
   b. Harrington Harbour, Que.
   
   c. Blanc Sablon, Que.
d. Port Harrison, Que.
e. Great Whales, Que.
f. Moosonee, Ont.
g. Ruppert House, Que.
h. Eastmain, Que.
j. Fort Georges, Que.
k. Paint Hill, Que.
l. Fort Albany, Que.
m. Port Burwell, Que.
n. Fort Chimo, Que.
o. Payne Bay, Que.
p. George River, Que.
q. Wakeham Bay, Que.
r. Ivuyvik, Que.
s. Nottingham Island

24. Suggested changes on CAO 246-3 Restricted is attached as Annex A.

Roland A. Reid
Colonel
Commander Quebec Region
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

V 1901-1999/0 TD 7321 (DOPS)
4 July, 1968

Distribution List

CANADIAN RANGERS


1. Attached is a draft study prepared by D Ops as a result of the conference held on 30 October, 1967 and the comments resulting from Reference A.

2. Addressees are requested to submit their comments and suggestions before this study is submitted for consideration.

3. In addition, the following addressees are requested to insert the detail in the annexes indicated below:

4. Comments and the completed annexes are to be submitted directly to DGOPSL-2 by 29 July, 1968.

   N.H. Ross
   Brigadier
   Director General Operations Land

DISTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION

1. On 30 Oct 67 a conference was held, under the auspices of the former DG Ops, to discuss the future of the Canadian Rangers (CDN Rangs). Representatives were present from:
   a. CFHQ (D CON P, D OPS AND DG RES)
   b. HQ Mob Comd
   c. HQ Quebec Region
   d. RCMP
   e. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

2. The conference came to three conclusions:
   a. Some form of military or para-military representation is requested in the northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada.
   b. The primary tasks of this organization should be:
      (1) Reporting significant incidents.
      (2) The provision of guides and assistance to defence of Canada forces.
   c. The existing Canadian Army Order 246-3 requires re-writing.

AIM

3. To make recommendations with respect to the future of the CDN Rangs.

BACKGROUND

4. The present authorized establishments and strengths (May 1968) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>REGION</th>
<th>ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Atlantic</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Quebec</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ontario</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>NIL</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Prairie</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Pacific</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The CDN Rangs is a corps of the Reserve Militia and is organized into companies and platoons; the company localities and status are as shown in the attached Annex A.

6. In the existing CAO 246-3 the Rangers are given the following tasks:

   a. Normal Tasks. The normal tasks of the Rangers, which are to be performed under ordinary as well as emergency conditions, are:

      (1) To respect any suspicious activities occurring in their respective areas to the appropriate army headquarters by the best means available;

      (2) To provide guides to army units operating within their areas;

      (3) To assist in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces. This does not include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence;

      (4) To perform aircraft spotting duties to supplement the RCAF Ground Observer Corps, including the locating and reporting of crashed aircraft and the reporting of aircraft apparently in distress within their area of responsibility;

      (5) To carry out coast watching;

      (6) To provide rescue parties for military purposes as detailed by officers commanding commands;

      (7) To assist the RCM Police and/or provincial police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;

      (8) To collect detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance in their other tasks or of value to the armed forces generally.

   b. Special Task. Where it can be established that a locality requires a defence force and it is not feasible to employ a Regular Army or Militia unit for such a purpose, officers commanding commands may recommend to AHQ that this task be assigned to a Ranger unit.

7. The administrative and financial implications are:

   a. Weapons and Ammunition. The CDN Rangs are issued with obsolete No. 4, Mk 1 Rifles of which stocks are adequate for the foreseeable future. The .303 ball ammunition stocks are adequate and are also available in commercial patterns.
b. Annual Re-supply. Rangers are issued with 200 rounds of ammunition per year. This is usually done during one of the Ranger Liaison Officer’s (Rang LO) visits.

c. Financial Implications. The following factors apply:

(1) The Rangers are NOT paid.

(2) During the fiscal year 1967/68 $ [blank] was expended in travel costs to permit Ranger Company and Platoon Commanders to visit their sub-units.

(3) Regular Rang LOs are employed at each of the Region Headquarters except Ontario Region, but only about 25% of their time is spent on Ranger duties.

(4) During the fiscal year 1967/68 $ was expended on travel costs to permit Rang LOs to visit within their Regions. These costs include, in part, the transportation of the annual re-supply of ammunition.

(5) A summarization of costs is at Annex B.

d. Uniforms and Equipment. The Rangers are issued with a web belt and an identifying armlet.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

8. As a result of the conference, referred to earlier, the Commands and Regions were asked to consider the future of the CDN Rangs and to offer their views on the possible employment of the Rangers. The replies from the Commands are summarized as follows:

a. Maritime Command. It is felt that the Rangers should be retained and that their roles continue as listed in CAO 246-3. The point was made that the Rangers were considered to be the main source of intelligence with respect to clandestine operations in remote areas. It is also considered that the Rangers may be useful in helping to locate merchant vessels anchored in isolated areas (this is within the context of naval control of shipping).

b. Mobile Command. The Command is very interested in the retention of the Rangers as a source of guides and information.

c. Air Defence Command. The Command has a limited interest in the Rangers, but felt that they might be useful in remote areas. They may be able to give assistance in Search and Rescue, and in reporting suspicious air and ground activity.
9. The replies from the Regions are summarized as follows:

a. Atlantic Region. It is considered that the Rangers perform a useful role at the minimum cost and should be retained. It was also stated that land and sea exercises had proven the worth of the Rangers as an intelligence gathering agency.

b. Quebec Region. The Region made a very strong and good case for retaining the CDN Rangs. Two important considerations were cited:
   (1) The Rangers serve as insurance against surprise air or sea-landed nuisance raids in isolated areas.
   (2) They could be a means by which inhabitants of isolated settlements could be indoctrinated against docile reaction or even assistance to an enemy.

c. Ontario Region. The Region has NO Rangers and knows of NO requirement for them.

d. Prairie Region. Recommends that CDN Rangs be dormantized.

e. Pacific Region. Recommends that the role of the CDN Rangs be taken over by the RCMP and provincial employees (eg game wardens).

10. It may be significant that the Commands and Regions with interests in coastal areas are in favour of the retention of the Rangers. The one exception is Pacific Region and this is interesting because this is where the Ranger organization was first raised during World War 2 in the form of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers.

11. It is considered that the statement of requirement made by Maritime Command and Mobile Command justify the continuation of the CDN Rangs.

12. The use of the designation “Canadian Ranger” has been questioned, but it is considered that if an organization similar in function and constitution is to be retained, then we should also retain the well-known designation which is already embodied in QR&O.

13. Although it has been established that the CDN Rangs should continue in being, it was also evident, from the comments, that changes are required. They are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
**MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE NORTH**

14. There should be a military presence in the North (and other remote areas of Canada) for the purpose of maintaining sovereignty, for defence purposes, and possibly to give inhabitants of these areas a sense of participation in Canadian military affairs. This is probably best done through the Active Reserves, but until an area becomes sufficiently populated and “urbanized” to support a reserve unit the next best solution is the CDN Rang organization.

**TASKS**

15. The tasks set out in paragraph 6 require revision because they place too much responsibility on the shoulders of a corps that is given virtually NO direction or training. The most significant improper task is the “Special task” in which the Rangers are required to provide a defence force under certain circumstances. This should be removed because the Rangers have NO more formal a commitment to this role than a private citizen and his obligation to serve in a “local defence force”. One problem here is that the term “Ranger unit” is used in paragraph 6 and there really is NO such thing as a Ranger unit in the military sense.

**ORGANIZATION**

16. A fault in the present organization is that Rangers are organized into “platoons” and “companies”. This tends to mislead people into thinking that they are organized into formed military bodies; they are NOT and function very much, and at their best, as individuals. It is considered that designations of a non-tactical nature should be substituted; a reasonable arrangement would be the use of a term such as “Ranger Area” to describe a geographical grouping of Rangers. Attached as Annex C is a proposed organization, including channels of communication.

17. It is considered that the internal organization within the Rangers for command and control should be kept as simple as possible; even simpler than the present system of company and platoon commanders. The system should be based on geography and communications and “command” should be bested in the man who is the focal point of communications to the “outside”, eg. A Hudson Bay Company Factor, mission superintendent, DOT representative, etc.

18. A political division such as the District of Keewatin could be divided into a number of “ranger areas” at the discretion of the Region Commander, but consistent with the foregoing principles. The general disposition, of course, should be consistent with the operational requirement stated by the commands.
LOCATIONS

19. The comments received from the Commands and Regions state that the following areas are of concern to them:
   a. Newfoundland and Labrador.
   b. Quebec.
   c. Ontario.
   d. Manitoba.
   e. Northwest Territories.
   f. Yukon Territory.
   g. British Columbia.

20. Subject to the operational requirements of Mobile Command, consideration should be given to dormantizing the majority of Rangers in Ontario Region. An exception is the area skirting Hudson and James Bays; there is a need for maintaining a presence in the coastal area.

21. The foregoing areas have been narrowed to those as indicated in the map at Annex D.

ESTABLISHMENT

22. In some cases, such as Ontario, Manitoba and B.C., the Rangers are shown as continuing in existence because a Command requested them, but, contrary to the recommendations of the Region. This decision was made on the basis that the Command’s operational need must prevail over the views of the Region. It is considered that the present establishment of 5,000 should remain intact because there are NO financial implications in maintaining this ceiling, but the vacancies should be re-allotted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>FORMER ALLOTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Atlantic</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Quebec</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ontario</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Prairie</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Pacific</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. CFHQ reserve for future allocation</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. The establishments should be reviewed periodically (eg: every five years) with a view to:
a. Transferring vacancies between Regions.

b. Converting some vacancies (and units) to the Militia as Ranger areas become urbanized and can support a unit of the active reserves.

RANGER STAFF OFFICERS

24. There are four Rang LOs located at HQ Atlantic, Quebec, Prairie and Pacific Regions. Generally speaking, they devote most of their time to matters other than Ranger. It is considered that many of the Ranger problems are attributable to the lack of attention given to them and interest shown in them and if the Rang LOs operated on a full-time basis and perhaps were more energetic in their activities the Rangers could be improved. It is considered, too, that appointing young Regular officers as Rang LOs would be a very good introduction to the Canadian North in addition to adding some young blood to the Ranger Staff. There might be merit in locating the Rang LO at population and administrative centres in the NORTH such as FROBISHER, WHITEHORSE or YELLOWKNIFE.

25. It is NOT considered that a Rang LO is required in Ontario Region. With the Ranger area and establishment reduced it is considered that the Ranger liaison duties in this particular case can be performed as a subsidiary function by another staff officer at the Region HQ.

TRAINING

26. Any failings in the Ranger organization must stem from our inability to train individual Rangers. This is virtually an insurmountable problem because of the nature of the individual Ranger and where he is most valuable he is also a nomadic man. It is considered, however, that most of the subjects in which we want to instruct the Ranger can be done by a few simple written instructions in the vernacular. A small booklet issued to each Ranger could convey to him the following:

a. The types of assistance that we want.

b. The form in which we would want information, and the suggested means of conveying it to us.

27. Without flooding the individual with instructions, it may be possible to issue bulletins, in the vernacular and only as required, on matters of current interest. As an example: if we were interested in USSR air activity in a particular sense (ie BEAR overflights), it might be possible to distribute unclassified hand-outs including recognition silhouettes and a statement of what was required of the Ranger.
RELATION TO THE FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS

28. It is considered that the Rangers should continue to be the responsibility of the Regions, but that when a force is operating in a Ranger locality the commander of the force may make a direct call upon the local Rangers for assistance. In an emergency the request could be made without reference to the parent Region, but if time permits (e.g. a pre-planned operation or an exercise) the arrangements should be made through the Region.

FINANCIAL

29. HQ Quebec Region has recommended that a Ranger commander be paid $100 per year to maintain his interest. It is considered that selecting one Ranger appointment for pay and NOT the others might create ill feeling. Consideration might be given to granting $100 per year to the Ranger Captain in charge of an Area to be used at his discretion for the benefit of his Area as a whole (e.g. an annual “parade”, purchase of ammunition if the annual DND supply fails, etc). The grant could be paid at the discretion of the Region Commander.

REVISED ORDER

30. Attached as Annex E is the draft of a CFAO to replace the present CAO 246-3. The draft incorporates all of the factors and recommendations made earlier in this paper.

SUMMARY

31. In summary, the following points are made:
   a. There is a continued operational requirement for the CDN Rangs.
   b. Changes are required to the order governing the CDN Rangs and to their tasks.
   c. The organization and organizational terminology applied to the Rangers should be changes to prevent their being confused with formed military bodies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. It is recommended that:
   a. The CDN Rangs continue in existence.
   b. The attached draft CFAO be approved for promulgation.
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION AND EXAMPLES OF THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE CDN RANGS

NOTES

1. The selection and designation of Ranger areas is to be left to the discretion of Region Commanders.

2. The numbers of individual Rangers within a Ranger area will depend on population densities and communications.
ANNEX D
To V1901-1999/0 TD7321
DATED 4 JUL 68

[Redrawn by Jennifer Arthur-Lackenbauer]
SUGGESTED CFAO FOR CANADIAN RANGERS

CANADIAN RANGERS

AIM

1. This order sets forth the policy governing the Canadian Rangers.

ROLE

2. The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces.

BASIC CONCEPT

3. Basically it is intended that the Canadian Rangers will function as individuals as opposed to formed bodies and that they will perform their approved tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations. Such tasks will be performed on an entirely voluntary basis.

MILITARY STATUS

4. The Canadian Rangers is a corps of the Reserve Militia. Members of the Canadian Rangers have, therefore, military status consistent with QR&O 2.03 and 3.295A. Thus they are:

   (a) liable to serve only in an emergency;

   (b) not required to undergo annual training;

   (c) liable for service when placed on active service by the Governor in Council.

5. Notwithstanding the above, Canadian Rangers may volunteer to perform tasks as set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 in peacetime, other than in times of emergency. They may also, in accordance with the terms of QR&O 2.03, be employed with the Regular Army.

TASKS

6. The normal tasks of the Canadian Rangers, which are to be performed under ordinary as well as emergency conditions, are:

   (a) to report any suspicious activities occurring in their respective areas, to the appropriate army headquarters by the best means available;
(b) to provide guides to army units operating within their areas;
(c) to perform aircraft spotting duties, including the locating and reporting of crashed aircraft and the reporting of aircraft apparently in distress within their areas;
(d) to carry out coast watching;
(e) to provide rescue parties as detailed by officers commanding Regions.

7. It is emphasized that the above tasks are the only ones to be performed by Canadian Rangers in their military capacity. Any others would be undertaken, in peacetime at least, as private citizens and not as members of the armed forces.

COMMAND

8. The Canadian Rangers will be under the command of the officer commanding the military Region in which the unit is located, unless otherwise authorized by CFHQ.

9. In an emergency an officer commanding a Canadian force may call directly upon local Rangers to give him assistance, consistent with paragraph 6 of this order, at which time they will come directly under his command. Where possible, however, this assistance and command arrangement should be pre-arranged with the Commander of the Region.

10. Command by officers of the Canadian Rangers will be exercised in accordance with QR&O 3.295A.

STRENGTH

11. The maximum strength of the Canadian Rangers is limited to 5,000 all ranks. The maximum strength authorized for each region is:

- Pacific Region .......... 200
- Prairie Region .......... 800
- Ontario Region .......... 200
- Quebec Region .......... 600
- Atlantic Region .......... 700
- Total .......................... 2,500.

12. The remaining 2,500 will remain under the control of CFHQ (DCOPSR) for possible allotment to Regions as they are required.
ORGANIZATION

13. It is emphasized that action is required in accordance with the role of the Canadian Rangers will normally be carried out by individuals. Unit organization, therefore, is required mainly for the collection and dissemination of information.

14. The Canadian Ranger organization is accordingly divided into Ranger Areas within the geographical boundaries of each Military Region. The size and strength of the Ranger Area will be at the discretion of Commanders of Regions.

15. The Senior Ranger in each Ranger Area will hold the appointment of “Ranger Captain” and he will hold the rank of a lieutenant in the Reserve Militia.

TRAINING

16. Commanders of Regions will be responsible for the training of Rangers in their Regions; such training will be based upon broad direction issued by CFHQ. These directions will be consistent with the tasks of the Canadian Rangers and will be based on requirements stated by the Commands.

PERSONNEL

17. Personnel should be restricted mainly to those who would not be available on mobilization for active service in other components of the Canadian Forces. The standards of selection of personnel will be those judged by Regional Commanders as suitable for the performance of ranger tasks.

DURATION OF SERVICE

18. An enrolment as a Canadian Ranger shall be for an indefinite period of time.

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

19. Appendix “A” to this order sets out the Canadian Ranger entitlement for arms and equipment, together with accounting and repair procedures.

20. Issue of rifles and ammunition to Canadian Rangers will be restricted to actual requirements as determined by Regional Commanders, within the scale shown in Appendix “A”.

21. Rangers employed on tasks requiring rifle equipment may be issued with such equipment with the prior authority of CFHQ (DCOPSR). This equipment is meant primarily for Rangers on coast watching duties.

22. Uniforms will not be issued to Canadian Rangers.
FINANCIAL

23. Service in the Canadian Rangers will be unpaid except when such service is required under the conditions set out in QR&O 2.03(3). Participation in northern exercises and attendance at an Army school of instruction are examples of employment under QR&O 2.03 (3) and payment for such employment will be charged against the Militia vote.

24. Expenditures from Militia votes for the training of Canadian Rangers will not be incurred without the prior approval of CFHQ (DCOPSR).

25. In accordance with QR&O 210.81A Ranger Captains, with the prior authorization of the Minister, may be reimbursed for travelling expenses when visiting their Rangers for administrative and training purposes.

26. Entitlement to medical care at public expense is governed by the provisions of QR&O 34.07. In this connection Canadian Ranger duty will be construed as consisting only of those tasks or training set out in paragraphs 6 and 15.

27. Canadian Rangers are entitled to disability compensation under the terms of [illegible] for any injury, disease, or illness attributable to the performance of Continuous Army Duty or Special Duty.
ACCOUNTING AND REPAIR PROCEDURES FOR
STORES ISSUED TO CANADIAN RANGERS

ENTITLEMENTS

1. The following items may be issued to Canadian Rangers, at the discretion of Commanders of Regions, up to the maximum quantities shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catalogue No</th>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Issue Per Man</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1A 2500</td>
<td>Belt, waist, WE patt 37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A 6450</td>
<td>Carrier, cartridge, WE patt 37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD 308623</td>
<td>Armlent, Khaki, Canadian Rangers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/BA 10050</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 bantam butt, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/CR 27GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 with long butt, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/CR 28GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 with normal butt, or</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/CR 29GA</td>
<td>Rifle, No 4, Mk-1 with short butt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/SM 52A</td>
<td>Bottle, oil, Mk-5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/AA 0571</td>
<td>Cover, breech, rifle, No 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/BA 0518</td>
<td>Pullthrough single, Mk 4B</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/BB 0521</td>
<td>Pullthrough gauze, wire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB/AA 1657</td>
<td>Sling, rifle, web</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ/QA 0174</td>
<td>Cartridge, .303-in ball, Mk 7</td>
<td>300 rounds per Ranger per annum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Ammunition entitlements for Canadian Rangers will be calculated by Region headquarters, based on the latest strength return received from Ranger Captains. Region HQ will advise the applicable stores and CFHQ of the quantity of ammunition to be issued. It will not be necessary for Canadian Ranger units to return fired cartridge cases.

ISSUE OF STORES

3. Base Supply Service will maintain the records for stores issued to Canadian Rangers.

4. BSS will:
(a) voucher stores to Canadian Ranger Captains;
(b) ships stores direct to individual Canadian Rangers or to Ranger Captains;
(c) forward the one copy of the issue voucher to the Ranger Liaison Officer

5. On receipt of the stores, the individual Rangers or the Ranger Captains will:
(a) check the stores to the packing note copy of the ordnance issue voucher and place the following certificate thereon:
“Certified that the stores listed on this voucher have been received in good order.”;
(b) forward the packing note to the BSS;
(c) issue the stores and obtain a receipt from each individual concerned.

REPAIR AND INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT BY RCEME

6. Individual small arms will NOT be inspected or repaired at remote localities.

7. Equipment requiring repairs in RCEME workshops will be returned to the BSS by the Ranger Captain. The BSS will prepare a request for Repair Service (CAFC 2149) and forward the equipment to the RCEME workshop.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

8. Loss of firearms and other equipment will normally be reported immediately to the Ranger Captain. Where local conditions are such that the individual member concerned can report a loss earlier to the RCM Police than to his Captain such action will be taken and the Captain informed accordingly.

9. The Ranger liaison officer will investigate the loss of or damage to stores on issue to the Canadian Rangers.
MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE
ON THE CANADIAN RANGERS
HELD AT CFHQ AT 1000 HRS, 1 MAY, 1969

PRESENT

Chairman  LCOL  WBS  Sutherland  DGOPSL
Members  LCOL  R  Berube  SSO P&O, HQ FMC
        LCOL  REM  Cross  D Con P
        MAJ  W  Bain  D Ops
        MAJ  AR  Kirk  DCD
        MAJ  WG  Munroe  D Con P
        MAJ  AJ  Rundell (RA)  DERL
        LT(N)  TC  Arkell  D Res P
        CAPT  CR  Carpenter  D Land R
Secretary  MAJ  RT  MacEachern  DGOPSL

INTRODUCTION

1. The Chairman called the Conference to order at 1010 hrs and asked whether there were any errors or omissions arising from the minutes of the conference held the previous week. There being no comment the Chairman proceeded with the order of Business as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>ACTION BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>WORKING GROUP REPORT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A Working Group Report concerning the feasibility of extending the militia to the north, militia assistance to the Rangers in that area and whether or not a new command and control structure is required in northern Canada was presented for review and comment. In presenting the report the Secretary stated that the report
was a result of consultations with and advise [sic] from 
LCOL Berube, Capt J Bordeau of Que Mil Dist, D 
Land R and DConP. In subsequent discussion the 
following points were raised:

a. All environments are responsible for the direct 
defence of Canada consequently bush pilots and off-
shore fishermen should be tasked in Ranger type roles as 
part of a future organization for the defence and security 
of northern Canada.

b. When and how to establish a militia presence in the 

north.

c. Enrolment standards.

d. Regional problems in Ranger control arising from 
former staff cut at Regions.

e. Need for an equipment policy to be defined and 
detailed requirements to be staffed.

f. Requirement for an on the spot survey to determine 
the type and size of militia organizations which can be 
supported.

g. Such surveys to be conducted by Regional Ranger 
Organizations but augmented to a degree that tasks can 
be properly carried out.

h. Regions should be given clear instructions on survey 
requirements and assistance, where necessary, to 
implement a programme.

ACTION NOW REQUIRED

3. The Chairman stated that three courses of action or 
steps were required before gaining approval to task 
Regions:

a. A report to the Northern Steering Committee 
outlining a course of action for the Land Force in the 
North.

b. Details of concept and philosophy to be worked out.

c. A working group be established to produce costing
requirements.
The Chairman closed the meeting by stating that copies of the report to be sent to the Northern Steering Committee would be made available to members of Ranger Conference.

R.T. MacEachern
Major
Secretary

V 1901-1991/10 (DGOPSL 2)

CANADIAN RANGERS
WORKING GROUP REPORT

1 May, 1969

AIM
1. To report on the feasibility of extending the militia to the north, militia assistance to the Rangers in that area and whether or not a new command and control structure is required.

BACKGROUND
2. The conference on the Canadian Rangers on 24 April 1969 concluded that:
   a. The Rangers, if active, fulfill a useful military function.
   b. The Rangers must be revitalized to continue in a meaningful role.
   c. Canadian national objectives in the north dictate a requirement for a military presence in that area which is beyond the scope of the Rangers.
   d. A new military presence is required to fulfill the needs of our national objectives in the north.
   e. The extension of the militia to settled communities in the north was suggested as a means of advancing a new military presence and at the same time be a vehicle by which the Rangers can be brought under effective control and revitalized.
f. Military assistance to our native Indians and Eskimos would enhance the position of individuals and groups, develop an awareness of citizenship and be of value to other government and commercial agencies.

g. A new command and control structure may be required for the north.

POPULATION

3. Many areas of the north are rapidly becoming developed and are supporting larger populations of both white and native inhabitants. These populated areas should be capable of manning a militia unit or sub unit but such support would be subject to the following limitations:

   a. The populated areas consist mainly of short term inhabitants who work for government or industries in order to make quick money and return south;

   b. the Whites, Indians and Eskimos who are natives of the area are rugged individuals with an aversion to an organized and structured way of life;

   c. it is believed that the Yukon Regiment was disbanded due to a lack of appeal to and support by the inhabitants.

4. Attached as Annex A to this report is a breakdown of dormant and active Ranger locations together with the population figures for those areas. Unfortunately those figures are based the 1961 census but many have been updated by Vital Statistics and Quebec Region. These figures do however point to the changing face of the north and the fact that many Eskimos and Indians now live in settled communities which have churches, schools and industrial plant. An analysis of those areas best suited to support a militia unit or sub unit are as follows:

   a. **West** – Pacific Region

      The majority of Rangers locations are dormant however the Kitimat – Ocean Falls area could, possibly, support a battalion size militia organization. However, this is not in the north and may not be desirable [sic] in the present context.

   b. **Yukon and North West Territories**

      (1) **Yukon** – A weak battalion centred on White Horse or a company size organization with sub units or platoons in outlying areas could possibly be supported.

      (2) **NWT**. The Yellowknife – Hay River – Fort Smith – Uranium City area may be able to support a battalion size militia organization.
c. Quebec Region and Baffin Island

(1) Frobisher Bay. Now has a population of 2800. Frobisher Bay is being built into a fairly large administrative base for the whole of Baffin Island. A militia platoon could be established and serve as a control centre for Rangers in the outlying areas.

(2) Fort Chimo. Population approximately 750. A small platoon could be established as a control centre for the Ungava Bay area.

(3) Lake St John area. Population has grown greatly in recent years. A militia battalion could possibly be supported.

(4) Western Quebec. Bourlamaque – Malartic – Amos – Noranda – Rouyn area may be able to support a battalion minus organization. It may also be possible to serve as a control centre for Rangers in the James Bay area.

(5) St Lawrence north shore. The population has grown in this area to the extent that Rangers may be disbanded in favour of militia.

d. Newfoundland and Labrador

(1) Churchill Falls. This area now has a population of approximately 3000 and is growing rapidly. A platoon plus could be established in this area.

(2) Goose Bay. May also support a platoon and serve as a control centre for Rangers in the district.

Churchill Falls and Goose Bay are considered as vital points and local defence of those areas should be augmented as much as possible from local resources.

PROPOSED MILITIA LOCATIONS

5. Population figures alone cannot be taken as the sole criteria for establishing new militia units and sub units. Local attitudes, population mobility, custom, state of literacy, distance, communications, climate and a host of other factors need to be considered. Regions should therefore study and make recommendations for their areas. However, from a population point of view militia units could possibly be established as follows:

b. **Yukon.** Battalion headquarters and one company in the Whitehorse area with companies located at the Dawson – Mayo – Keno area and the Aklavik – Inuvik – Fort McPherson area.

c. **NWT.** Battalion headquarters and a company(-) in Yellowknife with company or platoon locations at Hay River, Fort Smith and Uranium City. Yellowknife is an important communications centre and could possibly be used as a militia region headquarters at some future time.

d. **Quebec.** Battalions may possibly be established in the Lake St John area, Western Quebec and the St Lawrence north shore area. Fort Chimo and Frobisher Bay may support platoons by which Rangers could be brought under greater control.

e. **Newfoundland.** The Churchill Falls and Goose Bay areas may be able to support company size militia establishments.

**SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS**

6. The whole of the northern continental coast together with the Hudson Bay and northern islands reaching to Ellesmere Island does not have the sufficient population to support militia units. Ranger units in these areas must be revitalized, brought by some means under greater control and new Ranger posts established to ensure a token military presence in these areas. There are many small communities with various forms of government agencies in these areas now which could facilitate the establishment of viable Ranger posts.

**RANGER REVITALIZATION**

7. All of the areas suggested for possible militia units and sub units are locations of Tanger companies or platoons and each location has very positive growth potential for population. The native Indian and Eskimo populations of the north are now living in larger communities and their children attend regular schools set up by the Department of Northern Affairs. It is in these areas that military training and assistance by Militia organizations can be of value to the country, to the community and to the individual. It may not be desirable to drill an Eskimo but he can be taught a variety of skills. Those who venture out on the trap lines or annual limits can be of greater value to the defence of the country by virtue of training which he does not now receive.

8. A new identity, pay, and the provision of limited amounts of uniforms and equipment on an equal basis with militia in other parts of the country will greatly assist in giving Rangers new incentives to serve on a more active basis.
9. Those Rangers who now inhabit sparsely populated areas need to be brought under greater control. It is in these areas that now Ranger posts should be established. Regional headquarters should therefore seek out areas for new Ranger posts so as to close the huge gaps along our northern coasts.

10. The old Ranger organizations of companies and platoons are not organized, nor do they function, as companies and platoons. Future Ranger organizations to operate in the barrens should be organized into posts rather than companies. A type of organization could be as follows:

![Diagram]

- Militia unit or sub unit
- Rangers of Militia unit
- Ranger Posts controlled by Militia Units
- Individual Rangers

**COMMAND STRUCTURE**

11. Should Military Regions support the establishment of militia in areas suggested in this paper a new command structure may therefore be required. It is felt that the initial expansion should be carried out under the auspices of Regional headquarters but thereafter command and control may be better effected through channels created by new headquarters. From a geographical point of view, northern Canada is best divided into two sectors. The sector East of a line running North from the West boundary of James Bay and including Baffin Island be controlled from CFB Valcartier. The other sector controlled from CFB Calgary. The North West Sector would be best controlled from a location within the geographic sector, therefore, a location such as Yellowknife is well suited for the purpose. Indeed the second phase of northern military expansion may well be the creation of a Northern Region with its headquarters centred on Yellowknife.

12. Mobile Command is responsible for the direct defence of Canada and, under conditions laid down in the War Book, Rangers may be used for this role. The northern militia and Rangers should therefore form a future part of the Mobile Command Reserve or that headquarters which will be responsible for the defence of Canada in the future.
SUMMARY

13. It is the opinion of this Working Group that from a population point of view, and subject to the detailed study and recommendations of Districts/Regions, it is feasible to extend the Militia to northern areas. Such an extension would assist in providing a new military presence desireable [sic] under the terms of Canada’s National Objectives for the north, and at the same time serve as a means of revitalizing the roles and functions of the Canadian Rangers in northern areas. The establishment of Militia units and sub units to northern areas should initially be carried out under the control of Militia Districts. Thereafter such units should be placed under the command and control of new northern headquarters centred on Yellowknife for the north western sector and CFB Valcartier for the north eastern sector.

V 1901-260/4 (DMIL)
Canadian Forces Headquarters
Ottawa 4, Ontario
10 March, 1970

Commander
Mobile Command
CFB St Hubert
St Hubert, P.Q.

CANADIAN RANGERS

1. Attached is a paper outlining the current status of the Canadian Rangers. This paper has been prepared to assist your HQ in the command and control of the Canadian Rangers which is being assumed 1 Apr 70

W.K. Lye
Brigadier General
Director General Operations Land

CANADIAN RANGERS

1. CFOO 70-5 dated 16 Feb 70 “Command and Control – Militia and Canadian Rangers” transferred the command and control of the Canadian Rangers to Commander Mobile Command from Canadian Forces Headquarters effective 1 Apr 70.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to outline the current situation of the Canadian Rangers prior to handover of command from DCOPSR to Comd FMC.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3. The units of the Canadian Rangers are placed under command of the officer commanding the region in which they are located, except that the Rangers in Ontario are under command of Quebec Region. An officer on the establishment of each Region (less Ontario) is detailed as the Ranger Liaison Officer.
ORGANIZATION

4. The Canadian Rangers is a sub-component of the Reserve Force and is organized into companies and platoons. It consists of officers and men who volunteer to hold themselves in readiness for service but who are not required to undergo annual training.

TASKS

5. The normal tasks of the Rangers are as follows:

   a. report by the best means available by any suspicious activities;
   b. provide guides to armed forces units operating within their area;
   c. perform aircraft spotting duties including locating and reporting crashed aircraft;
   d. carry out coast watching;
   e. provide rescue parties; and
   f. collect, as required, detailed information concerning their local area.

The tasks of the Rangers are normally carried out by individuals and therefore unit and sub-unit organization is mainly for control, administration and the collection of information.

RANGER STRENGTHS AND LOCATIONS

5. Attached at Annex A is a list showing the Ranger company strengths and locations. …

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

7. See CAO 246-3

EQUIPMENT

8. See CAO 246-3

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. At a conference held 24 Apr 69 to discuss the Canadian Rangers (attended by HQ FMC) the following conclusions were recorded and it was recommended that they form the basis of a departmental policy:

   “a. The Rangers if active, fulfill a useful military function,
   b. The Rangers must be revitalized to continue in a meaningful role,"
c. Canadian national objectives in the north dictate a requirement for a military presence in that area which is beyond the scope of the [Rangers],

d. A new military presence is required to fulfill the needs of our national objectives in the north,

e. The extension of the Militia to settled communities in the north was suggested as a means of advancing a new military presence and at the same time be a vehicle by which the Rangers can be brought under effective control and revitalized,

f. Military assistance to our native Indians and Eskimos would enhance the position of individuals and groups, develop an awareness of citizenship and be of value to other government and commercial agencies; and

g. A new command and control structure may be required for the north.

10. The Canadian Rangers is a part of a general review now in progress on a broader activity “need for a para-military force in the North” of which the Rangers is only one part. The OPI for this study is DGOPSL.
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

FMC 1901-260/4 COS OPS

5 Aug 70

Distribution List

MOBILE COMMAND GOAL 70/205
REORGANIZATION OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

Reference: A. FMC 1901-260/4 COS OPS dated 7 May 70

1. Reference A detailed the stages in the execution of a special project to
determine the requirements and concepts for the reorganization of the Canadian
Rangers as required by Mobile Command Goal 70/205. Major W.K. Stirling was
appointed Project Officer. This study has now been completed and Major
Stirling’s final report is attached.

2. It will be noted that the recommendations in paragraphs 23 and 24 of this
report are based on military principles and are opposed to the political trend
towards greater involvement in the Canadian North. It should also be noted that
command of the Canadian Rangers will be assigned to Commander Northern
Region at a date to be determined. This Headquarters’ recommendations on the
reorganization/disbandment of the Canadian Rangers will have considerable
effect on the current NRHQ Phase I studies and thus should be forwarded to
CFMQ as expeditiously as possible.

3. Addressees are requested to assist in the formulation of the FMC position on
the reorganization/disbandment of the Canadian Rangers by commenting on:
   a. the recommendations in the attached report,
   b. the requirement for further study, and
   c. other factors which should be considered.

May comments please be submitted to DCOS OPS by 14 Aug 70.

C.V. Carlson
Colonel
A/COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST
THE CANADIAN RANGERS
AN IN DEPTH STUDY CONDUCTED
BY MAJ WK STIRLING UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
MOBILE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

INTRODUCTION

1. Command and control of the Canadian Rangers was transferred from Canadian Forces Headquarters to the Commander Mobile Command effective 1 Apr 70 in accordance with Canadian Forces Organization Order 70/5.

2. A paper prepared by the Director General Operations Land on 10 Mar 70 (attached as Annex A) outlined the current statue and tasks of the Canadian Rangers insofar as CFHQ was aware. This paper included the following recommendations as a basis for Departmental policy on the North:
   a. The Rangers if active, fulfill a useful military function.
   b. The Rangers must be revitalized to continue in a meaningful role.
   c. Canadian national objectives in the North dictate a requirement for a military presence in that area which is beyond the scope of the rangers.
   d. A new military presence is required to fulfill the needs of our national objectives in the North.
   e. The extension of the Militia to settled communities in the North was suggested as a means of advancing a new military presence and at the same time would be a vehicle by which the Rangers can be brought under effective control and revitalized.
   f. Military assistance to our native Indians and Eskimos would enhance the position of individuals and groups, develop an awareness of citizenship and be of value to other government and commercial agencies; and
   g. A new command and control structure may be required for the North.

3. CDS Directive D7/70 of 16 Mar 70 (Annex B) established a new military presence in the North and command and control structure by the organization of Northern Region Headquarters. The status of the Militia and Ranger was not resolved by this Directive.

4. Consequently the Commander, Mobile Command directed that a study cc the Canadian Rangers be initiated “to determine the requirements and concepts for
the reorganization of the Canadian Rangers..........” A copy of this Study Directive of 7 May 70 is attached as Annex C.

BACKGROUND

5. The Canadian Rangers were established as a Corps of the Reserve Militia by PC 1644 of 23 May 47. The roles were defined as:

a. IN WAR
   (1) Provision of guides to troops.
   (2) Provision of a reconnaissance screen.
   (3) Coast watching.
   (4) Fighting as guerilla bands, if required.
   (5) Assistance to the RCMP and, where applicable, the Provincial Police in the discovery and apprehension of small groups of enemy agents.
   (6) Reporting and locating friendly aircraft in distress and rendering assistance to the crew of such aircraft.
   (7) Reporting the approach of enemy aircraft.

b. IN PEACE
   (1) Collection of detailed information about the country likely to be of use in future planning.
   (2) Provision, if required, of rescue parties.

6. It should be pointed out at this time that the Canadian Rangers are a direct successor to the PACIFIC COAST MILITIA RANGERS (PCMR) established in British Columbia and Yukon Territory in 1942. Immediately after WORLD WAR II pressure was brought to bear on the Minister of National Defence and the CGS by members of the PCMR to perpetuate their organization. Consequently a national organization was established. The PCMR were organized during a critical period of the Second World War when Japanese power was at its height and there was a very real threat to Canadian territory. To convey this concept into any situation short of actual war would be difficult as indicated by MGEN HW Foster, GOC Eastern Command in his letter to the CGS of 12 Oct 46.

“It is considered that it would be extremely difficult to maintain interest under peacetime conditions even for a small nucleus of such a Corps (Canadian Rangers). The problem of administration and training would create an added load for the small staffs available for such work and would be out of proportion to the results obtained. Experience with the PCMR’s on the West Coast shoved that during the Japanese threat the Rangers were extremely enthusiastic and performed a useful function.
However, as soon as the immediate threat disappeared, interest fell off and the organization became somewhat top heavy with administration.”

7. During the period 1946-47 when the concept for the national organization for the Canadian Rangers was being developed some other doubts were expressed by senior officers such as BRIG SF Clark, DCGS in his letter of 1 Nov 46.

“I suggest that before authority is given for the organizing of Canadian Rangers that it be definitely established that such a force would be of real value in the defence of Canada. In this regard I wish to point out that folk-lore attributes many qualities to outdoor people and especially to natives (such as Indians and Eskimos) which, in fact, they do not possess. It is common belief that Indians and Eskimos, and to a lesser degree trappers, in our Canadian hinterlands possess special qualities of sense of direction and as such would be extremely valuable as guides to Military parties during operations. One of the most experienced Arctic travellers, [VILHJALMUR] STEFANSSON, states that invariably he found that Indians and Eskimos were reasonably good guides in country with which they were familiar but that as soon as they were taken into unfamiliar country, they displayed no “sixth sense of direction” but were, in fact, less able to find their way about than an experienced Anglo Saxon.

Further, unless personnel are trained on accurate reporting to topography details, there is the question of whether or not it is better to have no details or information than to have information or details that cannot be relied upon.

Assuming for the moment that one cannot rely on such personnel as guides and topography intelligence officers, what then is the value of a handful of men widely dispersed and equipped with sporting rifle?”

“It is my view that only trained reconnaissance elements should be used for recce purposes.”

“Reporting and Locating Friendly Aircraft. In unorganized territory where numerous telephone booths do not exist, now can this possibly be done without an elaborate wireless net work? If the essential elaborate wireless net work is established, then any person, male or female can do the job.”

“Reporting the Approach of Enemy Aircraft. See recommendation in above paragraph. With the increased speed and height of flight of modern aircraft, I doubt the value of visual aircraft recognition as opposed to radar and planes equipped with IFF.”
“Collection of Detailed Information. This is the responsibility of the GS Branch, ISTS, Engineer officers, etc. I think it is worth a try but the information gained should be closely screened to see if it is sufficiently valuable to be continued as a peace-time role for Rangers.”

“Rescue-Parties. Agree, but surely this will be done whether or not personnel are organized as Rangers.”

“Training. It is my opinion that they should either be trained or not trained. There should be no half-way measure. If Rangers are to be trained in Military topography, Military message writing and use of wireless, then the training should be intensive or not undertaken at all. In regard to wireless training it must be borne in mind that the Rangers are located in isolated parts of the country. Therefore, no footling little wireless set will suffice for training. It must be a man-sized piece of equipment costing a very great deal of money, be technically complex and not capable of being man packed.”

8. BRIG WHS Macklin VAG stated in his letter of 28 Jun 46 on the subject of Canadian Rangers:

“I suggest that before such a force as this is organized we should be perfectly clear as to the military necessity for it and the precise military functions it would carry out, and its relation to the other Armed Forces, especially the Reserve Army.”

“Several proposed roles have been listed (see paragraph 5 this paper). Note that these are almost all entirely ancillary to the operation of other, more highly organized forces. My own opinion is that everyone of these roles, except acting as guides, or as hunters of small enemy date, in the immediate vicinity of the Rangers homes can better be done by regular forces.”

“Moreover, if these roles are to be properly carried out there has to be adequate training; or the results may be disastrous. Thus “coast watching” sounds simple but we had a couple of general alarms in Pacific Command because coast watchers reported “submarines” that turned out to be whales. And as for “Elementary Aircraft Recognition” (proposed to be taught to the Rangers) it is nothing less than a menace. In fact, there is no such thing - you either recognize the aircraft or you don't! Guesswork in no help.”

“I had some 18 months experience, as BRIG IC Adm and afterwards BGS, Pacific Command, with the PCMR in 1942-44. This force was
organized when the Americans lost naval control of the Pacific for a time, and there was a great risk of an actual invasion of Canadian territory.”

9. BRIG Macklin commented further on the Canadian Ranger proposals in a memorandum to the Adjutant General on 31 Oct 46.

“In short, I am not at all convinced of any military necessity for a nationwide Ranger org. I believe the moving spirit behind this proposal is LCOL Taylor, formerly staff officer PCMR in Pacific Commend. The field of activity for Rangers in BC is probably greater than anywhere else in Canada. But in my view it is very limited even in BC.”

“P.S.”

“In short I rather feel this is another instance of making the plan and then desperately trying to make the appreciation fit it.”

10. MGEN EG Weeks Adjutant General forward BRIG Macklin’s memorandum of 31 Oct to DMO&P with the following comments:

“I agree with the comments of the VAG”.

“BRIG Macklin has had some practical experience with this organization (PCMR) when he served in Pacific Command.”

11. It would appear that some considerable doubt existed in the earliest days as to the military value and possible roles of the Canadian Rangers. When one considers the dramatic changes that have taken place with respect to communications, transportation and social and economic conditions in the remote areas of Canada in the past quarter century there is even more reason now to believe that these doubts were well founded.

CURRENT SITUATION

12. The Canadian Rangers are alleged to be active in some 61 communities across Canada from Newfoundland to BC and throughout the Yukon and North West Territories with an active strength of some 1,647 individuals (Annex A refers).

13. The author had the opportunity in June and July of this year to visit some 17 representative communities in the remote areas of Canada in an attempt to determine:

a. Ranger interest and activity.

b. A definition of operational requirements and current roles.

c. A plan for the reorganization of the Canadian Rangers based on a and b.
14. It was discovered that there is some interest in the Canadian Rangers by a few individuals who are or were members of the corps however there is for all practical purposes no activity. Members of the Rangers, RCMP, Government officials and other citizens were at a loss to describe any requirement or role for an organization of this type other than in the most nebulous terms based on self interest. Consequently no plan has been contemplated for the reorganization of the Canadian Rangers. A summary of the situation in each community visited is as follows:

a. PORT MENIER, ANTICOSTI ISLAND, QUEBEC
(1) Reported to be an active unit.
(2) Determined that there has been no Ranger activity or interest since 1964.
(3) The District Superintendent of Consolidated Bathurst Ltd (this company owns the island lock, stock and barrel) was of the opinion that there was no need for the Rangers as the Company had excellent communications with the mainland and would report any unusual incident as a matter of course.

b. ST ANTHONY, NEWFOUNDLAND
(1) Reported to be an active unit with a strength of 28.
(2) A meeting was held with some six members and former members of the Canadian Rangers.
(3) Consensus as follows:
   (a) They had never had a “gathering”.
   (b) They had never been told what to do.
   (c) They believed the Rangers should continue but were unable to define a purpose other than to hold rifle practices and report conditions on the coast.

C. HARRINGTON HARBOUR, QUEBEC
(1) Reported to be an active unit.
(2) Discovered a total of five Rangers.
(3) At a meeting with three members it was determined that they had never had a get together and had never been told what to do. They were unable to describe any role they could perform other than report unusual incidents at sea which they would do anyway.
(4) Mr John Blake the local Anglican priest who is also a pilot and covert the coast in a church airplane was of the opinion that DOT
radio operators, lighthouse keepers, fishing patrol vessels and commercial air pilots were much more familiar with activities in the overall area and would report as a matter of course.

d. CARTWRIGHT, NEWFOUNDLAND (LABRADOR)
   (1) Reported as an active unit with strength of 29.
   (2) Met with Mr WS Moores, representative of the Dept of Labrador Affairs who is the senior Ranger. He is of the opinion that the Rangers could serve a useful purpose in reporting incidents. The issue of rifles and ammunition was important to the local inhabitants.

e. MOOSONEE, ONTARIO - MOOSE FACTORY (FEDERAL STATUS)
   (1) Reported as a dormant unit.
   (2) There is a CAF Radar Site at Moosonee so Rangers would be redundant.
   (3) Discussion with the RCMP, MOOSE FACTORY with respect to James and Hudson Bay revealed:
      (a) They felt there was no requirement for Rangers.
      (b) RCMP were responsible for submarine reporting.
      (c) The entire coast was covered by radio telephone and reporting of unusual incidents was automatic.

f. OCEAN FALLS, BRITISH COLUMBIA
   (1) Reported as an active unit.
   (2) Recorded strength is seven.
   (3) Met with Mr AA Peters, Ranger Officer. He is quite keen to have the organization continue however could only suggest that they could carry out shooting practices and possibly assist in search and rescue.
   (4) Local RCMP advised they used the Rangers one year as town patrol on Halloween however could see no other need as the coast is covered by three RCMP patrol boats. Furthermore there are large auxiliary RCMP detachments at PRINCE RUPERT, TERRACE and KITIMAT which suit their purposes better.

g. DAWSON CREEK, BRITISH COLUMBIA
   (1) Reported as an active unit with a strength of 107.
   (2) Unable to locate any Rangers.
(3) Local RCMP were unaware of the existence of the Canadian Rangers and did not believe they could serve any useful purpose. They have 21 members in the Auxiliary RCMP and believe they are capable of carrying out any of the functions suggested.

h. FORT ST JOHN, BRITISH COLUMBIA
(1) Reported as an active unit with a strength of 90.
(2) Met with Mr EJ Galibois, Commander of 15 Company Canadian Rangers.
(3) This was the only active organization discovered, they produced 30 Rangers to act as enemy and guides for Exercise TOP HAT 1969. Mr Galibois was of the opinion that the Rangers could still serve a useful purpose as guides and for traffic control on the Alaska highway. However they would require uniforms, radios, FN rifles, ID cards and a considerable amount of training.

j. FORT NELSON, BRITISH COLUMBIA
(1) Reported as an active unit.
(2) Mr Andy Grychuk, senior Ranger stated he still had 37 names on his books. He felt there was still a need for Rangers to act as guides and to guard critical points on the Alaska highway. Stated that they would require FN rifles, uniforms, radios and a lot of training.

k. WHITEHORSE, YUKON TERRITORY
(1) Reported as an active unit with a strength of 20.
(2) Was able to locate three members.
(3) Held a meeting with two Rangers who were not too sure what they could do but felt they should have uniforms and ammunition for annual rifle competition.

m. DAWSON CITY, YUKON TERRITORY
(1) Reported as an active unit with a strength of 19.
(2) Only able to locate one former member of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers.
(3) This gentleman indicated that he could see no interest in nor need for the Canadian Rangers.

n. INUVIK, NORTH WEST TERRITORIES
(1) Reported as an active unit.
(2) Discussed situation with Mr Dave Jones, senior Ranger, RCMP and Mr Dick Hill who is in charge of the INUVIK RESEARCH LABORATORY and is also the mayor.

(3) I was advised that the Rangers were formed in 1952 however they have never been called upon for any reason. The senior Ranger could see no role or requirement for Rangers and there was little or no interest around town.

(4) Mr Dick Hill was emphatic in his advise that insofar as the native people are concerned:
   (a) No separate or special programmes should be established - they should be treated simply as Northerners.
   (b) There should be no special treatment or pay.
   (c) We must divest ourselves of the colonial approach such as setting up native units or especial constables such as the RCMP.

p. AKLAVIK, NORTH WEST TERRITORIES
(1) Reported as an active unit with strength of 25.
(2) No Rangers could be found.
(3) This community is 60% Indian and 40% Eskimo. Entered into a discussion with the VERY REV HG COOK ANGLICAN BISHOP of the North West Territories. In his extensive time and travels in the Arctic he was unaware of the Ranger programme and felt it would be of little value today considering the majority of the natives live on welfare in fewer and larger committees and no longer hunt or fish to any extent.

q. TUKTOYAKTUK, NORTH WEST TERRITORIES
(1) Not a Ranger site but one of the oldest Eskimo communities in the Western Arctic.
(2) Mr Dennis Lowing, Area Administrator for the Territorial Government could see no need for a Ranger organization as there is a DEW line site and an RCMP detachment.

r. FORT SIMPSON, NORTH WEST TERRITORIES
(1) Reported as an active unit.
(2) Found one Ranger and discussed programme in conjunction with the RCMP.
(3) Was advised that they could not see what purpose they could serve and in effect were not required.
15. Perhaps the most important piece of general advice I received was that southern Canadians should rid themselves of their romantic concept of the North. The Arctic has become rather a sophisticated social environment. Hunting and trapping, though still carried on are not the main pursuits of the indigenous people. Eskimos are being collected into permanent settlements such as FROBISIER, CAMBRIDGE BAY and TUKTOYAKTUK where they are provided with houses and to a large extent live on welfare. The young Indian and Eskimo is being well educated in modern schools at INUVIK, YELLOWKNIFE and FROBISHER. When they complete their education they will be trained to take their place in modern society and not on the Arctic ice or the trap line.

16. Certainly there are still people in the North who hunt, trap, fish and prospect and one hopes there always will be however these people are now the exception rather than the rule. The people who know the North best are the RCMP, bush pilots, certain members of the Territorial Government, some prospectors and the missionaries. Unfortunately these citizens for various and obvious reasons are not the types on which to base a Ranger type organization. The type of people envisaged by the DND planners in 1946 on which to develop the Canadian Ranger concept simply no longer exist in sufficient numbers.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

17. The Study Directive (Annex C) indicated the possibility of upgrading the Canadian Rangers to Militia status or perhaps to a type of para-military force along the lines of frontier forces in Alaska.

18. At one time there was a Militia unit in WHITEHORSE (THE YUKON REGIMENT) and in YELLOWKNIFE (ENGINEER SQUADRON). These units were disbanded for lack of support and this situation does not appear to have changed.

19. One should remember that a Militia unit requires a large population base in order to maintain its viability. The population of WHITEHORSE is 11,000, YELLOWKNIFE 5,000, INUVIK 4,500 and FROBISHER 2,500. It has been demonstrated that the two largest cities in the North have been unable to maintain a Militia unit. One of the reasons for this is that Militia service is somewhat traditional and depends on a rather stable population. These conditions do not exist in the North. The population is composed of many new Canadians and by far the majority of all Northerners are in the North to make as much as they can as quickly as they can and then move out.

20. In order to establish a Militia unit a Regular staff would be required as would unit accommodations and training facilities. All this would be very expensive as is everything in the North and it is doubtful if such expenditures could be justified
on a military basis considering be doubtful support of a highly paid and very mobile population.

21. The question of a para-military organization comprised of native people should be investigated further in conjunction with the Territorial Government and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The advice I have received is that this would be a wrong approach and that the Indians and Eskimos should be treated as equal Canadian citizens and if they wish to enlist should have an equal opportunity to do so in the Regular Force.

22. One of the most popular and well received programmes in the North is the military cadet programme particularly in the residential schools. Perhaps this programme could be reinforced by permanent Regular Force instructors and more sophisticated equipment. However this question was beyond the scope of this study.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23. The Canadian Rangers as presently constituted both in form and concept should be disbanded.

24. No attempt should be made at the present time to establish Militia units in the North.

25. The possibility of developing a para-military organization of native peoples on a regular basis should be investigated further in conjunction with the Federal and Territorial governments.

26. The cadet movement in the North should be reinforced and developed further.

CONCLUSION

27. There are a considerable number of people in the North who have dedicated their lives to the development of this vast estate and to the welfare of the native peoples. These people are to be found amongst the RCMP, Federal and Territorial governments and the various church organizations. They are unlike the majority of Northerners who are there simply for the “fast buck” or because they could not fit in the southern society. These people feel somewhat protective of the North and particularly resent what they call “do-gooders” making a brief tour of the Arctic and then deciding what is best for the poor natives. There are too many instances of this to be recorded however the effects of these well intentioned programmes are still felt and resented is the North. The Canadian Armed Forces have an extremely good reputation in this part of the country and we must ensure that this is maintained. No programme should be conceived or
initiated until such time as we once again have an intimate knowledge of current social and economic conditions in Northern society. In addition we must work very closely with the people of the various agencies of the North to make sure that our objectives reinforce and not disrupt the pattern of development.
REORGANIZATION OF THE
CANADIAN RANGERS

B. FMC 1901-260/4 (Comd) dated 4 September 1970
C. V 1901-260/4 TD 0258 (DORL) dated 7 October 1970
D. NR 5323-1 (SSO Land) over V 3060-0 (Gp Ldr Rangers) dated 4 September 1970 (copy attached)
E. Annex B to NR 3120-1 (Comd) dated 25 September 1970 (copy attached)
F. S 1901-1580 (CDS) dated 13 October 1970.

1. By reference C this Headquarters was requested to suggest an appropriate reply to reference B. For reasons given hereunder it is not considered possible to do so at this time, and an alternate course of action is proposed in lieu.

2. Careful study of references A and B by this Headquarters has led to the conclusion that Commander Mobile Command can foresee no useful functional role for the Canadian Rangers, and therefore has recommended their disbandment. Coincident with the MOBCOM study, however, LCOL J.A.R. Vandal of this staff was involved as a member of the Rangers Study Group for the forthcoming Force Development Objective for the Canadian North (see reference D). That study group set out “to determine the activities of the Canadian Rangers, Cadets, and other elements of the Reserve Forces which will make the optimum contribution to the Defence objectives for the Canadian North.” The members examined each objective in turn to determine whether, and if so how, Rangers could play a useful part in their attainment. They concluded that there was a valid role involving tasks essentially similar to those
already documented. In doing so, however, they stipulated the major proviso that certain formal training would be essential to the effective discharge of each of the tasks associated with that role.

3. Recognizing the impropriety of making firm and final recommendations on the reorganization of the Rangers without first being exposed to real life factors such as weather, terrain, distance, maple, and employment in the North, the study group identified three prerequisites to successful completion of their assigned task. These may be summarized as follows:
   a. that the Rangers not be hastily disbanded or reorganized;
   b. that NRHQ conduct further field studies to determine where Rangers are required and to define specific tasks; and,
   c. that no attempt be made to finalize reorganization planning without prior consultation between the CF (i.e. NRHQ) and other federal agencies concerned with the North.

Based upon these, the group made several interim recommendations, chief among which involved the two concepts that:
   a. Ranger Posts should be established only where there was a job for Rangers to do; and,
   b. Ranger reorganization should be along strictly regional lines, with NRHQ exercising Command and Control only over Rangers within the Northern Region.

4. The Ranger Study Group report, albeit an unofficial document, was used by this headquarters in drawing up the proposed statement of Operational Procedures which was submitted to CDSAC on 30 September 1970. (Reference E.) By reference F the CDS approved these procedures. Commander Northern Region has been directed to determine over the coming 18 months locations for and employment of Rangers in order to take firm recommendations on the reorganization of the Rangers by 1 April 1972.

5. Commander Maritime Command, for his part, is understood to be keen to assume Command and Control over Rangers within his regions. This being the case, and in view of Commander Mobile Command’s recommendations, it therefore is proposed that an interim directive be issued assigning command and control of the Canadian Rangers to Regional Commanders, and providing for:
   a. Commander Northern Region to progress detailed surveys of potential Ranger posts and requirements throughout the North leading to formal recommendations for the re-vitalization of the force within his region by 1 April 1972;
b. Commander Maritime Command to conduct appropriate surveys/studies in Atlantic and Pacific regions and to submit his recommendations, ideally within the same time frame as (a) above; and,
c. the disbandment of Ranger units no longer required.

6. This Headquarters has every confidence that through close coordination between the two commanders and with CFHQ it will be possible to achieve a reorganization plan common to both (and thus resulting in a clearly identifiable Canadian Ranger Force), and at the same time adaptable to the unique requirements of East, North and West.

R.M. Withers
Brigadier-General
Commander

ANNEX G
TO V 3185-C/70 (DGFO)
DATED October, 1970

CANADIAN FORCES
NORTHERN ACTIVITIES
TASK GROUP ON
RANGERS, RESERVES, CADETS

References:

A. CFHQ Instruction VCDS 5/70 dated 12 Jan 70. Force development objective for Canadian Forces in the North.

B. Task assignment for activities in the Canadian North Rangers dated Jul 70 as amended by V3185-0170 (DGFO) dated 14 Aug 70.

C. V1901-1991/10 (DGOPSL) over V3120-13 dated 28 Oct 69. Brief concerning the desirability of having the Canadian Rangers and/or other Reserve land forces in the North.

D. V1150-110/536 (DCONP) over V3120-13 dated 5 Dec 69. A report by the Steering Committee on the Canadian North.

E. 1150-110/536 (DCONP) over 3120-13 dated 16 Jan 70. Col R. Berube's report on his tour of Northern Canada.


G. FMC Ranger Study conducted by Maj WK Stirling.


INTRODUCTION

1. In reference D, Defence Objectives for the North were identified as follows:

   a. Contributing to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in the North by:

      (1) providing a military presence;

      (2) surveillance and reconnaissance of Canadian territory, airspace and territorial waters as well as the air and sea approaches thereto;
b. Maintaining operationally ready maritime, land and air forces capable of defeating illegal and forcible entry into the Canadian North;

c. Providing effective search and rescue services in Canadian territory and making cooperative contributions in international areas adjacent to Canada;

d. Assisting other government and commercial activities which enhance the economic development of the Canadian North and which are not available from other sources.

2. Practically all previous and current studies on the North suggest that the Rangers, other elements of the Reserves and the Cadets could make a worthwhile contribution to the attainment of the defence objectives for the North.

AIM

3. The aim of this Study is “to determine the activities of the Rangers, Cadets and other elements of the Reserves which will make the optimum contribution to the defences objectives of the North”.

SCOPE

4. Reference B defines the Canadian North for the purposes of this Study as that area included within the 60th and 141st west Meridians of longitude and from 60° North parallel of latitude to the North Pole including Hudson Bay and the Islands of the Arctic Archipelago. Notwithstanding this restriction, due consideration has been given in this study the following factors:

   a. Current planning at NRHQ is based on the assumption that the area of responsibility of Northern region will be the whole of The Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory, thereby excluding the portion of Quebec which is North of 60° parallel of latitude.

   b. Authorized units of the Canadian Rangers do not exist only in the North as defined above but in other areas of Canada where they may still be required in the future.

5. For the sake of simplicity and clarity this study is divided into three parts as follows:

   a. Part 1 - The Canadian Rangers

   b. Part 2 - Other elements of the Reserves

   c. Part 3 - Cadets.
PART 1 - THE CANADIAN RANGERS BACKGROUND

6. References C, F and G give considerable detail on the history, current status and shortcomings of the Rangers. In summary, this organization is practically non-effective today; however, in many areas there is still evidence of keen interest in a para-military organization such as the Rangers.

7. The main problem is the lack of a clearly defined role and tasks not adapted to the realities of Canada in 1970. Whilst nearly everyone suggests that, if active, the Rangers could fulfil a useful military function, there are very few suggestions as to what precisely the Rangers tasks should be.

THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

8. From a study of past Ranger operations, the following lessons can be drawn:

   a. Role and Tasks

   As stated above, a Ranger organization cannot remain active, particularly in peacetime, unless it is given a clear role. The tasks given to the Rangers must be realistic and reflect a genuine requirement.

   b. Training

   Indians and Eskimos have often shown themselves keen members of the Rangers. However, without training their usefulness is marginal at best.

   c. Equipment

   Most of the rifles which have been issued to the Rangers are unserviceable. Many have been lost; more are in bad need of repair or replacement. Other equipment, such as binoculars, has never been issued to the Rangers although it has often been requested.

   d. Command and Control

   Too many Headquarters, inadequate staff, faulty organization; those are comments which have been made frequently. For instance, the Company organization has never worked efficiently. Company Commanders could only see their platoons on the very rare occasions when they were travelling on their employer's business. In addition, Rangers LOs at various Headquarters could not be spared to see their Rangers often enough and as a result the Rangers lost interest.
e. Leadership
The practice of appointing Rangers leaders does not work. It has often been suggested that natural leaders selected by the Rangers themselves would have a much better chance of success.

f. Dress
The practice of issuing the Rangers with only an armband has not been found satisfactory. Some form of dress for the Rangers has been suggested as a real requirement.

g. Ranger Activities
It has been found that to maintain interest and to provide a minimum of training opportunities, the Rangers must be used more often in exercises, as guides, enemy or otherwise.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR RANGERS

9. In accordance with its terms of reference, this study is concerned mostly with the definition of the requirement for Rangers in the North, that is the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory. In this region, which is the suggested area of responsibility of Northern Region, the problem can be defined as follows: What contribution can the Rangers make to the attainment of the defence objectives for the North?

10. In addition, it is recognized that other Commands, in particular Mobile Command and Maritime Command, may have a requirement of their own for Rangers elsewhere in Canada. Also, other Commands may have various tasks for Rangers in the North.

DEFENCE OBJECTIVES IN THE NORTH

11. The contribution which the Rangers could make to the attainment of the defence objectives in the North is discussed in the following paragraphs.

MILITARY PRESENCE

12. If the Rangers are to contribute to the establishment of a military presence in the North, obviously they must be seen and recognized as an effective military organization.

   a. This suggest that they be given an identity of their own as part of the Canadian Forces; Their title should include a reference to the Canadian Force; The Canadian Forces Rangers is one of the many possibilities. Their dress should make them easily recognized as Rangers. Is an armband
sufficient? It is too easily lost to be adequate. A badge sewn on their cap or shoulder would be better. Ideally they should have some form of uniform; however, the cost and the administrative difficulties may make this impossible. The suggestion has often been made to issue them with an obsolete item of dress such as the battle dress. Although this may be possible, it is not recommended unless they can be trained to wear and maintain a uniform.

b. In addition, it is quite clear that, to be effective, the Rangers must be given some training. They must understand their tasks and be trained to carry them out. If they are given weapons and equipment they must know how to use and care for it.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECCE

13. a. If the aim of surveillance is the detection of anomalies, it follows that the Rangers may be useful in two ways:

(1) **Assisting in determining what’s normal.** In this respect, the Rangers could be very useful in assisting the Regular Forces to gaining the intimate knowledge of the North without which they could not be truly effective in the North. To this aim Northern Region will be establishing a data bank in the North. The Ranger could be an important information source for NRHQ.

(2) **Assisting in the detection of anomalies.** The Ranger, especially if he is trained to observe and report, could be very useful in that he would be asked to report not only what he has seen himself but what he has heard from others who may have witnessed an incident, a comprehensive surveillance system, whether area-oriented or actively-oriented would have to make use of every possible observer.

b. In the field of reconnaissance, the Rangers could again be useful in confirming incidents reported by other means of surveillance or by supplying additional information.

c. It is obvious that the usefulness of a Ranger will depend largely on the amount of training he is given. He must he taught at least what to observe and how to report it accurately and speedily. This suggests that a small number of trained Rangers deployed in the areas of prime interest (such as the Arctic Archipelago) would be better than a large number of untrained Rangers deployed at random over the whole of the North.
14. MAINTENANCE OF OPERATIONAL FORCES

a. The Rangers are far too dispersed to be truly effective in the defence of vital points. They should not be given a direct defence role other than observing and reporting.

b. However, the Rangers could assist in a meaningful way in the training of the Regular forces.

   (1) In operations such as Exercise New Viking the Rangers could assist in the individual training of members of the Regular forces by contributing their intimate knowledge of particular areas of the north. In addition, it may be very useful to include Rangers in Exercise New Viking serials to provide them with a training opportunity which has not been available in the past.

   (2) In operations or training exercises, the Rangers could continue to be used as guides, as enemy forces or in other capacities. This again can be another opportunity to train the Rangers to make them more useful.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

15. This is an obvious area in which the hanger could he useful. However, here again, the Rangers usefulness will be proportionate to the amount of training he has received in such skills as map reading, communications, marking of DZs, or LZs, recognition of aircraft, etc.

ASSISTING OTHER GOVERNMENT OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

16. In this respect, there is a wide range of possibilities which have not been exploited in the past. For instance, in small isolated settlements, the Ranger may assist in identifying those community projects which may require assistance from DND. In addition the Ranger may be in some cases the permanent DND contact man in isolated settlements. His intimate knowledge of a particular area may be very useful if DND is called upon for any reason in this area.

17. In summary, the Rangers could make a meaningful contribution to the defence objectives in the north. This is a clear role for a Ranger organization. The tasks are much the same as they have always been. What is different is that at last with the formation of NRHQ, it will be possible to regularly visit or contact the Rangers and thus instil a high degree of interest and effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. General. There are three pre-conditions that must be considered before listing recommendations, they are:
a. There should not be any hasty disbandment or reorganization of the current Ranger organization.

b. NRHQ should be given the opportunity to determine where Rangers are required and define precise Ranger tasks. This will not be possible until NRHQ is operating in the north and becomes more familiar with its area of responsibility.

c. The Armed Forces should not attempt to finalize its plan for Rangers before first establishing a close, intimate relationship with other federal agencies who have an abundance of knowledge of the north. In particular the Territorial Governments, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Department of Transport and the RCMP must be consulted before rendering a final decision. NRHQ is the obvious military unit to establish this relationship.

19. CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION

a. Ranger organizations should be regional. NRHQ should organize the Rangers in the Yukon and Northwest Territories to meet the specific requirements in its area of responsibility.

b. NRHQ should have full command and control of all Rangers within its region, only. If Rangers are needed in other parts of Canada to meet the requirements of other Commands they should be commanded and controlled through or by the applicable Region Headquarters.

c. Rangers should be organized by determining where individuals or Ranger Posts of one or more individuals are required and should only be established where required instead of arbitrarily selecting company or platoon areas. It is felt that it would be wrong to attempt to organize Rangers above the small post level. No attempt should be made to fix the strength of any Ranger organization; however, it is not envisaged that very large numbers would be required as in the past.

d. Rangers must be clearly told what to do, how to do it and how to report the information either direct to NRHQ or through one of its detachments such as Whitehorse and Frobisher. Generally speaking Rangers should not be organized in an area which lacks a means of communications; however, if an area was important enough NRHQ could fly in to make contact on a regular basis.

20. TRAINING. The Regional Commander should be responsible for the training of Rangers within his area of responsibility, in addition to the training which can be given “in situ” on the occasion of visits to Ranger Posts, a more
formal training programme is required. A team of instructors could well visit certain locations in the North and give a few days of instruction to selected Rangers in the area.

21. **EQUIPMENT.** Rangers are currently equipped with the Lee Enfield303 rifle and it is recommended that this weapon be retained as the Ranger rifle. Rangers should also be issued with binoculars to aid in their surveillance role, NRHQ may recognize additional equipment requirements once it begins operating in the north. Should some or all of the present Rangers be demobilized it is recommended that no attempt be made to recover the rifles already issued. Ammunition should not continue to be issued to demobilized Rangers.

22. **DRESS.** Uniforms should not be issued at this time, NRHQ should make a recommendation for the replacement of the currently issued Ranger Armband.

23. **PAY.** Although the Rangers need not be paid for their services, consideration should be given to granting an annual honorarium of $100.00 to every Ranger who has proved to be active and useful during the previous year. If he is not effective nor useful, he should be removed from the Ranger list. It would thus be possible to make the Ranger accountable for the equipment issued to him and assist him in defraying the expenses he may incur in the performance of his duties.

24. **MILITARY STATUS.** No change from the provisions of CAO 246-3 is considered necessary at this time.

25. **UNIT DESIGNATION.** It is recommended that the title “The Canadian Rangers” be changed to reflect a closer connection with the Canadian Armed Forces. “The Canadian Forces Rangers” is one such suggestion.

26. **PERSONNEL.** The standards of selection of personnel should be those judged by the Regional Commander as suitable for the performance of tasks. As a general guideline he should be sixteen years of age or older and should appear physically fit enough to complete assigned tasks. It is accepted that many Rangers may be unable to speak the [English or French languages] and an interpreter will therefore be necessary on the staff of NRHQ.

V 1901-260/4 TD 0258 (DORL)

Canadian Forces Headquarters
Ottawa 4, Ontario
4 November, 1970

Commander
Mobile Command
CFB St Hubert
St Hubert, PQ

MOBILE COMMAND GOAL 70/205
REORGANIZATION OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

B. V 1901-260/4 (VCDS) of 22 September, 1970

1. Your letter of 4 September 1970 contained a recommendation that the Canadian Rangers be disbanded. (Reference A). On 22 September 1970 I agreed to study the proposal and to communicate a decision in respect of the future of the Rangers (Reference B).

2. Since that time three significant factors have come to bear upon the question.
   a. A study of the future organization and role of the Rangers has been completed within the context of a Force Development Objective on the North. One recommendation contained in the document is that the Rangers could perform a useful and meaningful role if properly trained and equipped to do so.
   b. In view of this the Commander Northern Region Headquarters has been tasked by the CDS to make within 18 months a detailed analysis of the need, location, organization and modus operandi for Canadian Rangers within his area of concern.
   c. The Commander Maritime Command has stated a desire to obtain command and control over Ranger elements in Newfoundland and Labrador.

3. In view of the foregoing it has been decided not to disband the Canadian Rangers at this time. While details have not yet been completed you should assume for planning purposes that;
   a. The Canadian Rangers will continue for the foreseeable future;
b. That command and control of Ranger units North of the 60th parallel of latitude will be transferred to the Commander Northern Region in due course;

c. That command of the Canadian Rangers on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts will be transferred to the Commander Maritime Command at an early date.

4. A reorganization plan based upon the foregoing will be promulgated in due course.

M.R. Dare
Lieutenant-General
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Col W.B.S. Sutherland/5-8191/kf

J.C. Gardner
  BGEN
  DGOPSL

R.C. Stovel
  MGEN
  DCOPSR

MEMORANDUM

NR 5323-1 (SO OPS)

28 Jan 71

COS OPS

STUDY ON THE CANADIAN RANGERS
NORTHERN SERVICE UNIT (RANGERS)

References: A. Canadian Forces Northern Activities Task Group on Rangers, Reserves, Cadets of 4 Sep 70.
B. The Canadian Rangers. An in depth study conducted by MAJ W.K. STIRLING 5 Aug 70.
C. Eskimo administration V. (Diamond Jenness) 7 March 1968.

1. The future of the Canadian Rangers has not as yet been determined despite the studies that have been completed and the clearer definition of military roles in the North resulting from the formation of Canadian Forces Northern Region.

2. Reference B is an excellent study within the parameters in which it was established, however, it did not go far enough. This is evident in the following paragraph of that paper:

   a. “21. The question of a paramilitary organization comprised of native peoples should be investigated further in conjunction with the Territorial governments and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The advice I have received is that this would be a wrong approach and that the Indians and Eskimos should be treated as equal Canadian citizens and if they wish to enlist should have an equal opportunity to do so in the Regular Force”.

3. The questions that must be resolved in any study of the Canadian Rangers are as follows:

   FIRST Is there a requirement in the North for a military force?

   SECOND If a requirement exists can it best be met by the employment of Regulars or could a Militia (Ranger) type of organization fill the bill?
THIRD If there is a requirement for a military force what will be the roles, organization, employment and equipment requirements?

4. The primary defence objective for the North has been defined as:

a. Contributing to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty by:
   (1) providing a military presence;
   (2) surveillance and reconnaissance of Canadian territory, airspace and territorial waters as well as the air and sea approaches thereto.

5. The answer to the first question is apparent. There is a requirement for a military force in the North.

6. The answer to the second question is not quite so obvious. The Maritime Command Argus patrol flights do in fact provide a military presence, however, it can best be described as fleeting. These flights contribute to surveillance and have a limited reconnaissance capability, however, the territory is so vast and the flights so infrequent that effective surveillance and reconnaissance is not maintained. Maritime ships do not have the capability of operating in Arctic waters except under the most favourable conditions (no ice) and then only for a few weeks each year.

7. The Canadian Forces Northern Region will provide a minute military presence in the North and will have a limited reconnaissance, but not a surveillance capability. The training exercises conducted by Mobile Command in the North achieve a one time presence but these are so infrequent as to be of questionable value.

8. Air Transport Command resupply and training flights in the North provide an assist to military presence and surveillance but once again are of limited value. Air Defence Command provides a military presence at Cape Parry, Cambridge Bay, Hall Beach and Cape Dyer as does CFCC at Inuvik and Alert but as those installations are otherwise dedicated their value is extremely limited.

9. It would appear that the Regular Force as presently constituted and taken does not have or is unable to provide an effective military presence in the North nor is it capable of maintaining surveillance or conducting reconnaissance “of Canadian territory, airspace and territorial waters as well as the air and sea approaches thereto”. Let us now assess the capability of the Reserves.

10. There is no effective reserves organization north of 60° including the Canadian Rangers. The Reserve organization in southern Canada is composed of full time civilians on part time military activities. They receive up to 35 days pay/training each year and have limited value as a back-up force to the Regulars.
They are completely dependant [sic] on Regular Force personnel, equipment and facilities for their training. A similarly constituted force in the North would be of little value for the following reasons:

a. a military presence cannot be achieved by a part time service man;

b. surveillance is a full time, not a part time job;

c. reconnaissance requires training, equipment time; and,

d. Regular force personnel, equipment and facilities are not available for training.

11. The answers to the first two questions have indicated that a military force is required in the North and that they should be Regulars or at least on a full time basis. The third question is a matter of roles, tasks, organization and employment.

12. Suggested roles and employment for a full time military force in the North would be:

a. provision of a military presence;

b. surveillance of terrain, airspace and territorial waters;

c. land, sea and air reconnaissance including acting as guides for land parties and assistance in navigation for ships and aircraft;

d. assistance in search and rescue, particularly as ground search parties of life maintenance units;

e. assistance to other government departments particularly in the field of communication, community development and surveys of flora and fauna;

f. reporting on damage to the ecosystem; and,

g. maintenance of weather stations and sea and air navigational aids.

13. A suggested organization is outlined at Annex A including locations and strengths. This organization is based on the following principles:

a. All officers, NCO’s and men would be Northerners and would be members of the Regular Force (albeit initially restricted to service in the North).

b. The Northern Service Unit (Rangers) would be under command and control of the Commander Northern Region.

c. The purpose of the Training Company would be:

(1) to train Northerners to the extent of knowledge and skill required to carry out their duties in the field sections;
(2) to train NCO’s and officers for duty in the company headquarters and field sections.
(3) to prepare Northerners for service in other units of the Regular Force;
(4) to conduct training in special skills such as radio, electronics, mechanics etc.

d. Battalion headquarters and each of the four field companies would be commanded on a pro tem basis by Regular Force officers but only until such time as Northerners could be trained as commoners.

e. Initially the enrolment standards for all ranks would be different than those for southern members of the Regular Force, however, a programme could be developed leading to eventual equalization.

f. Each company would be responsible for a designated portion of Canadian territory, territorial waters and airspace in the North. Initially each company headquarters would be equipped with:

(1) a radio for communications with each field section, aircraft, ships and battalion headquarters at Yellowknife;
(2) light oversnow vehicles (LOVs) for winter patrols;
(3) a motor launch for summer patrols and resupply; and.
(4) aircraft servicing equipment.

g. Each section would be equipped with:

(1) a radio for communications with aircraft, ships other sections and company headquarters;
(2) LOV’s for winter patrols and surveillance; and,
(3) a small lending craft/launch for summer patrols, resupply and ship contact.

14. It is envisaged that the primary function of the unit (battalion) headquarters would be in command, control, training and force development whereas the company headquarters would be concerned with operations, administration, repair and supply. Each section would maintain daily year round radio communications with Yellowknife providing weather information, monitoring the movement of ships and aircraft, resource development, and providing reports required by other government departments. The information gathering system would be active rather than passive. During the winter months a regular patrol programme would be carried out between each section so that in effect the entire Arctic from the Alaska boundary to the eastern edge of Baffin Island between 65° and 85° NORTH would be covered. During the period of open water, patrols
would be carried out by radio equipped motor launches covering virtually the same area.

15. The advantages of a full time military force in the North, comprised of Northerners are many:
   a. The inherent skills of the Northerners could be utilized to the advantage of the military in achieving a year round military presence.
   b. Full time surveillance can be maintained.
   c. Reconnaissance can be carried out as required by forces in being and in location.
   d. The ability of the Regular Forces sea, land and air cleaners to conduct operations in the Arctic will be greatly enhanced.
   e. The Canadian Forces capability for search and rescue will be much more effective.
   f. Northern communications and weather reporting system will be expanded.
   g. Assistance to other Federal government departments will be of considerable value particularly in the fields of wildlife management, pollution control and resource development.
   h. The creation of 415 well paid jobs for Northerners in remote areas of the North will be of inestimable value. The relief to the welfare system, contribution to the economy of the communities and the development of pride in the individual employed in renumerative [sic] and essential employment is incalculable.

16. The developing, training and establishing of a Northern Service Unit (Rangers) is of course not without problems and it may well take some years before it can become effective. The important thing is to meet the challenge now and make a start even if it is only a few sections or one company to begin with. It is really more a matter of development than concept.

W.K. Stirling
SO OPS
NRHQ
ANNEX A
TO NR 5323-1 (SO OPS)
DATED 28 JAN 71

NORTHERN SERVICE UNIT (RANGERS)

V 1901-260/4 (DORL)
Canadian Forces Headquarters
Ottawa 4, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Distribution List

COMMAND OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

1. As a result of recommendations received from the Commanders Maritime Command and Northern Region together with conclusions reached by the study group on Force Defence Objectives, it has been decided that:
   a. the Canadian Rangers will not be disbanded at this time;
   b. further studies are required to redefine their roles, tasks, concept of operations, establishments and training;
   c. command of the Canadian Rangers will continue to be exercised by Commander, Mobile Command, until 31 March, 1971. Effective 1 April, 1971 command will be assumed by Commander Northern Region and Commander Maritime Command as indicated in the attached annexes.

2. Attached are the following annexes:
   A – Ranger units to be under command Maritime Command.
   B – Ranger units to be under command Northern Region.
   C – Ranger units and sub-units to be reduced to nil strength and made dormant.

3. CFOOs listing all organizational changes will be promulgated by CFHQ/CG Branch and the terms of reference of the Commanders involved will be revised. In addition, instructions required regarding the disposal of equipment and personnel matters for units and sub-units to be made dormant will be issued at a later date by the appropriate CFHQ agency.

M.R. Dare
Lieutenant General
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
**RANGER UNITS TO MARITIME COMMAND**

**ANNEX A**

**TO V 1901-260/4 (DORL)**

**DATED 22 February, 1971**

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<td>3 Pl</td>
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<td>Cape Dorset, NWT</td>
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ANNEX B
TO V 1901-260/4 (DORL)
DATED 22 February, 1971

RANGER UNITS TO NORTHERN REGION – HQ

ANNEX B
TO V 1901-260/4 (DORL)
DATED 22 February, 1971

RANGER UNITS TO NORTHERN REGION – HQ

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Key Documents
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<td>22</td>
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<td>NOTE: Strengths are not accurate</td>
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CANADIAN RANGERS

UNITS AND SUB-UNITS TO BE REDUCED TO NIL STRENGTH AND
MADE DORMANT

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit/Sub-Unit</th>
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<tr>
<td>27 Company</td>
<td>Uranium City, Sask</td>
<td>PRAIRIE</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Platoon, 5 Company</td>
<td>Fort Harrison, Que</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Platoon, 5 Company</td>
<td>Rupert House, Que</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Platoon, 5 Company</td>
<td>Fort George, Que</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Platoon, 5 Company</td>
<td>Great Whales, Que</td>
<td>EASTERN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Platoon, 5 Company</td>
<td>Moosonee, Ont</td>
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</tr>
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<td>7 Platoon, 5 Company</td>
<td>Fort Albany, Ont</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Platoon, 8 Company</td>
<td>Fort Chipewyan, Alta</td>
<td>PRAIRIE</td>
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INTRODUCTION
1. The Canadian Rangers provide a military presence capable of limited action in accordance with their role in the sparsely settled Northern, Coastal, and isolated areas of Canada.

2. The Canadian Rangers are a direct successor to the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) established in British Columbia and the Yukon Territory in 1942. The organization in existence today was established in 1947 and has been in continuous existence since that date.

AIM
3. The aim of this directive is to define the organization, role and concept of operations of the Canadian Rangers.

GENERAL
4. The authority for the organization of the Canadian Rangers is QR&O Article 2.034 sub-para (d). The provisions of QR&O are amplified in CFA) 2-8 and as appropriate in CAO 246-3.

5. The Canadian Rangers are to provide a military force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces. It is a sub-component of the Reserve Force. Members have, therefore, military status consistent with QR&O article 2.03. They are:
   a. liable to serve only in an emergency;
   b. not required to undergo annual training; and
   c. liable for service when places on active service by the Governor in Council.

6. Notwithstanding the above, the Canadian Rangers may volunteer to perform military tasks in peacetime. Such tasks, other than in time of emergency, where emergency is defined as war, invasion, riot, or insurrection, real or apprehended,
will be performed on an entirely voluntary basis and without pay, unless these tasks involve employment on Special Duty.

7. Under authority of CFHQ letter V1901-260/4 (DORL) of 22 Feb 71 the command of the Canadian Rangers was vested in Maritime Command and Northern Region.

8. In general terms, those units allocated to Maritime Command are located in the following areas:
   a. the island of Newfoundland, including adjacent smaller islands;
   b. the coast of and certain inland locations of Labrador;
   c. the Ungava Coast and the upper North Eastern coast of Hudson’s Bay adjacent to Ungava;
   d. the North Shore of the St Lawrence river, from the Baie Comeau to Blanc Sablon, including Anticosti Island; and
   e. the coast and certain inland locations of British Columbia

9. Geographic areas of responsibility are outlined at Annex A.

10. Basically, it is intended that the Canadian Rangers will function as individuals with the capability of forming operational sub-units. They will perform their approved tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations.

ROLE

11. The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence in the sparsely populated areas of Canada.

ORGANIZATION

12. The Canadian Rangers shall be organized on the basis of Battalions, Companies, Platoons and Sections on a scale to be recommended by the RLO based on local conditions such as availability of personnel, lines of communication, distance and accessibility. As a general guide the following may be used as a basis for organizational planning:
   a. Battalion – To consist of 2 to 6 companies. The commander may hold the rank of Ranger Lieutenant Colonel;
   b. Company – To consist of 2 to 6 Platoons. The commander may hold the rank of Ranger Major;
   c. Platoon – To consist of 10 to 30 Rangers. The commander shall hold the rank of Ranger Captain/Lieutenant;
   d. Section – To consist of 5 to 10 Rangers. The commander shall hold the rank of Ranger Lieutenant.
13. The detailed organization is issued on a restricted basis as follows:
   a. Annex B – Organization East;

TASKS
14. The normal tasks of the Canadian Rangers which are to be performed under normal as well as emergency conditions are:
   a. to carry out coast watching to include the reporting of suspicious or unusual activity and to report, locate and provide assistance for ships in distress in their areas;
   b. to report any suspicious or unusual activities occurring in their respective areas;
   c. to perform air observation duties to include reporting of suspicious or unusual activities and to report, locate and provide assistance for aircraft in distress in their areas;
   d. to provide guides to Canadian Forces units operating within their areas;
   e. to assist in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending arrival of other forces. This does not include the planning or direction of such operations;
   f. to assist the RCMP in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;
   g. to collect detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance in their tasks, or of value to the Canadian Forces generally.

15. In addition, where it can be established that a locality requires a defence force and it is not feasible to employ a Canadian Forces Regular or Reserve unit for such purpose the Commander Maritimes Command, with the approval of CFHQ, may task the local Ranger unit to provide a Base Defence Force.

16. The only tasks which may be performed by Rangers in a military capacity are those listed in paras 14 and 15 above. Any further tasks undertaken must have the direct authority of the Commander Maritimes Command.

COMMAND
17. The Commander Maritime Command is responsible for the overall policy governing organization and employment of the Canadian Rangers within Maritime Command.
18. Detailed command and control of the Canadian Rangers in Eastern Canada is delegated to COS OPS Headquarters Maritime Command, with necessary input and advice from D/COS PLANS.

19. Detailed command and control of the Canadian Rangers in Western Canada is through the Commander Maritime Forces Pacific.

20. Terms of Reference for officers in direct control of the Canadian Rangers are contained in the following Annexes:
   a. Annex D – Responsibilities of CO CFS St Johns;
   b. Annex E – Responsibilities for Command and Control in Western Canada;
   c. Annex F – Responsibilities of Ranger Liaison Officer East;
   d. Annex G – Responsibilities of Ranger Liaison Officer West;

PERSONNEL

21. The strength ceiling of the Canadian Rangers allocated to Maritime Command is 3000 all ranks. Of this total 2000 are allocated to Eastern Canada and 1000 to Western Canada.

22. In general, Rangers are to be recruited from civilians whose employment would allow them to perform their Ranger duties in conjunction with their civil employment. As a guide, civilian employment fields considered suitable are:
   a. sea employment, ie inshore fishermen, trawlermen, ferrymen and associated employment;
   b. woodsmen to include professional guides, camp operators, persons employed in the pulp or lumber industries;
   c. communications employment to include radio and telephone operators, communication repairmen or technicians;
   d. flying employment, ie bush pilots, pilots or operators of small commercial lines, camp operators who regularly use light aircraft for access to hunting or fishing areas.

23. Retired personnel of the Canadian Forces located in outlying areas and with suitable employment to fulfill the Ranger function should be recruited where possible.

24. General prerequisites for employment as a Ranger are as follows:
a. be of an age which is commensurate with the maturity and physical capability required to carry out the Ranger duties. As a guide age 17 to 65 should be applied;

b. hold Canadian citizenship, or signify intention to become a Canadian citizen;

c. be in sufficiently good health to meet the physical requirements to perform their Ranger duties;

d. where it is desirable, by virtue of employment, location, etc females may be enrolled.

e. Eskimos and Indians may be enrolled in the Canadian Rangers. It should be noted in this regard that approval may be required from the appropriate Federal or Provincial Government Department.

25. Officers of the Canadian Rangers should be selected from well known and respected personnel permanently resident in the area in which they operate. They should by virtue of their employment travel as part of their employment or have time available for liaison, have demonstrated executive ability and have time available to devote to their duties.

26. Officers may be promoted from within the Ranger organization or recruited for direct entry. General prerequisite for enrollment or for promotion to officer rank shall be the same as for Rangers with the exception that they must be Canadian citizens.

COMMUNICATION

27. Normal communication between RLO and Headquarters Maritime Command shall be by CFCC facilities. Alternate civil means may be used as circumstances warrant.

28. Normal communications between the RLO and Ranger organization shall be by postal service. Traffic on operational matters shall utilize civil telephone facilities, RCMP or approved radio nets.

29. Communications networks available for use are outlined in the following Annexes:

a. Annex J – Communications RLO East;

b. Annex K – Communications RLO West.
SECURITY

30. Details regarding Ranger identification, locations and strengths shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL. General information shall be classified RESTRICTED.

31. In view of the impracticability of securing screening and clearing of individuals in isolated areas, access to classified information may be permitted only where there is a need to know basis.

32. The passage of operational information by civilian means must be restricted to the minimum necessary commensurate with the operational requirement.

33. The security of weapons, stores and records shall be in accordance with existing regulations.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

34. In general each Ranger is issued with a rifle and entitled to a yearly allocation of ammunition, and is identified by the use of an armband.

35. Detailed of scales of issue, entitlement and accounting are contained in Annex L.

36. Rangers act in an unpaid capacity, except that they may be reimbursed for services, at applicable Reserve rate of pay, when employed on Special Duty. Actual and reasonable reimbursement for travel expenses may be made to Ranger officers in respect of liaison and inspection trips.

37. Ranger documentation shall be in accordance with current Reserve Force procedures with the following exceptions:
   a. a Ranger enrolment document will be used;
   b. enrolment shall be for an indefinite period which may be terminated by either party, for good reason and upon sufficient notification;
   c. no medical documentation shall be required;
   d. no personnel selection officer documentation shall be required;
   e. security clearance shall not be required for enrolment, however, all potential Rangers will be screened by consultation with RCMP and civil authorities.

LIAISON

38. Liaison between Maritime Command, Maritime Forces Pacific and Northern Region shall be maintained.
39. Direct liaison among RLO’s is authorized.

ANNEX D

TO MARC: 1901-CANADIAN RANGERS (DPLANS)

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CFS ST JOHN’S

AIM

1. The aim of this Annex is to detail the responsibilities of CFS St John’s for Base support of the Canadian Ranger organization.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

2. In the absence of the RLO East, CO CFS St John’s will ensure the availability of an officer to carry out RLO duties.

3. He will ensure that CFCC facilities are available for transmission of operational reports or information.

CLERICAL SUPPORT

4. Adequate clerical and orderly room assistance will be made available to the RLO East for:
Key Documents

a. Production of routine correspondence;
b. publication of Ranger POR’s;
c. Central Registry assistance for the receipt and dispatch of correspondence;
d. assistance in the maintenance of Ranger documents.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

5. Adequate support for the receipt, issue and dispatch of stores and equipment for the Ranger organization shall be given. The RLO East will ensure close liaison with the Station Supply staff particularly in regard to the control of rifles and ammunition.

6. The necessary financial support will be provided.

TRANSPORT/MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

7. CFS St John’s will supply suitable transportation to the RLO East as required.

SPECIALIZED SUPPORT

8. Specialized support in respect of Rangers, eg training, concentrations etc., will be mutually agreed upon by CO CFS St John’s and RLO East.

9. Members of the Canadian Rangers will be entitled, upon application to Station Exchange cards.

ANNEX F
TO MARC: 1901-CANADIAN RANGERS (DPLANS)
Dated 31 MAR 71

RESPONSIBILITIES OF RANGER LIAISON OFFICER – EAST (RLO)

AIM

1. The aim of this Annex is to provide guidance to the RLO East on the organization and operational functions of the Canadian Rangers in Eastern Canada.

ORGANIZATION

2. The Canadian Rangers East will be organized into three battalions with sub units in accordance with para 12 of this Directive.

3. The geographical areas of responsibility for each battalion will be as follows:
   a. 1 Battalion – The island of Newfoundland and adjacent smaller islands;
b. 2 Battalion – The Labrador coast and the Northern islands where applicable;
c. 3 Battalion – The North Shore of the St Lawrence, the interior of Labrador and the Ungava Coast.

4. The RO East shall be responsible for the detailed implementation of this organization, and maintenance of a current organization chart and location state.

5. Recommendations for appointments to command of a Ranger unit shall be the responsibility of the RLO East, in consultation with CO CFS St Johns.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

6. For purposes of administration and discipline, the RLO East will report to CO CFS St Johns.

   a. the detailed organization of the Canadian Rangers in accordance with the concept outlined in this Directive;
   b. the maintenance of liaison with Ranger units and sub-units;
   c. liaison with CFS St John’s on Ranger matters within their area of responsibility;
   d. recruitment and documentation of Rangers;
   e. administration necessary for the efficient operation of the Rangers;
   f. submission of periodic reports to Maritime Command Headquarters on the state of the Rangers in Eastern Canada;
   g. advice to Canadian Forces unit commanders if required on the employment of Rangers with their units;
   h. transmission of operational Rangers reports to Maritime Command Headquarters; and
   j. accounting procedures as necessary for stores and equipment supplied to Rangers.

8. Channels of communication for the RLO East shall be as follows:

   a. on routine and administrative matters through CFS St John’s;
   b. On operational matters direct to Maritime Command Headquarters and to CFS St John’s on an information basis.

9. The RLO East will maintain a current communication network chart, and ensure dissemination of this information as required.
TRAINING

10. The RLO East will ensure Ranger training is carried out on a basis to be decided. In particular he will ensure:

   a. that all Rangers are familiar with their duties and channels of communication;
   b. that each Ranger receives a copy of the Ranger Handbook and amendments thereto;
   c. where practical collective training is conducted;
   d. that periodic training bulletins are promulgated.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

11. The RLO East will ensure that adequate administrative support is available to the Ranger organization from CFS St. John’s. This will include, logistical maintenance and clerical support.

12. The RLO will maintain central records for Rangers, and ensure the maintenance of unit records by Unit Ranger Officers.

13. Equipment and stores as listed in Annex L to this Directive will be issued on authority of Maritime Command. Where stores or equipment not listed are required, the RLO East shall seek the necessary authority.

14. Submission for write-off of stores and equipment will be initiated by the RLO East through CFS St John’s.

15. Where monies are to be expended in support of the Ranger organization, for internal liaison, training, special duty for exercises or search and rescue the RLO East will ensure the preparation and submission of claims to CFS St John’s.

ANNEX H

TO MARC: 1901 – CANADIAN RANGERS(DPLANS)
Dated 31 Mar 71

RESPONSIBILITIES OF RANGER BATTALION, COMPANY, PLATOON AND SECTION COMMANDERS

AIM

1. The aim of this Annex is to outline the responsibility of Ranger commanders at all levels of this command.
GENERAL

2. It is acknowledged that acceptance of command of a Ranger unit or sub-unit is an unpaid commitment, and that this undertaking must not interfere with the officers civil occupation. Accordingly the responsibilities detailed herein are the minimum consistent with the requirement to maintain an efficient organization.

3. The RLO will be available for advice and assistance at all levels of command.

BATTALION COMMANDER

4. The following are the responsibilities of the Ranger Battalion Commanders:
   a. to ensure that the Ranger units and sub-units assigned to his command are organized and that an effective measure of control is maintained;
   b. to ensure that planning for and the organization of training is carried out on a regular basis in accordance with Training Directives issued by RLO;
   c. to maintain effective liaison with his subordinate commanders;
   d. to advise on the appointment of suitable subordinate commanders;
   e. to ensure effective coverage of his area of responsibility in accordance with assigned tasks and to advise on location or personnel changes to meet this responsibility;
   f. the submission of periodic reports on the overall state of his command;
   g. to establish an overall policy to ensure the adequate logistical support of his command.

COMPANY COMMANDER

5. The following are the responsibilities of the Ranger Company Commander:
   a. to ensure that the Ranger sub-units assigned to his command are organized and that an effective measure of control is maintained;
   b. to ensure the organization and conduct of training is carried out on a regular basis in accordance with the Battalion Commander Directive.
   c. to maintain effective liaison with his subordinate commanders;
   d. to advise on the appointment of suitable subordinate commanders;
   e. to ensure effective coverage of his area of responsibility in accordance with assigned tasks and to advise on location, or personnel changes to meet this responsibility;
   f. to ensure the collection of information required for the periodic reports submitted by the Battalion Commander;
g. to ensure the logistical support of his sub-units in accordance with the policy of the Battalion Commander;
h. advice to sub-units on personnel requirements;
j. to maintain effective liaison with the Officers under his command.

PLATOON COMMANDER

6. The following are the responsibilities of the Ranger Platoon Commander:

a. to ensure that Rangers assigned to his command are organized and that an effective measure of control is maintained;
b. to ensure that training is carried out on a regular basis;
c. to maintain effective liaison with the Rangers under his command;
d. to advise on the appointment of suitable subordinate commanders;
e. to ensure effective coverage of his area of responsibility in accordance with assigned tasks and to advise on location, or personnel changes to meet the responsibility;
f. to ensure maintenance of the records required to provide the information for the periodic reports;
g. to ensure the detailed administrative and logistical support in accordance with unit policy;
h. Recruitment and recommendation for enlistment of suitable personnel to maintain his sub-unit strengths;

SECTION COMMANDER

a. to ensure that the Rangers assigned to his command are organized and that an effective means of control is maintained;
b. to ensure that training is carried out on a regular basis;
c. to maintain effective liaison with the Rangers under his command;
d. to ensure effective coverage of his area of responsibility in accordance with assigned tasks;
e. to ensure the maintenance of records required to provide the information for periodic reports;
f. to ensure the issue, receipt and maintenance of the stores and equipment on distribution to his sub unit;
g. recruitment and recommendation for enlistment of suitable personnel to maintain his sub-unit.
ANNEX L

To MARC: 1901 – CANADIAN RANGERS (DPLANS)

RANGER SCALES OF ISSUE, ENTITLEMENT AND ACCOUNTING

AIM

1. The aim of this annex is to detail Ranger scales of issue, entitlement and accounting procedures.

SCALES OF ISSUE

2. The following is the scale of issue for the Canadian Rangers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>PER MAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle No 4 Mk 1 Assorted Butt Lengths</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottle, oil, Mk 5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover, breach, rifle No 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pullthrough</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single, Mk 4 B</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauze, wire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sling, Rifle, web</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge, .303-in ball Mk 7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armlet, Khaki, Canadian Rangers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt, waist, WE, patt 37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier, cartridge, WE patt 37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The following stores and equipment may be issued to key Ranger personnel on authority of Maritime Command:
   a. binoculars;
   b. Compass; and
   c. maps and charts.

ENTITLEMENT

4. Rangers entitlement for stores and equipment, other than the initial issue referred to in para 2 shall be limited to specific requirements. Ranger requests for additional entitlements will be made to the RLO.

5. The yearly ammunition entitlement per Ranger is 200 rounds per year. The RLO is responsible for consolidation of records of ammunition expended and arrangements for replacement on a regular schedule. Brass cases need not be returned.
6. Ranger officers will verify holdings of equipment, stores and ammunition semi-annually. Where this verification cannot be made semi annually due to lack of adequate communications etc., special arrangements will be made through the RLO.

7. In the event of loss, damage or theft of stores and equipment on distribution to the Canadian Rangers, the appropriate Ranger Officer will notify the RLO who will advise the necessary action.

8. As a guide the following course of action should be followed:
   a. every reasonable attempt should be made to recover the loss or theft;
   b. in the case of firearms or ammunition the loss or theft will be reported immediately to the RCM Police;
   c. if recovery is not effected, a Summary Investigation will be ordered.

9. Equipment and stores requiring repair will be [returned] to the RLO who will take the necessary action for replacement or repair.

MEMORANDUM
V 1901-260/4 TD 1175 (DLODR)
15 July, 1971

DCOPSR

STUDY – CANADIAN RANGERS

1. The enclosed files reflect that there has been continued dissatisfaction with the status of the Canadian Rangers and that the subject has been under continuous review at least as far back as 67. Unfortunately, little or no progress has been made and instead of supplying an impetus to revitalize the organization, we have in fact, succeeded in allowing it to almost die.

2. The following flags and notes will serve as a brief review of events in the past four years:

   Flag A. “It was decided that a study would be carried out by DC Plans and DGOPS to examine and redefine the mission of the Canadian Rangers.” (8 Dec 67).

   Flag B. The study group recommended:
   (1) “that the Canadian Rangers continue in existence”;
   (2) “that the task list be redefined so as to bring it into line with present day needs and organizational changes”;
   (3) “that these matters be promulgated in a CFAO which will supersede CAO 246-3”.

   The present VCDS agreed with these recommendations and directed that the CFAO be written (30 Jul 68).

   Flag C. Follow-up action still in limbo (10 Feb 69).

   Flag D. Brief by the Northern Steering Committee concerning the desirability of having Canadian Rangers and/or other Reserve elements in the north. This was an inter-departmental position and recommended retention of the Rangers (28 Oct 69).

   Flag E. Minutes of DGOPSL meeting at which the approach to the problem was discussed (28 Apr 69).
Flag F. Minutes of DGOPSL conference. More problems exposed (5 May 69).

Flag G. FMC assumed command of the Rangers 1 Apr 70. This paper provides background data (10 Mar 70).

Flag H. An FMC study. Recommended that “The Canadian Rangers as presently constituted, both in form and concept should be disbanded.” (5 May 70)

Flag J. Sketch map of Ranger locations.

Flag K. Comd FMC recommended that Rangers be disbanded (4 Sep 70).

Flag L. VCDS directed DCOPSR to review flag K. (22 Sep 70).

Flag M. FDO Study. “Rangers should not be hastily disbanded” (Oct 70).

Flag N. Comd NR recommended that command of Rangers should go to MARCOM and NR with a mention that VCDS direction was given to make firm recommendations on the reorganization of the Rangers by 1 [Apr] 72 (30 Oct 70).

Flag O. Minutes of a meeting at NRHQ on command and control and to co-ordinate MARCOM and NR Study (26 Jan 71).

Flag P. Command of Rangers was given to MARCOM and NR (22 Feb 71).

Flag Q. MARPAC (BGen Quinn) requested CFHQ meeting to co-ordinate the efforts of Northern, Atlantic and Pacific Regions (10 Mar 71).

Flag R. DORL agreed to a meeting (22 Mar 71).

Flag S. NR and MARPAC suggested agenda items (30 Mar 71).

Flag T. MARCOM study directive (31 Mar 71).

Flag U. MARCOM suggested agenda items (6 Apr 71).

Flag V. CFHQ notification of delay of meeting.

3. The Comd NR received direction to conduct a study to determine and recommend to CFHQ the role, tasks, concept of operations, organization and establishment for the Canadian Rangers by 1 Apr 72, see Flag O. Mention is also made of this fact in his presentation to Defence Counsil, see minutes of 29th meeting, 19 Oct 70. This aim also “slid” over to MARCOM from NR at the time when Command was split to the two entities.
4. Adequate direction appears to have been given on the fact that regular field units will not be stationed in the North but, rather, troops in the South will be made available when required. If, however, this fact is not firm then any study of the Rangers in isolation is wrong. If conclusions are not based on the whole picture of military affairs in the north they will probably be false and will again cause further change and procrastination. I am reasonably satisfied, however, that our policies are well enough established that Ranger studies need not be concerned with overall defence of the north except to the extent that activities being conducted by ATC, ADC, Marcom and MOBCOM must affect ranger roles and deployment. The paper prepared by HQNR (Flag W) interjects a completely new thought and we are told that even though it has not been officially presented, it has been discussed at senior military levels, with the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories and with the Minister of Northern Affairs and Indian Development and has been favourable received. If this proposal is likely to mature, it will open a wider study scope than just the Canadian Rangers. It is my opinion that such a proposal is based on very little military justification for a full-time land force but would fit admirably with an expanded and effective Ranger organization.

5. In summary, it appears that, after prolonged delays, we now have two different commands doing studies on the Rangers – NR and MARCOM. I believe that definite action must be taken by CFHQ to draw these very lengthy proceedings to a satisfactory conclusion. I recommend the following:

a. As both NR and MARCOM have geared their studies for completion by 1 Apr 72 and in that there has been a limited degree of co-ordination, and recognizing the different circumstances as seen by the two Headquarters, I recommend they complete their studies in accordance with their scheduled programmes.

b. To ensure the on-going studies are in fact based on common policy I recommend CFHQ conduct a co-ordinating conference in Sep 71 under the chairmanship of DCOPSR(DGLF). The aim of this conference would be to review the progress of both studies and confirm or establish as required a common basis for study on the fundamentals outlined as possible Agenda items at Annex A. In addition this conference would study the recommendations of MARCOM and NR for an interim policy on organization, training and general administration to permit meaningful development whilst the studies continue over the period Sep 71-Apr 72.
c. On receipt of the completed studies (Apr 74) CFHQ reconvene the coordinating conference for the purpose of finalizing the broad policy directive to be issued in the form of a revised CFAO.

J.C. Gardner
Brigadier General
DGLF
1. In October 1970, Commander Maritime Command was directed to study and make recommendations on the future of the Canadian Rangers.

2. Principal factors in this study were:
   a. Defence policy, as promulgated in the White Paper, Defence in the 70’s;
   b. Established Defence objectives for Maritime Command as confirmed by the White Paper;
   c. Canadian Government policy in stated priorities, guidelines and strategy for development;
   d. Threat assessments;
   e. The situation which actually exists in the remote Maritime Command areas relative to the land, the people, resources and government;
   f. Actual performance of Canadian Forces units in similar activities; and
   g. The experience of US Alaskan Command in employment of the Alaska National Guard Scouts.

3. On 5 Oct the status of the studies being undertaken by Maritime and Northern Commands was reviewed at a CFHQ meeting chaired by DGLF. At this meeting the Commander Northern Region proposed that the Rangers in Northern Region be reorganized into a Regular/Militia unit, to meet the detailed requirements of Northern Region. The Maritime Command representatives at the meeting considered that the Northern Region proposal had considerable merit and requested time to study it in detail.

4. DGLF requested that the Maritime Command study be completed as quickly as possible. In order to assist the DGLF staff to correlate the final proposals put forward by the two commands, it was agreed that, if possible, the Maritime Command proposal would follow the same format as that of Northern Region.
AIM

5. To present the Maritime Command operational concept and implementing details for the reorganization of the Canadian Rangers, within the Command.

CONSIDERATIONS – GENERAL

6. The Canadian Forces have the ultimate responsibility for surveillance and control of Canadian territory, territorial waters and airspace. They are also responsible for search and rescue (SAR) and assistance to the civil authorities in emergency situations. Forces activities are to contribute both to the development of youth and to projects which further the development of the nation.

7. Because of the factors of time, space, terrain, weather, resources and people, the Coastal areas present a special and most demanding challenge to us in the discharge of all these responsibilities. One additional factor has particular effect on the way we carry out our regional activities; it is the Government’s policy for priorities, guidelines and strategy for regional development.

8. In summary, the Government has directed that activities of all departments will give priority to the social development of the people above all material or resource development considerations. On practical terms, this means that departments are to:
   a. provide for the maximum participation of the indigenous population in all activities;
   b. train these indigenous people to fill vacancies, and accept the increased cost which may result from application of this aspect of policy;
   c. coordinate on an inter-departmental basis to ensure optimum “secondary benefit” of individual programs;
   d. contribute, to the extent possible, to the development of the regional infrastructures which, in turn, will provide greater economic opportunity for these people.

9. In assessing activity options for achieving regional defence objectives, it is essential to accord these special factors a prominent position. Let us now turn to consideration of specific tasks.

CONSIDERATIONS – SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND CONTROL

10. From the outset of our new look at defence priorities it has been clear that an essential feature of a sovereign Canada is the ability to know what is going on in the remote parts of the nation and, having determined the situation, to have the
capability to execute control measures. Anomalies must be detected, then defined and action taken; surveillance, reconnaissance and control.

11. One of our great problems has been definition of anomalies; there has been virtually no definition of what we are looking for. Furthermore, there has been even less consideration of the “characteristics of regional targets” in such anomalies. In absence of such study, we have tended to view the problem in traditional military terms. Let us now examine both questions; anomalies and target characteristics.

12. Briefly, there is really very little threat from overt Soviet action against Canada. Force requirements for regional operations, therefore involve a very minimal need for land tactical response. However, a small boat coastal reconnaissance capability is essential. The sovereignty issue is not a question of combat, or force or contesting land. One of its key elements is resisting the assumption of control, whether that control be economic or otherwise, by any other nation. It also involves the ability to be able to counter disregard for our laws and regulations, such as those dealing with territorial waters and pollution control zones.

13. Sovereignty is the demanding problem and anomalies are the key to all roles. We consider that there are three classes of regional anomalies:

   a. **Tactical anomaly.** Airspace invasions, submarines, penetrations where military forces are involved;

   b. **Common weal anomalies.** Events and things which threaten our safety, survival, quality of life, comfort and wellbeing but are not hostile (e.g. forest fires, ecological damage, transportation incidents); and

   c. **Sovereignty anomaly.** Events or things which weaken sovereignty without force or open hostility (e.g. flagrant violations of law by outsiders).

14. Maritime Command experience in past years indicates that common weal and sovereignty anomalies occur more consistently than military anomalies. However, the fact that military anomalies, particularly submarine and aircraft sightings, do occur regularly, precludes dismissing this type of anomaly as a low grade or negative threat. It is equally true that many more anomalies have occurred and, because of the lack of an effective reconnaissance and reporting organization were never prosecuted. It is also possible that “target characteristics” shielded a situation which an on the spot investigation might have proved to be an anomaly. Let us review the characteristics of the northern target.

15. We shall start with an examination of some of the characteristics of regional surveillance and reconnaissance which differ from those we have been used to.
a. **Target Density.** The target density (possible targets per mile) will be very low. Maritime Command carries out long range surveillance over Canada's 60,000 miles of coastline. (Mainland 18,000, Island 42,000) In addition, Maritime Command may be called upon to carry out long range surveillance tasks anywhere over Canada's 3,000,000 square miles of uninhabited land area. This combination coastal and inland area means that the occasional occurrence of say; up to ten targets at any one time must not be discounted. Even so, the target density must be considered to be much lower than normally encountered in the traditional military situation.

b. **Sensor Space Ratio.** The sensor space ratio, that is the probable available number of sensors usable at any one time related to the area to be covered, will always be low and probably below the ideal ratio unless inexpensive systems can be developed.

c. **Targets.** Differences between the traditional target and the regional target are outlined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Target</th>
<th>New Regional Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Evasive</td>
<td>1. Evasive to a lesser degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. High ability to conceal and deceive</td>
<td>2. Overt and possibly cooperating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hostile &amp; responsive</td>
<td>3. Not hostile &amp; probably not dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mobile</td>
<td>4. Low mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Limited in variability</td>
<td>5. Complex &amp; variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Easily recognized &amp; identified</td>
<td>6. Difficult to recognize, often requiring sampling &amp; data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Countered mainly by fire power</td>
<td>7. Rarely, if ever countered by fire power or force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. In summary, surveillance and reconnaissance targets in the remote areas of Canada in the current threat situation tend to be different and demand different, close examination systems in response. They are probably not hostile, probably do not deny or prevent investigation and can be approached. These targets may not try to conceal themselves but they may be more complex, difficult to identify, describe and establish accurately. Seldom, if ever, will they be countered by force,
fire power or hostile acts. In the main, they will be investigated and countered more by accurate timely reporting, documentation, accurate description, diplomatic response, interrogation, friendly presence and actual physical conversation. Target sensor ratios and the surveillance area size all point towards the need for inexpensive systems available in larger numbers.

17. All this suggests that on-the-ground and on-the-water investigation will be required a great deal of the time if not all the time. On-the-ground and on-the-water surveillance may become important because of target complexity and reconnaissance will involve more and more elements of ground and water investigation. The conclusions are:

a. Platforms for surveillance and reconnaissance should have ground, water, and air capability.

b. The extensive employment of ground and water surveillance and reconnaissance is an essential requirement.

c. The human becomes an attractive part of this concept because of the new conditions of operation, the need for special identification and his ability to be programmed to react to a wide variety of situations. This same human sensor can move to the target area by air, ground (on ice) or on the surface of water. The platforms for him are all well within the state of the art and are now in use and are proven items. As a result, there would be no development costs.

d. Finally, it will be seen that this same human with his platforms constitutes a system which can perform effectively in activities designed to attain the other Defence objectives.

18. Our stated requirement is to define the anomaly (i.e. conduct detailed reconnaissance) within 24 hours of its discovery. Experience in Maritime Command, with current CF reconnaissance resources, forces the conclusion that such is virtually impossible. Weather, distance, unserviceability and higher priorities elsewhere have been the problems. Very close coordination of the surveillance and reconnaissance functions is essential if our present poor record of “re-contacts” is to be improved.

19. Given then that, in practically all cases, surveillance and reconnaissance must be closely coordinated and that the principal agent is the human sensor, at the location, it follows that communications between the surveillance and reconnaissance forces must be of the highest order. Furthermore, factors of time, space, weather and experience allow the deduction that the reconnaissance resources must be deployed throughout the region to be effective. To the extent
that conditions render the human sensor ineffective, remote sensors must take over as an alternative.

20. Furthermore, it is clear that operations of the Canadian Forces designed to demonstrate and uphold our sovereignty must be conducted with all Canadian resources. We must keep clear in our minds that the Joint Defence of North America is a separate role and not confuse it with the top priority activity. It can be deduced that the Force Structures for regional operations should aim for the maximum Canadian content in manpower, equipment and procedures. In other words, they should not be subjected to major foreign inputs which could give rise to comment that “we could not operate without them” and, thereby, nullify the Canadian capability. The optimum course of action would be to proceed quietly building an all-Canadian capability.

21. In conclusion, reconnaissance and control activities must mainly be conducted by an all Canadian human sensor system deployed throughout the remote areas of Maritime Command. This system must be capable of rapid movement over land, ice and water. It should be noted that the mere presence of this system will provide highly visible proof of Canadian control. Furthermore, and as will be seen later, it can be effective in other tasks.

CONSIDERATIONS – SAR

22. The vast uninhabited area of Canada make SAR a task of monumental difficulty and prime importance. The aircraft is the vehicle of these areas on which people depend for life itself [in] so many situations. Our record has not been 100 per cent satisfactory; principally due to the fact that the same factors of time, space, and weather have so frequently worked to our dis-advantage.

23. Furthermore, the record shows a constant increase in SAR incidents. Expansion of development produces the inevitable forecast that the number is bound to increase. A more comprehensive coverage of these facts is available in the SAR FDO which also states the concept of improved SAR coverage through additional or secondary tasking of units who can assist in the job.

24. Clearly then, the reconnaissance and control system described before would provide a secondary SAR capability. However, while it is of considerable help, it would not solve the problem of the major airline disaster; additional resources will still be needed.
SUMMARY OF DEDUCTIONS TO THIS POINT

25. In summary up to this point, we have deduced the following:
   a. three types of anomaly occur in the Maritime Command region; military, common weal and sovereignty;
   b. common weal and sovereignty are much more likely to occur than military;
   c. target characteristics of most anomalies are such that remote sensing is unsatisfactory and, therefore, the human sensor is needed;
   d. to be effective, the human sensor system must be deployed throughout the regions;
   e. the required human sensor system must have air, land and water mobility plus the communications needed for command control;
   f. considering that it is performing an entirely national job, the system should be entirely Canadian in character;
   g. the human reconnaissance and control system would provide an important secondary SAR resource in the North.

26. It is now appropriate to examine these deductions in the context of both the other defence objectives concerned with national development and youth as well as the Government’s priorities, guidelines and strategy for achievement of objectives.

CONSIDERATIONS - NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

27. Briefly, Government policy gives priority to programs which give rapid effect to the guidelines for social improvement of the indigenous population of remote and undeveloped areas. This requires the creation of employment opportunities for indigenous residents wherever feasible in Government programs. Next in the order of priority is the maintenance and enhancement of the natural environment. Following these, in order, are programs to encourage and stimulate the development of renewable resources, programs to encourage and assist strategic projects and, finally, programs to provide necessary support for other non-renewable resource projects of a recognized benefit to Canadians generally.

28. As an example of the type of goal which results from this policy, it has been established for some time that departments should aim to have 75 per cent of the vacancies in their operations in remote and undeveloped areas filled by indigenous residents, by 1977.
29. Having deduced that a Ranger Force is required for reconnaissance, control and SAR augmentation, we must next consider how it can be developed in line with the Government's policy on Defense and Regional Economic Development.

30. Throughout the Maritime Command regions, settlements exist which are inhabited by men who have lived for generations by their skill as hunters, fishermen and seamen. Although urbanization on a small scale and the introduction of wage economy have dulled the sharpness of the skill in some localities, it is still true to say that there is an extensive resource of manpower proficient in observation and travel with minimum resources in a most demanding environment. Given the necessary organization and appropriate training they are the natural selection for our human sensor system. That these men would be prepared to undertake such tasks has been proven by over twenty years of Canadian Ranger experience.

31. It has been deduced that our requirements can be met by raising a unit manned, in the main, with indigenous residents and supported by regular elements which would provide command and control, and logistics support. This would achieve the following:

   a. not just providing job opportunities, but rather making it possible for these people to perform essential defence tasks which would instill pride of accomplishment and dignity.

   b. military training would not only assist in the inevitable adaptation to new ways, but also could provide important technical experience;

   c. an operating concept and logistic concept which involve the resources of the settlement plus local purchase of goods and services such as fuel, food and lodging to name three would be a direct input to the local economy.

In short, this concept is of major and beneficial impact to the regions.

32. In addition, the following benefits would accrue to DKD:

   a. Light over snow vehicles are a Canadian product available from the trade;

   b. Basic communications equipment is of commercial pattern, available in Canada and much cheaper than the very sophisticated military sets.

   c. And, finally, filling vacancies with local residents will be less expensive than is the case with regular force personnel.

33. This last benefit, cost of manpower, needs some explanation. As will be covered later the personnel concept calls for the local resident to be enrolled as a reservist and a small number of key persons to be employed on continuous military duty while the remainder would be subject to short periods of full time military duty as required. These men would not be liable for service outside their
traditional hunting, fishing or travelling area. In computing manpower costs for the regular member, one must take into consideration not only pay and allowances, but also medical, dental, married quarters, dependent education and like services. In the case of the indigenous resident the cost is simply pay and allowances as, in the main, housing, dependent education, medical care and similar social services would be supplied under existing schemes not effected by short periods of full time duty. Hence the total cost of the individual to DND would be much less than that for a member of the regular force. In fact, from a total Treasury Board viewpoint the additional cost of employing the indigenous resident is reduced to that increment which results from subtracting welfare payments from military pay and allowances.

34. Neither does this concept foresee the need for any increase in the number of Canadian Forces bases in the region. To the contrary, it calls for making maximum use of facilities now available and those being developed. In this way it will not only be a minimum capital outlay to DND but also will contribute to the economic development of the region. As will be seen later, however, there will be a need for a small increment to the applicable CF Base/Station to support this unit.

35. Finally, we must consider the benefit of this concept relative to the local youth. First of all, manning of the unit will provide opportunities for many young men under the age of 25 who now have rather bleak employment prospects. Over and above this, the development of sub units in the regions will form the basis for expansion of cadet activities in a manner entirely applicable to the local situation. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Alaska National Guard Scout Organization has played a major role in the development of leadership and community responsibility in that State to the extent that practically all civic leaders had their start in this reserve activity. (Incidentally, Major General A.R. Hollingsworth, Commander US Army Alaska, states that his two scout battalions constitute the best surveillance and reconnaissance force he has ever had the experience to command).

UNIT DESIGNATION

36. Before summarizing, we must consider the designation of the unit to be formed. From a historical or traditional point of view, and to provide continuity with the existing organization, the unit should continue to be designated the Canadian Rangers. Regional distinctions could be made such as Canadian Rangers (Atlantic) and Canadian Rangers (Pacific).
SUMMARY

37. In summary, our appreciation has led us to the deduction that effective reconnaissance and control operations in the Regions require the establishment and operation of a unit to be deployed throughout the remote areas and to be supported by the required command, control and logistical resources. This unit, the Canadian Rangers, would have the important secondary task of SAR operations. Manned principally by local residents with only a regular, or continuous military duty cadre, this unit would also represent an important contribution to regional development as required by government policy. Equipment for this unit would be available directly from the trade in Canada; research and development costs would be nil. Logistic support arrangements would feature maximum integration with the community and minimum outside supply.

38. Preliminary expansion of the several aspects of this concept has taken place and is shown at annexes as follows:

ANNEX A – CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL ORDER
ANNEX B – SEA SUPPORT REQUIREMENT
ANNEX C – AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT
ANNEX D – COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPT
ANNEX E – PERSONNEL CONCEPT
ANNEX F – EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT
ANNEX G – ORGANIZATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND INITIAL MANNING
ANNEX H – COST ESTIMATES
ANNEX J – HONOURS AND AWARDS
ANNEX K – ANOMALIES WITHIN MARITIME COMMAND REGIONS
ANNEX A
TO MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG)
DATED OCT 71

CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATION ORDER

CANADIAN RANGERS

INFORMATION

1. Effective 1 Apr 71, the Commander Maritime Command was made responsible for command and control of the Canadian Rangers in his area of responsibility.

2. This unit to be known as the Canadian Rangers is to be organized as a battalion with headquarters and support services at St. John's, Nfld., and an Independent Company with headquarters and support services at Victoria, B. C. Sub units are to be based throughout Newfoundland, Labrador, the North Shore of the St. Lawrence, the Ungava Coast and British Columbia with headquarters located in principal centres. Each sub unit shall have patrols, which may be organized into platoons, located in remote areas and communities.

3. This is the first Canadian Forces Organization Order to be issued for the Canadian Rangers.

INTENTION

4. To state the organizational status of the Canadian Rangers.

EXECUTION

5. The Canadian Rangers is a unit of the Canadian Forces Primary Reserve and allocated to Canadian Forces Maritime Command.

EFFECTIVE DATE

6. This order is effective on date of issue.

ROLE

7. The role of the Canadian Rangers is to perform those tasks required to achieve Canadian Forces objectives, in accordance both with the Department of National Defence policy and with the priorities and guidelines promulgated by the Government.

8. a. The tasks of the Canadian Rangers in support of reconnaissance and exercise of control are:
1. to carry out coast watching to include the reporting of suspicious or unusual activity and to report, locate and provide assistance for ships in distress in their areas;

2. to report any suspicious or unusual activities occurring in their respective areas;

3. to perform air observation duties to include reporting of suspicious or unusual activities and to report, locate and provide assistance for aircraft in distress in their areas;

4. to provide guides to Canadian Forces units operating within their areas;

5. to assist in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending arrival of regular forces. This does not include the planning or direction of such operations;

6. to assist the RCMP in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;

7. to collect detailed information concerning their local area likely to be of assistance in their tasks, or of value to the Canadian Forces generally.

b. In addition to the above the Canadian Rangers may be called upon for assistance to civil authorities and agencies in:

1. emergency situation such as man made and natural disasters;

2. support of environmental preservation;

3. community and social development activities;

4. meteorological and ice reporting;

5. maintenance of navigational aids;

6. control of exploitation of resources; and

7. control and, for humanitarian and safety reasons, monitoring of individuals and/or groups operating in the regions.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

9. The officers appointed to command the Canadian Ranger Battalion, and the Canadian Ranger Independent Company hold the appointment of a Commanding Officer.
10. The Commanding Officers, Canadian Rangers, are responsible to the Commander Maritime Command for the accomplishment of their assigned mission.

11. The designation of company areas and location of subordinate units shall be as determined from time to time by the Commander Maritime Command.

**ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS**

**ESTABLISHMENT**

12. The establishment of the Canadian Rangers will be issued and controlled by CFHQ through the Commander Maritime Command.

**MANNING POLICY**

13. The Canadian Rangers shall comprise members of the Primary Reserves who are enrolled for service in their local areas and normally based in their home community. They will be supported by a Regular Force cadre.

**SUPPORT SERVICES**

14. The Canadian Rangers are lodger units of CFS St. John’s, and CFB Esquimalt and base level support services will be provided as detailed at Appendix 1 [not reproduced].

**ACCOUNTING**

15. The Canadian Rangers are not self-accounting.

**ADDRESS**

16. As promulgated in CFP 133.

Chief of the Defence Staff

ANNEX B

TO MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG)
DATED OCT. 71

**CANADIAN RANGERS**

**SEA SUPPORT REQUIREMENT**

**BACKGROUND**

1. The Canadian Rangers will have a battalion headquarters, and an Independent Company headquarters at St. John’s, and Victoria, B.C. respectively with headquarters of sub units in selected population centres in Newfoundland,
Labrador, the Ungava Coast, the North shore of the St. Lawrence and British Columbia. Patrols from these subordinate headquarters will range throughout their immediate area of responsibility on an as required basis.

2. In support of the Canadian Forces objectives, the Canadian Rangers tasks will include; reconnaissance, aid to the civil power, assistance to other government departments and search and rescue.

3. The special conditions prevailing in the above area; the great distance, the type of terrain and the topography of the land, the sparse population and the climate have produced a settlement pattern, which places most habitation along the coastline of the applicable river, sea, bay, strait, etc. Basic communication, has been, is now, and will continue to be, by water. Without a capability of direct and specialized water borne support the Canadian Rangers will be severely handicapped.

**AIM**

4. To define the sea support requirement of the Canadian Rangers.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

5. Canadian Rangers concept of operation will for normal implementation require support from ships having an inshore capability, and may for special cases have a requirement for off shore capability.

6. To achieve this support at the minimum expense, it will be essential that the Canadian Rangers have integral to the organization a ship capable of inshore operation. The greatest economy will be achieved by:
   a. Tasking of the integral Canadian Rangers ship;
   b. Tasking other CF sea resources;
   c. Charter from existing private operators where it cannot be supplied, or must augment a and b above.

**COMUNICATION WATER TRANSPORT**

7. A continuing need is foreseen for coastal liaison by commanders at various levels. The requirement for the re-supply of the organization will be carried out in the main by this type of transport.

**SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE**

8. Reconnaissance is foreseen as primarily one of a coastal nature. To be effective it must be intimate, provide a capability of going ashore and providing a base for operation. This implies a small ship with inshore capability.
9. While air support and off shore support may suspect an anomaly, fine definition may require the human sensor and where weather dictates open water an inshore ship capability is a necessity.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

10. Ranger assistance for search and rescue on water or a coastline implies a water borne capability.

ANNEX C

TO MARC: 1901-260/4
DATED OCT 71

CANADIAN RANGERS
AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT

BACKGROUND

1. The Canadian Rangers will have a battalion headquarters and an Independent Company Headquarters at St. John's, Nfld. and Victoria, B.C. respectively and headquarters of subordinate units in selected major population centres, with patrols in selected minor population centres. Patrols will range throughout their immediate area of responsibility on a regular and/or as required basis.

2. In support of Canadian Forces Objectives the Canadian Rangers, tasks will include: reconnaissance; aid to the civil power; assistance to other government departments; and, search and rescue, including humanitarian assistance.

3. The special conditions prevailing in the regions: the vast distances, the type of terrain and the topography of the land; the sparse population; and, the climate, all dictate the fact that effective command and control of and within the Canadian Rangers and the ability of the Rangers to perform their role and tasks will from time to time require the provision of air transport.

AIM

4. To define the air support requirement for the Canadian Rangers.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

5. The Canadian Rangers concept of operations will for special cases require support from aircraft with a VTOL or STOL capability.

6. To achieve this support at the minimum expense, such air support capability need not be integral to the unit. The greatest economy will be effected by:

   a. Normal tasking of CF air resources;
b. Request for support to other civil government agencies either federal or provincial;
c. Charter from existing private operators where it cannot be supplied under a. or b. above.

COMMAND FLYING

7. Air Support for command is foreseen for the regions once per year for the CO’s Canadian Rangers.

8. The requirement for subordinate unit commanders to use air support is foreseen to be a minor requirement.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

9. The requirement for air support for surveillance and reconnaissance will best be met by Ranger participation, where applicable, in the normal Maritime Command surveillance programme.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

10. Utilization of the Rangers in the Maritime Command Ranger SAR concept, does not foresee air support for Ranger participation, except under exceptional circumstances.

ANNEX D
TO MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG)
DATED OCT 71

CANADIAN RANGERS
COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPT

BACKGROUND

1. The Canadian Rangers, will have a battalion headquarters and an Independent Company Headquarters at St. John’s, Nfld. and Victoria, B.C. as applicable and headquarters of subordinate units in major population centres in the region. Patrols will operate from minor population centres.

2. The Canadian Rangers will have an active role in the accomplishment of Canadian Forces objectives. Tasks include reconnaissance, search and rescue, aid to the civil power and assistance to other government departments.

3. A communications capability is required to effect operational and administrative control over a large number of diverse and isolated patrol bases and deployed patrols.
AIM
4. To define the communications requirements for the Canadian Rangers.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
5. The Canadian Rangers will require to initiate, operate and maintain battalion, company and platoon communications networks as applicable.
6. This will require the use of existing communications networks controlled by:
   a. Canadian Armed Forces;
   b. Other government departments;
   c. Commercial communications companies (CN, CP, Bell); and
   d. Other private organizations.
7. The requirement for a secure military communications network is not foreseen. Use of existing communications is seen as the key to acceptable, flexible communications within reasonable limits.
8. To provide a field deployment capability there will be a requirement for a radio which can be carried by a mobile patrol and provide communication to the subordinate unit headquarters responsible for the area of operation. Beyond this requirement the fixed installations outlined in paragraph 6 will be utilized.
9. Logistical support of field deployable communications equipment will aim at 'on the spot' replacement.

…

ANNEX E
TO MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG)
DATED OCT 71

CANADIAN RANGERS
PERSONNEL CONCEPT

BACKGROUND
1. The term “Indigenous Peoples” is used to describe a person permanently resident in the remote or sparsely populated regions of Maritime Command. These people are definitely not transient. No further definition is attempted in this paper.

2. For a variety of reasons the indigenous people are rapidly adapting to a wage economy and forsaking their former social patterns. The present mature generation of these people generally lacks the level of education necessary to allow them to compete effectively in a modern economic environment.
3. The adult heads of family still retain ancestral skills which can be harnessed in the interests not only of defence objectives but also of national policy and priorities for the regions.

4. The next generation may be defined as those people who are still undergoing education and training. Only a very small number of these indigenous people of all races are now attending university. Small groups are receiving technical training, some of it under DND auspices.

AIM

5. To state the personnel concept for the Canadian Rangers.

ASSUMPTIONS

6. Present regulations will be amended to establish the Canadian Rangers as a unit of the primary Reserve under the direct command of Commander, Maritime Command.

CLASS OF SERVICE

7. Rangers will be enrolled into the Primary Reserve with special provisions for standards of education, age, and medical fitness. In broad terms, if a man is able to work outdoors and support himself and is trustworthy and reliable, he is suitable for enrolment.

8. The Canadian Rangers will comprise Primary Reserve officers and men supported by a Regular Force cadre. The first objective of training will be to develop leaders who are acceptable by regional community standards and ultimately to provide personnel for the support cadre either on a Regular or continuous military duty basis.

TERMS OF SERVICE

9. Key Canadian Ranger positions will be filled by personnel on continuous military duty at their home location.

10. The remaining personnel will be liable for periodic duty not to exceed 90 days per year for operational tasks.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

11. See Appendix 1.
## CANADIAN RANGERS

### CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>CONDITION</th>
<th>ENTITLEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>As per applicable to Primary Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Allowances</td>
<td>As applicable to Primary Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pensions and Annuities</td>
<td>Benefits as per Primary Reserves on Class C Employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Temporary Duty</td>
<td>As for Regular Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Medical and Dental</td>
<td>Entitlement as per Primary Reserves on Class A, B or C employment as applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Promotion Policy</td>
<td>Officers – Commander Maritime Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men – Ranger Liaison Officer or Battalion Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>Primary Reserve on Class C employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Release Authority</td>
<td>Officers – Commander Maritime Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men – Ranger Liaison Officer or Battalion Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Posting and Move of DF&amp;E</td>
<td>For Primary Reserve on Class C employment, posting may be refused without prejudice to continuing service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Departments and agencies of Government and various levels operating in the regions have developed a high degree of integration and cooperation in providing:
   a. command, control and communications in dealing with civil emergencies;
   b. short and medium range air transport to meet requirements in the general interest;
   c. communications, meteorological service and navigational aid;
   d. accommodation, electric power, surface transport;
   e. other utilities and services including fire prevention and restoration of utilities essential to survival in a hostile environment;
   f. personnel support services including:
      (1) medical and dental
      (2) police and justice
      (3) education of dependents
      (4) recreation; and,
      (5) public information.

2. Few military means for the support of operations in the isolated and sparsely populated region now exist. The Canadian Rangers have in the past relied heavily on existing facilities as listed above.

AIM

3. To state the concept for logistic support and equipment for the Canadian Rangers.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

4. In accordance with national guidelines for development of the economy of the regions it is desirable to employ local industrial and commercial facilities and agencies to support the Canadian Rangers.

5. Equipment and procedures must be simple. Time does not permit the initial re-training of the indigenous people to use strange tools; and indeed such a process would be counter to the established policy of retaining and preserving existing skills and techniques.
6. Successful implementation of the Canadian Rangers programme demands the timely fulfilment of promises. Equipping of the force must coincide with recruitment to avoid the repetition of one present Ranger's sardonic summary of his experience - “Twenty years of promises, 300 rounds of ammunition, and no action.” The initial equipping of the Canadian Rangers must be achieved without time consuming research and development. Without exception all the materiel needed must be shelf line items available from the CF inventory or existing commercial sources.

7. In the regions unserviceable equipment which cannot be restored to serviceability by simple operator repair procedures must be exchanged. Logistic support must be based on this criteria.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

8. Simplicity and economy dictate that to a greater degree than normal, repair and maintenance of vehicles and equipment must be carried out by the operator. To permit continuous operational availability maximum use must be made of local facilities on a pay as you go basis.

SUPPLY

9. The applicable Maritime Command CF Base/Station supply system will support the Canadian Rangers.

10. Materiel which is peculiar or exclusive to the Canadian Rangers will be held by the applicable Maritime Command CF Base/Station. Other materiel in general use which can be more economically provided from civilian sources will be purchased locally.

TRANSPORTATION

11. When feasible, CF carriers, other Government ships, aircraft and vehicles, or commercial means will be used for logistic support.

12. There vehicles peculiar to a certain area, i.e. motorized toboggans, are required these will be contracted for on a rental basis to DND.

MAINTENANCE

13. Since many replacement parts will be procured from regional civilian sources, operators must be trained to service and repair their equipment. The cost of such maintenance must be a part of the rental contract.

14. Radios and electronic sensors are the exception. No capability for on-site repair is envisaged, complete replacement of equipments will be required.
FINANCE

15. The applicable Maritime Command CF Base/Station will be responsible for pay and material accounting. Budget control will remain the function of Maritime Command HQ.

PAY

16. Disbursement of pay by the operational leader serves to maintain the cultural pattern of the indigenous population. It is essential that the accepted boss who apportions the labour distribute the rewards.

ADMINISTRATION

UNIT ADMINISTRATION

17. Personnel records and documents will be maintained by the applicable Maritime Command CF Base/Station.

PERSONNEL SERVICES

18. Medical and dental procedures will not change. Members on Class C service will be entitled to the service available to the regular force, including access to civilian facilities when necessary. Personnel on Class A or B status will be eligible during their periods of service.

PERSONNEL SUPPORT

19. Members of the Canadian Rangers are entitled to personnel support services on the same basis as other members of Maritime Command.

ANNEX G

TO MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG)
DATED OCT 71

CANADIAN RANGERS
ORGANIZATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND INITIAL MANNING

BACKGROUND

1. The establishment of the Canadian Rangers provides officers and men to carry out the tasks assigned to achieve Canadian Forces objectives. Ideally all positions will be filled by indigenous personnel of the Regular Force or Primary Reserve.

2. The Canadian Rangers are assigned to Maritime Command, and will be supported and administered by the applicable Maritime Command CF Base/Station.
3. This programme is to be implemented 1 Apr 72. Manning of key positions by 1 Mar 72 is essential to effective implementation.

AIM

4. To outline the organization and establishment of the Canadian Rangers, identifying key positions for immediate manning.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

5. The organization of the Canadian Rangers is similar to that of a land element combat unit. Since its tasks in support of sovereignty, security and environmental preservation are unending, the Canadian Rangers are considered to be available to be called to operational status from implementation.

ORGANIZATION

6. The Canadian Rangers assigned to Maritime Command will be organized in general as outlined below:

   a. One Battalion in Eastern Canada with headquarters located at St. John’s, Nfld., and with support services provided by CES St. John’s.

   b. One Independent Company in British Columbia, with headquarters located in Victoria, B.C., and with support services provided by CFB Esquimalt.

7. Sub-units will follow the existing land element organizational pattern of companies and platoons as applicable. Each sub-unit will be assigned an area of responsibility by Commander, Maritime Command, and will be located in principle population centres. Areas of responsibility are as outlined in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. Areas of responsibility may be adjusted as required by Commander, Maritime Command.

8. Five to eight Rangers comprise a patrol. Company or Platoon Commanders as applicable will task and supervise patrols; but battalion headquarters, or the Independent Company Headquarters may control patrols directly. Patrols are based in settlements, but in some cases may be established in unpopulated areas.

9. The battalion command element, and the independent company command element is capable of deploying anywhere in the region.

ESTABLISHMENT

10. The present Maritime Command ceiling of 3,000 Rangers (all ranks) will on reorganization be initially restricted to the number shown below:

   a. MARLANT Area - 1,000
BACKGROUND

1. Canadian Rangers are not now eligible for the Canadian Forces Decoration, despite length of service, because of the provisions of CFAO 18-9.

AIM

2. To state a proposal for rewarding loyal Canadian Ranger service.

CONSIDERATIONS

3. Successful implementation of the Canadian Rangers depends to a marked degree on the trust placed by the indigenous people in the department of National Defence. Senior members of communities with a knowledge of the existing Canadian Ranger program will have a profound influence on the attitudes of individuals and on community support.

4. A need is identified to demonstrate a keeping of the faith with these Canadian Rangers. Individual Rangers have served loyally for up to 24 years, almost always without pay; and with one or two exceptions, without other recognition.

5. Records of service cannot be assumed to be complete or reliable, since some have been lost; and many Rangers have changed their names because of Governmental emphasis on surnames. Determination of length of service will probably have to be based on sworn statements.

6. The Canadian Forces Decoration appears to be the most appropriate award. Selection of personnel can be made, and the medals issued as part of the rejuvenation of the Canadian Rangers.

RECOMMENDATION

7. To allow the presentation of Canadian Forces Decorations to Canadian Rangers, the following amendment to CFAO 18-9 is recommended:

   “Section 2 - Amplification of the Regulations”
QUALIFYING SERVICE

...

4. The “reserve forces of Canada” referred to in the regulations means:
   a. the Primary Reserves;
   b. the Cadet Instructors List;
   c. subject to para 5b, the Supplementary List; and
   d. the Canadian Rangers.

...

ANNEX K
TO MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG)
DATED OCT 71

ANOMALIES WITHIN
MARITIME COMMAND REGIONS

1. In defining anomalies that have occurred in the Maritime Command area of responsibility regions it is necessary to clearly understand the relationship between:
   a. The normal Maritime Command surveillance function which encompasses, in general terms, the land mass of Canada, the Canadian Arctic Islands and waters, and the coastline of Canada; and
   b. The Canadian Ranger function of intimate close range reconnaissance and control in their allocated areas.

2. It is accepted that these two functions are designed to, and will[,] complement each other.

3. Within the broad context of Maritime Command surveillance, reconnaissance, control and search and rescue, the following anomalies are known to have occurred in the Maritime Command area of responsibility in the last year.
   a. Tactical Anomalies
      (1) Numerous reports of submarine sightings have been received from civilians. The skill of the observer and the time delay in receiving and responding to these reports has made it impossible in each case to either confirm or deny the sighting. The last of these sightings occurred in Sep 71.
      (2) There have been instances of exploitation of Canadian airspace by Soviet civil aircraft flying reconnaissance patterns.
(3) Abnormally large numbers of fishing trawlers congregating in northern waters provide an opportunity for refuelling of submarines or intelligence collecting ships.

b. Sovereignty Anomalies

(1) Second Manhattan Voyage 5 Apr to 6 Jun 70
(2) US Ice Station “T3” in the Canadian Sector
(3) USSR Ice Station “SF16” in the Canadian Sector
(4) Monzino North Pole Expedition spring 71
(5) USCG Ships operating out of Resolute and Cape Christian
(6) “No-Notice” visits by US Forces aircraft
(7) Foreign fishing vessels operating off the Canadian coast. Instances are too numerous to mention, but excursions into Canadian waters have been made off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador.
(8) Annual visit of the Greenlanders to Ellesmere Island
(9) Numerous scientific parties from various nations operating in the region
(10) Over 100 Oil and Gas seismic parties transiting the regions
(11) Over 100 Oil and Gas discovery wells in the regions
(12) Colin Irwin’s small boat transit of the NW Passage in 71/72

c. Common Weal Anomalies

(1) Pine Point Fire Sep 71
(2) Hay River Fire Sep 71
(3) Numerous Forest Fires (consuming 2,300,473 acres) in N.W.T.
(4) Approximately 25 Forest Fires on the Labrador Coast, in the summer of 71
(5) King Christian Island gas fire 30 Dec 70 to 29 Jan 71
(6) Yukon River flood threat spring 1971
(7) Live trapping for illegal export of Falcons on Baffin Island daring winter 1970
(8) Pangnirtung windstorm in Feb 71
(9) Damage to trapping areas in the regions by seismic parties.
(10) Numerous reports of aircraft [harassing] herds of wild animals.
(11) Numerous Search and Rescue incidents in the region
(12) Approximately 20 Ground Search incidents.
4. It is emphasized that the above list includes only those anomalies that have been reported unsystematically by the various government and civilian agencies operating in the regions. It is expected that the combined capability of the Maritime Command surveillance function complemented by the Canadian Ranger reconnaissance, control and SAR capability, will discover, report and prevent many additional anomalies.

AIDE MEMOIRE

1901-260/4 (DMil)

21 Nov 73

THE CANADIAN RANGERS

BACKGROUND

1. The Rangers are designed to provide a military force in the sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which could not conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces. The Rangers carry out this role voluntarily without pay, and in addition to their civilian occupations. They receive no special training and are issued with a .303 rifle and an annual allotment of 300 rounds of ammunition as an incentive to join. Command and control is provided by a Ranger Liaison Officer who is based at Regional or Functional Command Headquarters. His direct contact with the Rangers under his control is limited in most instances to an annual visit.

TERMS OF SERVICE

2. The Canadian Rangers consists of officers and men who volunteer to hold themselves in readiness in the event of an emergency but are not required to undergo annual training. However, they may volunteer to perform tasks in peacetime and for employment with other units of the Canadian Forces.

ORGANIZATION

3. The Canadian Rangers is a sub-component of the Reserve Force and consists of a single corps. The Corps is comprised of 25 companies each having a headquarters and a varying number of platoons with an approximate strength of 1660 all ranks, 960 in MARCOM and 700 Northern Region. Command and control is vested in the Commander Maritime Command for units in Newfoundland, Quebec and British Columbia and the Commander Northern Region for units located in the Yukon and North West Territories.

NORMAL TASKS

4. It is intended that the Rangers will function as individuals and perform their approved tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations. The following tasks may be performed by the Rangers:
a. establish a visible national presence in support of sovereignty;
b. coast watching and air observation duties;
c. locate, report and provide assistance to ships and aircraft in distress;
d. provide guides and other assistance to Canadian Forces’ units operating in their areas;
e. collect detailed information of their local area; and
f. assist in ground/sea search and rescue operations.

5. In addition to the above, the Canadian Rangers could be called upon to provide services to civil authorities in emergencies such as man made and natural disasters, support of environmental preservation and community development and social improvement activities.

6. The rapid growth in economic and industrial activity in the North has added a new potential challenge to Canadian sovereignty. An inter-departmental committee was convened to discuss the overall implications of this new challenge and concluded that the Canadian Rangers can fulfill a necessary military function but must be revitalized in order to perform effectively.

OPTIONS OPEN FOR PROPOSED RECONSTITUTION

7. Consequently on 1 Apr 71 Maritime Command and Northern Region were directed to initiate concurrent studies of one year’s duration with the aim of arriving at a common concept and policy for the Canadian Rangers. A detailed analysis of these studies indicated that there were four options which are representative of the spectrum of feasible solutions to this problem. These options were:

a. **Option 1** – The current Ranger concept of operations.

b. **Option 2** – The NRHQ concept – which proposed the organization of a Ranger Regular Force battalion, comprising a mix of Regular Force and Ranger Reservists all on full time duty. In addition, it proposes the formation of an Arctic Air Squadron and a CFS Yellowknife. A total of 827 all ranks including 350 Regular Force would be required along with major new construction and support resources at a total cost of $60 million over five years.

c. **Option 3** – A Reserve oriented concept, based on the Maritime Command Study with the Ranger organization tailored to its establishment and training within the parameters of a conventional land force unit. Two battalion type units would be organized as the Canadian Arctic Regiment and the Canadian Coastal Regiment. Individual companies would be based on major population centres with an overall maximum strength of
2000 all ranks which includes a small full time training and administration cadre of 64 all ranks. This option is estimated to cost $15 million over five years.

d. **Option 4** – An adaptation of the current concept in which the Canadian Rangers would continue as a sub-component of the Reserve Force with a maximum strength of 1700 all ranks with the Ranger patrol as the basic sub-unit. The deployment and composition of the patrols would be determined by a detailed analysis of the military requirement, the local recruiting potential, the existing socio-economic structure and the prevailing geographical factors. A full time staff of 12 Regular Force personnel would be responsible for the overall administration, training and periodic liaison visits to their Ranger elements. The Ranger would perform military surveillance and reconnaissance tasks in conjunction with his civilian employment and would be paid an annual operational bonus of $100.00. He would also receive pay at applicable militia rates when participating in Canadian Forces exercises, organized training, and local inspections and ceremonies. In addition to a service rifle and ammunition, a distinctive parka would be issued to each Ranger and manportable radios and binoculars would be scaled and issued on a patrol basis. This option is estimated to cost $6 million over five years.

**DND RECOMMENDED OPTION**

8. Option 4, an adaptation of the current concept, is the option that meets the current and foreseeable basic military requirements at minimal expense and with a very small commitment of Regular Force personnel. The Canadian Rangers would continue to function within their current organizational concept, relying mainly on individual initiative and independent action with the additional capability of being able to form small operational sub-units. This option possesses the inherent future capability of expansion to the scope of Options 2 and 3 should future conditions and requirements so dictate.

**SUBMISSION TO CABINET**

9. The Deputy Minister has directed that the proposed reconstitution of the Canadian Rangers be made the subject of a Submission to Cabinet. This submission will be co-ordinated with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. The submission is now in its fifth draft and will be the subject of a presentation to DMC. Any implementation of this plan when authorized will be phased over five years commencing no sooner than fiscal year 1973/74.
Doc. 29: Canadian Forces Organization Order (CFOO) 1.201, 27 October 1976

1901-260/4 (DOE)
27 October 1976

CANADIAN FORCES
ORGANIZATION ORDER 1.201

CANADIAN RANGERS

INFORMATION

1. This is the first order issued to update the organizational structure of the Canadian Rangers (Cdn Rang), and it amplifies the organizational aspects of CFAO 2.8.

INTENTION

2. To state the organizational status of the Cdn Rang.

3. The Cdn Rang consists of members resident in the sparsely settled, northern, coastal, and isolated areas of Canada, and who may volunteer to take training. The Cdn Rang provide a military presence in those areas which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of Canadian Forces.

4. The Cdn Rang normally function as individuals as opposed to formed bodies, and they perform their routine tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations. Unit and sub-unit organization is required mainly for control, administration, and the collection of information.

EXECUTION

5. The Cdn Rang is a sub-component of the Reserve Force with elements (companies, platoons, and sections) allocated to Maritime Command (MARCOM) and Northern Region Headquarters (NRHQ) as detailed at Annex A.

Effective Date

6. This order is effective on date of issue.

Role

7. The role of the Cdn Rang is to provide a para-military force in sparsely, settled northern, coastal, and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other [elements] of the Canadian Forces.
Command and Control

8. The Commander MARCOM and the Commander NRHQ exercise command over assigned elements of the Cdn Rang.

9. The Cdn Rang organization is divided regionally into companies, and platoons. The company commander will normally be appointed as a captain, and a platoon commander will normally be appointed as a lieutenant. Platoons may be subdivided into sections, which will be commanded by locally appointed sergeants.

10. Command by members of the Cdn Rang will be exercised in accordance with QR&O 3.295.

11. The officer appointed to command a Cdn Rang company is a commanding officer in accordance with QR&O 3.23, however, he is only subject to the Code of Service Discipline when called out on continuous full-time service, or when placed on active service. He does not have powers of arrest in accordance with QR&O 105.06, and he does not have powers of punishment in accordance with QR&O 108.27.

12. Disciplinary matters shall be referred to the applicable commander.

13. The commanding officer of a Cdn Rang company or independent platoon is responsible to the applicable commander for the effective and efficient operation of his element.

14. Control of Ranger activities will be normally exercised through the Ranger Liaison Officer (RLO) on strength of MARCOM HQ or NRHQ.

15. The Rangers may be employed in conjunction with the Regular Force, or the Primary Reserve.

16. In an emergency, an officer commanding a Canadian Forces element may request local Rangers to volunteer their assistance (consistent with the listed tasks), at which time the applicable Ranger element would come under his command. Where possible this request should be coordinated in advance with the Commander MARCOM or Commander NRHQ.
Regional Responsibilities

17. The Commander MARCOM is responsible for Cdn Rang elements located in Newfoundland (including Labrador), Northern Quebec, the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, the north shore of the St Lawrence River, and in British Columbia.

18. The Commander NRHQ is responsible for the Cdn Rang elements located in the North-West Territories, the Yukon, the northern areas of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the western shore of Hudson Bay.

Military Status

19. Members of the Cdn Rang have military status consistent with QR&O 2.034, 9.01, and 3.295 and are:

   a. obliged to serve only when placed on active service by the Governor in Council, or when called out in an emergency;

   b. not required to undergo training, except when placed on active service; and

   c. employable with the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve.

20. Notwithstanding the above, Cdn Rang may voluntarily perform tasks as set out below in peacetime, other than in times of emergency.

Tasks

21. Routine tasks which members of the Cdn Rang normally perform in conjunction with their civilian occupations, without pay, are as follows:

   a. to report any suspicious or unusual activities occurring in their respective areas, to the appropriate Region or Command HQ by the best means available; and

   b. to collect detailed information concerning their local area which may, be of assistance in their other tasks, or of value to the Canadian Forces generally.

22. Tasks which a commander may assign to Cdn Rang for which the appropriate rates of Reserve pay may be paid are:

   a. to participate in Canadian Forces exercises and training courses;

   b. to provide guides and rescue parties for military purposes;

   c. to assist in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces. This does not include the responsibility for planning or directing local defence; and
d. to assist the RCMP and/or Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting, and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs.

23. Tasking of Ranger elements is normally exercised through the Commander MARCOM or the Commander NRHQ.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Establishment

24. The strength of the Cdn Rang elements is determined, issued, and controlled by NDHQ through applicable commanders.

25. The strength of the Cdn Rang is limited to 5,000 all ranks. Regional quotas are as follows:
   a. Atlantic Region 2,000;
   b. Pacific Region 1,000; and
   c. Northern Region 2,000.

Support Services

26. Support services are coordinated for Cdn Rang elements by the appropriate Commander.

Communications

27. Channels of communication shall follow the channels of command and control except that on matters concerning the provision of support services to Cdn Rang elements, the Commander MARCOM or the Commander NRHQ is authorized direct communication with appropriate support bases and stations.

Annex A

R.J. Brown
Colonel
Director Organization and Establishments for Chief of the Defence Staff

DISTRIBUTION
List A
Plus: NDHQ/DGRC
      MARCOM HQ  30
      NRHQ      15
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

CFOO 1.201
ANNEX A

CANADIAN RANGER ELEMENTS ALLOCATED TO CANADIAN FORCES REGIONS

(Unit and sub-unit organization required mainly for control, administration and collection of information)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AT 22 (South Labrador) Coy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>Cartwright</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pl</td>
<td>Battle/Mary’s Harbour</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Pl</td>
<td>Red Bay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33 (South Nfld) Coy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>Burgeo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Pl</td>
<td>Ramea</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Pl</td>
<td>Port Aux Basques</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Pl</td>
<td>Milltown</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Pl</td>
<td>Harbour Mille</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>34 (South West Nfld) Coy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>Channel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pl</td>
<td>Stephenville Crossing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Pl</td>
<td>Port Aux Basques</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36 (North Labrador) Coy</td>
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<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>Hopedale</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Pl</td>
<td>Nain</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 (North Shore) Coy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>Havre St Pierre</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Pl</td>
<td>Harrington Harbour</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Pl</td>
<td>Lourdes Du Blanc Sablon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23 (North East Nfld) Coy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>St Anthony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pl</td>
<td>Roddickton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>30 (Central Nfld) Coy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pl</td>
<td>Springdale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pl</td>
<td>Lewisporte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Pl</td>
<td>Gander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8 | 31 (East Nfld) Coy | Bonavista  
    | 1 Pl | Catalina  
    | 2 Pl | Hickmans Harbour  
    | 3 Pl |  
|---|-----------------|---------
| 9 | 32 (Avalon Peninsula) Coy |  
    | 1 Pl | Hearts Desire  
    | 2 Pl | Ferryland  
    | 4 Pl | Placentia  
| 10 | 35 (north West Nfld) Coy |  
    | 1 Pl | Flowers Cove  
    | 2 Pl | Norris Point  
|---|-----------------|---------
| 11 | PACIFIC REGION (MARCOM) |  
|     | 12 (Pacific Coast) Coy | Ocean Falls  
    | 1 Pl |  
| 12 | 13 (Southern BC) Coy | Vanderhoof  
    | 1 Pl |  
| 13 | 14 (Central BC) Coy | Smithers  
    | 1 Pl | Tatlayoko Lake  
    | 3 Pl | Alexis Creek  
| 14 | 15 (Northern BC) Coy | Fort St John  
    | 1 Pl |  
| 15 | NORTHERN REGION (NRHQ) |  
|     | 1 (Yukon) Coy | Watson Lake  
    | 1 Pl | Teslin  
    | 2 Pl | Faro  
    | 3 Pl | Carcross  
    | 4 Pl | Whitehorse  
    | 5 Pl | Mayo  
    | 6 Pl | Carmacks  
    | 7 Pl | Haines Junction  
    | 8 Pl | Burwash Landing  
    | 9 Pl | Dawson  
    | 10 Pl |  

213
| 16 | 7 (Great Slave Lake) Coy | Snowdrift  
| 1 Pl | Fort Smith  
| 2 Pl | Fort Resolution  
| 3 Pl | Pine Point  
| 4 Pl | Yellowknife  
| 5 Pl | Hay River  
| 6 Pl | Rae  
| 7 Pl | Lac La Martre  
| 8 Pl | Fort Providence |
| 17 | 8 (Hudson Bay West) Coy | Coral Harbour  
| 1 Pl | Repulse Bay  
| 2 Pl | Chesterfield Inlet  
| 3 Pl | Rankin Inlet  
| 4 Pl | Whale Cove  
| 5 Pl | Eskimo Point  
| 6 Pl | Baker Lake  
| 7 Pl | Sanikiluaq (Belcher Islands)  
| 8 Pl |
| 18 | 20 (MacKenzie River Delta) Coy | Holman  
| 1 Pl | Sachs Harbour  
| 2 Pl | Arctic Red River  
| 3 Pl | Inuvik  
| 4 Pl | Fort McPherson  
| 5 Pl | Aklavik  
| 6 Pl | Old Crow  
| 7 Pl |
| 19 | 21 (MacKenzie [sic] River) Coy | Fort Simpson  
| 1 Pl | Wrigley  
| 2 Pl | Fort Liard  
| 3 Pl | Norman Wells  
| 4 Pl | Fort Good Hope  
| 5 Pl | Fort Franklin  
| 6 Pl | Fort Norman  
| 7 Pl | Colville Lake  
| 8 Pl | Echo Bay  
| 9 Pl |

214
| Key Documents | 28 (Baffin Island South) Coy | Broughton Island  
|              | 1 Pl                      | Pangnirtung  
|              | 2 Pl                      | Frobisher Bay  
|              | 3 Pl                      | Lake Harbour  
|              | 4 Pl                      | Cape Dorset  
|              | 5 Pl                      |  

|              | 29 (Baffin Island North) Coy | Clyde River  
|              | 1 Pl                      | Pond Inlet  
|              | 2 Pl                      | Igloolik  
|              | 3 Pl                      | Arctic Bay  
|              | 4 Pl                      |  

|              | 40 (Central Arctic) Coy | Pelly Bay  
|              | 1 Pl                      | Spence Bay  
|              | 2 Pl                      | Gjoa Haven  
|              | 3 Pl                      | Cambridge Bay  
|              | 4 Pl                      | Bathurst Inlet  
|              | 5 Pl                      | Coppermine  
|              | 6 Pl                      |  

|              | 41 (High Arctic) Coy | Grise Fiord  
|              | 1 Pl                      | Eureka  
|              | 2 Pl                      | Resolute  
|              | 3 Pl                      | Isachen  
|              | 4 Pl                      | Mould Bay  
|              | 5 Pl                      |  

| 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 |

MEMORANDUM

1901-260/4 (D Res C 4)

9 Jun 78

DRes C

CANADIAN RANGERS – WEST COAST

Refs: A. MARC 1901-260/4 (Comd) 2 May 77

B. MARC 1901-260/4 (Comd) 26 May 78

1. Refs A and B are representations from the Commander Maritime Command to reduce the West Coast Rangers units to nil strength. Indeed in Ref B, the Commander indicates it is his intention to do so by 1 Sep 78.

2. The attached chronology of Ranger history indicates the indecision over the years which has accompanied the maintenance of a Ranger Force as a component of the Reserve. It would appear there has always been a certain undercurrent of doubt regarding the value of the Rangers and this is particularly true of the Prairie area and Pacific area Rangers. In fact several Prairie Ranger units were reduced to nil strength in 1970.

3. The reasons the Commander wishes to reduce the Rangers to nil strength are:
   a. there is no Ranger Liaison officer;
   b. the West Coast Rangers are not active; and
   c. there does not appear to be a realistic role for them.

The reasoning here is valid. The Ranger LO position apparently was given up in 1973 however the current staff appear to be making annual visits to units, which is about the same frequency as in Northern Region. The fact that there is no activity probably reflects on the lack of a believable requirement. This fact has been re-validated numerous times in various studies – the Ranger tasks, particularly in more populated southern areas are not realistic.

4. The concern about adverse publicity is probably still valid, DG Info is being queried by memo regarding his position on PR however it is suspected that the reply will be the same as last year.
5. The alternative of course is to tell the Commander to continue living with the present situation. This may be the easy way out for NDHQ but it does not address the Commander’s problem of what to do with the Rangers.

6. In conclusion it may be said:
   a. additional studies are not required – the Rangers have been studied to death;
   b. there has been and remains today obvious doubt about the validity of the Rangers - particularly those in the populated areas of the West Coast;
   c. the position of the Cdr MARCOM is agreed with; and
   d. concern over the MND reaction and adverse PR may require us to maintain the status quo and advise Cdr MARCOM of this fact.

G.E. Niels (?) LCDR
DRes C4

Encl: 1

1901-260/4 (D Res C 4)
19 September, 1978

Distribution List

CANADIAN RANGERS

References:  A. Marc 1901-260/4 (Comd) 26 May 1978
              B. NDHQ DCDS 156 2612152 June 1978

1. The CDS has reviewed reference A and has approved the intended course of action. to reduce Canadian Ranger units in British Columbia to nil strength.

2. Formal announcement is not necessary. Should questions arise concerning our action, the response should be that there is no viable role for the Pacific Region Rangers at this time, but should the need arise in the future, units could be reactivated. it is suggested also, that those Rangers who are still known, should be notified personally of the decision.

3. The delay in this reply is regretted.

G.C.E. Theriault
Lieutenant-General
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
for Chief of the Defence Staff
MEMORANDUM

07 Nov 78

Commander

THE CANADIAN RANGERS - NORTHERN REGION

Reference: Your direction - morning conference 24 Cot 78

1. In accordance with your direction given at reference, the entire subject of Rangers has been reviewed to determine realistic and meaningful roles for this group in the period from the present to 1985.

2. The not so long but highly chequered history of the Rangers dates from 1947, when they were formed as a Corps of the Reserve Militia under authority of PC1644 dated 23 May 1947. Prior to their authorization, objection had been registered by GOC Eastern Command, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the Vice Adjutant-General. Brigadier Macklin the VAG, was convinced that the moving spirit behind the proposal to form the Rangers was a LCol Taylor who had been the Staff Officer, Pacific Coast Militia Rangers during the war. He stated that “this is another instance of making the plan and then desperately trying to make the appreciation fit it.” In spite of all objections, the first two Companies of Canadian Rangers were authorized at Whitehorse and Dawson City, Y.T. on 04 Sep 1947. An overall ceiling of 5000 Rangers was set, and allocations made to Commands who called out Liaison Officers and commenced recruiting.

3. By 1952 the initial recruiting effort seems to have been completed, and Rangers were alleged to be active in 61 communities across the country from Newfoundland to B.C. and throughout the NWT and Yukon. Not much seems to have happened from 1952 to 1970 except for periodic visits of the Ranger liaison Officer to the various locations. On the east coast, both Eastern and Quebec Commands had Regular force Majors as LO’s but it appears that “call-outs” continued to be used in the West. The LO’s checked and replaced rifles, and issued ammunition on their visits, which became much less frequent in the 60’s than they had been earlier.

4. On 01 Apr 1970 Command and Control of the Canadian Rangers was passed from CFHQ to the Commander Mobile Command, who directed on 07 May that a study on the Rangers be undertaken “to determine the requirements and concepts for the reorganization of the Canadian Rangers.” The results of the
study became know as the Stirling Report, the win recommendation being the disbandment of the Rangers.

5. Rather than disband the Rangers, NDHQ posted Maj Stirling to NRHQ, where he continued his studies on Rangers and on 28 Jan 71 suggested to the Chief of Staff, Operations, a number of roles and organizational points for creation of a Northern Service Unit based on the Rangers, whose future had not yet been determined. Among the roles, which included the traditional ones of surveillance, military presence, reporting of anomalies, etc. was assistance in search and rescue, particularly as ground search parties or life maintenance units.” This “role” continues to appear from that point onward in all the various proposals made for the Rangers. It appears to have emanated from an item listed in CAO 246-3 of 24 Mar 58 under Normal Tasks, “to provide rescue parties for military purposes as detailed by Officers Commanding Commands.”

6. From 1970 to date there has been no recommendation for disbandment, but a number of very detailed proposals for reorganization or revitalization of the Rangers have been made. On 18 Nov 70 the CDS directed the Commander NRHQ to undertake “a detailed analysis of the need, location, organization and modus operandi for Canadian Rangers within his area of concern.” A massive document resulted, which gave not only roles and organizations but equipment tables, design for Regimental Colours, location and costs of MQ’S’ a draft CFOO, etc. This was approved for implementation, but was never implemented due to the costs involved.

7. In 1971 a scaled down version of the 1971 document was once again submitted at NDRQ’s request, but nothing further has ever been heard on the future of the Rangers. In a discussion in July 77, DGRC stated that an attempt had been made to disband the Rangers but it had not been successful because the programme was very small, inexpensive, and not worth the political trouble it would cause if it were cancelled.

8. In most of the plethora of studies conducted in the 1969-73 period on the Rangers, there is a recurrent statement that the main problem with the Rangers is “the lack of a clearly defined role and tasks not adapted to the realities of Canada in 1970’s. While nearly everyone suggests that, if active, the Rangers could fulfill a useful military function,” there are very few suggestions as to what, precisely, the Rangers tasks should be.

9. During the 1970-74 period, NRHQ had conducted a number of trial training programmes aimed at preparing Inuit and Dene Rangers for service in the “Canadian Arctic Rangers” when the reorganization was duly authorized. Notwithstanding the fact that no direction has ever been received from NDHQ
as to implementation or otherwise of the last NRHQ proposals, we have continued to conduct two annual Ranger training exercises. These are designed to train a recruit to the “Basic Canadian Ranger” standard, which was developed at NRHQ using the Royal Canadian Army Cadet Green Star program as a base to work from. The exercises may be “small” - up to 12 Rangers, in which case the NRHQ Ranger staff of two conduct the training, or “large” between 12 and 25 Rangers, in which case we seek MOBCOM support in the form of two or three Infantry NCO’s to act as Assistant Instructors. This program is highly popular in small Arctic communities, provides us a nucleus VP of Rangers in these communities, gives us a permanent contact group in many locations and provides a source of guides and advisors for use by MOBCOM units exercising in the north.

10. During these training sessions, a constantly recurring question is “what are we to do? what is our purpose?” The book roles do not go far in convincing the native northerner that he is indeed a valuable member of the Canadian Forces. Though he is dedicated, and immensely loyal to the Crown, he is somewhat suspicious that we come and give him two weeks training, for which he is paid, and then walk away and leave him with a rifle and 300 rounds of ammunition, which we promise to replenish annually. To the Ranger, this is the entire incentive to join and his sole motivation to remain a Ranger.

SEARCH AND RESCUE ROLE

11. Another constant question is why are the Rangers not used in land search and rescue? The point is constantly made that if a light aircraft is missing, even if only one person is aboard, no expense is spared in trying to locate it, whereas a party of hunters who are overdue from a trip get no attention at all. This, to the natives, is inexplicable and to some degree tied to their perception of “the white man looks after his own and to hell with the natives.” There are very few native pilots and those few know better than to go astray in the Arctic, but there are legions of brash, inexperienced whites to constantly challenge our SAR capabilities. Outwardly at least, the natives have a point.

12. In the winter of 1977-78 out of the scores of “missing” hunters reported, one group was rescued off the ice of Baffin Bay by combined DND/RCMP effort, with the loss of much equipment but no lives. In three settlements, Frobisher Bay, Fort Chimo and Sanikiluak lives were lost, perhaps needlessly, because the rescue operation was not mounted in time. The Inuit feel very bad about this as do the RCMP who have the responsibility for searching for missing persons. Their problem, however, is not easily solved within their own resources. Parties of hunters are constantly overdue for a number of well know reasons such
as mechanical break-down, shortage of fuel, and bad weather for travelling. Usually, the missing party shows up safe and sound after a day or two. Occasionally, only the bodies are recovered. The problem facing the local RCMP is manpower. Usually the detachment is very small and the Corporal or Constable just cannot afford to drop everything to organize a search every time a group of hunters is overdue. If he does consider a search warranted, he has great difficulty in organizing the manpower, as people have to take time off from their jobs, provide their own fuel, food, etc. for the search and risk their own equipment. This can have far reaching effects - what happens to the family of a searcher if he too become lost? If he smashes his skidoo, who pays to repair it? His worries are endless to him.

13. With the training given to the Rangers, they feel they are ideally suited to taking on the role of search and rescue on the land. We have taught them to read maps and to navigate, to use HF manpack radios for communication, to select, lay out, and mark a rough airfield for Twin Otter aircraft. If we do not let them use this training, why do we give it to them? The question is very difficult to answer in any way that is not just another case of the white man looking after his own and only using the native when it is to our advantage.

14. It appears that with only a minimal increase in the Ranger budget this role could be implemented in selected areas where other resources are not available. There would initially be problems of authorization, control, accounting for use of equipment and repairs and probably many others we are unable to foresee. The fact remains that it may be possible for a real purpose to be given to the Rangers. A drill can quite easily be worked out with the RCMP whereby Ranger assistance could be sought and authorized, and a mechanism for control established that would allow specific members of Rangers to “volunteer” for service on a search. The same status would apply as when the Rangers are on training, i.e., he gets his daily pay, plus rations, rental for his skidoo and komatik, payment for fuel over 200 miles, and for damage to his equipment other than fair wear and tear. This would eliminate the individual’s worry over his family, equipment and well-being if he volunteered to go on a search and according to the few members of the MMP with whom it has been discussed, would produce more than sufficient volunteers.

15. In the years since this role was first assigned to the Rangers, there has not been a case on record where it was necessary to use a large ground party in an air SAR operation, however, the presence of this group should not be ignored by SAR planners. They are available if necessary, with their own means of mobility, excellent knowledge of the land and the ability to live on the land for as long as it is necessary to do so. They could be a very valuable asset during an emergency,
but there is no evidence to indicate that our SAR organization is even aware of their existence.

16. If and when they are called out to conduct or assist in a search, there would be a real need for on-scene co-ordination which cannot initially be provided from this Headquarters. Most Rangers are members of the Hunters and Trappers Associations (HTA’s), some of which have Search Committees to organize or assist in these local ground searches, and RCMP are inevitably called on to assist as well. They would be the logical coordinating agency, and would remain in control of a search until a member of the NRHQ Ranger Staff could make his way to the point of control.

17. It is strongly recommended that approval be granted to use Canadian Rangers as an organized land search organization to determine the feasibility of fully implementing this role for the Rangers north of the 60th parallel.

R.S. McConnell
Major
SSO Rangers & Cadets
AN EVALUATION OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

1. After more than a year as Commander NRHQ, and having travelled extensively across Northern Region, I have developed the conviction that a very valuable human resource, The Canadian Rangers, has been and continues to be largely ignored and significantly under-utilized.

2. The foregoing conviction has led to the attached evaluation which it is hoped underlines the important potential contribution which can be made by the Rangers as an effective augmentation force for our Regular Force defence elements in the north and in reinforcing Canadian sovereignty along our Arctic frontier.

3. I further believe that if such positive goals are to be achieved then additional effort will have to be made by the staffs at NDHQ, the functional commands and NRHQ to ensure the careful development of the Ranger force. In this regard I urge that the recommendations of the attached paper be studied with a view to agreeing the expansion and improvement of the Canadian Rangers in the North. Furthermore, it is requested that NDHQ convene a meeting of the interested parties in the very near future to review the NRHQ study and to agree a formal program for the further integration and development of the Canadian Rangers within our field forces as a credible component of the Reserves.

C.E. Beattie
Brigadier General
Commander
Northern Region Headquarters

Attachment:
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

CANADIAN RANGERS

EVALUATION REPORT

References:  
A. CFOO 1.201 dated 27 Oct 1976 (copy attached)  
B. RCMP “Area of Responsibility” Map (copy attached)

BACKGROUND

1. The “Canadian Rangers” were formed in 1947 with an organizational base similar to that of the Pacific. Coast Militia Rangers of the Second World War. The primary role assigned to those original Rangers had been one of ensuring Canadian territorial security and had involved surveillance of the coastlines in sparsely settled areas of the country with a view to detecting, reporting, and if possible preventing any penetration of Canadian Territory by hostile elements.

2. As the atmosphere of emergency and threatened national security faded after World War II, so did the interest in, and support for a continued Ranger force. However, with the renewed interest in the protection of Canadian sovereignty which became manifest in the early 1970s, initiatives were taken, first by Mobile Command Headquarters, and subsequently by Northern Region Headquarters to rejuvenate this Ranger force which was already, available in the North. This Ranger force already possessed the required personal traits and practical skills, was already adapted to the environment and identified with the land. The Rangers could also be conveniently classified as an “officially constituted” element of the Canadian Armed Forces and thus a visible manifestation of Canadian sovereignty in the North.

3. The foregoing approach was not only convenient, but sound, in that it pursued the mobilization of a valuable human resource and afforded an additional opportunity for native northerners to relate to the southern population and to confirm their Canadian identity. Furthermore it afforded limited opportunities for gainful wage employment, during the periodic training sessions. It also provided each member with a weapon and a limited supply of ammunition with which he could maintain proficiency, albeit through the killing of game, in fulfilling his needs for food, clothing and other creature comforts. Latterly it became clear that the special environmental expertise which native Rangers possessed could be a valuable asset in the environmental training of Southern based forces which were deployed from the south for operations or exercises North of 60°.

4. Thus, there evolved an appreciation of the continuing need to organize this valuable human resource as an integral part of our National Defence effort in the North. Unfortunately, at various periods in Ranger development, the
Department of National Defence policy has not been absolutely clear and convincing in its support of this component of the Reserves, or in specifying roles and tasks which could be seen by the Rangers to be of sufficient importance to justify their continued involvement.

PRESENT SITUATION

5. At the present time CFOO 1.201 provides the formal authority and structure for the Ranger organization in the North. This structure envisages the formation of units and sub-units in keeping with traditional military practice but under close scrutiny does not reflect the reality of the native community structure which is characterized by small population groups which are widely dispersed as villages or hamlets/settlements or even camps. These small groupings relate to a specific land area within which the people are expert, suggesting a situation in which a local platoon/patrol group or guerrilla cadré, would be more compatible, operating as an independent force or in support of regular forces within its area.

6. Within the current Ranger organization there are 394 Rangers serving in twenty-two communities across the Arctic from Aklavik in the Northwest to Broughton Island in the East; and from Grise Fiord in the Northeast to Churchill, Man, in the South. The recent, assignment to NRHQ of responsibility for Rangers in the Ungava Peninsula has increased this number by 150 men. In addition a recently completed study of Ranger coverage across the Arctic, indicates that both the need and the capability exists to organize three additional Ranger patrol groups in the Northeast Arctic Region which would raise their strength/coverage capability to 600 Rangers in 30 communities, and would close an important gap in our current coverage.

7. As noted earlier these Rangers provide a valuable resource which if properly organized, trained, and tasked can make an important contribution in confirming Canadian sovereignty in the North. They can also perform a useful routine service to the community in peacetime; as an emergency security force in support of Regional operations in “assistance to civil authority” or “aid to the-civil-power” operations; in support of exercises and operations conducted by the functional commands during peace time and in the event of war. In fact with the current rapid pace of Northern development, the discovery of important strategic or other national resources, and with the possibility of extension or improvement of vital points or defense installations in the North there could develop an increased requirement for this native Ranger force to eventually become even more involved in internal security duties.
ROLES AND TASKS

8. As a first step in any program to exploit the full potential of the Canadian Rangers, and in so doing improve their operational capabilities, the roles and tasks of the force must be redefined and updated to reflect the realities of the 1970s or 1980s vice the 1940s era when the organization came into being. It is now timely, therefore, to identify meaningful roles and tasks from which to develop training programs which will confirm for the Rangers themselves that they will continue to be engaged in valuable Canadian Defence/Sovereignty activities while at the same time providing useful peacetime service in support of regional or functional command operations, or in support of their local communities.

9. NRHQ has carefully examined the role and tasks prescribed in CFOO 1.201 and is firmly of the opinion that the current role is still the correct one and that it is in keeping with present capabilities. However, in view of technological and sociological changes which have taken place in the North over the past three decades, NRHQ is just as firmly of the opinion that Ranger taskings should be regrouped and somewhat expanded. Pursuing this latter conviction, it is proposed that the Ranger “tasks” be classified into three groups rather than the two which are indicated in the current CFOO. These groups would be categorized as follows:

GROUP I

No change in tasks shown at paragraph 21 of CFOO 1.201 as these tasks are common to any land force unit. i.e., Routine tasks common to all situations, normally without pay, consisting of:

a. reporting any suspicious or unusual activities occurring in local respective areas, to the appropriate Region or Command HQ by the best means available; and

b. collecting detailed information Concerning their local area which may be of assistance in their other tasks, or of value to the Canadian Forces generally;

GROUP II

Tasks normally performed in peacetime independently or in conjunction with other components of the Canadian Forces or Civil Authorities and for which the appropriate rates of Reserve pay may be paid:

a. participation in CF exercises and training courses;

b. provision of guides-and rescue parties for military purposes;
c. supervision of military fuel caches;

d. participation in Regional operations, e.g., reconnaissance, reporting and initial security for manmade disasters, (fuel spills, debris from aircraft and satellites); and

e. provision of assistance to a civil authority, e.g., deployment of ground search and rescue parties in response to RCMP/Provincial Police requests.

GROUP III

Tasks, in addition to the above, which would be performed in a national emergency (including aid to the civil power);

a. assisting RCMP/Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting, and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;

b. protecting the vital life-sustaining installations (e.g., airstrips, nursing stations, power plants or communications) in northern communities and/or defence installations; and,

c. forming self-supporting long range patrols for independent offensive regional operations within locally assigned areas of responsibility.

ORGANIZATION

10. The second most important consideration which must be viewed in the light of the 1979/1980 realities is the optimum organization for a Canadian Ranger force. In the North, the traditional military land force organization based on sections, platoons, companies; etc., the structure upon which the Rangers were originally organized, has proved to be an ambitious but unworkable concept which has further led to unworkable administrative procedures and an unwieldy command and control system.

11. After attempting to work with this traditional, formalized structure for approximately nine years, with a native population, which is by tradition very unstructured it is not difficult to conclude that a change is not only necessary but overdue. Accordingly, and in keeping with the northern community “way of life”, it is concluded that the present Ranger organization should be replaced by a basic Ranger grouping designated a “patrol” whose formal title is identified with the community (e.g., Igloolik Patrol). The ideal size of the patrol should be 12 and it should not normally exceed twenty. A patrol of this size would be sufficient to carry out the envisaged tasks but would still be small enough to be administered or supported within reasonable levels of financial or manpower resources.
12. Under the proposed structure each Patrol, headed by a Patrol Leader would report directly to the Ranger Staff at NRHQ which is, in fact, the current practice. This structure introduced in conjunction with an improved quarterly reporting procedure would provide for closer control, and the passage of more timely and accurate information than has been possible in the past. In proposing this more moderate, realistic, organizational structure it should be emphasized that its implementation would not preclude subsequent expansion to a more formal organizational grouping of one or more patrols under a designated senior Ranger or regular Canadian Forces Command structure should the need arise.

**PATROL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY**

13. Native people still identify strongly with the land or sea which is their environment - their area of livelihood. Restoring a local name to the Patrol will foster that identity. There is also a more useful military purpose implicit in this and that is to assign a clearly defined geographic area to each Patrol as its responsibility for coverage. Such a delineation is routine for any conventional military surveillance role. In the North it serves the additional purpose of ensuring that at least some coverage will be maintained between the far flung settlements. Since many Ranger tasks necessitate DND coordination and equally close working relationships with the RCMP, it is proposed that a system of boundaries similar to the RCMP overlay (copy attached) defining detachment area responsibilities might serve as the starting point for this concept.

**AGE LIMITATIONS**

14. Another long standing anomaly in the administration of Canadian Rangers is that of membership age. There has never been any upper age limit established for “active” membership with the result that in the past and even at present, Rangers are enlisted for an indefinite period which is terminated only by death or resignation. This practice has sometimes been advantageous in that the older, more experienced and thus more knowledgeable community members have been retained but it has also created a drawback in that with no upper age limit, the effectiveness of the aging Cadré in support of an operation or exercise is questionable. As a means of obviating this latter situation it would now seem prudent to adopt a prescribed retirement age. NRHQ’s current assessment based on nine years of experience indicates that in striking a balance between knowledge and affectiveness [sic] the “CRA” should not exceed age 60.

**LANGUAGE**

15. Only a few of the older Rangers are capable of communication in English or French. The complexity of languages spoken and written embraces Eastern and Western Inuktitut (and the associated syllabics and Roman orthographies)
together with regional variations such as the several Dene languages of the
MacKenzie River area and he Yukon. NRHQ has no internal translation
capability or arrangement with the Territorial Government to use its limited
Interpreter Corps services. There are no instructions promulgated in the native
languages and no training publications exist. The only applicable films available
for use are the St John Ambulance first aid films in two [Inuktitut] dialects.
Although this has continued to be a serious employment and training constraint
over the year, the retirement of the older Rangers and the enlistment of the
younger men into the organization, those in the 18 - 25 age group who are the
product of an improved Northern school system of the last 10 - 12 years, should
eliminate this problem almost entirely; there are few Inuit or Dene under the age
of 25 who do not have a working knowledge of English, however, the situation in
Nouveau Quebec is not clear at this time.

16. Despite the foregoing optimistic prognosis, inability to communicate in
native languages is believed to be instrumental in the failure of Rangers to
develop a greater degree of administrative and training self-sufficiency. If Rangers
are expected to share a defence responsibility for Canada, they must be treated as
respected partners in this goal and be accorded equal consideration of their
culture - part of which is language. It follows, therefore, that in Northern Region
“per se”, and very likely in Nouveau Quebec there is a short term requirement for
translation and publication of administrative procedures, training pamphlets, etc.,
in the native dialectal with an attendant financial commitment.

TRAINING

18. At present all Ranger training is the responsibility of a two man staff at
NRHQ, each of whom has other primary duties and responsibilities. Financial,
time, and environmental constraints have, in the past, limited to less than four
locations a year, the number of sites where periodic formalized Ranger training
courses can be conducted. Those constraints have meant that on a rotational basis
formalized training to achieve and maintain the basic Ranger standard, can only
be conducted every five or six years for each Ranger base. Even this unsatisfactory
frequency is difficult to achieve because of the need for initial training of new
patrols or semi-active patrols which have acquired new recruits.

19. In order to compensate for the training deficiencies NRHQ is taking
advantage of every FMC offer to train Rangers as part of its regularly scheduled
Northern exercises (exercises SOVEREIGN VIKING, NORTHERN VIKING,
etc.). This much appreciated assistance is, of course, closely coordinated by
NRHQ for purposes of documentation, pay, training standards, and equipment
supply. In furtherance of this embryonic program NRHQ will seek to expand
upon the use of the FMC training potential and will proceed to develop a training package (orientation, training standards, methods, etc.,) for ready use by Regular Force units/sub-units which will be operating in Northern locations where Ranger patrols exist. The development of training packages will, however, be delayed until the role of the Rangers and their designated tasks are reconfirmed. It should be appreciated that it is in this area, perhaps more than any other that effective progress and the most valuable contribution can be made by Rangers. Every effort should be made to develop close team work between the Rangers and the functional commands, and especially Mobile Command since it is in this area that they can make a most valuable contribution as an augmentation element in time of regional or national disaster.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

20. Not unlike other members of the Canadian Armed Forces the Canadian Rangers have long desired to wear clothing and identification illustrative of their status in their patrol and as bona fide representatives of the Department of National Defence. The only item now issued is a red arm band with the Ranger Crest and this item is frequently misplaced or lost in training.

21. Although it would be illogical to suggest the issue of complete CAF clothing kits to each Ranger, certain items of environmental protective clothing should be considered. More specifically, a parka, muklucks, Arctic mitts, and Balaclava/toque for wear during training or call-out periods would adequately meet the identity requirement and the wearing of the standard CAF small, detachable metal rank badges would permit status identification within the patrol and when working with Regular Force members or RCMP personnel in response to local emergencies.

22. The question of equipment must be dealt with under two categories. Firstly, under the present circumstances and setting, the equipment now issued, a .303 rifle and 200 rounds per year of ammunition, are appropriate. Stocks are plentiful and cost is minimal. Dependent upon the role envisaged for Rangers (for instance in a mobilization task) additional equipment would be needed. The most obvious items are tents, tent stores and radios. A Patrol “scale” for this equipment should be agreed and those items stockpiled for issue.

23. The second aspect of the equipment question concerns equipment which is privately owned and may be required for routine unpaid tasks, call out tasks or use in emergency operations, including mobilization; of prime importance is the means of transportation, normally dog team, LOSV, or motor-boat. In most cases this equipment is essential in earning a living or if utilized in the course of Ranger duty, rent is paid. Though there is no obligation for Rangers to possess
such equipment, they could undertake few of their tasks without it. There is, therefore, strong argument in favour of a yearly maintenance or operating grant (e.g., cost of 25 imp. gallons of fuel) as a means of ensuring availability of the equipment and facilitating performance of the Routine tasks assigned.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

24. The foregoing evaluation of the Canadian Rangers program in Northern Region has been an attempt to briefly but fairly assess the potential value to Canada and in particular the Canadian Armed Forces of a significant manpower resource which continues to be available at minimal cost, and to determine how best this valuable resource can serve the combined objectives of National Defence and Canadian northern sovereignty.

25. It is concluded from this examination that the Canadian Rangers do indeed fulfill a very important, if low profile, military requirement on Canada's Northern frontier. Given the unique factors involved, the concept is realistic and unquestionably economical. At a time when Canadian unity may be threatened and Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is being questioned by some nations, the Rangers provide an identifiable permanent native presence whose loyalty to Canada as a nation has been clearly demonstrated.

26. These arguments notwithstanding, the evaluation has also shown that there are weaknesses which can be overcome and that with minimal expenditures of funds or manpower the greater potential of the Ranger Force can be realized. In furtherance of this belief the following recommendations are tendered for your consideration:

It is recommended:

a. That the role of the Canadian Rangers in the North (including Nouveau Quebec) be reconfirmed as that shown in CFOO 1.201 dated 27 Oct 1976;

b. That tasks for the Canadian Rangers be redefined as indicated at paragraph 9 of this evaluation;

c. That the current organizational structure for the Northern Rangers be replaced by a structure embodying basic “patrols” identified by name with their local communities;

d. That the basic patrol size be established at not less than twelve and not normally more than twenty persons;
e. That the areas of responsibility for each patrol coincide insofar as is practical with the areas of responsibility defined for RCMP community based detachments;

f. That every effort be made to integrate Rangers into the Northern Training or operations of the functional commands and that appropriate funding be provided to promote such training.

g. That procedures be streamlined in order to facilitate cooperative ventures between the CAP and RCMP especially where Rangers can be of assistance in searches or in internal operations.

h. That authorization be granted to impose a CRA limit of 60 years for the Canadian Ranger Force;

j. That approval in principle be granted for the translation of key Ranger training publications into appropriate native languages. (Specific publications and estimated costs to be furnished prior to seeking final approval);

k. That authorization be granted to issue each active Ranger Patrol with a scaled emergency deployment kit and specific items of personal environmental protection clothing together with appropriate rank insignia as envisaged at paragraphs 20 and 21 of this evaluation; and

m. That authorization be granted for the provision of a personal equipment “maintenance and routine use” grant [to] not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) annually to each “active” Ranger.

27. It is the firm belief of NRHQ that if the preceding recommendations are acted upon the potential of the Canadian Rangers in the North will be realized and they will become an operationally effective, viable component of the Canadian Armed Forces as well as a valuable national asset. Sympathetic consideration of this evaluation and its integral recommendations is respectfully solicited.
FOR COMD FROM DGMPO

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF CANADIAN RANGER (CDN RANG) PROGRAMME

REF: A. COMD NRHQ LETTER TO VCDS 14 JUN 79
    B. NR 5323-1 (COMD) 06 DEC 79

1. It is understood a letter prepared for VCDS signature in reply to Ref A will state that a more structured organization of the Cdn Rang is not appropriate at this time. Admittedly this response was drafted without full consideration on your evaluation of the Cdn Rang at Ref B nevertheless it remains a position of ADM(POL) supported by DCDS group that a more structured organization of the CDN Rang could be undesirable on following grounds:
   a. The frequency of involvement in specific of tasks is very low
   b. Individual Rangers already possess ample skills for the tasks which the CF wish them to perform
   c. Increased structural organization could prove counter-productive by reason of conflict with existing values and customs; and
   d. Resulting additional costs would be difficult to justify in the absence of perceived threat

2. For above reasons it is considered inappropriate to proceed further with this matter until VCDS has had the opportunity to consider the response drafted for his signature. In meantime your evaluation at Ref B will be circulated to DG Pol P and DGIS for further analysis of its contents and consideration of the need for formal briefings and staffing.

3. It is regrettable that situation has developed in manner that led to staffing your 14 Jun 79 proposal to VCDS without benefit of the detailed evaluation submitted on 5 Dec 79. Further staffing proposed at para 2, hopefully, should result in fresh start with every factor known by all.

DRAFTER’S NAME: J. L. Ellard LCol/DMPC 4
SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER: G.L. Edwards Cmdre
The Canadian Rangers @ 75


NR 5323-1 (Comd)
Northern Region Headquarters
… Yellowknife, NWT …
21 Apr 80

National Defence Headquarters
… Attention: DGRC

CANADIAN RANGERS EVALUATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

References: 
A. NR 5323-1 (Comd) subject An Evaluation of the Canadian Rangers dated 06 Dec 79
B. Briefing on the Canadian Rangers 13 Mar 80
C. NRHQ 03 (Comd) subject Canadian Rangers - Study Recommendations date/time group 082305z Apr 80

Background

1. Reference A, “An Evaluation of the Canadian Rangers”, concluded with a number of recommendations. These were further amplified at Reference B, which was a presentation by the Commander NRHQ to VCDS, DCDS and ADM POL. Authority was given the Commander at that time to pursue the recommendations, specifically, the submission of a costed program for provision of clothing and equipment, through DGRC, for approval by PCB.

2. Reference C, requested that a meeting of interested NDHQ Directorates and Functional Command representatives be convened to pursue the implementation of training and other support recommendations made in Reference A.

Aim

3. To outline action required to implement the NRHQ recommendations contained in Reference A.

Discussion

4. In the subsequent paragraphs of this discussion, each recommendation of Reference A is restated. Each recommendation is then followed by an outline of the supporting action needed for future stages.
5. Role

a. **Recommendation:** That the role of the Canadian Rangers in the North (including Nouveau Quebec) be reconfirmed as shown in CFOO 1.201 dated 27 Oct 1976

b. **Supporting Action:** None.

6. Tasks

a. **Recommendation:** That tasks for the Canadian Rangers be redefined as follows:

(1) **GROUP I**

No change in tasks shown at paragraph 21 of CFOO 1.201 as these tasks are common to any land force unit, i.e., Routine tasks common to all situations, normally without pay, consisting of:

(a) reporting any suspicious or unusual activities occurring in local respective areas, to the appropriate Region or Command HQ by the best means available; and

(b) collecting detailed information concerning their local area which may be of assistance in their other tasks, or of value to the Canadian Forces generally;

(2) **GROUP II**

Tasks normally performed 'in peacetime independently or in conjunction with other components' of the Canadian Forces or Civil Authorities, and for which the appropriate rates of Reserve pay may be paid:

(a) participation in CF exercises and training courses;

(b) provision of guides and rescue parties for military purposes;

(c) supervision of military fuel caches;

(d) participation in Regional operations, e.g., reconnaissance, reporting and initial security for man-made disasters, (fuel spills, debris from aircraft and satellites); and

(e) provision of assistance to a civil authority, e.g., deployment of ground search and rescue parties in response to RCMP/Provincial Police requests.

(3) **GROUP III**

Tasks, in addition to the above, which would be performed in a national emergency (including aid to the civil power):
(a) assisting RCMP/Provincial Police in the discovery, reporting; and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs;
(b) protecting the vital life-sustaining installations (e.g., airstrips, nursing stations, power plants or defence installations); and
(c) forming self-supporting long range patrols for independent offensive regional operations within locally assigned areas of responsibility.

b. Supporting Action
(1) CFOO 1.201, CFAO 2-8, and any other supporting documents require revision, approval and reissue.
(2) Rangers must be informed and applicable local instructions amended.
(3) NRHQ Ranger Staff will determine if a change in emphasis on the basic training course is necessary.

7. Organization
a. Recommendation: That the current organizational structure for the Canadian Rangers be replaced by a structure embodying basic “patrols” identified by name with their local communities.

b. Supporting Action:
(1) This is already being implemented. Rangers have been informed by newsletter and at briefings in their settlements. There is no-change to UICs or to the chain of command.
(2) CFOO 1.201 and CFAO 2-8 require revision to reflect this organizational structure.

8. Patrol Size
a. Recommendation: That the basic Patrol size be established at not less than twelve and not normally more than twenty persons

b. Supporting Action: No external action is required. This is being put into practice as new Patrols are established. For older established Patrols where an apparent blanket recruiting approach was taken in the past, two or more Patrols will be established pending resolution of the problem by compulsory retirement for reasons of age (CRA).

9. Area of Responsibility
a. Recommendation: That the areas of responsibility for each Patrol coincide insofar as is practicable with the areas of responsibility defined for RCMP community based detachments.
b. **Supporting Action**: This has already been informally delineated on the map subject to consultation with Patrol Sergeants on the existence of natural terrain, hunting and trapping limitations for individual settlements. As each area is confirmed, the Ranger Patrol will be notified.

10. **Assistance in Training**

a. **Recommendation**: That every effort be made to integrate Rangers into the Northern Training or operations of the Functional Commands and that appropriate funding be provided to promote such training.

b. **Supporting Action**:  
   
   (1) This recommendation will necessitate the most co-ordination, principally with FMC. In this regard FMC will be requested to coordinate FMC environmental training to include assistance in training of, and with, Rangers.  
   
   (2) In order that the Functional Commands may better appreciate what is entailed in this recommendation, it has been expanded in greater detail in Annex A. Functional Commands, as applicable, have been invited to-comment.  
   
   (3) There are sufficient funds in the present Ranger budget to implement this proposal General estimates are shown at Annex B.

11. **CAF/RCMP Co-operation**

a. **Recommendation**: That procedures be streamlined in order to facilitate co-operative ventures between the CAF and RCMP especially where Rangers can be of assistance in searches or in internal security operations.

b. **Supporting Action**:  
   
   (1) Of foremost, but not the only concern, is the establishment of simplified procedures to enable a ready response to ground search and rescue. Insofar as this primarily concerns the interaction of 'G' Division RCMP and NRHQ on the one hand and the settlement RCMP Detachments and Ranger Patrols on the other, a new SOP will be drawn up and promulgated to all concerned. This SOP will have to meet existing regulations governing provision of assistance to civil authority. Call out of Rangers for Searches for Missing Persons will be the exception, and must be authorized by NRHQ.  
   
   (2) Preliminary briefing and discussion has taken place with Chief Superintendent A.H. Buttler, CO 'G” Division, RCMP. Yellowknife, and his response has been positive.
12. Retirement Age

a. **Recommendation**: That authorization be granted to impose a CRA limit of 60 years for the Canadian Ranger Force

b. **Supporting Action**:
   
   (1) Notification of this intent has gone to Ranger Patrols in the newsletter and personnel documents are being reviewed.

   (2) NDHQ endorsement is required. The CFOO and CFAO require revision to reflect this.

13. Translation

a. **Recommendation**: That in principle be granted for the translation of key Ranger training publications into appropriate native languages. (Specific publications and estimated costs to be furnished prior to seeking final approval).

b. **Supporting Action**:

   (1) A local translation service has been used on a trial basis for correspondence and newsletter translation into Inuktitut (Eastern Arctic). The cost is $0.15 per word. The reaction to these initial efforts is being awaited as a guide to future projects.

   (2) Although translation services into Inuktitut (Western Arctic) and Athapascan are very limited, this may well prove unnecessary since most of the younger generation speak English.

   (3) The basic pamphlet training package remains to be written in English before it can be sent for translation(s).

14. Clothing and Equipment

a. **Recommendation**: That authorization be granted to issue each active Ranger Patrol with a scaled emergency deployment kit and specific items of personal environmental protective clothing together with appropriate rank insignia.

b. **Supporting Action**:

   (1) An attempt was already made to get rank badges through normal channels. It was turned down because it was stated that it would require a change in dress regulations. Other methods are now being investigated to provide this item.

   (2) A scale has been proposed and costed. It is at Annex C. The personal issue costs $493,792.00 based on 900 Rangers (End 1981 strength projection). The Patrol deployment kit costs $57,410.40 based on 40
Patrols (End 1981 projection). A three phase program is suggested in Annex C to end Dec 83.

(3) Agreement is required on the scale of issue and to the phasing. Following this it is requested that DGRC staff the requirements to PCB for PCP action.

15. Maintenance Grant

a. Recommendation: That authorization be granted for the provision of a personal equipment “maintenance and routine use” grant, not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) annually to each “active” Ranger.

b. Supporting Action:
   (1) Based on a strength of 900 active Rangers, this will necessitate approval for an increase of $45,000.00 per year in the present Ranger budget.
   (2) Following approval, a payment plan will be drawn up.

CONCLUSION

16. In conclusion, it is requested that the following action be taken:
   a. that “supporting action” required in each of the foregoing sub-paragraphs be initiated by NDHQ as appropriate;
   b. that the meeting of interested NDHQ Directorates and Functional Command representatives be convened as soon as practicable; and
   c. that the costed clothing and equipment program, as contained in Annex C be presented to PCB for approval.

C.E. Beattie
Brigadier-General
Commander
Northern Region Headquarters

Attachments:
ANNEX A - ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FROM THE FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS
ANNEX B - COST ESTIMATES
ANNEX C - EQUIPMENT PROPOSALS
APPENDIX 1 - PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
APPENDIX 2 - PATROL EQUIPMENT
RANGER TRAINING ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FROM THE FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS

BACKGROUND

1. In the paper on "Evaluation of the Canadian Rangers". it was recommended that "every effort be made to integrate Rangers into the Northern training or operations of the Functional Commands and that appropriate funding be provided to promote such training.

2. During FMC sponsored exercises at Coral Harbour in Nov/Dec 79, a basic Ranger training exercise was incorporated into the Regular Force exercises. Experience gained from this initial joint training attempt was used to further develop the initial recommendations and these were elaborated in a briefing on the Canadian Rangers which was presented at NDHQ to the VCDS, DCDS and ADM Pol in Feb/Mar 80.

3. This briefing also emphasized those settlements where first priority should be given to the establishment of new Ranger Patrols. These had been determined in a prior review by Commander NRHQ and the Ranger Staff.

AIM

4. To propose involvement in Ranger training by the functional Commands.

DISCUSSION

5. Applicability

a. Of the three main Functional Commands, the greatest degree of involvement is likely to be by FMC. This aspect will be discussed at greater length later. The degree of involvement by MARCOM and AIRCOM (exclusive of those commitments which are indirect because they would be in support of FMC exercises/training) are more likely to be that of liaison and establishing contact, should their aircraft or ships be deployed in or near locations where there are Rangers. Alternative possibilities for these commands would be the conduct of ship visits and familiarization flights. The main intent is to promote public relations as well as foster a sense of identity with the Canadian Forces since the visits of the normal Ranger staff, for environmental and geographic reasons are infrequent. This type of assistance is best discharged by the routine advisement and co-
ordinational ready being undertaken between NRHQ, MARCOM and AIRCOM with NRHQ providing the settlement contacts for Rangers.

b. FMC units frequently exercise and train in Northern Region. There is an identity of working environment, training and methods of operation amongst FMC units and the Rangers. It therefore makes sense to take advantage of opportunities provided by the Presence of FMC troops to assist in the training of Rangers, if possible. Accordingly, the remainder of this discussion will concentrate on that possibility.

6. Co-ordination

a. The basic principle should be that of NRHQ keeping FMC advised of locations where Ranger Patrols now exist and locations where it is proposed to establish new Patrols. In terms of training, priority would go to new locations, followed by the established locations, in their own order of priority according to the length of time since their last training exercise.

b. FMC, in considering proposals for training by its own units, could then consider whether one (or more) of these locations might prove suitable for its aims and whether it might additionally be possible to simultaneously conduct training for Rangers.

7. Training

a. The level and scope of subjects taught in Ranger basic training are such that the officer and NCO of a basic combat arms sub-unit: (Armd/Arty Tp, Inf P1) could teach them to Rangers. They are: CF and Ranger role; organization and tasks; safety-oriented first aid; map using; basic radios and elementary VP; use of military arctic tents, tent group stores and rations; .303 rifle-familiarization, care and zeroing. This five day classroom and local area instruction is usually followed by a five day recce and patrol exercise on the land.

b. It is thought feasible—that a Sqn/Bty/Coy sized sub-unit could undertake Ranger training in up to four widely separated and isolated settlement locations simultaneously by judicious tasking of its sub-units. This could be done in conjunction with its own familiarization or survival training.

c. The sub-units would have to deploy, completely self-sufficient, with additional equipment for Ranger training as well (less .303 rifles). This must include sufficient IRPs for themselves as well as a 12-20 man Ranger Patrol. The actual number of participating Rangers expected would of course be notified beforehand.
d. NRHQ Ranger Staff would be responsible for:

(1) recruiting
(2) documentation
(3) settlement liaison and negotiation for special facilities (indoor lecture space; projectors, etc.)
(4) rifle issue
(5) Ranger pay and financial support
(6) advice and continued liaison if necessary.

8. Limitations. It must be realized that though this degree of co-operation and co-ordination is relatively easy to achieve through routine military channels, there are limitations unique to the Northern setting:

a. establishment of positive contacts, spreading of interest and recruiting useful personnel for Rangers might take up to six months to complete;

b. native languages, attitudes and orientation are quite different from Southerners and necessitate careful briefings on what to expect and what approach to take;

c. availability of personnel is subject to seasons and the natural cycles of fish, game and fur-bearing animals. Very few periods in the year are suitable for maximum native participation and therefore every Southern sub-unit should go with an alternate plan to conduct training for itself only;

d. few settlements have an airstrip large enough to accept a medium transport aircraft.

9. Existing Possibilities (New Locations)

a. Western

(1) Sachs Harbour - contact established. Awaiting results of information dissemination.

b. Central

(1) Cambridge Bay - contacts established and some names listed: Follow-up visit planned for 24 Apr 80.
(2) Gjoa Haven - no contacts yet.
(3) Spence Bay - no contacts yet.
(4) Pelly Bay - no contacts yet.
Note: The above group of four settlements would be suitable for Sgn/Bty/Coy deployments per para 7b above.

c. Eastern

(1) Chesterfield Inlet - no contacts yet.

(2) Rankin Inlet - information paper left with settlement.

(3) Whale Cove - no contacts yet.


Note: As per above note.

(5) Sanikiluaq - briefing given and info passed Dec 79. Awaiting names.


SUMMARY

10. This is a simple outline of how it is foreseen that the Ranger program and the Functional Commands may derive mutual advantage from training opportunities in the north. Commands are invited to comment and add their own ideas. It is considered that this concept presents a favourable opportunity for Functional Commands to both justify and become involved in Northern training in a more meaningful way than has been possible in the past.
MEMORANDUM
5323-1 (DLPC)
20 Jun 80

Distribution List

CANADIAN RANGERS EVALUATION

Ref: A. NR 5323-1 (COMD) 21 Apr 80

1. The NRHQ evaluation and proposal for implementation of recommendations contained at Ref A have been reviewed with particular emphasis on the role, tasks, organization, patrol size, area of responsibility and procurement of clothing and equipment.

2. It is noted that the role is unchanged from that contained in CFOO 1.201. CLDO agrees with:
   a. the regrouping of tasks to more adequately reflect the level/type of Ranger activity;
   b. the proposed organizational restructure which embodies “patrols of 12 to 20” identified by name with the local community and with areas of responsibility being aligned with current RCMP boundaries; and
   c. the recommendation that “supporting action” for the above subparagraphs be initiated by NDHQ.

3. The training implications will not be addressed as this clearly falls within the purview of HQ FMC.

4. While the concept is fully supported the outstanding problems of communication, command and control which have limited Ranger performance in the past, are not fully addressed in Ref A. For example, it is assumed that the issue arrangements for individual clothing and equipment will be the same as the rifle and ammunition allocation. This will entail high usage rates and complicated distribution and resupply problems. Under these circumstances it is essential that costs for clothing and equipment replacement as well as annual redistribution be identified before the proposal is presented to PCB.

5. Aside from our intuitive concerns, attempts to outfit the Militia and Reserves with winter clothing has had a very disappointing history. Procurement efforts were frustrated in 1979 when approved contracts were suspended for lack of
funds. This PCP which was to cost $107K is now $206K with little prospect of early PCP approval. There are now serious shortages of environmental clothing for the Reserves and an omnibus PCP 9042 has been drafted in an attempt to redress the deficiencies. The cost of this proposal is $40 million and it is unlikely to be funded before the later part of this decade. The requirements for winter clothing for the Canadian Rangers is not included in PCP 9042.

6. Current NDHQ policy places emphasis on equipping the Militia to permit augmentation and full participatory training with the regular force. This policy is reaffirmed and consequently the provision of winter clothing and equipment for the Canadian Rangers must take a lower priority after meeting the long outstanding needs of the regular force and the militia.

J.B. Riffon
BGen
A/CLDO

DISTRIBUTION LIST

DRAFT

CHRONOLOGY OF STUDIES ON CANADIAN RANGERS

1. The following chronology of studies on the Rangers has been put together to provide assistance in resolving the problem posed by the Commander Marcom, on what to do with the West Coast Rangers:

   July 1968: A study prepared by D OPS 4 July 68 recommended that the Rangers continue to exist. The one dissenting vote at this time was Pacific Region which recommended that Ranger tasks be taken over by the RCMP and provincial employees.

   Oct 1969: A briefing by the Northern Steering Committee, which appears to have been an inter-departmental group, recommended retention of the Rangers in the North on 28 Oct 69.

   Apr 1970: FMC assumed command of the Rangers 1 Apr 70. Some background data was provided by CFHQ to FMC HQ in a paper on 10 Mar 70.

   Sep 1970: The Commander FMC after an in depth study recommended the Canadian Rangers be disbanded. There was some suggestion that further study was required on the development of a para-military organization for the North, and that a Cadet movement would be a promising course of action.

   Nov 1970: On 4 Nov 70, VCDS decided that the Rangers should continue and that transfer of Command and Control would be transferred to Northern Region and Maritime Command. This was communicated to FMC HQ and was based on a Force Development Objective on the North, and on Marcom and NR indicating a desire to assume command of the Rangers.

   Feb 1971: Command of Rangers transferred to Marcom and Northern Region under authority of V 1901-260/4 (DORL) 22 Feb 71.

   Oct 1971: The Northern Region Operational Concept for the Canadian Arctic Rangers was completed.

   Dec 1971: The Maritime Command Operational Concept for the Canadian Coastal Rangers was completed.

   Feb 1972: The VCDS presented NR and Marcom concept papers plus a third option to the CDS Advisory Committee on 15 Feb 72.
Option 3 was approved by CDS AC 3/72 (S1901-260/0 A/DPCC/CDS16 Feb 72) with the proviso that as much of the proposal as possible should be accomplished in FY 72/73 and the major part be put forward as a “B” Budget item in FY 73/74. DIAND support was also to be solicited.

Apr 1972: Approval was not to be however and the 8th meeting of DMC (V1901-260/4 (VCDS 7 Apr 72) directed that the reconstitution of the Rangers be made subject of a Cabinet submission. The item was deleted from the “B” Budget. DCOPSR was to proceed with a cabinet submission on a priority basis.

May 1972: A cabinet submission was prepared with 4 alternatives, (V1901-260/4 (DLOTR) 31 May 72). The VCDS selected option 4 which was basically an adaptation of the current ranger concept under which the Rangers would continue to function with the current organization concept.

Aug 1973: This submission was delayed several times, then placed on hold by DCDS on 10 Aug 73 pending the tabling of a policy paper by ADM(Pol) at a future DMC.

Aug 1973: The DMC met on 20 Aug 73 and, based on recommendations from A/ADM(Pol), directed that there be neither further study nor resources committed on the Rangers, pending completion of the Land Forces Review, which was intended for completion in May 74.

Jan 1974 DCDS letter 1901-260/4 TD 3353(DGMPO) 9 Jan 74 attempted to clarify the intent of the DMC decision of 20 Aug 73. This letter stated that while staff action on Rangers was to cease, Ranger programs might continue with no additional funding from NDHQ.

Jun 1974 DCDS letter 1901-260/4 TD 4122 (DGMPO) 11 Jun 74 in response to Northern Region request for funding for training indicated that the program was too expensive and Ranger funding was restricted to 44K for FY 75/76, the same as the previous year.

1974: The Land Force Policy Review 1974 (5th draft) page 12-2 indicated it was unable to establish a rationale for retaining the Canadian Rangers in the north, and further study was required.
Nov 1974: DCDS Study 2/74 Military Capability in the North 26 Nov 74 concluded that there was a requirement for a militia presence in the North including both coasts - and this presence could be fulfilled by the Rangers.

Apr 1975: DCDS did not support the conclusions of this study and his memo to CDS indicated such and recommended the status quo remain, pending further improvement to the fiscal/manpower situation of the Department. He recommended expansion of the cadet program in the North and supported northern base development. (1200-050/77 DCPC 9 Apr 75)

Sep 1975: The new DCDS reconfirmed Gen Carr's position stated in the previous, memo to CDS. (1200-050/77 DCDS Sep 75)

May 1977: The Commander Marpac, through Commander Marcom, requested the west coast rangers be reduced to nil strength because the unit had in fact become dormant.

Jun 1978: Ranger units on west coast reduced to nil strength.

16 Jan 1979: MARCOM requested [Ungava] ranger units be transferred to N.R.

24 Jan 1979: DGRC requested NR to examine MARCOM proposal.

17 Apr 1979: NR agrees to take over Rangers from MARCOM.

5 Nov 1979: Approval granted for NR to take over Rangers in Northern Quebec (UNGAVA) from MARCOM. (effective 13 Nov 79)

30 Nov 1979: CMDR NR requests replacement HQ building.

6 Dec 1979: NR submitted an evaluation of the Canadian Rangers along with eleven [recommendations] for improvements to Rangers.

13 Mar 1980: CMDR NR Briefs DCDS/VCOS/ADM POL on role of Rangers and proposed change.

21 Apr 1980: NR submitted an outline of actions required to carry out recommendation submitted on 6 Dec 79.

25 June 80: Meeting on revitalization of Rangers:
(1) Patrols to be identified by name of local community.
(2) CRA – 60 years
(3) DGRC/MARCOM/NR/To coordinate PCP for Parkas for rangers.
Doc. 36: Capt Les Palhazi, “Canadian Ranger Liaison Visit to North Region Headquarters,” 16 April 1984

1901-1 (Cdn Rgrs)
Canadian Forces Station St. John’s
... 16 April 1984

Maritime Command Headquarters ...

**Attention: SORO**

**CANADIAN RANGER LIAISON VISIT TO NORTHERN REGION HEADQUARTERS**

**Reference: COS RO 113 081500Z Mar 84**

1. In accordance with the reference, the Maritime Command Ranger Liaison Officer, Captain L. Palhazi, accompanied Major D.C. Iley, Staff Officer Regional Operations at Maritime Command Headquarters, Halifax on a liaison visit to the Canadian Ranger staff at Northern Region Headquarters (NRHQ) Yellowknife, N.W.T. during the period 11-14 March 1984.

**AIM**

2. The aim of the visit was to discuss areas of common interest dealing with the Canadian Ranger programme. The prime topics of discussion centred around Canadian Ranger staff, organization, training and support.

**NRHQ CANADIAN RANGER STAFF**

3. The NRHQ staff tasked with supporting the Canadian Ranger programme consists of one officer and five combat arms trained Senior NCO's. Major R.P. Hodgson, the Senior Staff Officer Rangers and Cadets (SSO R and C), has overall responsibility for the Canadian Ranger programme at NRHQ. A breakdown of his responsibilities include command and control (of the remainder of his staff, training, operational taskings, appointments, liaison, visit coordination), administration (including enrolment, documentation, record keeping, pay, correspondence) and supply (including ammunition allocation and inspection, repair and replacement of rifles).

4. A Ranger MWO presently (MWO Ritthaller) assists and acts as second in command to the SSO R and C in the carrying out of the above mentioned responsibilities. Each also has another major function at NRHQ. The SSO R and C has the same policy, supervision and budget responsibility for northern cadets including the Whitehorse Cadet Camp as does any Regional SSO Cadets in the
south, and the Rangers MWO is the Regional Warrant Officer for Northern Region.

5. The Canadian Ranger staff also includes four Sergeants who work as teams of two and are responsible for a given area in which they must:
   a. establish liaison;
   b. resupply with ammunition and equipment;
   c. plan and conduct training; and
   d. maintain records and data about each patrol.

6. The previous SSO R and C, LCol J.E.R. Tattersal, who held that position from July 1979 until July 1982 realized, in order to realistically carry out his responsibilities vis-a-vis the Canadian Rangers, he would require a substantial increase of staff. As a direct result of his efforts, there was a permanent increase to the establishment of NRHQ, of the four above mentioned Sergeant positions.

ORGANIZATION

7. The Canadian Rangers in Northern Region are presently organized into 35 patrols located in communities throughout the NorthWest Territories in Churchill Manitoba and on the Ungava Peninsula of Quebec. Each patrol is based on one single community and all members of that unit belong to that community. The patrol is commanded by a Canadian Ranger Sergeant. The average size of a patrol is 20 but they vary in size from six in Inuvik, N.W.T. to 55 at Povungnituk, P.Q. As of 7 March 1984 there were 661 Canadian Rangers in Northern Regions area of responsibility.

8. In the last two years, NRHQ has been actively pursuing a policy of expanding the Canadian Ranger programme by establishing units in communities which did not previously have one. During the past year, new patrols at Gjoa Haven N.W.T. and at Rankin Inlet N.W.T. have been activated. In 1984 NRHQ proposes to establish five more new patrols in the following locations; Spence Bay N.W.T., Baker Lake N.W.T., Igloolik N.W.T., Pelley Bay N.W.T, and Old Crow, Yukon.

TRAINING

9. NRHQ's Ranger Training Plan is a direct result of the increased staff they have been allocated for their task. The Ranger Training Plan is based on a three year cycle. In addition to annual ammunition/liaison visits, each Ranger Patrol will participate in an exercise of five days or longer approximately every three years. Prior to the increase in staff the SSO R and C and Rangers MWO were able to
conduct only two Canadian Ranger training exercises per year. At that rate it would have taken over 15 years to conduct one for every Ranger Patrol.

10. In 1984, NRHQ proposes to conduct 14 Canadian Ranger training exercises. This two week long exercise is called Nanook Ranger and is conducted in or around the community in which the Ranger Patrol lives. It consists of two separate phases, Basic (intown) and Advanced (long range patrol). The Canadian Ranger staff have prepared a Course Training Standard, course details and performance objectives for Nanook Ranger, Copies of these are attached as annexes to this report.

11. There is presently some discussion at NRHQ about the setting up of an Advanced Canadian Ranger NCO training course at the PPCLI Battle School at Camp Wainwright, Alberta. This idea, however, has only now reached the preliminary planning stage.

SUPPORT

12. NRHQ has a detachment of two CC138 aircraft from 440 Squadron based in Edmonton. These aircraft are based in Yellowknife primarily for a transport role in support of NRHQ. The NRHQ Canadian Ranger staff has access to use this valuable resource and indeed they are the primary user of these aircraft.

13. Financially, NRHQ has allocated a budget of $160,000 in fiscal year 1984-85 in support of the Canadian Ranger programme.

COMPARISONS

14. This paper has attempted to outline some of the principal findings of a liaison visit conducted to NRHQ with regard to Canadian Ranger staff, organization, training and support. The table below shows some comparisons in several key areas between Northern Region and Maritime Command.

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Source: DPIS 3-4 as of 7 Mar 84

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15. The Canadian Rangers of Northern Region are composed almost entirely of native peoples, the Dene and the Inuit. Whereas in Maritime Command's area of responsibility there is a far greater diversity of cultural backgrounds within the programme. From the primarily Francophone personnel of the Lower North Shore of Quebec, to the Inuit of the Labrador Coast, to the Anglophone Newfoundlanders, this great divergence of cultures presents great challenges in providing meaningful training. As compared to NRHQ which is, primarily training only native peoples, Maritime Command has to train Canadian Rangers from three distinct cultures. On account of the vastly different cultural backgrounds within the Canadian Rangers of Maritime Command, any training conducted has to take into account the culture of the group undertaking that training. Due to this fact, training the Canadian Rangers of Maritime Command by necessity must be far more flexible and varied than that of NRHQ.

**CONCLUSIONS**

16. This paper has attempted to outline some of the observations and findings of liaison visit to NRHQ, with regard to Canadian Ranger organization, staff, training and support.

17. One indisputable conclusion is that NRHQ has seen fit to allocate far greater resources to the support of the Canadian Ranger than has Maritime Command.

18. As an historical point of interest, the staff study of 1971 which dealt with re-establishing the Canadian Rangers (MARC: 1901-260/4 (COMD) over MARC: 1901-260/4 (DREG) of 1 December 1971) recommended a Regular and Reserve Force Ranger Support Staff in Maritime Command of 53 all ranks to run the Canadian Rangers. The staff included 27 Officers, 24 Senior NCO’s and 2 OR's. Amongst these were one Administration NCO, two administration clerks, one supply NCO and one finance NCO.
19. There are currently 730 Canadian Rangers in Maritime Command area of responsibility. One Regular Force Captain administers the entire programme. For comparison purposes, the current Canadian Ranger strength approximates the size of an infantry battalion but the number of personnel dedicated to the command, control, training, administration and supply of an operational infantry battalion probably exceeds the one man Maritime Command Ranger Staff by several thousand percent. It is also significant, that unlike the closely co-located sub-units of a battalion, sub-units of the Canadian Rangers are located throughout the island of Newfoundland, along the entire Labrador Coast and along the Lower North Shore of Quebec. It is granted that there is quite a difference in requirement and function and, consequently, the comparison is not quite fair except as a yardstick.

20. Nevertheless, in one significant area a valid comparison is possible, the Ranger Liaison Officers’ responsibilities with regard to the Canadian Rangers are identical to the SSO R and C.

21. As NRHQ has had to do, in the last few years it is now time that Maritime Command Headquarters reviewed the need for a larger Canadian Ranger Support Staff. There is both historical and contemporary evidence to support arguments for a larger staff. The precedent of NRHQ and its recently increased permanent establishment for Canadian Ranger Support Staff, indicates that even in these times of austerity and manning difficulties there was a recognition of the highest levels of command for the drastic need for increased support.

22. Using the present Northern Region staff as an example, the Maritime Command staff should comprise at least three more Senior NCO’s each having responsibility for 10-11 Canadian Ranger Platoons (approximately 200-250 Canadian Rangers). Their specific responsibilities would be similar to those of their counterparts at NRHQ but the training conducted would take into account the greater cultural variations within Maritime Command. The Ranger Liaison Officer would be made responsible for the command, control and training of his staff. This increased level of support as no other would revitalize and immeasurably increase the effectiveness of the Canadian Ranger programme within Maritime Command.

L. Palhazi
Captain
Ranger Liaison Officer

Attachments:
Annex A Course Training Standard
Annex B Course Details
Annex C Performance Objectives
1. This order supersedes CFOO 1.201 Canadian Rangers dated 27 October 1976 and has been renumbered to number 1.7 to conform with current CFOO identification policy. This CFOO provides additional organization and command and control information to that contained in CFAO 2.8 and should be read in conjunction with that CFAO.

2. The intention of this order is to state the organizational status of Canadian Rangers (Cdn Rang). This is an organization document and is not intended for use as an authority for other than organizational purposes.

3. The Cdn Rang is a sub-component of the Reserve Force and comprises elements called companies, platoons, sections or patrols. These elements are assigned to Maritime Command (MARCOM) and Northern Region Headquarters (NRHQ) on a geographical basis.

4. Those Cdn Rang elements assigned to MARCOM are organized as companies, platoons and sections as detailed at Annex A. Those Cdn Rang assigned to NRHQ are organized as patrols identified by name with their local community as detailed at Annex B.

5. Members of the Cdn Rang are residents of sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada who volunteer to hold themselves in readiness for service but who are not required to undergo annual training. The Cdn Rang normally function as individuals performing their tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations. For administration purposes the basic organization structures described in paragraph 4 of this order are utilized.

6. This order is effective on the date of issue.
Role

7. The role of the Cdn Rang is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces.

Command and Control

8. The Commander MARCOM and the Commander NRHQ exercise command over assigned elements of the Cdn Rang.

9. For the Cdn Rang elements under the command of Commander MARCOM the company commander will normally be appointed as a captain and a platoon commander will normally be appointed as a lieutenant. Platoons may, if required, be divided into sections commanded by a sergeant.

10. Command by members of the CdnRang will be exercised in accordance with QR&O 3.295.

11. The member commanding a company, platoon or patrol is the officer in charge in accordance with QR&O 102.01. He is only subject to the Code of Service Discipline when called out on continuous full time service, or when placed on active service. He does not have powers of arrest in accordance with QR&O 105.06 and he does not have powers of punishment in accordance with QR&O 108.27.

12. The member commanding a company, platoon or patrol is responsible to the Commander MARCOM or the Commander NRHQ, as applicable, for the effective and efficient operation of his element. All disciplinary matters will be referred to these applicable commanders.

13. A Ranger Liaison Officer (RLO) is established within MARCONI HQ and NRHQ to provide control of Cdn Rang activities on behalf of the applicable commanders.

14. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff/Director General Reserves and Cadets/Director Reserves is the responsible NDHQ office for Cdn Rang matters.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Establishment

15. The establishment of the Cdn Rang shall be determined, issued and controlled by NDHQ through the Commander MARCOM or Commander NRHQ as applicable.

16. Support services will be arranged by the Commander MARCOM or Commander NRHQ as applicable.
Communication

17. Channels of communication shall follow the channels of command and control, except that on provision of support services to the Cdn Rang the Commander MARCOM and the Commander NRHQ may communicate directly with any base, station or unit of the CF from which support services are required.

Address

18. Correspondence for any element of the Cdn Rang should be directed to MARCOM or NRHQ as applicable.

R.P. Pattee
Brigadier-General
Director General Organization and Manpower
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Attachments:
Annex A
Annex B

DISTRIBUTION LIST
List A
MARCOM HQ (30 copies)
NRHQ (20 copies)
NDHQ/D Res (4 copies)

ANNEX A
CFOO 1.7

CANADIAN RANGERS ELEMENTS ASSIGNED TO MARITIME COMMAND
(Canadian Rangers elements located in Newfoundland (including Labrador) and Quebec)

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<tr>
<th>Element</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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<td>1 Platoon, 22 (South Labrador) Company (1 PL 22 (South Labrador) Coy)</td>
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ANNEX B
CFOO 1.7

CANADIAN RANGERS ELEMENTS ASSIGNED TO NORTHERN REGION HEADQUARTERS
(Canadian Rangers elements located in the Northwest Territories, Manitoba and Quebec)

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1901-260/4 (COS RO)

Atlantic Regio Headquarters
Halifax, N.S.

Distribution List

MARCOM CANADIAN RANGERS
STATUS REPORT - 1 NOV 84

References:  A. 1901-1 (Cdn Rgrs) 8 Nov 84 (enclosed)
            B. 1901-1 (Cdn Rgrs) 16 Apr 84 (enclosed)

1. General. The MARCOM Canadian Rangers Status Report covers the period 1 Oct 83 to 1 Nov 84. It is organized as follows:
   a. Liaison Activities, 1 Oct 83 - 1 Nov 84;
   b. Supplemental Information;
   c. Future Activities and Training;
   d. Clothing; and
   e. Recommendations.

2. Liaison Activities. Reference A (enclosed) is the Canadian Ranger Liaison Officer’s Activity Report for the period 1 Oct 83 to 1 Nov 84. It is similar in format to the 1982/83 report forwarded to DRES-5, 1 Dec 83. This year’s report is very informative and provides a useful summary of the 1983/84 Ranger Programme.

3. Supplemental Information. The information in the following sub-paragraphs is provided as a supplement to the Liaison Officer’s report.
   a. Finance. The NDHQ allocated budget is $31,200, of which the majority of funds are expended on Class A Pay, and on TD expenses for the Training Seminars. MARCOM HQ support is provided in the form of approximately $16,000 for TD for the Ranger Liaison Officer and since September, for his Officer Cadet Assistant. Prior to this Fiscal Year, the Ranger Liaison Officer’s TO was expended from the Ranger Budget. This year his TO now comes from MARCOM HQ, which has freed up to $16,000, permitting an increase in the frequency of seminars. For example, there will probably be six seminars this Fiscal Year. versus four in 1983/84.
b. **Public Relations.** The Training Seminars, as well as Ranger Liaison Officer contact with the platoons, has resulted in favourable press coverage. Attached at Annex A are photocopies of some of the local newspaper articles.

c. **Administrative Support.** The Ranger Liaison Officer is supported administratively by CFS St. John's, where he is provided with an office, a telephone answering machine, and clerical support from the Station Orderly Room. He is also provided with a commercial pattern four-wheel drive vehicle since most of the Ranger Platoons on the Island are accessible by road. Because St. John's is at the extreme eastern end of the Province, the Ranger Liaison Officer must spend considerable time on the road. CFS St. John's provides very limited direct support in the running of the Ranger Programme. In order to accomplish as much as he does out of a limited budget, the Ranger Liaison Officer must take advantage of all the support he can get at low cost from the resources on hand. For example, the following Bases/Stations/Units support the Ranger Programme:

(1) CFB Gander
- Vehicle Repairs
- Classrooms
- Messing
- Financial
- Administration

(2) 103 Rescue Unit, CFB Gander
- Occasional helicopter transportation
- Instruction

(3) U.S.N. and Facility, Argentia
- Accommodation
- Classrooms
- Messing
- Instruction
- Rifle Ranges

(4) CFS Goose Bay
- Accommodation
- Classrooms
- Messing
- Instruction
- Financial
- Administration

(5) CFS Moise
- Accommodation
- Classrooms
- Messing
- Financial
4. Future Activities and Training.

a. Training Levels.

(1) Prior to 1978, the Canadian Ranger programme in MARCOM was very low profile. In fact, the programme was almost dormant, in view of the small budget, and the limited amount of travel by the Ranger Liaison Officer, who occasionally was tasked as Provincial Warning Officer, or took the opportunity afforded him to take career courses or attend university.

(2) Since 1978, the programme has been given greater emphasis. In particular, since the present Ranger Liaison Officer was posted to the position four years ago, the programme has really expanded, primarily due to his efforts. The Ranger Liaison Officer is a single, thirty year old infantry officer who works well on his own. Last year he spent almost half a year on TD throughout the province.

(3) As for the future, there are two ways to go. The status quo can be maintained, by conducting five or six Training Seminars per year for 20% of the Rangers. On the other hand, the level of activity could be increased to that of NRHQ. As stated previously by NDHQ, MARCOM should be treated as equals to NRHQ. In this case, it has just taken MARCOM longer to get its programme together. However, the potential is there to obtain greater value from the programme. For a strictly voluntary organization, there is a 20% participation level at Seminars, limited only by their frequency and their locations, contingent for the most part upon support from the local Bases and Stations. Nevertheless, the Canadian Rangers are very interested in the activities of the Forces. They will travel miles at their own expense to attend briefings and platoon commanders
meetings. Unlike the NRHQ rangers, the MARCOM rangers are not centralized, but live in the many communities that dot the countryside. They can be “called-out” on short notice because of their telephone fan out system.

b. Increased Training and Activities.

(1) For FY 85/86, the increase in levels of training and activities would be moderate, limited only by budget and personnel support. Ultimately, for FY 86/87, the levels of activity/training should reach a level comparable to NRHQ. Increased activity and more responsibilities will lead to a greater sense of identity and pride within the Canadian Rangers as well as a greater sense of purpose. This could be accomplished as follows, depending on the community:

(a) a five-to-ten day training package for Canadian Rangers on the Labrador Coast and Lower North Shore of Quebec. This would be a similar package as that offered by NRHQ;

(b) increase the number of Training Seminars and vary the locations. Include more hands-on equipment training;

(c) increase the number of Ranger Liaison Officer visits (at present, he attempts to meet every Ranger at least once a year);

(d) use Canadian Rangers as a nucleus for the defence of Vital Points, under the General Support Forces Concept. This would be of considerable value initially to CFB Gander and CFS Goose Bay.

…

LCol Meharg
for D.B. Ells
Colonel
for Commander Atlantic Region

Attachments:
Annex A – Public Relations

A MILITARY PAPER ENTITLED
THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

PART 1 – GENERAL

1. INTRODUCTION. As a result of policy statements in the White Paper on Defence (1987), Challenge and Commitment - A Defence Policy for Canada, expansion of the Canadian Ranger Program was highlighted. However, the Canadian Forces Development Plan (Provisional) of Nov 88 did not concern itself with any aspect of the Canadian Rangers in the concept of Total Force. Other than seven staff positions, the 1600 members of the Canadian Rangers are considered a bonus because they are not included in the 180,000 Regular and Reserve Total Force members.

2. AIM. The aim of the paper is to review the Canadian Ranger program to determine its future.

PART 2 - BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

3. The Canadian Rangers began in British Columbia with the formation of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) in 1942 to meet the Japanese threat. The PCMR reached a strength of 15,000 before being disbanded at the end of hostilities in September 1945. Following WWII, in 1947 it was decided that the PCMR concept was valid - and should be extended throughout Canada, to conduct security and surveillance over Canadian territory and coastlines. In accordance with CFOO 1.7, the DCDS exercises control over the Canadian Rangers except that Comd MARCOM/ARHQ and Comd NRHQ exercise operational control and administrative control over Ranger elements assigned. This means that in Halifax the program is administered by Atlantic Region Headquarters for the 890 Canadian Rangers in Newfoundland/Labrador and the lower North Shore of the Saint Lawrence River in Quebec. Northern Region Headquarters in Yellowknife is responsible for the 750 Canadian Rangers in the Yukon Territory, North West Territories, Northern Manitoba and Northern
Quebec. On the other hand, the Canadian Rangers in British Columbia, administered by Comd MARPAC, were reduced to nil strength in 1978.

4. The Canadian Ranger programs in Atlantic and Northern Regions continue to operate successfully at the present time. As a direct result of the increased emphasis on the Reserves in the White Paper (1987), Pacific Region has proposed the reactivation of the Canadian Rangers in British Columbia and relevant comments are included in this paper. At the same time, the question of activating Canadian Rangers in other areas of Canada, not already covered by ARHQ and NRHQ, should also be considered.

PART 3 – DISCUSSION

5. ROLE. The role of the Canadian Rangers has been examined by numerous studies since 1947 and remains valid today. As stated in 1947 and in the current CFOO 1.7:

“The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces.”

6. The role has recently been strengthened by the 1987 White Paper on defence Challenge and Commitment - A Defence Policy for Canada, where sovereignty and territorial defence call for:

“appropriate land forces to demonstrate presence, authority and effective defence within Canada in peace time and to defend against incursions and sabotage in war.”

7. Not only does the White Paper call for increases in the Regular Forces, the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve, but also it states specifically that:

“the Canadian Rangers will be expanded and their equipment improved” …and… “its significance as a surveillance force and as a visible expression of Canadian sovereignty in the North requires its expansion and an improvement in the equipment, training and support it receives.”

8. In review of Canadian population densities, it is apparent that a large portion of Canada's coastal and northern areas is sparsely occupied, and that Primary Reserve units are located only in the larger, southern urban locations. Without trying to equate the Canadian Ranger to the Primary Reserve member, it seems that the most economical and most practical way of providing a military presence
in the remaining isolated coastal and northern areas of the country is through the Canadian Ranger Program.

9. **TASKS.** Canadian Ranger tasks can traditionally be grouped into two categories. The first of these are the tasks they carry out on a voluntary basis without pay while going about their normal everyday life. They are to:

   a. report any unusual or suspicious activities within their area; and
   b. collect detailed information concerning their local area which may be of assistance to the Canadian Forces.

10. Tasks for which Rangers receive the appropriate rate of Reserve pay are:

    a. local training exercises (weapons handling, map and compass exercises, and first aid);
    b. ground search and rescue; and
    c. CF exercises as guides/scouts, advisors, recce personnel, survival instructors, etc.

11. In addition to the above, in wartime the Rangers are tasked to assist in local defence by observing and/or containing enemy detachments pending arrival of other forces. For the most part, this involves fixing and following enemy detachments, rather than defensive operations. In this context, local defence tasks may be construed as protection of Civilian Vital Points, a civil police responsibility, which will quickly devolve to the Rangers. The Rangers will also assist the RCMP or provincial police forces in discovering, reporting and apprehending enemy agents or saboteurs.

12. Some new tasks that may be appropriate are:

    a. operate closely with the Naval Reserve Maritime Coastal Defence Organization in coastwatching and assist in the conduct of Inshore Surveillance Tasks *in both war and peace* (*drug, immigration, fisheries, etc*).
    b. support the Land and Air Forces in the Territorial Defence Task Force role;
    c. work with Cadet Corps where special skills can be taught, and in general provide support to the Cadets especially in areas where there is no other military presence; and
    d. provide intelligence, on-site information and assistance in local disaster operations, i.e. oil spills, earthquakes.
13. The roles and tasks of the Canadian Rangers are not unique. In the United States, the Alaskan Scouts, consisting of Natives, carry out this requirement. In Australia, lack of security in the remote and unpopulated North Western area was recognized as a problem, and so, in their recent Defence White paper, three Regional Force Surveillance Units, totalling 3000 were created along the Canadian Ranger lines by recruiting the local people who live in the area – both aboriginals and caucasians. In an area representing one-quarter of the continental land mass of Australia, these units aim to provide protection for the many vital assets and installations in Northern Australia without tying down combat formations.

14. **PEOPLE.** The Canadian Rangers are not Army Reservists in the traditional sense, in that they are not members of the Primary Reserve component, but a separate sub-component in their own right, and just like the Cadet Instructors List (CIL), they are not included in the Canadian Forces as “fighting assets”. The special and unique status of the Rangers (minimum training, no uniforms, ranks and appointments without qualifications, etc) keep them distinctly separate from the Primary Reserves. The Rangers consist of two cultural groups (natives and caucasians) with the program evolving along two distinct lines. Distinctive aspects of the Rangers program are:

a. education varies considerably from Rangers with Masters Degrees to those with minimum schooling;

b. ages range from 18 to 70, with an average age in Atlantic Region in the early 40’s and the early 30's in the Northern Region;

c. trade skills also vary widely from teachers, engineers, helicopter and airplane pilots, airplane mechanics through to fishermen, trappers and hunters;

d. many Rangers in Atlantic Region have had previous military service while this is very rare in Northern Region;

e. in contrast to the Primary Reserves which are located in larger urban areas, the Canadian Rangers provide a military presence in nearly every town and village in the Province of Newfoundland/Labrador, the lower North Shore of Quebec, Northern Quebec (Ungava) and the Northwest Territories; and

f. enrolment standards are quite subjective, based mostly on a determination by the Ranger Liaison Officer, the Company Commanders and Platoon Commanders. The enrolment process is quite simple as there are no aptitude tests, medicals or dental examinations. Two criteria that do apply
are that the Rangers must be Canadian Citizens "or of Landed Immigrant Status" and they must not have a criminal record. This aspect is verified through the RCMP computer information network.

15. **ATTITUDES.** The individuals that join the Ranger program are keenly interested in the military and the part that they play, as Rangers, in the Defence of Canada, whether in the North or in other parts of the Country. Although their motives vary, the majority do not join just to get a rifle and some ammunition. In many cases, the Ranger platoons/section are the only formal organization in a community. Some members see the Rangers as a quasi-military, guerrilla forces that will be employed in the defence of the country while the Regular Forces are committed elsewhere, either in the country or the world. They provide a military presence in isolated, northern and coastal parts of the country, and at the same time support our military programs in a very positive manner. The Canadian Rangers are one of the most efficient and cost effective components which can high profile the military in a sovereignty role, provide military awareness and involvement at the local level, and finally ensure the development of Reserves in areas too small or remote for Primary Reserve Units.

16. **EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT.** Except for their .303 cal Lee Enfield rifle, ammunition, a parka, and compass, Canadian Rangers use their own equipment in the course of their daily routines and when called out on exercises or in support of DND. Their personal airplanes, helicopters, buses, boats, snowmobiles, etc that they bring with them are rented on an as required basis, minimizing the requirement to provide DND equipment.

17. **ORGANIZATION.** The regions are organized quite differently as follows:

   a. **ARHQ:** The Rangers are controlled by the Commander, Atlantic Region in Halifax through the Ranger LO operating from CFS St. John’s, Newfoundland. The 890 Rangers are organized into ten companies and 31 platoons. Platoons vary in size from 20 to 45 Rangers, with personnel on entry waiting lists in some of the communities. The operating languages are English and/or French. The Rangers come from the local communities, and a large cross-section of trades and professions are represented.

   b. **NRHQ:** Northern Region has 750 Rangers. They are mostly native peoples from small communities (100 to 300 in size) in the sparsely settled north, involved in traditional occupations of hunting, trapping and fishing. They are organized into 40 patrols, of about 20 Rangers each, located from the Ungava Peninsula in Quebec through the Northwest
Territories to the Yukon. Although English is used, the operating language is Indian or Inuktut [sic].

c. **PACREGHQ**: In British Columbia, a twelve company organization consisting of 37 Platoons has been recommended, with a total strength of 1300 Rangers. In Northern British Columbia, and the isolated coastal areas, they would be organized similarly to NRHQ, and include primarily, native peoples. In the South, and in isolated mining, fishing and ranching communities, they would be organized like ARHQ and the Rangers would primarily be Caucasians.

18. **SUPPORT STAFF**.

   a. **ARHQ**: The Ranger organization consists of one Captain (Regular Force) who is stationed in St John’s, Newfoundland. He has hired two Class “B” Reservists, a WO and a Sgt to help him, but this is still inadequate. Administrative support is provided through the Region’s small Cadet detachment staff at CFS St John’s. Additional support is provided, as required, from Air Command Bases at Gander and Goose Bay. One vehicle is provided by CFB St John’s. The Ranger LO and his staff spend more than half the year on Temporary Duty Travel.

   b. **NRHQ**: The Ranger Staff consists of the following Regular Force positions: a Capt, a Warrant Officer and five Sergeants. Administrative support is provided by NRHQ. Since only one Ranger patrol is accessible by road, twin-otter aircraft are used for travel across the north.

   c. **PACREGHQ**: The proposed Regular Support Staff consists of ten positions; one Staff Officer Rangers (Major) and one Ranger Warrant Officer (WO) located at Region HQ Esquimalt; one Ranger Liaison Officer (Capt) and two Ranger Instructors (Sgt) and one Clerk/Storesman (Sgt) at each of two Support Staff locations, Northern, Prince Rupert and Southern, Kamloops. Personnel implementation would be as follows:

   (1) First Year
   
   (a) Acquisition support staff accommodation Prince Rupert and Kamloops;
   (b) Posting of Regular Force Support Staff;
   (c) Orientation and briefing;
   (d) Ranger recruiting and enrolment commences; and,
   (e) Potential Ranger leaders selected.

   (2) Second Year
   
   (a) Initial Ranger leadership training course conducted;
   (b) Selected leaders appointed to command positions;
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

(c) First 400 Rangers enroled and second recruiting drive commences;
(d) Ranger Safety Officer’s Course.

(3) Third Year. Ranger enrolment to 12 companies with 1319 personnel completed.

d. Other than financial constraints, there appears to be no upward limit on the number of Rangers that can be recruited. A War establishment exists for Atlantic Region support staff, but not for NRHQ or PACREGHQ.

19. BUDGETS.

a. ARHQ: $179,000 FY 89/90, $200 per man year;
b. NRHQ: $410,000 FY 89/90, $550 per man per year;
c. PACREGHQ: $50,000 FY 90/91, $200 per person year (Recruiting Phase);
d. Paid training days per Ranger:
   (1) NRHQ - 5 days per year,
   (2) ARHQ - 3 days per year, and
   (3) PACREG - 3 days per year;
e. The perception exists that Canadian Rangers are a no cost organization, but that is not the case as shown above. The Canadian Forces, however, does get excellent value for the amount of money spent; and
f. Rangers are under-utilized because few CF units know that they exist, although they have periodically supported Regular Force and Militia exercises.

20. TRAINING OF RANGERS: The Rangers in each organization are trained quite differently.

a. ARHQ: In Atlantic Region, the Rangers conduct annual company training exercises of three to five days duration, and hold monthly platoon sessions for discussions and training. An annual training plan is issued by the Ranger LO to the Company Commanders who are responsible for implementing the training. The Ranger LO and his staff provide administrative and technical support, as required; and

b. NRHQ: The Ranger Patrols are exercised once every two years during a ten-day training package. NRHQ has very little contact with the patrol except during this training package. NRHQ Ranger Staff would like to increase this schedule but do not have sufficient resources. The most limiting factor is the availability of the two aircraft.
c. PACREG: It is expected that the training of Rangers would be similar to that conducted in Atlantic Region.

21. COMMAND AND CONTROL. This has the potential to be the most frustrating aspect of the entire Canadian Ranger program. The Canadian Forces chain of command is used, with the CDS, through the C Res & Cdts exercising control over the Canadian Rangers except that both the Commander MARCOM and Commander NRHQ exercise operational and administrative control over the Ranger elements that are assigned. The system works well now, even though Region boundaries are crossed in several instances. For example, the Commander ARHQ is responsible for the four Atlantic Provinces, but he has Ranger Platoons in southern Quebec, (Eastern Region) as far west as Sept Isles. In the northern peninsula of Quebec, control of Ranger Patrols is carried out by NRHQ, a responsibility taken over from ARHQ in 1978 when Atlantic Region found it too difficult and expensive to travel to the area and administer the program from the Ranger LO's position in St John's. In any case, these Rangers are all located in Mobile Command's Eastern Region area of responsibility. With Region responsibilities (less NRHQ being transferred to FMC over the next few years, FMC should conceivably assume responsibility for the Canadian us be prepared to allocate Rangers (less NRHQ Rangers). FMC must be prepared to allocate full resources (dedicated staff) to support the Canadian Rangers, and make a clear commitment to the programme otherwise the program should remain with MARCOM and NRHQ. It should be noted that the Commander FMC recommended disbanding the Canadian Rangers in 1970, and unless this position has changed, FMCHQ probably does not want responsibility for the Ranger Program. As well, Eastern Region has never shown any interest in assuming Ranger responsibilities. It was an astute decision by the VCDS, and a commitment by MARCOM that not only kept the Canadian Ranger program alive in Atlantic Region, but also provided the resources for the program to grow. Unfortunately the support by MARCOM did not get passed along to MARPAC (PACREGHQ) and the Ranger program on the west coast died in 1978, at which time the Rangers were reduced to nil strength. This aspect of command and control will require further examination, especially since transfer of personnel resources will be necessary. From a structural framework viewpoint, the Ranger LO in ARHQ is in Capability Component 1 (MARCOM), while the Ranger Staff in NRHQ are in Capability Component 7 (NDHQ). Unfortunately, with the various Capability Component machinations that are underway, NRHQ is supposed to reduce in strength, so there appears to be little room for manoeuvre of personnel. Personnel positions in MARCOM CC1 are fully committed and therefore transfers from CC1 to CC2 (FMC) are not likely even if it only amounts to a maximum of ten personnel.
PART 4 – OPTIONS

22. **1ST OPTION: DISBAND THE CANADIAN RANGERS.**
   a. **Advantages:** Frees up CF resources, but savings will be minimal, since the program costs so little in personnel and money.
   b. **Disadvantages:** This option runs counter to the White Paper requirement for increased surveillance and sovereignty of Canadian Territory. It will limit CF surveillance of the North and isolated portions of the country. It will remove any semblance of a military presence in the majority of Canada's small towns and villages. Through the loss of contact and knowledge of the local area, it will again reduce the CF's capability to operate anywhere in Canada. The Canadian political climate will not accept a reduction to nil strength.
   c. **Comment:** This option is rejected and will not be studied further.

23. **2ND OPTION: MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO**
   a. **Advantages:** This option will involve no increase in CF resources and will cost no more that the present. It is a well established program, albeit which exists in only two Regions, and can remain as is. Very little publicity, positive or negative, will accrue to this option unless someone quotes the White Paper stating that the Canadian Rangers are supposed to be expanded and their equipment improved. It will be very easy to continue doing the minimum from a staff and organizational aspect.
   b. **Disadvantages:** This will result in the poor utilization of an effective, loyal and low cost resource. CF will miss out on a very positive political climate. It will also miss out on an inexpensive way of supporting the Reserves, that is, getting more bang for the buck. It may become very difficult to maintain any semblance of status-quo if the program is transferred to FMC where it will likely be understaffed and under supported.
   c. **Comment:** This will lead to the eventual demise of the program except for the Rangers supported by NRHQ.

24. **3RD OPTION: CREATE TWO DISTINCT PROGRAMS.**
   a. **Advantages:** By creating two programs consisting of the Northern Rangers and the other group, the Southern Rangers, the problems of trying to integrate the training and administering of these two distinct groups could be eliminated. Each group could go their own distinct and separate ways. If, by change, the Ranger program is not supported in the south, there would still be a “face-saving” institution in the North, catering to the
native groups. Training in the South could be oriented toward the Army and white man ways while that of the North could accommodate the natives in the form of a flag waving and sovereignty exercise.

b. **Disadvantages:** Since enrolment, training and promotion standards are quite subjective, and different from that of the Primary Reserve, a new sub-component of the reserves would probably have to be created to cater to those Rangers that remain in the program in Southern Canada, leaving the natives in the North in the original Canadian Ranger sub-component. However, the role of newly created Southern sub-component would be hard to define because the current role of the Rangers is perfectly acceptable in Southern Canada as it is in the North, just that it is applied differently taking into consideration the different cultural aspects of the two groups.

c. **Comment:** Since the roles of both groups are the same, there is no need for a duplication of effort, with parallel staffs and organizations.

25. **4TH OPTION; EXPAND THE PROGRAM NATION-WIDE.**

a. **Advantages:** This option will result in a military presence in nearly every community in Canada. ie, Regular Force and Primary Reserve units will be found in the larger, more populated centres while the Canadian Rangers will be in the smaller, isolated and coastal areas of the country. This nation-wide military presence will allow for more contact with civilians, assist in recruiting (long range), provide for a larger military lobby, in addition to the support provided by the Canadian Legions and United Services Institutes. Since many small communities have Cadet Corps, the Canadian Rangers will provide a follow-on outlet for those who get too old for Cadets, but who remain in the community, especially if they are unable to join the Regular Force or the Primary Reserves. Expansion can be carried out in phases, improving the capabilities in our current program followed by a phased expansion into other provinces. A draft plan exists now for expansion into British Columbia. It will also permit improved Command and Control, improved capabilities, effective utilization of resources, and improved public relations and a political climate in consonance with the White Paper.

b. **Disadvantages:** There will be increased costs in money, equipment, personnel and infrastructure. Staff personnel will have to be provided from NDHQ and MARCOM Capability Components, since the Canadian Rangers were not included in the CFDP.
PART 5 - PREFERRED OPTION

26. **OPTION 4 is preferred**: Expand the Canadian Ranger program nation-wide, throughout Canada.

PART 6 - OUTLINE PLAN

27. a. A comprehensive list of goals, objectives and timelines must be identified. Suggested phases are as follows:

   (1) improve capabilities in current program by improving quality and quantity of training in Atlantic Region, and in Northern Region, expand into five or six new communities in the interior of NWT and the Yukon;

   (2) expand into British Columbia in stages over a period of three years. Proceed with staffing of Headquarters personnel in NDHQ and PACRGN in Sep 89; and

   (3) expand into other Provinces. Perhaps the Northern Prairie Provinces, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.

b. DCDS approval will be required to proceed with the national plan, including an identified start date for each phase. The end-state strength of the Canadian Rangers must be determined.

c. Although this list is not all inclusive, items requiring further staffing are as follows:

   (1) a national organizational plan is required, to include personnel support staff at Region/Area Headquarters;
   (2) a financial plan is required for initial start-up costs, and then, annual recurring costs;
   (3) Command and Control must be determined (Regions, FMC and/or NRHQ);
   (4) Clothing, weapons, ammunition and equipment must be obtained;
   (5) Canadian Ranger badge and motto “Vigilans” must be approved;
   (6) a publicity plan will be required to promote expansion and assist in recruiting; and
   (7) CFAOs, UICs and scales of issue will have to be amended.
FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

References:  
A. 1901-1 (DLCD) 26 April 1989  
B. 1901-260/4 (DGRC) 18 April 1989  
C. 3290-1 (DComd) 31 March 1989

1. Reference A forwarded a paper entitled “The Future of the Canadian Rangers” (reference B) to this HQ for information and comment. The opportunity to comment on the subject of the Canadian Rangers in general and the paper in particular is appreciated. The future of the Canadian Rangers is topical as it relates to our evolving concept for territorial defence (TERDEF) and to a force structure which it appears may be increasingly closely tied to this task.

2. As a point of departure, it must be recognized that the FMC position referred to in paragraph 21 of reference B has long since been overtaken by events. The Land Forces are moving to a regional structure and are assuming regional operations responsibilities; TERDEF has taken on a much greater significance in our force development and operational planning; and the North has been allocated a higher profile in Departmental activities. Thus, there is now a body of logic for tying the Canadian Rangers into the Land Forces that is virtually irresistible.

3. The official future of the Canadian Rangers is somewhat less than well-articulated at present. The CFDP establishes “a re-vitalized Canadian Rangers” as a short-term objective for “other Capability Components”, but does not specify the component to which this applies. Canadian Forces Northern Region is not mentioned in this document. It might almost be assumed that the Land Forces are expected to inherit responsibility for both Northern Region and the Rangers in the near to mid term. However, we have not made them part of our visible agenda as yet.

In terms of specific comment, the following points are [offered]:

Key Documents
a. **Capability.** As presently configured, the Rangers provide a viable, effective and efficient contribution to the CF’s surveillance capability in peace and war. In peace, the Rangers are also useful as a training resource and an expression of sovereignty. Their wartime utility can be extended to include limited and temporary security tasks, but this should be considered an exception rather than normal practice. The assignment of local security tasks - either MVP or CVP - to the Rangers as specific to their role would necessitate a major revision of the present concept. This is not to say that such a revision would be inappropriate, but it would have to be considered in the context of an overall review of security requirements (ie the TERDEF concept) and would demand an increased commitment of resources.

b. **Structure**

(1) The Ranger concept and role is appropriate in areas that are relatively remote, sparsely populated and irregularly policed. Generally, Primary Reserve units are not located in such areas of the country and a conflict of role is thus avoided.

(2) The logic of incorporating the Canadian Rangers into the Land Forces and superimposing their organization on the regional structure is obvious. The view that Northern Region should eventually conform to this structure has already been stated in reference C.

5. To sum up, it is clear that it is timely for the future of the Canadian Rangers to be considered more directly in Land Forces force development planning. The capability they provide now and could provide more widely in the future is an essential component of the “territorial surveillance and defence” task which is now third on the list of CF priorities. This capability requirement should be integrated into our TERDEF concept. In addition, we should, in the context of the present force structuring exercise, determine in broad outline the most desirable future relationship between the Land Forces and the Rangers and the best approach for achieving this.

J.E.P. Lalonde  
Brigadier-General  
Chief of Staff Operations  
for Commander
MEMORANDUM
3120-55 (A/COPFD)
10 Jul 89

FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

Refs:  A. 1901-260/4 (DGRC) 18 Apr 89
       B. 1901-260/4 (D Res 3-2) 18 Apr 89

1. It is regretted that our reply has been delayed. The delay was caused by our heavy involvement in the post-budget cyclical defence review. While it is agreed that the 1987 White Paper (WP) stated that the Canadian Rangers would expand, it is also noted that the WP stated:
   a. “the role would remain basically unchanged”; and
   b. “its significance as a surveillance force and as a visible expression of Canadian sovereignty in the North requires its expansion....” (underlining is ours).

2. On a policy basis, therefore, support for an expansion of the Rangers to the “south”, except in sparsely populated areas of the B.C. coast, cannot be provided. On the basis of role and purpose also, we cannot justify the proposal. The Rangers have and continue to serve a political/military purpose. The political aspect fits only the north or very sparsely settled areas of the country. That does not apply to the south.

3. On a military role, purpose and requirement basis, it is difficult to see the need for an expansion of the Rangers to the “south”. Our effort in the so-called south must focus on improvements to the militia who can in turn now, and many fold more in the future, do anything that was envisaged for a southern Ranger force.

4. On the basis of practicalities, we can envisage some very contentious aspects in the proposal. Competition with the Militia is one but on a far more serious note is likely to be the adverse public perception of issuing rifles and ammunition to additional special segments of society.

5. For these reasons, the proposal cannot be fully supported. Moreover, because of the penuriousness of the recent budget and its consequences on the ongoing cyclical review, it would be considered untimely to advance such a proposal since it is as yet unknown what the final force structure will consist of.

W.R. Dobson
BGen
A/COPFD

MARC: 1901-260/4 (COMD)
Maritime Command Headquarters
FMO Halifax, NS …

24 June 1990

Distribution List
CANADIAN RANGERS - PACIFIC REGION

References:  A. MARP: 1901-2 (Comd), 10 Mar 88
           B. MARP: 1901-4 (Comd), 21 May 88
           C. 3120-55 (A/COPFD), 10 Jul 89
           D. 1901-260/4 (D Res 6-2), 15 Feb 90

1. In reacting to the White Paper on Defence (1987), Challenge and Commitment - A Defence Policy for Canada, Commander Maritime Forces Pacific sought approval and funding to re-establish Pacific Coast Canadian Rangers, References A and B. DGRC fully supported the Pacific Region request and initiated staffing of the requirement within NDHQ. Formal staffing of this proposal ceased in July 1989, when it could not be fully supported by A/COPFD because of the uncertainties [sic] of the DND budget cuts and the outcome of the force structure reviews, Reference C. Although certain fiscal issues persist and require resolution, they should not be used to impede the rationalization and enhancement of our Canadian Ranger programme.

2. The aim of this letter is to seek your support for an expanded and improved Canadian Ranger programme as proposed by Maritime Forces Pacific and this Headquarters.

3. The Canadian Rangers are deemed to be a very valuable component of the Canadian Forces. For a minimum cost, they hold themselves in readiness to perform tasks in support of the military that could not otherwise be done, and provide an important Canadian Forces presence in the less populated, remote and coastal areas of our country. They volunteer to support all forms of military activity including assistance operations and respond to our needs in a versatile manner. From a sovereignty operations point of view, they provide a military presence which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces. Many isolated and sparsely populated areas of the country, including southern Canada, have no military presence. From the Maritime Command perspective, there is no coverage on the West Coast, particularly the sparsely populated areas of the British Columbia coast. The Canadian Rangers have a very real role and tasks to perform in support of the
Maritime Coastal Defence, Territorial Defence Operations, and in support of the anti-drug operations and environmental protection.

4. Considering that the Canadian Ranger CFOO 1.7 does not specifically apply to any particular region or coast the authority is deemed to exist for the Commander Maritime Command to re-establish Canadian Rangers in Pacific Region. Therefore, with NDHQ agreement and DGRC funding, it is proposed that the re-establishment of Canadian Rangers on the West Coast take effect as soon as practicable.

5. What is proposed is a very modest programme that could, in the fullness of time, be developed into a full Ranger programme of about 1,000 personnel comparable to that established for each of the Atlantic and Northern Regions. To initiate the programme, start up costs for FY 90/91 would be 75K. This would provide for the employment of one Captain (Class B Service) as a Ranger Liaison Officer and for the recruiting and manning of one Ranger Company Headquarters and three Ranger Platoons. Once established, the programme could be expanded at approximately $75K a year over five years to reach a total operating budget of approximately $500K by 1995.

6. A second issue that will be the subject of separate correspondence will be a proposal to establish a Ranger Working Group to be chaired by DGRC and comprising members from Atlantic, Pacific and Northern Regions, Mobile Command and others as required. Its purpose will be to develop CF policy and objectives, and implement an inexpensive, expanded, effective and coordinated Ranger programme.

7. There is concern that if we wait until the uncertainties of budget cuts and force restructure are resolved, the re-establishment of Pacific Coast Canadian Rangers may never happen. For very modest costs, we can get the Pacific Coast Rangers up and running and be in a much better position to rationalize our Canadian Ranger Programme. Your support for this initiative would be greatly appreciated.

R.E. George
Vice-Admiral
Commander Maritime Command
MEMORANDUM

3120-55-5 (COPFD)

10 Sep 90

DCDS

CANADIAN RANGERS - PACIFIC COAST

Refs:  A. MARC 1901-260/4 (Comd) 24 Jun 90
B. 1901-260/4 (C Res and Cdts) 17 Aug 90
C. NDHQ Ottawa DCDS 073 271230Z Aug 90

1. Since the promulgation of the White Paper in 1987 there has been a steady increase in the strength of the Canadian Rangers. Currently there are 950 Rangers in Atlantic Region and 875 (approximately) in Northern Region. The Northern Region numbers are approximate because of the difficulties in keeping accurate and complete records of the widely dispersed members. The growth of the Rangers was 100 in 87/88, 116 in 88/89, 133 in 89/90 and 37 in 90/91.

2. The proposal at ref A has been discussed with DMPP and CLDO staffs. The question of funding for the proposal is not an issue for the DSP. The funds should be requested in the budget of DGRC for the Rangers and as such is not seen as a problem. However, there is some concern over the issue of starting up the West Coast Rangers at this time of fiscal uncertainty and with the imminent transfer of the Ranger responsibilites [sic] to the appropriate Area HQ’s under FMC control. While CLDO supports the earliest possible start-up of the West Coast Rangers by MARPAC, they have some concerns that any associated personnel requirement (one Class B CAPT identified) established by MARPAC must transfer to FMC with the transfer of responsibilities [sic]. There is no planning in the Land environment for support of the Rangers because it is anticipated that support will be resident in the various organizations at the time of the transfer and will be part of the transfer package.

3. Although proposals have been made by Comd NR there is currently no clear direction on the increase/future of the Rangers. There are plans to increase the Northern Region patrols by 2-3 per year until total Ranger strength in the North reaches approximately 1000. Likewise the Atlantic region expects to expand to approximately 1000 but their emphasis is not on new recruiting but rather on improving the training and effectiveness of those Ranger personnel they now have
on strength. Except for the MARCOM request to re-establish the West Coast Rangers there is no other major expansion planned.

4. Policy, both current in accordance with the 1987 White Paper and proposed in accordance with the ongoing work to revise and repromulgate the White Paper, address Rangers as an integral part of DND’s structure. Both indicate that Ranger forces will increase in strength, thus the implementation of the MARCOM proposal is appropriate at this time.

5. Other benefits, given current events, would be to provide a visible and positive expression of the Government’s recognition of aboriginal people’s position and status in Canada, as integral to Government policies. It would also highlight the positive relationship aboriginal people, as Rangers, have in the CF.

6. Ref B supports the MARCOM request to establish the Pacific Coast Rangers at this time rather than wait for the uncertainties of budget cuts and force structures to be resolved. Establishing and manning the West Coast Rangers would have no adverse effect on the current Force development efforts and would, in fact, provide visible and positive progress in an otherwise gloomy picture. The concerns of the COPFD branch, as expressed in paragraph 1 of ref A, are therefore rescinded. The staffing of this proposal has proceeded in accordance with your direction at ref C.

7. Submitted for information as directed in your minute to ref A. DGRC staff are anticipating drafting your response to Comd MARCOM.

8. ADM(Pol) staff have been consulted and agree with this proposal. They have, however suggested that any public disclosure be considered within the context of the possible publication of a White Paper.

J.L. Sharpe
MGen
COPFD
UNCLASSIFIED

1901-260/4 (D RES)

01 02 021740Z OCT 90 RR UUUU D RES 1580

NDHQ OTTAWA

MARCOMHQ HALIFAX//COMD/COS RO//

MARPACHQ ESQUIMALT//COMD/DRO//

INFO LANTREGHQ HALIFAX

NRHQ YELLOWKNIFE//COMD/SSO R AND C//

FMCHQ ST HUBERT//DCOS OPS//

NDHQ OTTAWA//COPFD//ZEN

SIC WLC

UNCLAS D RES 1580

SUBJ: CANADIAN RANGERS - PACIFIC COAST


B. COS RO 002 161342Z JAN 90 (NOTAL)

C. DMPC 193 070815Z SEP 90 (NOTAL)

1. DCDS HAS APPROVED ESTABLISHMENT OF RANGER PRESENCE ON THE WEST COAST IN LINE WITH REFS A AND B. FORMAL LETTER WILL FOLLOW PROVIDING FURTHER DETAILS. IN VIEW OF THE TIME TAKEN TO GET APPROVALS, PLANS SUBMITTED PREVIOUSLY HAVE BECOME DATED. YOUR INPUT REQUESTED. IN THE MEANTIME, FUNDING FOR AN OFFICER AND NCM (BOTH CLASS B) UP TO DOLLAR 75K IS PROVIDED FOR FY 90/91 UNDER FOLLOWING MARCOM RANGERS ALMT 07E3 RES CODE 01134

2. ALSO CONTAINED IN REF A WAS REQUIREMENT FOR RANGER WORKING GROUP TO DEVELOP CF POLICY AND OBJECTIVES, AND TO IMPLEMENT AN INEXPENSIVE, EXPANDED AND EFFECTIVE RANGER PROGRAM. SUGGESTED DATE FOR MEETING IS 22 NOV 90 AT CFB ESQUIMALT, AS A CONTINUATION OF THE REGION WORKING GROUP 20/21 NOV 90. REF C REFERENCES.

D.C. ILEY/MAJ/D RES 6-2/992-3419/SW/3392m

P.D. MONTGOMERY/LCOL/D RES COORD

THE CANADIAN RANGERS

Prepared by
Major DI Hay

MARP: 1901-2 (RGRS)
8 Feb 91

GENERAL

1. The Canadian Ranger Programme is being reactivated in British Columbia after an absence of some 13 years. Rangers in British Columbia were active from 1947 but was disbanded in 1978. The Canadian Rangers are a component of the Canadian Forces. Organized into loose patrols, Rangers live and operate in the sparsely settled coastal and isolated areas of Canada. The Rangers, armed with a rifle and provided with ammunition, volunteer to hold themselves in readiness for service by providing a military presence in those areas that cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Reserve Force. The individual Ranger is enrolled in Canadian Armed Forces Reserves subject to certain minimum criteria. Canadian Rangers Programme is active elsewhere in Canada with detachments in the Yukon, North West Territories, Newfoundland, Labrador and in Northern and the Lower North Shore of Quebec.

2. The value of Rangers within British Columbia has again been recognized. The first step in reactivation was the organization of the Headquarters (HQ) Ranger Staff. Responsibility for the Canadian Ranger Programme within British Columbia has been given to the Director Regional Operations for Pacific Region, Lieutenant-Colonel MR Gentles. The initial Ranger Staff consists of the Staff Officer Rangers, Major DI Hay and the Ranger Training NCO, Warrant Officer Haines DC. The Ranger Staff is co-located with the Naval Headquarters in Victoria.

ROLE

3. The role of the Canadian Rangers in British Columbia is to provide an active military presence in coastal areas and small isolated communities that cannot conveniently or economically be covered by the Regular Army or the Militia. The real value of the individual Canadian Ranger depends upon three things. These are:

   a. the Ranger is usually a long-standing resident of the area and, as such, is intimately familiar with the local people, industries, terrain, tides, weather conditions, etc;
b. the Ranger is out and around his area working on or near the sea or land and in a position to observe unusual incidents, unidentified ships or aircraft, etc; and

c. the Ranger possesses certain skills or expert local knowledge or is employed at a certain job which by itself, is supportive to the Ranger role.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

4. Rangers are [enrolled] for an indefinite period of service and may serve up to the age of 65. A Ranger can be released or transferred at anytime; a Ranger will not, however, be relocated except by personal choice. Specific conditions of service for Rangers are as follows:

a. be a male or female volunteer;

b. be at least 18 years of age;

c. in good physical condition;

d. have local knowledge of the land, waterways and weather (or an interest in acquiring such knowledge); and

e. free from a serious criminal record (or for which a pardon has not been granted).

TRAINING

5. Base Training. The Rangers are a special sub-component of the Canadian Forces Reserves and undergo periodic training. This training consists of First Aid, surveillance, weapons skills (.303 Lee-Enfield) including live target practise, map and compass, and general military knowledge. Although training is expected to be conducted on a voluntary basis, a Ranger is subject to obligatory service or call-out. The Ranger is issued a .303 Lee-Enfield rifle, 300 rounds of ammunition annually, a Ranger red-ball cap and armband with the Ranger insignia, and a military Identification (ID) Card.

6. Continuation Training. To maintain fundamental skills, Rangers are expected to engage in certain voluntary training activities:

a. participate in voluntary individual training, with their patrol several times per year to meet the training objectives as delineated by the Standing Training Directive;

b. participate in one Annual Patrol level refresher exercise of 2 to 3 days duration to maintain and confirm skill levels; and

c. engage in periodic leadership training for Ranger Patrol Leaders as is conducted centrally by the HQ Ranger Staff.
RANGER TASKS

7. Rangers are part-time soldiers and perform both paid and non-paid tasks. Year round they perform the following day to day tasks, without compensation, in and around their local community. These standing non-paid tasks are:
   a. the reporting of any suspicious or unusual activities occurring in their respective areas to the appropriate Region or Command Headquarters by the best means available;
   b. the reporting of a major environmental disaster or accident (oil spill or aircraft or vessel accident to the nearest civilian authority and/or to the Region or Command Headquarters); and
   c. acquiring information concerning their local area which may be of assistance or value to the Canadian Forces generally.

8. Subject to approval and authorization by the HQ Ranger Staff, tasks which can be assigned to members of the Canadian Rangers for which pay, and/or compensation are made, are:
   a. periodic Ranger training that is organized by the HQ Ranger Staff;
   b. participating in Canadian Forces exercises and operations;
   c. providing guides and rescue parties;
   d. assisting in immediate local security by observing small hostile detachments pending the arrival of other forces. This does not include the responsibility of planning or directing local defence (wartime only);
   e. assisting the RCMP in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs (wartime only);
   f. in conjunction with the Maritime Coastal Defence Organizations, conducting coastal surveillance duties assisting in the conduct of inshore “coastal watch” in both peace and war;
   g. supporting Naval, Army and Air Forces in territorial defence and security tasks;
   h. where practicable and appropriate, providing specialized training assistance to cadet corps where special local skills can be taught, and in general provide support to the Cadets, especially in areas where there is no other military presence or community support, and
   j. where appropriate providing intelligence, on-site information and assistance in local civilian disaster operations, i.e. oil spills, earthquakes, floods, downed aircraft, shipwreck, etc.
CONCLUSION

9. Finally, the Ranger is a rugged self-reliant individualist who is intimately familiar with local terrain conditions. Rangers are integral members of their community and are prepared to serve their country in times of emergency.

…

D.I. Hay
Major
Staff Officer Rangers

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List
Doc. 44: Capt D. Scandrett, “Staff Plan to Form the Canadian Rangers in LFCA,” 30 May 1991

The Formation of The Canadian Rangers in LFCA

Situation

The summer of 1990 saw a major upheaval in relations between the Canadian Government and the indigenous peoples. The actions at Akwasasne and Oka have had a variety of effects, most of which were negative. [It] is now time to consider the future and to develop plans to increase our ability to defend Canada and at the same time improve our relations with, and understanding of, the native peoples of this country.

In 1947 the Canadian Forces formed the Canadian Rangers to address the skill set shortages in Northern Operations. This innovation has resulted in the recruitment of many Indian, Metis and Inuit people into the Rangers with the subsequent realization of some of our defence and social goals in the far north. The following, outlines my plan to establish the Canadian Ranger Programme in the Northern regions of the LFCA land mass.

Aim

My aim this evening is to summarize for you my proposal to establish a Canadian Ranger Programme within LFCA by 1992. The briefing will consist of the following:

(#2 Slide On) Why the Rangers,
The Tasks of the Canadian Rangers,
The current Ranger Programme Distribution,
A Concept of Operations for LFCA Rangers consisting of:
Organization,
Command and Control,
Training,
Inter-governmental coordination, and finally Funding.

Background: Why the Rangers?

The DND has an ongoing agenda to recruit native people into the regular component of Forces. There is no specific Militia Programme for Native peoples primarily because of the geographic distribution of the Militia into the more populous areas of southern Canada, as shown in this chart. The Regular recruiting plan has met with varying degrees of success. In Ontario, the Cadet movement has been active in the establishment of Corps and Squadron’s in the vicinity of native communities, such as Hearst, Moose Factory, Chapleau and
others. Again, this has met with varying degrees of success in the enrolment and training of native peoples.

The problem exists where there is neither a Cadet Corps or Militia Unit that can provide military training and actively involve native people in the defence of Canada. The Cadets of course have no mandate, role or task to participate in the Defence of Canada. Their prime function is citizenship training. This is where the Canadian Ranger’s can fill the gap: The Canadian Rangers are a sub-component of the Reserve Force and are intended to provide a para-military force in sparsely settled northern, [coastal] and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the CF. Rangers tend to function as individuals rather than as formed bodies of troops. Please note that the leaders of Ranger Patrols are elected annually by the members and then paid in the appropriate rank.

The Tasks of the Canadian Rangers

The Canadian Rangers break down into two categories as follows: First are the Voluntary tasks that are carried out as a part of normal everyday jobs, such as reporting of unusual or suspicious activities and the collection of detailed data on the local area which may be of assistance to the Canadian Forces, such as climatic data, [flora] and fauna, terrain analysis, water conditions etc.

The second group of activities that takes place and for which Rangers receive pay are: local training exercises; ground search and rescue; and participation in CF exercises as guides, advisors, recce personnel, and survival instructors, to mention a few. In wartime the Rangers could fulfil these tasks as well as functioning with the RCMP, and in LFCA the OPP in the assisting with local defence tasks.

Current Ranger Distribution

The Canadian Rangers are presently split into three separate groups. The most well known Rangers are commanded by Northern Region HQ in Yellow Knife [sic]. They are organized into individual patrols based on local communities or settlements. These are spread throughout the two territories, Northern Manitoba,
and Ungava Bay in Quebec. As of this year there will be 54 patrols and approximately 1250 Rangers primarily from the Indian, Metis and Inuit peoples.

Commander MARCOM, through a liaison officer in St John’s Newfoundland controls the Canadian Rangers organized into Companies and Platoons located in Newfoundland and Labrador, and along the north shore of St Lawrence River in Quebec. At present there are 968 Canadian Rangers divided up into 10 companies, and 31 platoons.

Finally, the Canadian Rangers on the West Coast are controlled by Commander, MARPAC at Esquimalt, BC. This programme is in the formative stages, with active recruitment underway. The intended goal is to enrol and train a force of 1000 people organized into Companies and Platoons at various coastal locations. These Ranger Detachments will be slightly different as they will include a higher percentage of non-native peoples and will have a significant ecological and disaster assistance role.

**Threat?**

In the matter of forming the Canadian Rangers in LFCA, the question will be [posed] as to why do we need them? Is there a threat? The traditional method is to define the human threat and then build forces to meet it. We have done that for the past forty five years in [Europe], and have seen that threat implode and diminish. At this time it is difficult to consider the USSR as a viable threat in the LFCA North. I feel we must have a longer view, and prepare for future considerations of a less tangible or traditional form. The facts are that we are the second largest country in the world with the longest coast line situated on three oceans. … Consider the distribution of LFCA units in the populous south and in a very thin line of NOMD, stretching from the Sault to North Bay; we do not have a lot of depth in the North. There are of course the interlopers from the LFWA who continue to violate our flanks all the way to Thunder Bay.

There is a need to provide a military presence in the LFCA north, coupled with the need to involve native people. To put this into geographic perspective, Ontario has a salt water coast line of 1200 km long, twice the distance between Windsor and Cornwall and six times greater than that of Holland. With the closure of CFS Albany and later CFS Mooseanee [sic] in 1970, there is no [permanent] DND presence on shores of Hudson or James Bay. The DND conducts infrequent exercises in the north but we tend to go to the far north. In tankers parlance; we have disregarded the medium range band. But again is there a threat? There is if we consider such things as Sovereignty, pollution, the environment, forest fires, and transportation disasters. In large part we lack the regional knowledge to conduct effective military operations in Northern Ontario.
This is where a Ranger programme can provide the local wisdom and skills that we in the south do not possess. Finally, from the socio-economic, citizenship and cultural standpoints it would not do any harm to have our total force officers, NCOs and soldiers learn more about this huge country and her diverse regions.

Concept of Operations

Groupings

The distribution of native reserves and settlements are shown in this slide. For the sake of simplicity, I have grouped the reserves geographically rather than by Bands. Please note that this distribution and grouping will require closer study to better reflect the traditional band structures and interactions. The ground has been christened as follows:

- Coastal
- Northern
- Mid-Northern
- Railway
- Mid-Southern
- and, Southern.

The priority of establishing Rangers Patrols should, in my mind start in the Coastal area and then expand inland, towards the south. This would ensure that the LFCA presence is initially established on the outer edge of the Area. I see no need to bring the Ranger programme into the current LFCA area of operations. The Mid-Southern and Southern portions of the Area should not be part of the Ranger programme.

Organization

With the above distribution in mind, LFCA would form a Canadian Ranger Training Detachment located at CFB North Bay. The Detachment Commander would in turn report to LFCA HQ in a similar manner to that of a Militia Training Centre of MTSC. The Detachment would initially consist of a Regular Force Captain, Combat Arms OC, a Regular Force Warrant Officer as 2IC and Training NCO, a cadre of three Combat Arms Sergeant instructors, a clerk; and finally and most critically, a native person fluent in Cree, the predominant native language in northern Ontario. This structure would expand as numbers increased and training became more dispersed. The Ranger implementation goal should be
for 30 patrols with a total strength of approximately 1000 Rangers predicated on a five year plan of forming 6 patrols per year.

Administrative support for the programme would have to be negotiated with, and provided by, CFB North Bay; the most northern Base in Ontario.

Ranger Training

The current Ranger training package is of ten days duration and covers modified basic GMT subjects. This is followed by an Advances Course of five days duration after two to three years of service. Most Rangers are experienced in the “Bush” and they do not require extensive military training. There is considerable sensitivity required in this training process, and all staff must demonstrate a positive attitude towards native people and be mindful of their customs and ways. Staff in support of this programme should attend the Native Cultural Awareness Course conducted by the Department of Indian Affairs, at various locations across Canada. It has been proven that the military training programme should be to the point, and conducted insitu and not at centralized locations. Incremental instructors for the present Ranger programme are tasked from Regular and Reserve units. The same procedure would apply for LFCA Rangers. An example of this; Warrant Officer Shur of G3 Collective Training spent 14 days in April at Hall Beach NWT as an incremental instructor to the Ranger Basic Course. To paraphrase him, he had a fantastic time and learned far more than he taught.

Funding

The constant nagging concern is funding and this programme is not cheap; the O and M costs will be high. On the positive side, there are funds for Rangers at NDHQ and there can be cooperative funding from other Federal and Provincial government departments. A preliminary estimate sees expenditure levels in the $300,000.00 per annum range once the programme is at full speed. A detailed cost projection and cashflow forecast will be provided as this plan is developed.

Coordination

This programme must be harmonized with the activities of the federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Provincial Governments Department of Natural Resources. Once I have received a formal blessing of this plan, I will contact the appropriate Provincial and Federal Departments. The most prominent contacts will be with the native groups who will be effected [sic] by this plan. With out their support, success will be impossible.
Conclusion

In conclusion, there are a number of other details to be discussed and I will be circulating a detailed plan for staff consideration by the end of June. We are entering a period of force restructure, reduction and change. This plan sees an opportunity and chooses a positive approach, looking to expansion and growth. I feel that a modified Canadian Ranger programme to be the most effective method of increasing our presence in the LFCA north. It will stimulate consciousness on the parts of both communities and foster greater understanding.

…

D. Scandrett
Capt
G3 Trg Plans

…

30 May 1992
Doc. 45: Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence on the Canadian Rangers in Quebec,” 1 October 1991

BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ON THE CANADIAN RANGERS IN QUEBEC

ISSUE

1. The ref is a comprehensive package on the Canadian Ranger programme. The following information will amplify involvement of the Canadian Rangers in Quebec.

BACKGROUND

2. The current Canadian Ranger programme was established in 1947. Units were formed in the North, Quebec and Newfoundland shortly thereafter. The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers had already been established, in 1942, for wartime coastal surveillance.

DISCUSSION

3. As of 7 Aug 91, more than half of the total Ranger establishment is located south of the 60th parallel. In Ungava there are 246 Rangers and along the lower North Shore of the St Lawrence River there are 83 Rangers. The location and strength of the Ranger patrols/platoons in Quebec and vicinity are shown on the attached map. As of Aug 91 Quebec’s 329 Rangers constituted 14% of the total Ranger force. Plans have recently been approved to increase the Northern Rangers by 500 and to re-establish, after their reduction to nil strength in 1978, the Rangers in British Columbia. It is expected that the British Columbia Rangers will number 1,000. As a result Rangers in Quebec will only constitute 9% of the Ranger force.

4. There is no programme in place to expand the Rangers in Quebec. There is, however, an ongoing staff check to investigate establishing Rangers in the northern prairie provinces and northern Ontario. Additionally a strategic study for future Ranger activity is being initiated.

CONCLUSION

5. There is currently a strong Ranger programme in Quebec. There are no plans at this time to expand the Ranger programme in Quebec. Any future expansion would be determined as a result of the aforementioned strategic study.

Group Principal: VAdm R.E. George, DCDS, 992-3355
Prepared by: Maj D.C. Iley, D Res SPO Armouries & Rangers

Date: 1 Oct 91

Ref: Aide-Memoire for MND on the Canadian Rangers of 12 Aug 91
Annex A: Map of Ranger Locations in Quebec and vicinity
**LÉGENDE**

**EMPLACEMENTS ET EFFECTIFS DES CANADIAN RANGERS**

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<td>12. Kangiqualujujuaq</td>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Harve St Pierre</td>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Harrington Harbour</td>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Lourdes de Blanc-Sablon</td>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Red Bay</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Port Hope Simpson</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Cartwright</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Goose Bay</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Churchill Falls</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Labrador City</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Rigolet</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Makkovik</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Postville</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Hopedale</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Nain</td>
<td>LABRADOR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Iqaluit</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Lake Harbour</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Cape Dorset</td>
<td>NWT</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Sanikiluaq</td>
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### ANNEXE B

**EFFECTIFS DES RANGERS PAR PROVINCE/TERRITOIRE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RÉGION</th>
<th>PELOTONS PATROUILLES</th>
<th>EFFECTIFS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Région de l’Atlantique</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terre-Neuve</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labrador</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec (Côte-Nord du Bas Saint-Laurent)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1 017</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Région du Nord</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec (Ungava)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Territoires] du Nord-Ouest</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1 160</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Région du Pacifique</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombie-Britannique</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 287</strong></td>
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</table>

### PORCENRAGES PAR PROVINCE/TERRITOIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Territoire</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terre-Neuve/Labrador</td>
<td>40,8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>14,4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>0,4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territoires du Nord-Ouest</td>
<td>34,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombie-Britannique</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
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Doc. 46: Maj G.S. Rust, Aide-Memoire on the Canadian Rangers, 3 January 1992

AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THE CANADIAN RANGERS

ISSUE

1. The intent of this aide-memoire is to provide background information, the current status and plans for the future for the Canadian Ranger programme.

BACKGROUND

2. In 1942 the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) were established in British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. At that time it was feared that Japan might attempt to mount a military expedition against continental North America. Although the need to defend against such an event was obvious, there were not sufficient troops available to observe and defend the long western coastline. It was decided, therefore, to raise a force of irregulars who, concurrent with their normal daily activities, could observe and report any unusual coastal activities. At its strongest, there were over 15,000 personnel in the PCMR. In addition, the PCMR were armed and organized so that they could, if necessary, provide immediate local defence until the arrival of formed bodies of trained troops. These bodies of troops would, on arrival in the area, make use of the PCMR's expert knowledge of local terrain and conditions.

3. Following World War II it was decided that the concept of the PCMR was valid considering the length of Canadian coastline and the scarcity of formed bodies of troops of either the Regular Force or the Primary Reserve. In fact, it was considered to be such a good idea that it was expanded to include all stretches of Canadian coastline where there were no formed bodies of troops in existence.

4. In 1947, the Canadian Rangers were established with the primary role of ensuring Canadian territorial security and surveillance of Canadian coastlines. In 1971 command of the Canadian Rangers was transferred to Maritime Command Headquarters in Halifax (MARCOM) and Northern Region Headquarters in Yellowknife (NRHQ). In 1978 the Rangers on the West Coast were reduced to nil strength as units in this area had become dormant, however, in Oct 1990 they were re-established. In 1979, at MARCOM’s request, approval was granted for NRHQ to take over the Rangers in Northern Quebec (Ungava Peninsula) from MARCOM.
CURRENT STATUS

5. The following paragraphs provide a brief outline of the current status of the Canadian Rangers. Canadian Rangers are a sub-component of the Reserve Force. They provide a para-military force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces and normally function as individuals as opposed to formed bodies. Their presence provides a means of visible proof of Canada’s ownership and sovereignty in the north and the isolated areas of Canada.

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATIONS

6. The Canadian Rangers are split into three separate groups. A break-down by Province/Territory is attached at Annex A. The Rangers controlled by the Commander, Northern Region Headquarters in Yellowknife are organized as individual patrols identified by the name of their local community. These patrols, 22 in average strength, are located in the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories, Northern Manitoba and the Ungava Bay and Peninsula areas of Northern Quebec. As at 31 May 1991 Northern Region had 52 active patrols with 1,160 Rangers, primarily Indians, Metis and Inuits [sic].

7. The Rangers controlled by the Commander, Maritime Command through a Liaison Officer in St. John’s, Newfoundland are organized in companies and platoons located in Newfoundland (including Labrador) and along the lower north shore of the St. Lawrence River in Quebec. Currently Atlantic Region has 1,017 Rangers in ten companies and 30 platoons.

8. The Rangers in the West are controlled by the Commander, Maritime Command (Pacific) through a Liaison Officer in Esquimalt, BC. As this element has just been reformed, at present there are 190 Rangers in seven patrols.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

9. Canadian Rangers are a special component of the Reserve Force, and have somewhat different terms of service than the Primary Reserve. The important distinction is that the Rangers are unpaid volunteers who hold themselves in readiness for service but are not required to undergo annual training. They are obliged to serve only when placed on active service by the Governor-in-Council (Prime Minister and Federal Cabinet) or when called out in an emergency (which is normally taken to mean war, invasion, riot or insurrection). They also have no obligation to train except when placed on active service. They must be in good health and be able to effectively operate on the land. Rangers can of course take
their release at any time. This selection criteria is the backbone of the program and for the most part means that the Rangers must have good outdoor skills.

**RANGER ROLE**

10. The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence in peacetime and to assist in defence against incursions and sabotage in war in those sparsely settle northern, coastal or isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components or sub-components of the Canadian Forces. The role has not changed significantly since World War II.

**RANGER TASKS**

11. Canadian Ranger tasks can be grouped into two categories. The first of these are the tasks they carry out on a voluntary basis without pay while going about their normal everyday jobs. They are to:
   a. report any unusual or suspicious activities within their area; and
   b. collect detailed information concerning their local area which may be of assistance to the Canadian Forces.

12. Tasks for which Rangers receive the appropriate rate of Reserve pay are:
   a. local training exercises;
   b. ground search and rescue; and
   c. participate in other CF exercises as guides, advisors, recce personnel, survival instructors, etc.

13. As well as the above, in wartime the Rangers are tasked to assist in local defence by observing and/or containing enemy detachments pending arrival of other forces and assisting the RCMP or provincial police forces in discovering, reporting and apprehending enemy agents or saboteurs.

**ENROLMENT PREREQUISITES**

14. There are certain prerequisites or standards which an individual must meet in order to enrol in the Canadian Rangers. An individual must:
   a. be of an age which is in keeping with the maturity and physical capability required to carry out Ranger duties. As a guide, the ages of 18 to 65 should be applied although a Ranger may stay on past 65 at the Platoon Commander’s discretion provided his or her age does not interfere with the performance of his or her duties;
   b. be a Canadian citizen or signify intention to become a Canadian citizen;
   c. be in sufficiently good health to meet the physical requirements to perform the duties of a Ranger;
d. have not been convicted of an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada prior to enrolment; and

e. not be a member of any other sub-component of the CF.

SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT

15. As a guide, civilian employment fields considered suitable:

a. **Sea Employment.** For example inshore fishermen, trawlermen, ferrymen and associated employment, fisheries officers;

b. **Woodsmen.** For example professional guides, camp operators, persons employed in the pulp or lumber industries, wildlife officers;

c. **Communications Employment.** For example radio and telephone operators, communications repairment or technicians, air traffic controllers;

d. **Flying Employment.** For example bush pilots, pilots or operators of small commercial lines, camp operators who regularly use light aircraft for access to hunting or fishing areas; and

e. **Retired CF Personnel.** For example retired members of the CF—located in outlying areas and with suitable employment to fulfill the Ranger function.

EQUIPMENT

16. Ranger equipment requirements are minimal. Currently all ranks of the Canadian Rangers are issued with a red armband and cap (both with Ranger crest), a number 4 Lee-Enfield .303 calibre rifle, and 300 rounds of ammunition per year for marksmanship training. The Enfield rifle may seem obsolete but it is desired because of its dependability under harsh operating conditions, and from a security viewpoint, it can be stored at the Ranger’s residence. The scale of issue for Rangers is under study and increased equipment/clothing is anticipated in the future. Specialized equipment such as snowmobiles, sleds, boats, etc are rented by the Department from the Rangers when required for Ranger activities.

TRAINING

17. Notwithstanding the earlier statement that Rangers have no obligation to train, on authority of their respective Commanders, the Rangers receive basic military training on enrolment and more advanced training annually or biannually. Because of the difficulties in arranging transportation to Northern Region Ranger locations, and to some extent in British Columbia, (aircraft are the only means available to most locations) these Rangers exercise once every two years for eight to ten days. The Rangers in Maritime Command’s area of responsibility conduct a three to five day exercise annually.
18. In Northern Region, on long exercises, training is split between the classroom and the field. The classroom portion includes:
   a. general service knowledge - in particular where the Rangers fit in to the Canadian Forces;
   b. map using;
   c. first aid;
   d. rifle care, cleaning, and zeroing plus familiarization with other CF weapons; and
   e. instruction on other military equipment, rations, tents, radios, etc which they may have the opportunity to use or see other troops using on an exercise.

19. The field portion of the training is adapted to the local environment, climate and season. Normally it is a reconnaissance exercise by boat, snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or dog sled. The scenarios are flexible and are used to train in any one of several Ranger tasks. Examples are ground search, navigation and link up, support of larger forces and survival techniques.

20. As well, the Rangers also provide a number of personnel to support exercises by other components of the Canadian Forces in Arctic and Eastern Canada each year. For example, in Feb 1990, three Ranger Patrols from Chesterfield Inlet, Rankin Inlet and Whale Cove on the Western Shore of Hudson Bay combined to take part in a training exercise with the winter warfare instructors course out of Wainwright, Alberta.

21. The real value of the individual Canadian Ranger rests upon the following:
   a. the Ranger works, for the most part, in isolated areas on land or sea, and is often in a position to observe unusual incidents, unidentified ships or aircraft, etc;
   b. the Ranger is a long-standing resident of the area and as such is intimately familiar with the local population, industries, terrain, weather conditions, etc; or
   c. the Ranger possesses a certain skill or is employed at a certain job which, by itself, is of use to the Ranger organization.

RANGER LIAISON OFFICER (RLO)

22. The direction, supervision, documentation, and administration of the Canadian Rangers is assigned to three Ranger Liaison Officers, one located in Northern Region Headquarters, Yellowknife, one in St. John’s, Newfoundland and one in Esquimalt, British Columbia. Each has a small staff to assist with administration and training of the Rangers.
23. Due to the great distances to travel and the large number of patrols/companies/platoons involved, the RLO and staff spend a considerable portion of their time visiting and travelling. The purposes of these visits include liaison between RLO staff and patrol/company/platoon commanders, ammunition distribution, weapon replacements, and conducting training. As well the RLO is involved in ceremonial functions such as the presentation of certificates of service to retiring Canadian Rangers and Canadian Forces Decorations and Clasps to long serving members.

BUDGET

24. The total Canadian Ranger budget for 1991/92 is $2,271,400 of which $1,066,000 is allocated to Northern Region, $947,900 to Maritime Command and $259,500 to Maritime Command (Pacific).

FUTURE

25. In keeping with the direction provided by the White Paper on Defence (1987), Challenge and Commitment A Defence Policy for Canada, and the new Defence Policy, 17 September 1991, the Canadian Ranger Program is expanding. Northern Region is expanding from 52 to 66 Ranger Patrols (3 to 4 per year) which should amount to 1,658 Rangers by 1995. In Atlantic Region, the number of platoons is not being increased, but the quality of the 1,000 Rangers is being improved. Finally, the re-establishment of Rangers in the West, in Pacific Region, which began in Oct, 1990 will continue until a goal of 1,000 Rangers is reached.

CONCLUSION

26. The Canadian Rangers perform a valuable role in the Canadian Forces and to all of Canada. Their presence from Vancouver Island to Cape Race, Newfoundland and north to Grise Fiord on Ellesmere Island provide a military presence and a symbol of sovereignty over a vast portion of Canadian Territory. In the final analysis, the key to this programme's success is the 2,300 public spirited volunteer Canadian Rangers who give so freely of their time and expertise for their country.

Annex A - Ranger Strengths by Province/Territory
File No: 1901-260/4
Prepared by: Major G.S. Rust, D Res SPO (A&R), 992-0558
Dated: 03 Jan 92

FOURTH DRAFT

1901-260/4 (D Res SPO 2-3)

Aug 92

A MILITARY PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

PART - AIM

1. Aim. The aim of the paper is to establish guidelines for the development of the Canadian Ranger Programme.

2. Assumption. This paper is written from the perspective of post 1 Sep 92, when all Land Force Areas are established and the appropriate CFOO's have been amended.

PART 2 – BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

3. The Canadian Rangers began in British Columbia with the formation of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) in 1942 to meet a perceived Japanese threat and reached a strength of 15,000 before being disbanded at the end of hostilities. Following World War II, it was determined that the concept was still valid and should be extended throughout Canada. In 1947, up to 5,000 Canadian Rangers were authorized to conduct security and surveillance over Canadian territory and coastlines.

4. In accordance with CFOO 1.7, the VCDB exercises command over the Canadian Rangers and operational and administrative control is delegated to the Commanders of the Areas where patrols are located.

5. The Canadian Ranger programmes in Atlantic Area and Northern Area are successful and continue to operate effectively. With increased emphasis placed on the Reserves in the 1987 White Paper, the Canadian Rangers were reactivated in British Columbia where they had become dormant and the establishment of Ranger patrols in other remote areas is being considered.

PART 3 - DISCUSSION

6. Role. The role of the Canadian Rangers has been reviewed many times since 1947 and remains valid today. As stated in the 1947 Order in Council and in CFOO 1.7:
“The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces.”

7. The role was confirmed in the 1987 White Paper and it was re-affirmed by the Minister in a new Defence Policy on 17 September 1991. He emphasized that:

“the numbers of Rangers, who play such an important role in the north, will also be increased.”

Subsequently, the Canadian Defence Policy of April 1992 placed greater emphasis on national roles and expansion of the Canadian Ranger Programme. Additional tasks can be assigned to an expanded Ranger organization which will complement this renewed emphasis.

8. A large portion of Canada’s coastal and northern areas is sparsely occupied, and Primary Reserve units are located only in the larger, southern urban locations. An economical and practical way of providing a military presence in isolated areas is through the Canadian Ranger Programme.

9. Tasks. Tasks can traditionally be grouped into two categories:

a. tasks they carry out on a voluntary basis without pay while going about their normal everyday life which are:

   (1) to report any unusual or suspicious activities within their area; and

   (2) to collect detailed information concerning their local area which may be of assistance to the Canadian Forces.

b. tasks for which Rangers receive the appropriate rate of Reserve pay which are:

   (1) local training exercises (weapons handling, map and compass exercises, and first aid);

   (2) ground search and rescue; and

   (3) to act as guides/scouts, advisors, reconnaissance personnel, survival instructors and so on, during CF exercises.

10. In addition to the above, in times of emergency or war, Rangers may be tasked to assist in local defence by observing and/or containing hostile lodgements pending arrival of other forces. For the most part, this involves fixing and following the enemy, rather than executing defensive operations. In this context, local defence tasks may be construed as protection of civilian vital points,
a civil police responsibility, which could devolve to the Rangers. The Rangers will also assist the RCMP or provincial police forces in finding, reporting and apprehending hostile agents or saboteurs.

11. Some new tasks that may be appropriate are:

a. to operate closely with the Naval Reserve Maritime Coastal Defence Organization in coastal surveillance and to assist with in shore surveillance tasks;

b. to work with Cadet Corps to teach special skills, and in general to provide support to the Cadets, especially in areas where there is no other military presence; and

c. to provide intelligence, on-site information and other assistance during local disaster relief operations following oil spills, earthquakes, and so on.

12. The roles and tasks of the Canadian Rangers are not unique. In the United States, the indigenous Alaskan Scouts perform a similar function. In Australia, lack of security in the remote and sparsely populated northwestern area was recognized as a problem and three Regional Force Surveillance Units, totalling 3,000 personnel, were created along Canadian Ranger lines, by recruiting volunteers who live in the area - both aboriginal and non-aboriginal people. In one-quarter of the land mass of Australia, these units protect many vital assets and installations freeing combat formations for other tasks.

13. People. The Canadian Rangers are not reservists in the traditional sense in that they are not members of the Primary Reserve component, but constitute a separate component. Like the Cadet Instructors List (CIL), they are not included in the Canadian Forces as “fighting assets”. The special and unique status of the Rangers (minimum training, no uniforms, etc) keeps them distinctly separate from the Primary Reserve. Approximately half of the Rangers are aboriginal Canadians, residing primarily in CFNA. Particular aspects of the Canadian Ranger programme are:

a. education levels vary considerably, ranging from post-graduate degrees to minimum schooling;

b. ages range from 16 to 70, with an average age of early 40s in the Atlantic Region and early 30s in CFNA, and about ___% of them are females;

c. trade skills vary widely -- from teachers, pharmacists, engineers and aircraft pilots and mechanics to fishermen, trappers and hunters;
d. many Rangers in Atlantic Canada, British Columbia and the Yukon have had previous military service, but this is very rare in the North West Territories;

e. in contrast to the Primary Reserve which is located in larger urban areas, the Canadian Rangers, organized into patrols of up to 20 persons, provide a military presence in nearly every town and village in Newfoundland/Labrador, on the lower North Shore of Quebec, in Northern Quebec (Ungava), the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. In British Columbia, the Rangers are beginning to provide a military presence north of the Trans-Canada Highway, where neither Primary Reserve nor Regular Force units are based; and

f. enrolment standards are subjective and are based on a determination by one of the Ranger Liaison Officers, representing his Area Commander and located in Esquimalt, Whitehorse, Yellowknife and St John’s and by the Ranger company and platoon commanders where they are established. The enrolment process is quite simple as there are no aptitude tests, medicals or dental examinations. Two criteria that do apply are that the Rangers must be Canadian citizens or they must have signified their intention to become one and they must not have a record of an indictable criminal offence.

14. **Attitudes.** People who join the Canadian Ranger Programme are keenly interested in the military and the part that they play in the Defence of Canada. They are strongly oriented toward their communities and join the Rangers for a number of reasons including the challenge, the opportunity to exercise leadership and the continuation of a family tradition. Many Rangers view their service as the paying of “dues” to their community, and the community sees the Ranger patrol in their midst as the paying of “collective dues” to society. In many cases, the Ranger platoons/patrols are the only formal organization in a community. The Programme is one of the most efficient and cost effective components of the CF. It gives the military a high profile in a sovereignty role, instils awareness and involvement at the community level in military matters, and finally, it promotes the development of the reserves in areas too small or remote to support full fledged Primary Reserve units.

15. **Equipment and Support.** Except for their .303 calibre Lee-Enfield rifles, ammunition, parkas and head-dress, Canadian Rangers use their own equipment in the course of their daily activities and when called out on exercises or in support of another component of the Canadian Forces. Their personal snowmobiles, sleds, boats vehicles, airplanes, helicopters, etc, are rented by the
Department as required, minimizing the need for DND equipment. DND supports the Rangers by providing supplies of ammunition, rations and training stores through support bases, often utilizing Canadian Forces aircraft in remote areas.

16. Organization. Organizations have evolved separately in each area and in Sep 92, were as follows:

a. **Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA):** Operational control of the Rangers in LFAA is exercised by the Commander, LFAA in Halifax through a Ranger Liaison Officer (RLO) operating from CFS St John’s, Newfoundland. The 1,100 Rangers are organized into ten companies and 31 platoons. Platoons vary in size from 20 to 45 Rangers. Many communities have a lengthy waiting list of personnel wishing to join the programme. The operating languages are English and/or French and a large cross-section of trades and professions are represented. LFAA will continue to control and support the Ranger company located along the 'Lower North Shore' of Quebec until LFQA is ready to assume this responsibility;

b. **Land Force Quebec Area (LFQA):** LFQA has approximately 330 Rangers. There is a company of 90 Rangers located along the 'Lower North Shore' and the remaining 240 Rangers, who are mostly aboriginal people, are spread among 12 patrols around the Ungava Bay region of northern Quebec. They are all involved in the traditional occupations of hunting, fishing and trapping.

c. **Land Force Western Area (LFWA):** In British Columbia, a 1,000 member organization is being created, on a phased basis, through to 1995. In northern British Columbia they will be organized similarly to CFNA, and will include primarily aboriginal volunteers. In the centre of the province, they will be organized like LFAA, and the Rangers will primarily be non-aboriginals. There are currently 268 Rangers in B.C. organized into ten patrols; and

b. **Canadian Forces Northern Area:** CFNA has 1,400 Rangers. They are mostly aboriginal people from small communities (100 to 300 in population) in the sparsely settled North, involved in traditional occupations of hunting, trapping and fishing. They are organized into 58 patrols and are located throughout the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. Although English is used, the operating language is the local indigenous tongue or Inuktitut. CFNA will continue to exercise operational control over and to support the Ranger Patrols located in...
Northern Quebec around Ungava Bay until LFQA is ready to take them under command.

17. SUPPORT STAFF

a. **LFAA:** The Ranger organization consists of a regular force Captain in St John’s, Newfoundland who has a Warrant Officer and three Sergeants to assist him. Although limited administrative support is provided by CFS St John’s, adequate support cannot be provided to the Rangers due to their wide geographic distribution. Additional support is provided as required from Air Command bases at Gander and Goose Bay and a wheeled vehicle is provided by CFS St John’s;

b. **LFQA:** LFQA is proceeding with plans to assume operational control of the Canadian Rangers within Quebec. Until they have established a fully functioning support staff cell, the RLOs from the other two Areas will continue to coordinate the activities of the Ranger patrols/platoons which they previously controlled. A two year transition phase is envisaged before LFQA will be able to assume complete operational and administrative control;

c. **LFWA:** The support staff in B.C. is increasing along with the phased increase in Rangers. They are located in Victoria, B.C. and consist of a Major, a Master Warrant Officer, Warrant Officer and a Sergeant; and

d. **CFNA:** The Ranger staff consists of two Captains, a Master Warrant Officer, a Warrant Officer, five Sergeants and a Corporal clerk. Administrative support is provided by CFNA HQ. Since only a few Ranger patrols are accessible by road, Twin-Otter aircraft are used for the majority of travel across the North.

In all Areas, the Support Staff integrate regular and reserve force personnel into a truly “Total Force” organization.

18. **Budgets.** The total Canadian Ranger budget for 1992/93 is $2,883,000, allocated as fols:

   a. LFAA: $1,334,300;

   b. CFNA: $1,022,200; and

   c. LFWA: $526,400.

There is a perception that Canadian Rangers are a no-cost organization, but such is not the case. The Department obtains excellent value for the money spent on its 2,535 personnel making it one of the most cost-effective programmes within
DND. The proposed expansion of the Ranger Programme will require a commensurate growth in the Ranger budget in the future.

19. **Training.** Training procedures differ in each Area:

   a. **LFAA:** In Atlantic Region, the Rangers conduct annual company training exercises of three to five days duration, and hold monthly platoon sessions for discussions and training. Since the Rangers are organised into companies and platoons, an annual training plan is issued by the RLO to the company commanders who are responsible for implementing the training. The RLO and his staff provide administrative and technical support as required;

   b. **CFNA:** The Ranger patrols are exercised once every two years during a ten-day training session. In the off years, support to CF sovereignty exercises is provided when Regular Force or Primary Reserve units train in remote areas. More training would be preferred, but the small size of the support staff at CFNA HQ and the lack of hours available on the two aircraft allocated to CFNA preclude any increase; and

   c. **LFWA:** In British Columbia, the training is conducted much the same as in LFAA, with platoon exercises of three to five days duration and local platoon training sessions are held monthly.

**PART 4 – THE WAY AHEAD**

20. **Expanding the Programme Nationwide.** In keeping with the direction provided by the White Paper on Defence (1987) *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, and the New Defence Policy, April 1992, the Canadian Ranger Programme is expanding. As directed, CFNA is expanding by three to four patrols per year and LFQA is in the process of assuming responsibility for the 330 Rangers split between Ungava Bay region and the Lower North Shore. At this time there is no approved expansion plan, but expansion is programmed. Finally, the re-establishment of Rangers in British Columbia, which began in Oct 90, will continue until a total of 1,000 Rangers is reached. This will give a final figure of approximately 3,700 Rangers across Canada by 1995.

21. **Further Expansion.** On 15 April 1947, the Governor-in-Council authorized the formation of the Canadian Rangers and imposed a manning ceiling of 5,000. The strength of the Rangers has fluctuated considerably since then and current strength is near 2,700. Other areas being examined for establishment of patrols are the northern areas of the prairie provinces, Ontario and Quebec. The expansion plan is modest, but the contribution to the national fabric will be
significant since the programme will be based on small communities in sparsely settled areas. As well, the embracing of a common goal by aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities will strengthen unity, understanding and tolerance.

22. Command and Control. The VCDS will continue to exercise command of the Canadian Rangers, and Commanders, LFC and CFNA will continue to exercise operational and administrative control; in the case of LFCHQ, through the Area HQs. There is a requirement to organize Ranger Patrols along more formal lines to facilitate Command and Control, administration and training as follows:

a. in most Areas, Rangers should be established into companies and platoons, with captains appointed as company commanders and lieutenants appointed as platoon commanders. Platoons may, if required, be divided into sections commanded by a sergeant. Due to the special circumstances in the NWT, this organization is not feasible because of the wide dispersal of communities and they should remain established in patrols commanded by Ranger sergeants who report directly to the RLO in Yellowknife;

b. the Ranger commanding a company, platoon or patrol is the officer or NCM-in-charge and is responsible to the appropriate Area Commander for the effective and efficient operation of his element; and

c. a Ranger Commanding Officer, Deputy Commanding Officer and Ranger Liaison Officer (RLO) should be appointed within each Area to provide the necessary operational and administrative control of Ranger activities on behalf of the Area Commander. Each RLO should have an instructional and administrative staff consisting of Regular and Reserve Force NCMs in sufficient numbers to adequately train and perform liaison duties with their Ranger units. This staff could vary in strength depending upon the number of Ranger patrols/platoons in their Area.

23. Role/Tasks. Although the role of the Canadian Ranger remains valid, the tasks assigned to them can be expanded in line with the Canadian Defence Policy of April 1992, which emphasizes national roles. Potential exists for expanding the tasks of the Rangers into additional areas by providing assistance of a passive nature to federal, provincial, and territorial government agencies, such as the reporting of illegal fishing activities, violation of environmental laws, smuggling of drugs and search and rescue.

24. Equipment and Support. There is a need to update the equipment supplied to the Canadian Rangers:
a. the Ranger rifle is an essential part of being a Ranger and the rifle is part of the Ranger ethos. The .303 calibre Lee-Enfield rifles supplied to the Rangers are in a poor state of repair and are becoming difficult and costly to maintain. It is time to procure a more modern bolt-action rifle; and

b. the personal equipment supplied to the Rangers is adequate and deficiencies are made up from personal stores and equipment. Additional stores needed for major tasks or extended operations will be maintained at the Area level for issue as required.

25. Training. With the restructuring of the Army and regional operations coming together under LFC and CFNA, some fundamental elements of individual Ranger training should be standardized. A common standard of leadership training for the Ranger officers and NCMs is worthy of consideration. Training in first aid, communications and reporting should be standardized.

PART 5 – RECOMMENDATIONS

26. In summary, the following recommendations are made:

a. the Canadian Rangers remain a VCDS resource;

b. the Canadian Rangers remain a pare-military organization, but the command and control apparatus be organized along more formal lines to facilitate a more efficient and effective organization with the appointment of Commanding Officers in each Area;

c. based on recommendations by commands, the expansion of the Canadian Ranger Programme be continued, to include the northern areas of the three prairie provinces, Northern Ontario and additional areas in Quebec to a maximum manning level of 5,000 Rangers;

d. a new Ranger rifle be procured to replace the out-dated .303 Lee-Enfield rifle; and

e. subsequent staff actions be initiated to amend CF00 1.7 and to produce a VCDS Instruction to implement these changes.

Prepared by: Maj M.U. Kelly, D Res SPO 2-3 (Rangers) 995-5744
Date: Aug 92
(Doc ID: 0732D)
### Canadian Rangers Strategy Paper Milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Oct 91</td>
<td>First Draft to D Res</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov 91</td>
<td>Second Draft for distribution to DCDS, Commands and Regions for comments by 01 Feb 92</td>
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<tr>
<td>04 Dec 91</td>
<td>Visit to FMC and briefing on Ranger Programme (1 Day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 91/Jan 92</td>
<td>Visits to MARCOM, MARPAC &amp; NRHQ to discuss the way ahead for the Rangers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 91/Jan 92</td>
<td>Briefing to Force Development Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>01 Mar 92</td>
<td>Final Draft and CFOOs updated for Canadian Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Apr 92</td>
<td>FMC assumes responsibility of NRHQ's regional ops. NRHQ becomes LFNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Sep 92</td>
<td>FMC assumes responsibility for all Regional operations</td>
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Doc. 48: Brief for Director Reserves, “Command, Control and Organization of the Canadian Rangers,” 6 November 1993

Prepared by: D Res 3-2-2 1901-260/4 (D RES 3-2-2)
Advice from: D Res 2-2 6 Nov 93

BRIEF FOR D RES

COMMAND, CONTROL AND ORGANIZATION
OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS (1947 - 1993)

AIM

1. To provide information on the evolution of the Canadian Rangers command, control and organization, from their inception to the present day and to highlight strengths and deficiencies leading up to proposed corrective measures.

BACKGROUND

2. The Canadian Rangers are a component of the Reserves whose role is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the CF. Rangers are volunteers who hold themselves in readiness for service, but who are not required to undergo annual training. The Canadian Rangers normally function as individuals, performing their tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations.

3. Ranger units are organized into companies and platoons, or patrols identified by the name of their local community. The DCDS exercises control over the Canadian Rangers, with DGRC as the responsible office within NDHQ, except that the Commander LFC and the Commander CFNA exercise operational and administrative control over the Canadian Rangers assigned.

4. Order In Council PC 1644 of 23 May 1947, authorized the formation of the Canadian Rangers as a part of the Reserve Militia of the Canadian Army, with a strength not to exceed 5,000. The concept of the organization whereby reservists would be established in small groups was evolved from the war-time Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, which had been disbanded in 1945. By 1952, the Rangers had individuals from Nfld to BC and throughout both territories. After unification, the Canadian Rangers left “Army” control when they were transferred from FMC to MARCOM (Atlantic and Pacific coasts) and NRHQ (Arctic) in 1971 as part of the DND reorganization of regional operations. From 1971 to 1978 the Rangers on the west coast withered on the vine due to neglect. They were ultimately deemed to be non effective by Commander MARCOM and reduced
to nil strength in 1978. This may be considered to be the low point of the Rangers’ existence. Their resurgence in recent years is discussed below by geographic (and command) area.

5. The 1987 Defence White Paper stated that “the Canadian Rangers will be expanded ...” and “its significance as a surveillance force and a highly visible expression of Canadian sovereignty in the North requires its expansion ...”. The White Paper also stated that LFC would assume regional responsibilities, including Rangers.

6. The D Comd of LFC attended a coord conference in Apr 91 on the transfer of regional operations from MARCOM to LFC where it was agreed that transfer of responsibilities for Rangers would take place as of APS 92. In Jun 92 LFC confirmed that the transfer of Canadian Rangers would take place as of Sep 92 with LFAA HQ taking over responsibility for Rangers located in Nfld and Labrador, and LFWA HQ assuming responsibility for Pacific Region Rangers.

CANADIAN RANGERS IN THE NORTH

7. The Canadian Rangers in the North, are well supported by CFNA. They enjoyed a period of modest growth during the 70s and 80s. Post 1987 White Paper [initiatives] have seen the Canadian Rangers expand in the Yukon, NWT and Saskatchewan. NRHQ developed plans to expand from 52 to 66 patrols, (3-4 per year) and that the size of each patrol would increase to 25 by 1995. As of 1 Sep 93 there were 1168 Rangers in 55 patrols in NRHQ,

CANADIAN RANGERS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

8. As a direct result of the 1987 White Paper, the Commander MARCOM proposed in 1988 and again in Jun 90 (which had been jointly worked out with NDHQ staff), to reintroduce 1000 Rangers in BC (a number that was comparable to the establishments in Atlantic and Northern Regions). DCDS gave his approval in Sept 90 and as of 1 Sep 93, there are 648 Rangers in 37 patrols in BC.

CANADIAN RANGERS IN CENTRAL CANADA

9. In Jun 91, as a result of discussions with the Ranger desk officer at D Res, LFCA HQ began the staff process to bring the Canadian Rangers into LFCA. Their plan was presented at the LFC in Sep 93 where it was turned down as being too ambitious. It is understood that a modest trial may be [authorized] by the Commander LFC.
CANADIAN RANGERS IN QUEBEC

10. It was decided at the Jul 92 Ranger WG that the transfer of responsibility for Rangers in Que, would occur over a two year period. CFNA and LFAA would remain responsible for LFQA Rangers during the interim. It was subsequently decided that as of Sep 93, LFQA would assume operational control of the 345 Rangers, organized into 12 Ranger patrols within the Province of Quebec, from CFNA (262 Rangers) and LFAA (83 Rangers) and have [administrative] control of the CFNA patrol in the Belcher Island, NWT.

CANADIAN RANGERS IN ATLANTIC CANADA

11. Since their establishment in 1947, Rangers in Atlantic Canada experienced a significant and long standing degree of success. In the spring of 1991, when the Rangers on the West coast were just beginning their expansion, Atlantic Region had close to 1000 Rangers in 10 coys/31 pls. As of 1 Sep 93, there are still approximately 1000 Rangers due to LFQA assuming control of 3 (North Shore) Company on the Lower North Shore of Quebec.

DISCUSSION

12. Canadian Rangers work well through co-operation of all concerned because they are a low-profile organization that is relatively cheap to operate. This spirit of co-operation has however, led to informal arrangements that are hard to justify when questioned by those who are responsible for the assignment of resources (given the period of fiscal restraint we currently are in). For example, patrols are being organized in BC and their physical placement is based solely upon community support and not in response to any operational requirement. Further, staff officers at LFC HQ have recently asked via telephone, for clarification as to where the direction to expand the Canadian Rangers can be found.

13. Investigation of the various files and documents has not revealed whether approval was ever given by senior management on the expansion of Rangers outside of the Pacific Region as the following paragraphs will show.

14. The expansion of the Rangers began as a result of statements contained in the 1987 White Paper which were acted upon by the Commander MARCOM in 1988, to re-establish Rangers in BC. As a result of this proposal and in light of the 1987 White Paper, DGRC conducted a study in the form of a “Military Paper On The Future of Canadian Rangers” in 1989 (Flag A). The paper which was circulated for comment, recommended that the Canadian Rangers be expanded on a nation-wide basis. Most comments received were favourable, however A/COPFD (now D Force S) did not support the recommendations. Specifically he did not support expansion into southern areas, but did accept
expansion into sparsely populated areas of the BC coast. His comments cited uncertainties of the DND budget cuts and the outcome of the force structure reviews. (Flag B).

15. In light of COPFD’s objections, Comd MARCOM resubmitted his proposal for a slightly less ambitious expansion (1,000 vs 1,300) (Flag C), to which COPFD agreed (Flag D). In early Jun the CDS visited NRHQ where he expressed his support for expansion of the Canadian Rangers program and directed Comd NRHQ to submit a plan for expansion to NDHQ for approval. The Comd NRHQ states in his letter to the DCDS that he is going “to proceed aggressively in areas agreed to by the CDS.” (Flag E). The plan calls for an expansion of 2 to 3 patrols per year from 44 to 50 and from 935 to 1250 Rangers in 90/91. COPFD states in his recommendation to DCDS on the MARCOM proposal, that although there are plans to expand in the North and in Atlantic, there is no clear direction on the increase/future of the Rangers (Flag F). Specifically he states that “Except for the MARCOM request to re-establish the West Coast Rangers, there is no other major expansion planned.” (Flag G). It would appear that the DCDS gave his approval only to MARCOM’s proposal on the minute sheet attached to COPFD’s comments (Flag H). It is not clear at this point whether the DCDS knew of Comd NRHQ’s proposal and was in fact giving his approval to both. D Res followed the DCDS’s approval by issuing a message in October to MARCOM with information copies to Atlantic Region HQ, FMC HQ and NRHQ, stating that DCDS approval had been given and to proceed (Flag I). Here-in lies the problem; COPFD clearly supported Comd MARCOM’s proposal while shooting down expansion into southern areas without specifically giving or with-holding approval to NRHQ’s proposal.

16. In Jun 91 the Ranger desk officer provided advice to LFCA HQ on the procedures to establish Canadian Rangers in LFCA (Flag J). This is in direct contrast to COPFD’s rejection of expansion of the Canadian Rangers into southern areas the previous year. In Aug 91 DGRRC directed that D Res develop a proposal on the long term development of the Canadian Rangers. The study went through four drafts up to Aug 92 without ever receiving final approval. The study recommended that the Rangers expand to 5000 (the maximum figure allowed by the Order In Council 11644 of 23 May 1947, that established the Canadian Rangers and set their maximum size at 5,000) and be allowed to expand into the northern areas of the three prairie provinces, Northern Ontario and additional areas of Quebec. It is clear from these recommendations, that approval had yet to be given for expansion into areas outside of BC and NRHQ, and it is implied that NRHQ had previously received approval for their
expansion plans, as confirmed by DGRC's approved in principle the CFNA and LFWA expansion plans at the 1992 Ranger WG (Flag K).

CONCLUSION

17. The following points need to be resolved:

a. did the CDS/DCDS approve of Comd CFNA plan for expansion of the Canadian Rangers? If so where is the documentation? and if not then we must seek to have the situation legitimized;

b. what size should the Canadian Rangers be in each Region given the Order In Council of 1947 ceiling of 5,000?;

c. there is no authority to expand into “southern areas”. In fact COPFD's comments and the DCDS minute (Sep 1990) preclude expansion into other areas. Therefore LFCA's initiative is unsupportable, as would be expansion into the prairie provinces and Quebec, outside of areas previously controlled by CFNA;

d. since the 1987 White Paper introduced the concept of increased roles and responsibilities for the Canadian Rangers, several studies have been undertaken to give long term direction to the Canadian Rangers program. To date, there hasn’t been an approved strategic plan issued for the Canadian Rangers. Since there is no NDHQ policy statement with sufficient detail for CFNA and LFC to be able to plan and execute future development, the current situation will exacerbate until a conflict arises as to the employment of [diminishing] resources. For example, given the current environment of fiscal restraint and LFC’s attempt to re-direct Reserve pay to fund Regular positions, competition may arise as to allocation of Reserve pay or equipment away from Rangers to Reserve units; and

e. in accordance with the direction received from the VCDS to transfer DGRC responsibilities for Rangers, it will be necessary to resolve the ultimate NDHQ vs CHQ responsibilities.

List of Flags:

Flag B. 3120-55 (A/COPFD) Future of The Canadian Rangers 10 July 89
Flag D. Minute Sheet COPFD Sep 90
Flag E. NR 3000-22 (COMD) CDS Staff V - Nother Region Rangers Action Summary 27 July 1990

Flag F. 3120-55-5 (COPFD) Canadian Rangers - Pacific Coast 10 Sep 90

Flag G. 3120-55-5 (COPFD) Canadian Rangers - Pacific Coast 10 Sep 90

Flag H. Minute Sheet DCDS 13 Sep 90

Flag I. D RES 1580 021740z OCT 90 Canadian Rangers Pacific Coast


Doc. 49: Canadian Forces Organization Order 1.7: Canadian Rangers, 15 September 1994

1901-260/4 (DGFD)
15 SEPTEMBER 1994

CANADIAN FORCES
ORGANIZATION ORDER 1.7

CANADIAN RANGERS

INFORMATION

1. This order supersedes CFOO 1.7 dated 1 July 1988. This CFOO provides additional organization and command and control information to that contained in CFAO 2.8 and should be read in conjunction with that CFAO.

2. Members of the Canadian Rangers (Can Rang) are residents of sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada who volunteer to hold themselves in readiness for service but who are not required to undergo annual training. The Can Rang normally function as individuals performing their tasks in conjunction with their civilian occupations.

INTENTION

3. The intention of this order is to state the organizational status of the Canadian Rangers. This document is not intended for use as an authority for other than organizational purposes.

EXECUTION

4. The Can Rang are organized in accordance with Volume 1, Article 2.034 of the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces and are comprised of elements titled companies, platoons, sections or patrols. These elements are assigned to Land Force Command (LFC) and Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA) on a geographical basis.

5. Those Can Rang elements assigned to LFC are organized as companies, platoons and sections as detailed at Annex A. Those Can Rang assigned to CFNA are organized as patrols identified by name and their local community as detailed at Annex B.

Effective Date

6. This order is effective on the date of issue.
Role

7. The role of the Can Rang is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces.

Command and Control

8. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) exercises control over the Rangers except that the Commander LFC and the Commander CFNA exercise operational control and administrative control over the elements assigned. All LFC Rangers are under command of an appropriate Land Force Area (ie. LFWA, LFCA, LFQA, and LFAA).

9. The Director General Reserves and Cadets/Director Reserves is the responsible office within NDHQ for Canadian Ranger matters.

10. For the Ranger elements assigned to Commander LFC the Company Commander will normally be appointed as a captain and a platoon commander will normally be appointed as a lieutenant. Platoons may, if required, be divided into sections commanded by a sergeant.

11. Command by members of the Rangers will be exercised in accordance with QR&O 3.295.

12. The member commanding a company, platoon or patrol is the officer-in-charge. In accordance with QR&O 102.01 he is only subject to the code of service discipline when called out on continuous full-time service or when placed on active service. He does not have powers of arrest in accordance with QR&O 105.06 and he does not have powers of punishment in accordance with QR&O 108.27.

13. The member commanding a company, platoon or patrol is responsible to the Commander LFC or the Commander CFNA, as applicable, for the effective and efficient operation of his element. All disciplinary matters will be referred to these appropriate commanders. LFC will place all Can Rang assets under Command of an appropriate LFC area.

14. A Ranger Liaison Officer (RLO) is established within each of the four LFC areas and CFNA to provide liaison on Rangers activities on behalf of the applicable commanders.
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Establishment

15. The establishment of the Canadian Rangers shall be determined, issued and controlled by NDHQ through the Commander LFC or Commander CFNA as applicable.

Support Services

16. Support services will be arranged by each LFC area commanders or Commander CFNA as applicable.

Communication

17. Channels of communication shall follow the channels of command and control, except that on provision of support services to the Rangers, the four LFC area commanders and the Commander CFNA may communicate directly with any base, station or unit of the CF from which support services are required.

Address


   L.C. Campbell
   Brigadier-General
   Director General Force Development
   for Chief of the Defence Staff

Annexes

Annex A - Canadian Rangers elements assigned to Land Force Command

Annex B - Canadian Rangers elements assigned to Canadian Forces Northern Region

DISTRIBUTION LIST

1901-260/4 (DGRC)

30 May 1995

CANADIAN RANGERS ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

Refs: A. 1901/260-4 (DGRC) 30 Jan 95
    C. VCDS 017 172230Z Feb 95
    D. 1901/260-4 (DGRC) dated 16 Feb 95
    E. HQ CFNA 5323-2 (G3 R&C) dated 15 February 1995
    F. QG CFT 1180-1 (G3) dated 17 fevrier 1995

BACKGROUND

1. The 1994 White Paper on Defence directed that the ability of the Canadian Rangers to conduct arctic and coastal land patrols be enhanced. While this initiative had not been sought by the CF, mainly because of the new strategic outlook, it has the merit of allowing some current deficiencies to be addressed and an opportunity for expansion into some communities where the Rangers can make a significant contribution to the social fabric.

2. Refs A and B initiated the planning. At Ref C, VCDS approved the thrust of the planning for a limited enhancement of existing capabilities and issued additional directions to address other areas of concern. As a result, DGRC will review the command and control arrangements of the program and LFC will conduct a study of the Canadian Rangers program south of 60 degrees North IAW Ref D. While these issues are not part of the enhancement project, they will be a factor in its elaboration.

3. Refs E and F are HQ LFC and HQ CFNA submissions for the enhancement project.

AIM

4. The aim of this memo is to seek approval for a project-to enhance the capability of the Canadian Rangers to arctic and coastal land patrols as directed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence.

SCOPE

5. The role and tasks of the Canadian Rangers have been confirmed and are as stated at Annex A. Underlying these is the essential requirement to exercise sovereignty over Canadian territory. In all areas except the Arctic, this legal
requirement is met by other means. VCDS has therefore directed a limit to the scope of the enhancement program to CFNA’s area and generally north of 60 degrees North.

6. While the new strategic environment does not by itself promote an expansion in the number of patrols, a modest increase in their number into communities where their presence would be a significant boost to the social fabric and where there are the most significant gaps between patrols is considered a sound national investment. The scope of the proposed expansion is therefore limited to those communities that can and wish to support a Ranger patrol and where their presence would be most beneficial:

OPTIONS

7. The staff discussed a number of ways of enhancing the capabilities of Ranger patrols North of 60° N:
   a. Status Quo. Status quo was rejected out of hand because it did not address the direction contained in the White Paper on Defence;
   b. Additional Air Patrol. This option was not pursued as Arcturus missions are expensive ($9083 / flying hour), ephemeral and would therefore not meet the intent of the direction in the White Paper. It would entail the provision of sophisticated radio equipment and require extensive training in joint operations;
   c. Increase Naval Presence. This option was not pursued since we do not have an ice capability and therefore would not be able to sustain operations in the Arctic for most of the year. This option also called for communications equipment and extensive training in joint operations; and
   d. Increasing the Capability of Land Patrols. This option was retained as the only one which would provide the flexibility required (in terms of numbers, sophistication and cost). It would provide a permanent and visual presence. It would be relatively easy to implement and it would provide social benefits. It also achieves the objectives of the 1994 White Paper on Defence.

8. The preferred option was further developed into a combination of an increase in the number of patrols, an improvement in the communication and navigation capabilities, and an improvement in the uniform provided was decided early on to avoid equipment which would: generate high capital costs, followed by equally high training and maintenance costs (such as long range skidoos or BV206). This approach also enhances the Rangers capability to assist with SAR operations.
DISCUSSION

9. Environment. The extremely large area of operations of the Rangers, the extremely low density of population, and limited mobility combine to produce significant gaps in coverage even if a Ranger patrol was deployed in every single Arctic community. Fiscal and practical realities have always limited the Rangers coverage to the immediate area around the main communities leaving ample room for expansion as new communities were formed or established communities grew in size. A limited expansion will therefore only reduce the distance between areas where patrols are available still leaving ample room for any future expansion required by a changed strategic environment.

10. Patrol Coverage. Rangers conduct their business during the normal course of their activities in and around their communities. It is not practical or even possible to consider a complete ground coverage. However, their presence in and around the communities is where they are the most needed and patrols can be deployed elsewhere to assist other ground assets in operating in and coping with the environment. As volunteers, there are significant benefits in having a larger number of patrols available in more areas to increase their availability for such employment. However, experience has shown that it is fiscally prudent to expand only into those communities that have the certain demographic potential to sustain a patrol. In the CFNA area, there are only nine such communities and expansion into those would assist in reducing the absence of patrols in suitably populated areas of the Arctic.

11. The Rangers. Rangers only receive the minimum training required to perform their tasks. They have many peculiarities which make them very different from the rest of the CF. Patrols generally work by consensus, the chain of command is often unclear and the leader may change with the nature of the task. As every activity is considered a common task. Individual testing is not always indicative of the performance of the patrol as it responds better to group efforts and simple straightforward missions. While this does not make them ineffective in performing their traditional Ranger tasks, it does indicate that a significant amount of training would be required to enable patrols to coordinate their action with sophisticated assets. Providing this level of training would be cost prohibitive and it is considered more efficient to continue limiting the Rangers to assisting other CF members in the conduct of operations more sophisticated than basic observation, reconnaissance and reporting.

12. Principal Deficiencies. Apart from the inherent inability to provide ground coverage in areas other than the immediate vicinity of the larger communities, the
Ranger program suffers from three basic deficiencies which should be addressed as the first part of any enhancement:

a. Rangers, even equipped with maps, have difficulty in accurately reporting locations in a mode understandable to others. Equipping patrols with GPS receivers would address this concern;

b. Rangers observing a reportable event have no way of reporting it until they return to a location where communications are available. This may result in days or weeks delays in reporting. To address this deficiency, Ranger patrols tasked to visit the NWS sites are equipped with a HF radio. While this caters to planned tasks, each patrol should be equipped with the means to communicate back to their home base and with their HQ. To that end, each patrol requires two HF radio sets. The type used by the patrols visiting the NWS sites has proven to be adequate to the task; and

c. Recognition as a member of a Ranger patrol is extremely important to the morale of the Rangers and their standing in their community. As well, they should be identifiable as Rangers for training and operations. Equipping them with accoutrements suitable for summer and winter wear is considered appropriate, essential, and cost effective against the alternative of equipping them with standard issue combat uniforms.

ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

13. **General outline.** The most effective and affordable enhancement of the program would be to establish new patrols in selected communities and to provide Rangers with appropriate identifying pieces of accoutrement as well as with the means to accurately identify locations and to communicate. The following improvements are therefore proposed to enhance the ability of the Canadian Rangers to conduct arctic and coastal land patrols:

a. **Patrols.** An increase of up to nine additional patrols in CFNA and of two patrols on the shores of Hudson’s Bay in the LFC area. The target communities are listed at Annex B. To absorb the increased workload, CFNA has a requirement for two additional instructors (sergeants - Combat Arms) and one administration clerk (corporal);

b. **Equipment.** Each patrol located north of 60°N is to be issued with two HF radios and one GPS receiver;

c. **Uniforms.** Identifying accoutrements consisting of a Ranger sweatshirt, a Ranger T-shirt, a Ranger sleeveless vest and a Ranger tuque are to be issued to all Rangers in addition to the baseball cap and brassard presently on the scale of issue. Justification for this enhancement is at Annex C;
d. **Air Support.** A total of 450 extra Twin Otter flying hours (over four years) will need to be identified from within the CC138 YFR to service the additional patrols. At end state an additional 150 flying hours per year will be required; and

e. **Sovereignty Patrols.** Current deficiencies have prevented Rangers from conducting sovereignty patrols and therefore their capability is weak. The conduct of a limited number of patrols would exercise their military capability as well as enhance their profile in Northern communities. The incremental costs of such patrols are detailed at Annex D.

14. **Schedule.** The enhancement plan is to be implemented beginning FY 95/96 and completed in FY 98/99.

**COSTS**

15. The baseline funding levels for LFC and CFNA have been established at $2.5 M and $1.8 M respectively for FY 95/96. For FY 99/00 steady state base funding levels will be approximately $2.6 M and $2.5 M plus inflation respectively for LFC and CFNA. In addition, the enhancement project will require incremental funding for P,O&M and capital as described at Annex D over the next five years. The components of the program would generate additional costs as follows:

a. **Personnel.** There are three new military PYs required (two additional instructors (sergeants - Combat Arms) and one administration clerk (corporal)). In addition there is an increase in Reserve Pay amounting to $129K ($99/00 CY) for the new Ranger Patrols;

b. **O&M.** The incremental recurring O&M costs associated with this project are $520K (BY 00/01 $); and

c. **Capital procurement.** $1,278 k as a one time expenditure in FY 95/96 to procure the required equipment.

Note: The decision requested regarding the increase to the P,O&M Vote 1 baseline includes the increase in the Reserve Pay noted in (a) plus the increase in the O&M noted in b.

**CONCLUSION**

16. The proposed enhancement program is low risk, cost effective and represents a tangible improvement that will meet the letter and spirit of the directions contained in the White Paper. It will significantly improve the Canadian Rangers’ ability to observe and to report quickly and accurately while remaining within a reasonable funding envelope. Their capability to assist SAR missions will be enhanced.
J.G.P. Leblanc
Colonel
Director General Reserves and Cadets
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Annexes
Annex A  Canadian Rangers Role and Tasks
Annex B  Target Communities
Annex C  Enhancement of Canadian Forces Equipment Scale D13-105;

Annex A
1901/260-4 (DGRC)
30 May 95

CANADIAN RANGERS ROLE AND TASKS

ROLE
1. The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces.

TASKS
2. Tasks:
   a. provide a military presence in support of sovereignty:
      (1) report unusual activities,
      (2) collect local data of significance to the support of military operations,
      (3) conduct surveillance/sovereignty patrols as tasked.
   b. within capabilities, assist CF activities in area including:
      (1) providing local expertise in terms of guides and advice,
      (2) conducting NWS site patrols as tasked, and
      (3) providing local assistance and advice to SAR activities.

NOTES
1. Unusual activities refer to new events that are out of character with the routine of the area. Some examples would be the sighting of an unusual ship, unknown low flying transport airplanes etc...
2. Data of military significance refers for example to the availability of local assets a military commander would likely require to conduct operations.

3. Local advice and assistance to SAR activities does not refer to the ability to conduct SAR activities but rather to that level of general assistance and advice a local expert can reasonably be expected to offer to CF SAR teams.

Annex B
1901-260/4
30 May 95

NEW RANGER PATROLS COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Prov/Terr</th>
<th>Target year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFNA</td>
<td>Colville Lake</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>96/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luts'ke</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>96/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Liard</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>96/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Good Hope</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>97/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Norman</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>97/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wrigley</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>97/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Providence</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>98/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norman Wells</td>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>98/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burwash/Destruction Bay</td>
<td>YT</td>
<td>98/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>Umiujaq</td>
<td>Qc</td>
<td>95/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuujjuarapik</td>
<td>Qc</td>
<td>95/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex C
1901-260/4 (DGRC)
30 May 95

CANADIAN RANGERS ENHANCEMENT PROJECT
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT TO
CANADIAN FORCES SCALE No D13-105

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description (common title)</th>
<th>Present Quantity</th>
<th>Scale Remarks</th>
<th>DCRG Direction</th>
<th>Proposed Enhanced Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Sling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Cover</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pullthrough Mk 4B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pullthrough Mk 1A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description (common title)</td>
<td>Present Quantity</td>
<td>Scale Remarks</td>
<td>DCRG Direction</td>
<td>Proposed Enhanced Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle, No 4 (.303)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compass C6</td>
<td></td>
<td>“MARCOM” Rangers hold 227</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be replaced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Ranger Red Baseball Cap</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parka, Snow Camouflage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, Snow Camouflage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, Extreme Cold Weather</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parka, Extreme Cold Weather</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balaclava</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverall, Anti-exposure, SAR Orange</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>for “Ranger Section NRHQ” only</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirt, Cold Weather</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood, Extreme Cold Weather</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armlet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Ranger Brassard</td>
<td>A/R</td>
<td>“to be demanded and distributed by the Ranger Liaison Officer”</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Metal Rank Insignia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Per Sergeant</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Corporal Metal Rank Insignia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Per Master Corporal</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Slip On “Cdn Rang”</td>
<td>1 (pair)</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1 (pair)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine Pouch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description (common title)</td>
<td>Present Quantity</td>
<td>Scale Remarks</td>
<td>DCRG Direction</td>
<td>Proposed Enhanced Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Belt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>only for operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF Transceiver</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>quantity to be 2 per Ranger patrol North of 60°, plus 10% of area allocation to CFNA HQ and QG SQFT to act as spares for unserviceable equipment and unforeseen operational requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>quantity to be 1 per Ranger patrol North of 60°, plus 10% of area allocation to CFNA HQ and QG SQFT to act as spares for unserviceable equipment and unforeseen operational requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Ranger Red Sweatshirt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>quantity to be 1 per Ranger and replaced biennially (total of 4000 required initially)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Ranger Red T-Shirt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>quantity to be 1 per Ranger and replaced biennially (total of 4000 required initially)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian Ranger Red Tuque</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>quantity to be 1 per Ranger (total of 4000 required initially)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Ranger Identification / Safety Vest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>to be issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>quantity to be 1 per Ranger (total of 4000 required initially)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: 1. Scale No D13-105 states that this equipment will only be issued in the quantities shown and at the direction of Command Headquarters. In addition, “winter environmental clothing” (those items not included in the scale such as mukluks, etc) may be held by Command for issue to personnel in emergencies and for exercises at the discretion of Commands.

2. Ammunition is authorized on the basis of 100 rounds per Ranger per annum for training and operations, and 200 rounds per Ranger per annum for annual classification (but only where the annual classification can be carried out on range facilities under Command supervision).

JUSTIFICATION

There are several proposed changes to the Ranger scale and they can be divided into three areas:

a. Enhanced economies. – DGRC has directed that a large proportion of the combat winter clothing not be issued (thus reducing replacement and maintenance costs) but rather held in stores and kept available for operations only;

b. Enhanced Ranger identification. As a military organization, the Canadian Rangers need to be identifiable. The resent reduced clothing scale of one baseball cap and brassard are not suited for all seasons. The addition of a Ranger overvest similar to those worn by road crews and a tuque would be appropriate for the winter season while a Ranger sweatshirt and T-shirt would complement the baseball cap and brassard in more clement weather. As well, these items are particularly significant to the social standing of individual members in their communities and their esprit de corps as well as to the attractiveness of the Canadian Ranger programme; and

c. Enhanced operational capability. The proposed acquisition of global positioning systems and HF transceivers for patrols located North of 60° will enable Rangers to more effectively conduct long range patrols and operate in conjunction with other CF reconnaissance assets. Specific rationale includes:

   (1) GPS – while the Canadian Rangers’ local knowledge may enable them to navigate in a different environment, their operations and effectiveness are significantly hampered by their inability to communicate and be communicated locations effectively. GPS will not only enable them to accurately report and locate locations using
latitude/longitude (as opposed to subjective landmark references) but will also enhance their ability to navigate in difficult environment (up to 80 required).

(2) **HF radios** – lack of communications significantly reduces the Canadian Rangers’ effectiveness in the timely reporting of observations. It is not unusual for extremely long delays to be introduced in their reporting because of the inaccessibility of communications. HF radios will not only alleviate this problem but will also enable Ranger patrols to maintain communications when required (up to 160 required).
Doc. 51: “Canadian Rangers Ontario – South of 60 Degrees Study,”
May 1995

1920-1 (OC Cdn Rang Ont)

May 95

Canadian Rangers Ontario – South of 60 Degrees Study

Ref  A: LFCHQ 1180-1 (G3) 1 Mar 95
    B: NDHQ 1901/260-4 (C Res & Cdts) 30 Jan 95

Overview

1. As directed at Ref A, the following is the “South of Sixty Degrees Study” for LFCA. This study includes:

   a. an assessment of the ground;
   b. an estimation of cultural factors including transportation systems;
   c. a history of the Canadian Rangers in Ontario;
   d. an appraisal of the military reasons for Rangers in Ontario;
   e. the study with recommendations for the future of the Canadian Rangers in northern Ontario, and;
   f. Annex A, Descriptive Tables, describes the status of each Patrol, current and proposed.

Ground

2. Canadian Rangers Ontario operate in the scattered First Nations communities north of 50°. This is a vast, diverse expanse equal in size to the combined land areas of France and Germany. There is 1200 km of salt water coast line, with two thirds of the area being in perma-frost. The overall climatic rating for the area is that of “Sub-Arctic”. The coastal area, the littoral, is an “Arctic” climate due to the presence of Hudson and James Bays, which allows for the constant flow of cold air from the north. The Hudson/James Bay Lowlands, muskeg in this arctic area, is the second largest swamp in the world, surpassed only by the largest in Siberia. The swamp supports the largest migratory bird habitat in North America. In the western portion to the Manitoba border, the area is characterized by the precambrian shield of rock, rivers and lakes. The temperature ranges from a winter of -55°C to highs of +25°C in the brief summer. The rivers and lakes all flow to James Bay and Hudson Bay. Transportation is primarily by air with ocean barge haul available for freight shipments in the summer months along the coasts. Ground transportation is nonexistent in the area north of 50°; except for ice roads during a brief winter period.
Cultural Factors

3. There are 20,000 native people of the Cree, Ojibway and Ojicree nations that live in this area. The non-native population is about 3000. The First Nations, formerly nomadic hunter/gatherers, are now settled into communities ranging in size from 40 to 1500. These people are an integral part of the ecosystem. The cultural patterns and geography support “east-west” rather than “north-south” links. These linkages are the culmination of historic patterns of climate, movement and social groupings. There are thirty-six First Nation settlements north of 50°, four of these settlements have year round road access. The other thirty-one villages are only accessible by air, seasonal water transportation or ice roads. The settlements, in the north-west are sited on the many lakes that form the drainage system of the Precambrian Shield. The coastal communities are located at the mouths of major river systems, usually about ten to fifteen km from the sea. Eighty-five percent of the communities have 3500 foot compacted single runway gravel air strips, which is the northern standard. The remainder have ski or float plane access only. Scheduled runs exist for the healing of freight and passengers on small, single or twin engined aircraft. Road access will not change in the foreseeable future: the costs would be staggering. In the winter months there is a six week weather dependent “cat train” season. It allows for the shipment of fuel and heavy goods on large sleighs drawn by D9 Cats. The mild winter this year cut the shipping season to three weeks.

Government Infrastructure and Social Conditions

4. Native communities north of 50° in Ontario follow very similar patterns. They all have two constables provided from the OPP or Nishnawabe-Aski Police Services (NAPS). They have a nursing station, education authority, fire facility, Band Office, a CO-OP Store, and/or a Northern Store. There is also a church or churches of single or various denominations. Medevac is done by contract aircraft through Zone Hospitals located at Sioux Lookout in the north-west and Moose Factory in the north east. The “second line” hospital is Kingston General Hospital in Kingston Ontario. Education takes place in the communities up to Grade 8. Some of the communities have schools located in the basements of houses. After Grade 8 students are sent to high schools in the south at Thunder Bay, Sioux Lookout, Cochrane, Timmins, North Bay and some are sent as far away as Barrie, Ontario. This is a carry over from the days of residential schools. The system results in family separations of up to a year. Slowly, the communities are getting water and sewage systems. The majority do not have these services. Of the seven communities that have Ranger Patrols only two have potable water. All water must be boiled or purified through hand-held filter systems. The water, sewage and poor hounding situation have contributed to the resurgence of
communicable diseases such as TB, Hepatitis B, Whooping Cough, and Diphtheria. These third world afflictions are the result of poor sanitation and squalid, damp living conditions. Substance abuse if legion, with gasoline sniffing rampant in some communities. Some families are dysfunctional due to substance abuse, residential school syndrome, cross cultural impact and the loss of traditional spiritual values and bush skills. This is coupled with a total lack of employment in the vast majority of communities. In seventy-five percent of the cases housing is grossly substandard; due to a lack of indoor plumbing, proper heating and reliable hydro service. House fires are common and generally catastrophic. The suicide rate, particularly among young natives is the highest in Canada. In spite of these factors, there are many fine native people who have wisdom, dignity and pride in who and what they are.

5. By way of comparison, Resolute Bay NWT, which also has a Ranger Patrol, has been contacted to determine the level of services available in that community. The Resolute Bay RCMP Detachment has two full time Constables, there is a nursing station to support the population of 180 Inuit people. In addition, during the summer months there is a four to six person Canadian Coast Guard Detachment that operates from Resolute Bay. The community is serviced by Canadian Airlines four days per week and by First Air two days per week. These are all jet aircraft. There is also an air cargo service that flies in on a regular schedule. Resolute also has a twenty member Ranger Patrol. This level of service and capability is equal to or surpasses all of the communities in Ontario north of 50° as shown at Annex A. There are no Canadian Coast Guard assets on the west coast of Hudson or James Bay in Ontario. Aircraft service is of a lesser capability and frequency. The medical services and evac system is comparable to that of Ontario. Resolute Bay’s housing and social infrastructure will be similar or superior to northern Ontario. The table at Annex B lays out the federal, provincial and First Nations agencies available in northern Ontario.

Observations

6. The purpose of this preamble is to “christen” the ground in northern Ontario. The intention is to develop an awareness about the region and to dispel false perceptions. Finally, there is concern over the determination of the cut off line of sixty degrees in the study directive. The realities of Ontario geography are such that 60° does not acknowledge the facts of the northern Boreal forest regions of northern Ontario as set out above. In addition, the 60° line does not recognize the particular transportation, cultural and social factors of the Canadian “middle north” in Ontario. This is highlighted by the comparison of service levels available to the communities of northern Ontario and a similar community in the high arctic.
Canadian Rangers Ontario – History

7. a. Ranger History: The Ranger project started at LFCA in 1990. Further incentive to proceed was based on the experiences gained at Akwasasne during the summer of that same year. In Nov 93, funds in the amount of 130 thousand dollars were provided to set up two Patrols and a small headquarters at CFB Borden. This was based on: The Canadian Rangers: A Proposal and Plan for LFCA. The key considerations in the Proposal were:

b. the improvement of relations with native Canadians in northern [O]ntario,

c. fulfilling the responsibility of Commander LFCA to provide military coverage to all of Ontario and therefore LFCA,

d. be able to assist Regular and Reserve force training activities in northern Ontario,

e. provide a military presence in the remote and isolated portions of northern Ontario in peace time; and in war time assist in the prevention of sabotage and incursions,

f. meet the provisions of the Defence White Paper,

g. provide a low cost training and emergency response capability in northern Ontario in conjunction with First Nations, and

h. a five year Business Plan and Cash Flow Projection,

8. The Rangers were formed under UIC 4866 on 3 Nov 93 at CFB Borden. Ranger strength is now at 150 personnel. The Rangers are active within their communities and have performed a variety of voluntary tasks ranging from guides, preservation of property, crowd management, first aid training, geographic intelligence gathering, flood evacuations, three military funerals for veterans, five GSAR activities resulting in the rescue of five people, first aid assistance and security at Pow Wows and community events. Rangers have also been involved in gruesome tasks such as four drowning victim recovery operations and the removal of three bodies from fires. One was an arson resulting in a murder charge and the other was a house fire in Mar 95 [where] the Rangers recovered the remains of two children killed at Weenusk First Nation in Peawanuck. The mother of one of the children is a Ranger. …

Canadian Rangers Role and Tasks – General

9. At ref B the role of the Canadian Rangers is specified. CFOO 1.7 has been reaffirmed in ref B. As well there are Roles and Tasks laid down in Annex A to ref B that further amplify the CFOO. The aim, that has been approved by
Commander LFCA for Canadian Rangers Ontario, fully supports and encompasses the role laid down in CFOO 1.7 and ref B. The aim states:

“The Canadian Rangers Ontario will establish and maintain an operational military presence in the remote, coastal and inland portions of northern Ontario, primarily north of 50°. This specialized reserve force will provide the Canadian Forces with territorial surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning capabilities in the north. On order in peace or war, the Canadian Rangers will assist First Nations governments and other federal, provincial and municipal agencies.”

10. The emphasis that Canadian Rangers Ontario have taken is that of preparing Rangers in the roles of guides, instructors; and generating the specific local knowledge that can be of assistance to the CF and in turn their communities. The mandate for air and sea SAR is federal. Ground search is a provincial responsibility. First Nations communities fall between the cracks and are sadly deficient in this area. The key subject in Ranger training is navigation and the ability to move about on the land and water with knowledge and competence. This meets both the military requirement for guides and advisors as well as helping with the very real problems of ground SAR. This capability meets the specific requirement for SAR advice to CF SAR personnel. All LFCA Ranger Patrols are logged with RCC Trenton for operational employment in the event of SAR missions in the Patrols area of influence.

11. One of the major difficulties in northern Ontario is a lack of map coverage. The principle [sic] maps are 1:250,000 scale and are all out of date. The 1:50,000 coverage is monochrome or photo map, again, out of date and inaccurate. With the aid of GPS, SAR personnel and other agencies can be given correct, accurate information and advice thus saving time and hopefully lives. Examples of this mapping support function range from flood evacuation assistance, route recce, and helping instruct “southern” soldiers in bush survival skills.

**Military Tasks**

12. Concern has been expressed that Rangers do not fulfil military tasks. The argument is made that as Rangers only receive eight to twelve days of training per year they are ineffective to carry out tactical missions. LFC has established that Warrior training is required for all Regular and Primary Reserve personnel to make them combat ready to a minimum standard. For any force in Canada to be combat capable will take additional training and resources. The same applies to the Rangers. It takes four months of workup training to deploy a regular force Battle Group on peace keeping operations. The same consideration must be given to Rangers anywhere in Canada in the event that they are placed on active service by an Order in Council. Canadian Rangers Ontario also put meaning to the
Land Force Area concept that was previously focused exclusively on south-central Ontario. Commander LFCA has responsibilities in the north as follows:

   a. Domestic Operations,
   b. Provision of Services to Non Defence Agencies,
   c. CF Assistance Ops – DNDP 55
   d. Aid to the Civil Power – Peace and War, and
   e. SAR tasks within boundaries

The same tasks are applicable in northern Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta for SQFT ... and LFWA respectively. Finally, in planning for a MAJAID, the Canadian Rangers can provide very real assistance to the DND and other agencies that would be involved post crash. A minor crash in the south is a major catastrophe in the north due to time and space considerations coupled with severe facility, man power and resource limitations. Rangers can make a significant difference and put substance to these plans and commitments.

Sovereignty Assertion

13. The matter of sovereignty is a concern for all Canadians, whether they live in Toronto, Fort Severn or Resolute Bay. The political realities of the north are that First Nations are rapidly gaining autonomy under the devolution to self government. The principle political structure is based on the Treaty Nine native communities who are now called the Nishnawabe-Aski Nation or NAN. NAN is ostensibly Ontario north of the 50th parallel. Last year NAN assumed policing duties on James and Hudson Bay coasts and will expand to the entire area by 1997. NAN is assuming forest fire responsibilities as of this summer. The devolution process is moving quickly into schooling, child welfare and a variety of other areas. If the DND wishes to train or operate in the north in the future the time to establish links to NAN is now. The Ranger presence is being recognized and we are gaining in credibility. The consequences of withdrawal at this time would be a loss of credibility for the CF, a loss of access in the future, a lack of presence, increased costs for assistance operations, SAR, MAJAD, and the social consequences. The essence of cessation would be “bridge burning” rather than “bridge building” to [an] alienated portion of Canadian society.

14. With the moves towards self government amongst First Nations and the practical steps in that direction, training and operating in northern Ontario may become very sensitive in the coming years. Sovereignty issues may well arise from internal rather than external sources. Land claim problems and land use negotiations are rapidly becoming contentious particularly in the resource areas related to hydro, timber and mineral exploitation. By establishing the Ranger presence we demonstrate good faith, we take a dynamic, contributory interest in
the affairs of the north and we are pro-active in our approach. Native people are extremely patient and they take a long term view in their dealings. Trust is a highly regarded commodity and gone are the days when First Nations can be shouldered aside. That is why we need to be in the north now, so that we can go there in twenty or thirty years and not be strangers in our own land.

**Media Relations**

15. Our media relations are good. We have a positive image in the north and we are active in informing the media of our training and operations. The Ranger staff is pro-active in its media relations and fosters good working relationships. There is a well developed norther media list that is contacted regularly. We have had national coverage in the Globe and Mail on two occasions. The collateral benefits of this coverage has been quite extensive and all positive. We have had TV and radio interviews and coverage as well from a variety of sources in the north and nationally. All of our great press coverage has been favourable and supportive.

**Training Considerations**

16. The fact that there is a Ranger Patrol in a community can be a great asset. Rangers generate a pride of place similar to that of militia units in southern communities. This is not to imply that Rangers are the Militia, there is no move in LFCA to create militia units in the north from Ranger Patrols. Exercise Bold Eagle at Dundurn, Sask is a native training innovation that recruits young native people and trains them to Militia Infantry TQ3 standards. They then return to their reserves in northern Sask. How is this training utilized in the CF or the parent community? If the TQ3 training was “Rangerized” and a community had a Ranger Patrol then there would be value in Bold Eagle for all concerned, producing a positive training loop. Which is what Rangers in Ontario are trying to do. The Rangers become a vehicle to strengthen the links between First Nation and the rest of Canada or, nation building. Rangers become a non-intrusive link to main stream Canadian society that fosters and preserves native values. The CF has a poor record in the recruiting and the retention of native people. The Ranger programme in Ontario goes to First Nations and allows native people to serve Canada and their community at the same time. It is the best of both worlds, providing LFCA and the CF with local knowledge and coverage and at the same time empowering communities to be more self reliant, all at a very low cost. There has been the criticism that Rangers are “a group of adults seeking a bit of adventure”, this is correct and accurate. The same statement may be applied to the Primary Reserve and the Regular Force. If it were not the case, then no one would join any component of the forces.
Training Initiatives

17. As a result of a fire at Peawanuck on Hudson Bay, the Chief and Patrol Leader has asked for CF assistance in the provision of fire training in the community. This request was passed to the Muskegowuk Tribal Council at Moose Factory who are now advancing a consolidated request for fire training from the CF at all six of their communities. OC Rangers has met with the Commandant CFFA at CFB Borden who is actively marketing CFFA to outside agencies and governments for fire training. The function of Rangers in this is to provide the administrative vehicle for the programme and to deliver the very crucial cross cultural interface to allow the training to succeed. The response of the First Nations has been very strong. In May 95, there will be a formal visit to CFFA by the executive of the Mushkegowuk Tribal Council and representatives Ontario Native Fire Fighters Society. The aim being to establish a pilot training project to start in September 95. This programme will be on a full cost recovery basis.

18. As discussed earlier, there is great concern for native youth in northern Ontario. Many communities have expressed interest in a Cadet Corps as a platform for youth training. Cadets in the north have not worked in the past and there is a consistent history of failure. Cadets are costly in terms of equipment, personal kit and in maintaining adequate leaders to sustain the programme. CFNA is testing a Junior Ranger Programme in communities that have existing Ranger Patrols. This concept has an excellent chance of success in northern Ontario. An approach was made to the Duke of Edinbughs Award Scheme (Young Canadian Challenge) with the thought that this might be an adequate vehicle for youth training in conjunction with Rangers. On investigation it proved not suitable for native youth in the north, as it is not sensitive to native culture and values. LFCA will follow the progress of CFNA and assess the feasibility of introducing such a programme in Ontario in the future.

19. One of the significant training activities directly related to Rangers and the CF is the development of Cross Cultural Awareness Training for LFCA. The training is of three days duration at CFB Borden and involves instructional personnel from First Nations, specific Rangers and the Rangers staff. The training is two years old and started as an internal vehicle for the Ranger Staff. It spread and involves candidates from the Regular and Reserve forces in LFCA. The programme has been refined, and promoted resulting in extensive positive media coverage at the national level. This training is particularly timely given recent events concerning Somalia.

20. Commander LFCA has tasked SSFHQ to conduct a series of company level sovereignty exercises in northern Ontario, north of 50°. The aim is to capitalize
on the presence and capability of the Ranger Patrols and save time and money. The first exercise will be in Jan-Feb 96 and are planned out for five years.

21. The Ranger staff has been asked by the Mushkegowuk Tribal Council, who represent the seven communities on James and Hudson Bay to develop a programme to assist with the chronic housing shortage at the village of Attawapiskat First Nation, [where] there is a Ranger Patrol. They have asked for assistance in the construction of houses and in learning the skills to accomplish this. Staffing and consultation is underway with the idea of bringing the Area Construction Troop to the community to participate in CE type projects and provide instruction.

22. Sandy Lake First Nation Ranger Patrol has requested the conduct of a First Aid and CPR course for themselves and other members of the community. They are also recommencing GSAR operations for three missing personas who are presumed drowned in November of 1994. The bodies have not been recovered. A Ranger staff member who is a First Aid Instructor will go to the community in May and conduct First Aid and CPR training. He will also provide GSAR training for the Ranger Patrol. The community is sharing the costs of this training. First Aid and CPR training is extremely difficult to get in the north. GSAR training is non-existent.

Summary

23. The above paragraphs are aimed at reaffirming the need for viable Canadian Ranger units in northern Ontario. The reason that this programme was targeted at First Nations communities is that they are the prime occupants of the area. We may be dealing with a different type of sovereignty issue in northern Ontario in the near future. If the CF wishes to train and operate in this region in the next century then there is a need to establish strong links now to First Nations. Some of our problems of late can be attributed to the fact that for the past forty years the CF has not been attentive to its constituency at home and focused on Europe. This has left us out of phase with our own citizens throughout the region. The Rangers are an integral part of the host communities. They generate capability and pride, coupled with the empowerment of the community to deal with a crisis with their own resources and training. The Rangers are a low cost, highly visible vehicle that fives LFCA and the CF eyes and ears in the north. The programme in Ontario is fully compliant with the roles and tasks set down in CFOO 1.7. Much has been made of the training objectives of Rangers. The CFOO lays down some requirements for purely military skills. The emphasis on this function has shifted all over Canada. Rangers are not capable of fighting and never have been. The task is: to observe, but not engage. In addition, they provide vital insights into operating in their local environments. The James Bay coast is
radically different from the Precambrian Shield area. If the CF was to operate in a foreign theatre, we would engage the services of those who had special and detailed knowledge of that area. The same approach must be used in the north. Of late, there have been two significant air crashes in northern Ontario. The first resulted in seven people being killed at Sandy Lake First Nation. The second was at Big Trout Lake, with eleven people being severely injured and the aircraft destroyed. The resources of both communities were saturated in a matter of minutes. There was no group in these villages to react other than the one on-duty police constable. Sandy Lake now has a Ranger Patrol and Big Trout Lake First Nation has asked to start discussions on the formation of a Patrol. Rangers represent an identifiable group that is readily available to the community in a time of need, and for the CF for SAR, vital point tasks, instructors, guides, recce personnel and those who represent the interests of Canada in their communities at such things as Remembrance Day, Canada Day and Canada Remembers Celebrations of VE Day. Rangers do real things, they react in a cost effective, self reliant way that is of value to all concerned. For example, on 26 April 1995, the Bearskin Lake First Nation Patrol was put on standby to assist in a GSAR for an overdue skidoo traveller. They reacted effectively and had organized fifteen Ranger searchers in a matter of minutes. They all volunteered and had the basic training and confidence to act in a responsible manner. This search ended well, saved time and money for the community and in the process validated the presence of the Canadian Rangers.

Recommendations

24. The following recommendations are presented based on this study:

   a. Canadian Rangers Ontario is a viable programme and should be retained at all current locations; and,

   b. Canadian Rangers Ontario should be expanded in fiscal year 96/97 to a strength of 300 Rangers with the start up of six new Patrols as listed at Annex A.

Annexes

Annex A: Descriptive Tables
Appendix 1: Explanatory Notes to Descriptive Tables
Appendix 2: Canadian Rangers Ontario Patrol Location Map
Annex B: Service Delivery Table
1. You will find enclosed the subject study as requested at reference.

2. Please note that the study confirms the requirement for a Canadian Ranger program south of 60° degrees. However, in order to take account of the strategic, demographic, economic and political evolution over the past few decades, LFC should adjust its Ranger deployment throughout its area of responsibility.

3. To be successful, the Ranger program must be funded appropriately for the long term. Significant re-allocation of Ranger patrols, including the disbandment of some patrols concurrent with the creation of new patrols, must stand the test of time.

4. It is requested that NDHQ approval be granted by 15 August 1995 in order to allow LFC to proceed with Phase 1 implementation.

B.M. Archibald
Brigadier-General
Chief of Staff
INTRODUCTION

1. The 1994 Defence White Paper (reference D) states that the Canadian Rangers are an important dimension of Canada's national identity and that the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols. The general guidelines for the enhancement of the Canadian Rangers North of 60° degrees latitude were published at Reference C. Although it has been indicated that funds would be available for enhancing the Ranger program as directed, the fiscal environment and the necessity to optimize the efficiency of all programs make it necessary to review the Ranger program in those regions where demography has undergone significant changes since the program's inception.

2. As part of the first step in the enhancement plan the role of the Canadian Rangers previously detailed at CFOO 1.7, has been reaffirmed at reference C as follows:

   a. **Role.** The role of the Canadian Rangers is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces.
b. **Tasks:**

a. provide a military presence in support of sovereignty:
   1. report unusual activities;
   2. collect local data of significance to the support of the military operations; and
   3. conduct surveillance/sovereignty patrols as tasked.

b. Within capabilities, assist CF activities in area including:
   1. providing local expertise in terms of guides and advice;
   2. conducting NWS site patrols as tasked; and
   3. providing local assistance and advice to SAR activities.

3. At Reference B, DGRC issued specific direction to LFC for the conduct of a study to examine the requirement for Rangers South of 60° degrees latitude. These guidelines are as follows:

   a. the role of the Canadian Rangers as stated in CFOO 1.7 and as amplified above is reaffirmed. Underlying the role of providing a military presence is the essential requirement to exercise sovereignty over Canadian territory. In all areas except the Arctic, this legal requirement is met by other means. However, in those areas South of 60° degrees the Canadian Rangers may provide other required militarily significant services which may not be otherwise available. These services should be performed in parallel with the tasks that the Rangers are required to perform in support of their role;

   b. since the Canadian Ranger program was initiated, some communities have grown and the presence of the Canadian Rangers is no longer required. Concurrently, new communities have been formed where the presence of the Canadian Rangers would be beneficial to the CF. Priority is to be given to communities that are not accessible by land. The review of the posture and organization of the Canadian Rangers must address these issues. Any relocation of patrols should be progressively implemented between the end of the Ranger study and summer 1999; and

   c. where possible and desirable, Canadian Rangers will not duplicate services that can be provided by other existing municipal, provincial and federal agencies (i.e. surveillance, reporting). However, the social benefits of the presence of Canadian Rangers will be a factor.

4. Based on these guidelines, LFCHQ issued direction to the LFAs (reference E) to conduct individual studies for their areas of responsibility. The Area studies are enclosed as Flags A to D. It will only be necessary to cross refer to them when covering the recommendations later in this paper.
5. In addition to the NDHQ guidelines, LFC conducted this study based on the premise that the present ceiling on the number of LFC Rangers will not increase, since current and future budgets are not expected to increase beyond the FY 94/95 funding level.

AIM

6. The aim of this service paper is to review the requirement for the Canadian Ranger program South of 60° degrees and to recommend any necessary update in posture, organization and strength.

DISCUSSION

7. Given that the geographic and demographic circumstances of each LF Area vary considerably, this service paper does not intend to repeat all of the information provided in the Area studies. Instead, it will highlight each Area Commander's point of view and recommendations.

8. Reference A (the DDPG 95) is being produced to implement the policy issued in the 1994 Defence White Paper. In the DDPG two of the nine mission elements specific to LFC require Canadian Rangers within LFC's area of responsibility. These mission elements are:

   a. L1 - defend Canadian territory and assist in the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty through the provision of land surveillance and combat ready forces; and

   b. L3 - provide armed and unarmed assistance to civil authorities to aid in the maintenance of public order and security, or to assist in emergency relief.

9. The above missions are performed by the Areas with resources allocated by LFC. Since there are no Regular or Reserve forces north of 50° degrees in Eastern Canada and north of 55° degrees in Western Canada, the only resource available to Area Commanders to accomplish those missions in the northern part of their areas of responsibility are the Canadian Rangers.

10. The White Paper emphasizes the vital contribution of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to the maintenance and operation of Canada's search and rescue capability. LFC's principle [sic] task is to assist local authorities in land search and rescue. In most of the isolated communities in the northern and coastal regions of our area of responsibility liaison between the Canadian Forces and the local authorities is conducted by the Canadian Rangers. In these communities the liaison provided by the Canadian Rangers is vital to ensuring rapid assistance to local authorities. Most of the time the assistance required is limited to the involvement of the Canadian Rangers themselves, and
usually in a volunteer capacity. Therefore, without the presence of the Canadian Rangers in such regions the task of assisting local authorities in search and rescue would have to be done via more expensive means.

11. The Canadian Rangers do not duplicate services that are provided by other existing municipal, provincial and federal agencies. The LFA studies recommend that most of the patrols remain at their present location, to include those communities where implementation of new patrols has been recommended. In fact, in these communities other governmental agencies are either non-existent or have very limited capabilities.

12. As far as the social benefits derived from the presence of the Canadian Rangers are concerned, it is difficult to quantify their full impact in their communities. However, it is clear that their presence is very worthwhile both from the perspective of the communities themselves and for the Canadian Forces and the Canadian government. Frequently the Rangers represent the only identifiable and formed group that is readily available to the community in time of need. Furthermore, because of the present fiscal environment all government levels are in the process of reducing expenditures. This will result in a further reduction in services and the presence of government agencies in isolated areas. Therefore, the Canadian Rangers either are, or will be, the only permanent federal presence in many isolated communities.

13. There is a consensus among the four Areas that the Canadian Ranger Program provides an excellent return on investment. In addition to their social contribution in their communities, they represent a viable operational asset for the Area Commanders, who have utilised them on numerous occasions within their capabilities for different domestic tasks. In pure business terms, which seems necessary these days to justify any military endeavor, the Ranger program is analogous to a “Goodwill” class of asset. Its value is above and beyond the meagre budget that sustains it, yet that difference in value could only be realized once another means had to be funded to replace those services that the Rangers provide.

14. One issue that should be raised is the question of why the boundary for the enhancement of the Canadian Ranger Programme was drawn at the 60° degrees Northing. The need to provide a military presence to exercise sovereignty over Canadian territory is a criterion which does not justify an [arbitrary] line drawn at 60° degrees. If our aim is to show the international community that we are seriously exercising sovereignty over Canadian territory, then we should probably draw the line for priority Ranger presence at 70° degrees. It is above the 70th parallel that most of the challenges to Canadian sovereignty have historically
occurred. However, if a military presence is the essential requirement to exercise sovereignty over all Canadian territory, then a line should be drawn at the 50° degrees in Eastern Canada and 55° degrees in Western Canada as there are no Regular or Reserve forces north of these latitudes in the LFC area of responsibility.

15. By asserting that the Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada’s national identity and that the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols, reference D has raised expectations both in the communities where Rangers exist and in the communities where they are absent. However, the FY 95/96 budget softened those expectations. That said, all Area Commanders and Commander LFC have confirmed the requirement for a Canadian Ranger program South of 60° degrees. At present, there is no operational requirement to justify increasing the number of Rangers within LFC. However, in response to the strategic, demographic, economic and political trends in Canada over the past few decades, LFC should adjust its Ranger deployments in accordance with the Areas recommendations. These recommendations are as follows:

a. LFWA. There are presently 650 Rangers in LFWA entirely settled in British-Columbia. Some communities no longer require the presence of the Canadian Rangers while there are isolated communities in the northern part of the Prairies where Rangers would benefit both the CF and the communities themselves. Therefore, a large reallocation program within LFWA is recommended as follows: (See Flag C for location details)

(1) British-Columbia Rangers organized into 17 patrols, for a total of 340 Rangers;
(2) Alberta Rangers organized into three patrols for a total of 60 Rangers;
(3) Saskatchewan Rangers organized into four patrols for a total of 80 Rangers;
(4) Manitoba Rangers organized into seven patrols for a total of 140 Rangers; and
(5) Savings of 30 Ranger positions.

b. LFCA. There are presently 150 Rangers in LFCA divided into seven patrols. LFCA’s recommendations are as follows: (See Flag A for details)

(1) Canadian Rangers Ontario is a viable program and should be retained at all current locations; and
(2) Canadian Rangers Ontario should be funded to establish six new patrols (150 additional Rangers) over the next two fiscal years.
c. SQFT. There are presently 400 Rangers in SQFT divided into 15 patrols. SQFT’s recommendations are as follows: (See Flag B for details)

(1) all existing patrols in SQFT should remain in their present locations;

(2) the budget allocated to the Canadian Rangers must be kept at the same level as FY 94/95 in order to achieve the White Paper objectives;

(3) Phase 1 of the enhancement plan, which is the addition of two new patrols on the East coast of Hudson Bay should be authorized in 1995 and the budget adjusted accordingly; and

(4) Phases 2 and 3 of the SQFT expansion plan should be realized by 1999 as follows:
   (a) Phase 2. Formation of five new patrols on the East coast of James Bay; and
   (b) Phase 3. Formation of five new patrols in central Quebec.

d. LFAA. There are presently 1000 Rangers in LFAA divided into 28 platoons and organized into nine companies. LFAA’s recommendations are as follows: (See Flag D for details)

(1) immediate reduction of some platoons coupled with the disbandment of the Coy located around St. John’s and the section located in downtown Gander. This would result in a reduction of 214 Rangers or 21% of the-establishment;

(2) if required by fiscal contraints it is possible to further reduce by an additional two companies by 1998/99 (about 232 Rangers); and

(3) with LFC’s concurrence, LFAA will proceed with the elimination of the company structure to conform with the national organization, i.e. the individual patrol organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. Given that there is a requirement for Canadian Rangers south of 60° degrees then LFC should adjust its Ranger deployment across its area of responsibility. Any restructuring has to be done within the present fiscal environment. Given the volatile nature of the fiscal and political environment the restructure should be conducted in phases. This would ensure that the program conforms to the contemporary political and fiscal realities. Each of the two phases recommended could be implemented independently. They are as follows:

a. Phase 1. This phase should be activated as soon as this study is approved and completed by summer 1997. The general outline is as follows:
(1) the FY 95/96 budget should be adjusted to the level of the FY 94/95 budget;
(2) the addition of two new patrols on the East coast on the Hudson Bay, as specified at reference B, should be authorized in 1995 and the budget adjusted accordingly;
(3) reallocation of the LFWA Rangers in accordance with Flag C. At the end of this reallocation LFWA will have 620 Rangers deployed across the four western Provinces instead of the present 650 Rangers entirely in British-Columbia;
(4) immediate reduction in LFAA of some platoons coupled with the disbandment of the company located around St. John's, Newfoundland, and the section located in [downtown] Gander. Flag D refers. This would result in a reduction of about 225 Rangers and a new ceiling of 775 Rangers in LFAA for FY 97/98;
(5) LFAA would conduct a further study of all remaining patrols and the impact of further reductions which would lower their ceiling to 550 Rangers by summer 1999; and
(6) LFAA and SQFT will eliminate their company structure and adopt the patrol organisation during FY 96/97.

b. Phase 2. This phase should be activated during FY 96/97 and completed by summer 1999. The highlights are as follows:
(1) based on the LFAA study during Phase 1 on the impact of further reductions, such reductions could be implemented to reduce the LFAA ceiling to 550 Rangers by summer 1999;
(2) start up of SQFT Phase 2 which is the formation of five new patrols on the East coast of James Bay as recommended at Flag B;
(3) formation of six new patrols in LFCA as recommended at Flag A; and
(4) initiation of SQFT’s Phase 3 which is the formation of five new patrols in central Quebec.
17. The proposed changes in Ranger strength and distribution are summarized in the following table:

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18. To implement these recommendations LFC's baseline Ranger funding cannot decline below the funding level allocated in FY 94/95. Any reduction would have a significant effect on the ability to train Rangers within LFC's area of responsibility.

CONCLUSION

19. The Ranger program provides an excellent benefit to LFC at minimal cost. However demographic changes indicate a requirement to reallocate and relocate current Ranger resources to meet the requirements of LFA Commanders. We request that NDHQ approval be granted by 15 August 1995 in order to permit LFC to proceed with Phase 1 implementation.
SERVICE PAPER ON THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

BACKGROUND

1. A detailed history of the Canadian Rangers is enclosed as Annex A. It shows that the Rangers over the past 50 years have gone through a series of programme management and command and control arrangements. At Annex B is a synopsis of Defence policy statements related to the Rangers. Annex C details the role and tasks of the Canadian Rangers.

AIM

2. To examine the problem of command and control of the Canadian Ranger programme and recommend a solution.

DISCUSSIONS

3. Assumptions. The following are assumed:
   a. there is a requirement for the continued existence of the Canadian Rangers;
   b. there will be no change in the foreseeable future to the unique terms of service for the Canadian Rangers;
   c. CFNA will continue to be an NDHQ directed area; and
   d. Canadian Ranger programme policy enunciation will remain an NDHQ function.

4. Terminology. Terminology used throughout the body of this paper is based on those definitions contained in approved CFPs (such as A-AE-219-001/AG-001 “Organization, Concept and Policy” and CFP (J) 5 (4) - “Joint Doctrine for CF Joint and Combined Operations”). Selected definitions are enclosed at Annex D.

5. Existing Canadian Ranger Organization. Technically, because there is no Ministerial Organization Order (MOO) extant for the Rangers, they have not legally been allocated to a Command. Responsibility for their control and
administration is therefore retained with the CDS and the Canadian Rangers are thus a *de facto* NDHQ controlled unit.

6. A MOO should be completed to properly constitute the Canadian Rangers. In anticipation of this document, a review of the command and control of the Rangers is required so that it is formally established.

7. At present, control of the Ranger units is divided between the commanders of Land Force Command and Canadian Forces Northern Area. A pragmatic approach has been adopted by all concerned to overcome the obvious shortcomings of the following command and control arrangements as stated in the present version of CFOO 1.7:

> The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) exercises control over the Rangers except that the Commander LFC and the Commander CFNA exercise operational control and administrative control over the elements assigned. All LFC Rangers are under the command of an appropriate Land Force Area (i.e., LFWA, LFCA, LFQA and LFAA).

8. Existing Canadian Ranger Programme Arrangements. Defence Development Planning Guidance 1995 assigns the VCDS Group with the task (NDHQ 18) of providing control and guidance for the Canadian Rangers. In 1992 the VCDS directed that DGRC give up responsibility for the Canadian Ranger programme and the 1993 VCDS Tasking Directive on C Res and Cdts divestiture of staffing responsibility deferred this requirement until 1994. At that time C Res and Cdts was to recommend the capability component or staff branch best suited to assume stewardship; for various reasons this has not been done yet.

OPTIONS

9. The following options were retained:

a. **Status Quo – Rangers as NDHQ/CDS Owned VCDS Controlled Units.** This option would see the Canadian Rangers continue as independent NDHQ units assigned to the commands which require their services. This option has DGRC/D Res as the responsible office within NDHQ and the VCDS exercising control over the Rangers programme on behalf of the CDS (with the acknowledgement that there still a requirement to make minor modifications to CFOO 1.7 to correct command and control anomalies);

   (1) **Advantages:**
   
   • The Rangers are a unique army organization which does not fit into the concept of a multi-purpose land force; their varied requirements (that are a result of their existence in different
geographic and climactic regions of Canada) can be best addressed by the central staff,

- provides a central focus for a strategic resource that is a unique reserve force organization, with separate terms of service,
- provides continuity with an experienced staff that is already in place,
- staff work required is limited to refining key documents,
- Reserve Force matters are the purview of the VCDS/C Res and Cdts within NDHQ. Thus, Rangers fit in well.

(2) Disadvantages:

- Rangers would still belong to a staff officer versus a commander,
- runs contrary to the current emphasis on devolution,
- contrary to the 1993 VCDS direction that DGRC/D Res divest themselves of their Ranger responsibilities; and

b. Rangers As NDHQ/CDS Owned DCDS Controlled Units. This option would see the Canadian Rangers continued to be commanded by NDHQ and assigned to the DCDS, who would then have responsibility for the Ranger programme.

(1) Advantages:

- the Rangers would be incorporated into and centrally controlled by the Forces’ operational group,
- the Rangers, as a strategic resource, would be incorporated into an organization which has a unified tasking and control capability,

(2) Disadvantages:

- DCDS would require additional staff to maintain the present day initiatives and meet the requirements of the 1994 White Paper policy direction (double-hatting a J3 staff officer could potentially divert attention and focus from major operations),
- the guidance required for a unique Reserve force organization may not be readily available,
- a fair amount of staff work and change would be generated,

c. Rangers as a Land Forces Command Asset. This option would see all Rangers belong to the land force and have the same relationship to LFCHQ as does the Militia (it is recognized that LFCHQ will be eliminated and its components thereof will be incorporated into NDHQ by 1997):
(1) **Advantages:**
- this option recognizes that Rangers are (Reserve) ground force assets and places them directly under land force leadership,
- provides for unity of command,

(2) **Disadvantages:**
- there is little commonality between training and equipment requirements for “northern” (ie, those serving under the arctic conditions of CFNA) and “southern” (for the most part assigned to LFC) Rangers,
- the special requirements of Rangers, especially those in CFNA would likely suffer, unless dedicated staff were found to ensure there is no dilution of support services (it must be assumed that Canadian Rangers in the North West and Yukon territories would be placed under operational command of CFNA),
- with the impending disbandment of LFCHQ, it is quite possible that Ranger matters will be “lost in the shuffle”
- the span of control is very large,
- would generate a significant amount of change and staff work,

**d. Rangers as a Canadian Forces Northern Area Asset.** This option would see all Rangers belong to CFNA.

(1) **Advantages:**
- this option would ensure that the Commander most directly involved with the North would be responsible for implementing White Paper policy (it must be assumed that Canadian Rangers outside of the North West and Yukon territories would be placed under operational command of LFC/appropriate Land Force Area),
- provides for unity of command,

(2) **Disadvantages:**
- there is little commonality between training requirements for “northern” and “southern” Rangers,
- CFNA would require additional staff to support all Canadian Ranger requirements,
- the span of control is very large,
- would generate a significant amount of change and staff work.
DISCUSSION

10. While it must be acknowledged that the Canadian Rangers are essentially an “army” component and it is attractive to lump them in with the Militia as being another LFC asset, it must be recognized that until such time that CFNA becomes part of the Land Force, the Rangers will serve in two very different commands. There is also the potential, albeit very limited, that another environmental command could request the allocation of Ranger units (i.e., Maritime Command may wish to retain some Rangers as coast watchers). This split of a corps with varies requirements calls for a central command.

11. The fact that LFCHQ is to be eliminated in the near future brings into question the validity of proposing that they be given this task, only to have it brought back to Ottawa in a few years with the attendant confusion and related additional staff work.

12. It is attractive to place all Rangers under command of CFNA because this will be the area in which the recent White Paper initiatives will be centred, but this headquarters is too isolated to effectively control all Rangers throughout Canada without a significant increase in staff and P, O&M monies. Command and control of assets in LFC areas would have to be developed.

13. In the matter of whether the Rangers should be assigned to either the VCDS or DCDS, it has been almost three years since the VCDS of the time directed that the C Res and Cdts branch divest itself of its responsibility to the Canadian Rangers. Since that time, even though D Res has been dramatically cut in size, it has continued to manage the Ranger programme within its limited resources. The various points listed above would appear to effectively cancel each other out – the more realistic of the two options is to leave the Ranger programme within the VCDS group and specifically with DGRC/D Res as it has the experience, capacity to oversee this activity and ability to maintain focus on this programme. In the past, the DCDS group has been lukewarm to the idea of receiving direct command and control responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

14. The first option is preferred; it must be acknowledged that after the Canadian Forces have finished with the throes of the current round of down-sizing and the environmental command headquarters are eliminated, this matter should be revisited. There will be much work related to the Ranger Enhancement Plan and it is considered appropriate that stewardship of this Corps remain unchanged.
RECOMMENDATIONS

15. It is recommended that:

a. a Ministerial Organization Order should be completed as soon as possible to legally constitute the Canadian Rangers;

b. the Canadian Rangers CFOO should be revised to reflect the Rangers are NDHQ controlled, but that operational and administrative control has been assigned to LFC and CFNA – the text recommended is:

“The VCDS (or DCDS) exercises central coordinating control and guidance over the Canadian Rangers and the Canadian Ranger programme. Operational and administrative control of Ranger units has been assigned to Land Force Command and Canadian Forces Northern Area. LFC may further allocate its units as deemed necessary.”;

c. the Canadian Rangers should remain NHDQ/VCDS controlled units for the near future; and

d. the VCDS continue to exercise control over the Canadian Ranger Programme and that DGRC/D Res remain the responsible office within NDHQ for Ranger matters.

SUMMATION

16. The Canadian Rangers are an active body, and they will experience enhancement in the near future. Large scale changes to their official methods of operation are not foreseen; however, fiscal restraint and sound management practices dictate that before monies and efforts are expended overall programme direction should come from a central senior source.

B.A. Sutherland
Maj
D Res 2-2

Annexes:
Annex A: History of the Canadian Rangers
Annex B: Defence Policy and Initiatives Related to the Canadian Rangers
Annex C: Role and Tasks of the Canadian Rangers
Annex D: Command and Control Terminology
HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

1. The Canadian Rangers were authorized as a corps of the Reserve Militia effective 23 May 47 by Order-in-Council P.C. 1644, and as such they served as part of the Canadian Army until unification of the Canadian Forces in 1968. On their formation the Canadian Rangers were established with a maximum strength of 5,000 officers and soldiers organized into companies and platoons.

2. Initially, command of the Canadian Rangers was vested in the officer commanding the command or area in which the unit was located. CAO 246-3, the army order that set forth the policy governing the Canadian Rangers, allocated the following maximum strengths for each command:

   - Eastern Command 850
   - Quebec Command 550
   - Central Command 300
   - Prairie Command 700
   - Western Command 2,600

3. It would appear from a review of NDHQ files that Army Headquarters retained over-all responsibility of the Canadian Rangers up to the period of unification and then Canadian Forces Headquarters kept this task until 01 Apr 70 when command and control was transferred to Commander Mobile Command.

4. For reasons that were valid at the time, Mobile Command recommended in 1970 that the Canadian Rangers be disbanded; instead, on 01 Apr 71, command was assumed by the Commander Northern Region (for those Canadian Ranger units in the North West and Yukon territories) and Commander Maritime Command (for those Canadian Ranger units on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts).

5. This arrangement continued until the early 1990s when the Land Force area organization was introduced and the Canadian Rangers that had been assigned to the Maritime Command regional operations branches on the East and West coasts were transferred back to Land Forces Command and assigned to the appropriate area. The present organization of the 3360 Canadian Rangers is:

   a. CFNA: 1240 Rangers in 52 patrols;
   b. LFC: 2120 Rangers serving in:
      (1) LFWA: 645 Rangers in 21 patrols;
(2) LFCA: 150 Rangers in seven patrols;
(3) SQFT: 380 Rangers in one company of three platoons, and 12 patrols; and
(4) LFAA: 945 Rangers in nine companies consisting of 28 platoons.

6. During the 1970s and 80s the Canadian Rangers’ organization was guided by CAO 246-3 (until 1978), CFAO 2-8 “Reserve Force – Organization, Command and Obligation to Serve” and CFOO 1.20 (later numbered CFOO 1.7 in 1984). In the CFOOs, the term “control” was introduced and it referred to the duties of Ranger Liaison Officers on strength of either Northern Region or Maritime Command headquarters.

7. In 1994 the most recent version of the Canadian Ranger CFOO (1.7) was issued and it contained a number of command and control anomalies. It assigned to the VCDS control over the Rangers except that the Commander LFC and Commander CFNA exercise operational control and administrative control over elements assigned and that all LFC Rangers are under command of an appropriate Land Force Area.

8. Within CFHQ/NDHQ the lead agency for the Canadian Rangers has been the “army” operations branch; (ie: Director General Operations Land (DGOPSL), Chief of Land Operations (CLO)) and their directorate dealing with reserve matters (Director Militia) until the Director General Reserves and Cadets was formed. An amendment to CFOO 1.7 in 1986 formally acknowledged that DGRC/D Res was the responsible office within NDHQ for Ranger matters.

9. In 1992, the VCDS directed that DGRC/D Res divest itself of these responsibilities; to this date the organization which should receive the mantle of “coordination” for the Canadian Rangers has not yet been identified.
DEFENCE POLICY AND INITIATIVES RELATED TO THE CANADIAN RANGERS

1. Recent Defence policy has stated the Canadian Rangers will expand; this has been enunciated as follows:

   **1987 Defence White Paper** - “... However, while the role of the Canadian Rangers will remain basically unchanged, its significance as a surveillance force and as a visible expression of Canadian sovereignty in the North requires its expansion and an improvement in the equipment, training and support it receives.” (Page 60)

   **1991 Statement on Defence Policy** - “... The number of Rangers, who play such an important role in the North, will also be increased.” (Page 7)

   **1992 Canadian Defence Policy** - “The objectives of National Defence, with respect to the North, are to uphold Canadian sovereignty by exercising surveillance, demonstrating presence, helping civilian agencies cope with non-military contingencies and advising government on measures to deal with new challenges. These objectives will be pursued in various ways. National Defence will expand the Rangers. . . .” (Page 18)

   **1994 Defence White Paper** - “The Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada’s national identity and the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols. . . .” (Page 46)

2. From 1988 to the present day there have been a number of initiatives related to Canadian Ranger expansion, however, most of the effort has been expended in re-creating the Ranger organizations in British Columbia and Ontario. The results of the formation of these new sub-units have been very laudable in that, for example, they provide an interface between the Canadian Forces and the members of the First Nations. It should be noted that new patrols have been placed in communities that will actively support the Rangers – and not necessarily where the Canadian Forces require them to be.

3. In 1995, DGRC chaired a meeting with NDHQ and CHQ representatives that resulted in a “Ranger Enhancement Plan” that, *inter alia*, will control a limited increase in the number of Ranger patrols North of 60°, the purchase off-the-shelf of equipment such as HF radios and GPS receivers essential to the fulfilment of their surveillance tasks and acquire some additional articles of clothing.
SERVICE PAPER ON
THE UNIT ORGANIZATION
OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

BACKGROUND

1. The organization of the Rangers in the field has been recognized in the past as being weak. This situation continues and was a subject of discussion at the recent annual meeting of the Ranger Working Group. From their inception, it has been planned that the Rangers would, in the main, work as individuals. The patrol organization employed by CFNA is built on this concept and it effectively replaced the cumbersome company and platoon organization along which the Rangers were initially arranged - though it must be noted from the start CAO 246-3 stated that (the) “...Unit and sub-unit organization, therefore, is required mainly for control, administration, and the collection and dissemination of information.” It should be remembered that in 1947, when the Rangers were established, there existed an enormous pool of officers and senior NCOs that had just been released from the Canadian Army after service in the Second World War. In relative terms it was easy to find experienced individuals who could serve as company, platoon and section commanders.

2. At this time, Ranger units are organized along two lines: patrols and companies. The situation, described in detail later in this paper, is not ideal and needs to be corrected.

3. The present structure of the Rangers is also lacking in identifying distinct lines of responsibilities. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine a clear sequence on disciplinary matters or on matters of write-off; it goes from patrol to staff officer to commanders and again to staff officers.

AIM

4. To examine problems related to the present Ranger unit organization and recommend a solution.
DISCUSSION

5. Assumptions. The following are assumed:

a. there is a requirement for the continued existence of the Canadian Rangers;

b. there will be no change in the foreseeable future to the unique terms of service for the Canadian Rangers;

c. CFNA will continue to be an NDHQ directed area; and

d. Canadian Ranger programme policy enunciation will remain an NDHQ function.

6. Weaknesses of the Present Canadian Ranger Organization. Except for Atlantic Canada, where platoons and their company headquarters are relatively close to one another, the patrol organization and its direct links to its headquarters, through the Ranger Liaison Officer (RLO), is presently the most efficient grouping of Ranger units. Aside from Atlantic Canada, there would also appear to be great difficulty in finding individuals capable of performing even the limited responsibilities of a commissioned officer in the Rangers. That is not to say that there should never be Ranger officers and senior NCOs - but they should be employed where they can best be used (for example, as instructors or staff officers).

7. If form is to follow function, it would appear that since Rangers work individually or in small groups, then they should be organized at a very low level, commensurate with their dispersion. However, while a simplified channel of communications is necessary to enable Rangers in the field to efficiently report unusual activities in a timely manner, such a loose arrangement does not obviate the requirements of a proper chain of command to deal with matters such as personnel management, administration, logistics and discipline.

8. A review of the present Ranger organization also reveals that staff officers (the RLOs) have in fact become line officers. The original CFOO for the Canadian Rangers stated RLOs were established “...to provide control of Canadian Rangers activities on behalf of the applicable commanders” and while that statement has been revised to read “...to provide liaison on Ranger activities...” there is no doubt that on a day-to-day basis these officers have the responsibility of being commanding officers - without the authority.

9. It should also be noted that occasionally Area Commanders have appointed staff officers (usually their G3) as commanding officers of Rangers to exercise operational administrative control. This situation is not found throughout the Ranger programme, and in itself is not ideal because it “double-hats” an already
busy staff officer, isolated in a headquarters, with a secondary task over which he can have little personal contact.

10. This scenario should be corrected, and the most obvious manner would be to acknowledge the pragmatic nature of the RLO’s relationship to the individual patrol and properly codify it by incorporating this reality into the Ranger organization. This change would allow for the proper exercise of discipline (Ranger officers-in-charge have severe limitations as detailed in CF00 1.7) and administrative control in areas such as write-offs, etc.

OPTIONS

11. The following options were retained:

   a. **Status quo - Rangers organized in both companies/platoons and patrols directed by RLOs.** This option retains elements of the original Canadian Ranger organization that contains the familiar army hierarchy of a rifle company. Ranger patrols are a fairly recent innovation that removed a superfluous layer of command.

      (1) **Advantages:**
      • this structure exists and, for all its faults, works

      (2) **Disadvantages:**
      • lack of standardization in matters of organization across the Ranger programme
      • the company organization does not work well; company commanders cannot effectively control their platoons’ actions
      • patrol leaders are effective field commanders but cannot be involved with administrative and disciplinary matters
      • inappropriate use of staff officers as de facto commanders

   b. **Rangers organized in patrols and grouped on an area basis under command of full-time officers.** This option envisages creating within each Land Force area and CFNA, a Ranger unit that is under the command of the appropriate headquarters, as follows:

      • 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (all CFNA Ranger patrols);
      • 2e Groupe de patrouilles Rangers canadiens (all Ranger units in Quebec);
      • 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (all Ranger patrols in Ontario);
      • 4th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (all Ranger patrols in Western Canada); and
• 5th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (all Ranger units in Newfoundland and Labrador)

Notes: 1. The existing RLO and instructional cadre positions can be used to man the full-time command positions with little or no increase in personnel requirements. It is envisaged that commanding officers of the Ranger patrol groups would be co-located with the headquarters to whom they belong. Proper CF unit establishments should be developed and consideration could be made to allow (Reserve) Ranger officers and senior NCOs the opportunity to serve in the patrol group headquarters.

2. The precedence of the patrol groups listed above is based on the seniority of the various Ranger units.

(1) Advantages:
• establishes a formal hierarchy with commanders capable of both providing operational leadership and administering the requirements of a military organization
• standardizes Ranger units across Canada with the benefit that local leaders will all be of the same rank and common training standards and courses can be developed and applied nationally
• removes command responsibilities from staff officers

(2) Disadvantages:
• may call up additional full-time personnel resources and costs (ie, Ranger Patrol Groups most likely should be commanded by majors from either the Regular or Reserve Forces (the latter to be on Class B Reserve Service)

c. Rangers organized into battalions. This option envisaged the creation of two Ranger battalions (one each for LFC and CFNA) with companies organized along provincial and territorial lines. This proposal was not pursued because the lines of communication / chains of command become very convoluted (ie: do companies in provinces become “opcon” to districts or areas) and it would appear in any event to result in the creation of additional layers of commands which is contrary to the present D2000 trends.

d. Ranger companies and patrols organized as independent units. This option was rejected out of hand for obvious reasons. While Ranger units do possess their own UICs, primarily for pay and accounting purposes,
their structure cannot accommodate the legal requirements for only majors and above to be appointed commanding officers.

DISCUSSION

12. Although the status quo presents some advantages, it is felt that the advantages of the second option outweigh the costs involved. It would provide for a simplified, efficient and clear cut chain of command and reinforce the existing channel of communications. It would standardize the programme and eliminate disparities existing between areas and provide a straight forward administrative line for matters such as material accounting and write-off. This could be done at little or no cost in personnel. The option would merely formalize what takes place on the ground.

13. The organization of the Canadian Forces is structured and defined in detail. The cold reality of operation of the Ranger patrol in Grise Fjord requires some flexibility of mind and rules. Between NDHQ and its intricate bureaucracy and the patrol in Grise Fjord where there is no paperwork and village elders rule, there is a continuum which goes from extensive bureaucracy to common sense. Somewhere along the line we must shift from the traditional southern ways to that of the Northern aboriginal. The establishment of unit commanding officers would be the last level of formal bureaucracy. Ranger commanding officers would be given the authority to modify and/or apply Canadian Forces orders and regulations with the knowledge of local rules and practices.

CONCLUSION

14. The second option is preferred. While it is recognized that there still is a requirement for the Canadian Rangers, it is obvious that the lines along which they were organized a half century ago in the main needs to be overhauled. Fortunately, to rationalize the Ranger units establishments will require little or no increase in personnel therefore cost is not a significant issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. It is recommended that:
   a. the inefficient company organization be eliminated entirely and that platoons be reorganized into patrols; and
   b. the proposed establishment of Ranger patrol groups be staffed in detail for approval by the CDS.

B.A. Sutherland
Maj
D Res 2-2
MEMORANDUM TO PCB

FROM: DGPC

SUBJECT: PROJECT P9175 - CANADIAN RANGERS ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

Refs:  A. 1901-260/4 (DGRC) 31 May 95
       [3136-5-P9175 (DGRC) 31 May 95]
       B. VCDS 017 172230Z Feb 95

PROPOSAL

1. Director General Reserves and Cadets (DGRC) seeks PCB approval of the enhancement plan for the Canadian Rangers, at a one-time capital cost of $1,278K (BY) and an annual recurring steady state PO&M cost of 5795K (99/00). The primary focus of the proposal outlined at ref A is to increase the number of Ranger patrols North of 60°N, and to provide equipment and O&M support for the Rangers.

PREVIOUS DIRECTION

2. The Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project was directed by C Reserves and Cadets and approved by the VCDS at ref B. Direction was provided that the following criteria be followed:
   a. the enhancement would be limited, with most of the additional patrols North of 60°N;
   b. to avoid equipment which would generate high capital cost or high training and maintenance costs;
   c. LFC to conduct a study of the Ranger program South of 60°N; and
   d. DGRC to review the Command and Control arrangements.

BACKGROUND

3. Policy Basis. The 1994 White Paper states that “the Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada's national identity and the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols.”
4. Based on the threat analysis, the current Capital Equipment Plan and other spending, priorities, this project in itself has not been perceived as a high priority. Therefore, action taken in this regard is modest.

5. **Role of the Rangers.** The role of the Rangers is to provide a military presence in the sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot be economically or efficiently served by the Canadian Forces. This is accomplished through reporting unusual activities, collecting data of significance in support of military operations, and conducting surveillance/sovereignty patrols. Other services include providing local expertise regarding these tasks, conducting north warning system site patrols and providing assistance in SAR situations.

6. The Rangers have unique terms of reference and are, therefore, managed differently than the rest Of the Canadian military. The primary impact is less training and less complexity in operational roles. Under a simplified chain of command, demands on leadership are still high due to the Rangers practice of working in teams or groups that operate in specific widely dispersed communities. These circumstances have an impact on all of the options.

7. **Program Deficiencies.** Associated with achievement of the above tasks, this project seeks to remedy three basic deficiencies:
   a. difficulty in accurately reporting locations in an understandable way - to be resolved by using a global positioning system;
   b. lack of communications - to be resolved by purchase of HF radios; and
   c. lack of Canadian Ranger identification - to be resolved by an improvement in the Ranger uniform.

**OPTION ANALYSIS**

8. The scope of the project was based on several factors, the first of which was the implications for the South where the deficiencies could be resolved in many different ways. A separate LFC study is underway to determine the options for enhancing the Rangers south of 60° N in this area. In the North, the alternatives are reduced due to the general lack of new Rangers. A solution was limited to the communities that wished to support a Ranger patrol, and where their presence would be effective.

9. Four options were analyzed, as follows;
   a. **Status quo** - rejected because it did not address the 1994 White Paper;
   b. **Additional Air Patrol** - rejected because of the high cost of flight per hour;
c. **Increased Naval Presence** - rejected because of no ice capability, and operations in the Arctic cannot be sustained; and

d. **Increased Land Patrols** - is the preferred option, because it addresses all of the deficiencies in the most cost effective manner.

**RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS**

10. The resource implications associated with this project are both capital and P,O&M. The costs are based on detailed calculation and investigations with industry. No contingency has been included in the project totals. GST is not included in the figures below:

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a. **Project Management**. This project is managed out of the matrix. There are no project management costs associated with this project.

b. **Capital**. The capital represents a one time purchase ($1,278K) of global positioning systems, HF transceivers, tuques, t-shirts, vests and patrol start-up costs.

c. **Personnel**. There are two types of PY costs associated with the project. First, the annual cost of new ranger patrols training, patrol leader training and the actual patrols is $195K steady state. No new “Reserve positions” are associated with this project, however, Reserve personnel costs are included under O&M. Second, there is a requirement for three PYs (two Sgts and one Cpl) for CFNA to assist in the management of the increased number of patrols. These will be funded by an STRL loan until VCDS accruals become available.

d. **NPE**. The recurring annual replacement cost of those items procured centrally is $120K steady state.

e. **O&M**. The annual O&M charged to LFC and CFNA ($480K BY) represents the training costs, the YFR related to the patrols and the
replacement of the initial purchase of capital items. With the “P - Reserve” costs added (S195K (99/00)), the total O&N1 costs will be $575K (99/00).

ANALYSIS

11. Price of Success. The Canadian Forces did not formally request an improvement in the Ranger Program. Given the threat analysis and Canadian Defence objectives, there has been no priority associated with this area. The total cost over five years is over $5M ($3.7M Vote 1 and $1.3M Vote 5). In comparison to the entire DND budget, however, this [amount] is not significant; it is outweighed by the benefits of better sovereignty and search and rescue (SAR) and the corresponding increased visibility of the Rangers in the north.

12. Basis of the Requirement. The requirement is justified based on the 1994 Defence White Paper. There has been a continuing requirement to improve the sovereignty patrols in the north, and to improve the search and rescue capability. The new CFNA patrols will be at: Colville Lake, Luts'ke, Fort Liard, Fort Good Hope, Fort Norman, Wrigley, Fort Providence, Norman Wells all of which are in the NWT, and Burwash/Destruction Bay in the Yukon. New LFC patrols will be formed at Umiujaq and Kuujjuarapik (PQ). This project will increase the total number of Rangers to about 4,000.

13. Option Analysis. All of the available options were identified and analyzed. The number of available alternatives is limited, given the constraints involved; the northern environment (weather & dispersion), the social environment, limited training of inhabitants and affordability. This project appears to provide the most cost effective method of achieving project objectives. At ref B, the VCDS directed that the most “common sense” solution be found and implemented.

14. Cost Benefit Analysis. There is no business case associated with this project. There is a small cost $1,278K for capital and $795K in recurring P,O&M. However, the benefits are an improved capability for communications, sovereignty patrols and search and rescue. This project has subjective benefits related to the visibility of the Rangers in the north.

15. Funding Source. Technically, this project is a “Miscellaneous Recurring Requirement (MRR); however, this type of funding has already been allocated to Commands based on previous priorities indicated in their Level 1 Business Plans. No MRR funding is available. Vote 5 funding required ($1,278K) for the capital/start-up costs can be secured from within the VCDS Reserve. The O&M baseline increase for NPE, LFC and CFNA can be cash managed as part of the annual ADM(Fin CS)\DB estimates submission.
DECISIONS REQUESTED

16. PCB is requested to:
   a. approve the Canadian Ranger Enhancement Plan for the Canadian Rangers as outlined in the Memorandum;
   b. approve the Canadian Ranger Scales of equipment and clothing at a total five year incremental cost of $3,888K (FY 99/00);
   c. note the transfer of 3 VCDS accruals to DGRC (two sergeants, combat arms and one corporal admin clerk);
   d. direct an increase in the NPE, CFNA and LFC Vote 1 baseline O&M allocations related to the increase in Ranger patrols in the amount of $425K (FY 96/97), $600K (FY 97/98), $790K (FY 98/99) and $795K (FY 99/00) reaching steady state in FY 99/00 (see Annex A to ref A); and
   e. note that the acquisition of new scaled items for Canadian Rangers at a total Vote 5 capital cost of $1,278K (FY 95/96) is funded from the VCDS Reserve.

DGPC RECOMMENDATIONS

16. The above decisions are supported. However, VCDS accruals may not be available immediately to fill the requirements. …

CAPITAL PROJECT SUMMARY

FILE: 3136-5-P9175

PROJECT TITLE: CANADIAN RANGERS ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

PROPOSAL:

Effective approval is requested to enhance the capability of the Canadian Rangers. Their tasks are accomplished through reporting unusual activities, collecting, data of significance in support of military operations, and conducting arctic and coastal surveillance/sovereignty patrols. The primary focus of the proposal is to increase the number of Ranger patrols “North of 60°N”, and to provide equipment and O&M support for the Rangers. There are three main deficiencies in the Ranger’s capabilities, which will be addressed through this project: new equipment (Global Positioning Systems) to resolve difficulties in accurately reporting locations in an understandable way; the purchase of HF radios to resolve the lack of communications; and an improvement in the
uniform including tuques, t-shirts, and vests to resolve a lack of Canadian Ranger identification.

**RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS:**

The total capital cost is $1,278,000 (BY) (net of GST of $89,460) for the initial purchase of global positioning systems, HF transceivers, tuques, t-shirts, vests and patrol start-up costs. The incremental O&M costs will reach a steady state in FY 99/00 at an annual recurring amount of $795,000, related to training and the new patrols.

**SIGNIFICANT FACTORS:**

The 1994 White Paper states that “the Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada’s national identity and the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols.”

**PROCUREMENT PLAN:**

All equipment purchases will be tendered, subject to government contact regulations.

Approved

[David Collonette]

Minister

Date 23/7/95

1901-260/4 (VCDS)

22 September 1995

Distribution List

CANADIAN RANGER PROGRAMME
A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW (THE WAY AHEAD)

References: A. NDHQ 1901-260/4 (DGRC) 30 May 95 “Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project” (enclosed)
B. LFCHQ 4800-4-4 (COS) 15 June 1995 (NOTAL)
C. NDHQ VCDS 017, 172230Z Feb 95 (NOTAL)
D. NDHQ 1901-260/1 (DGRC) 07 July 1995 (NOTAL)

GENERAL

1. Concomitant with the approval of the Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project by the Minister on 23 July 1995, there is a requirement to formulate a strategic overview of the Ranger programme that will guide the efforts of those commanders and staff officers involved with the conduct and development of that Corps.

2. Contained in the following paragraphs is the overall direction I wish the programme to take over the next few years. This guidance is cognizant of a number of on-going studies which may impact on the programme such as the Management Command and Control Review Tern (MCCRT).

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

3. Capabilities. Canadian Rangers will continue to be a unique sub-component of the Reserve Force. They are to remain a body based on the individual member's ability to operate in a specific isolated area under climatic conditions which may be extreme.

4. Role. Although the threat scenario to our nation is now very low, there is still a requirement to maintain a deployed observation capability and a military presence to demonstrate sovereignty. The role of the Canadian Rangers, as detailed at Annex A of the enclosure, remains both valid and unchanged.

5. Tasks. You will also find at Annex A of the enclosure the tasks of the Rangers. The tasks were defined in order to provide more specific guidance for training, procurement and operations. Rangers are not to be used for domestic operations such as crowd control and counter-drug operations. They are not trained for
these roles and, in any event, other government elements have these responsibilities.

OVERALL RANGER PROGRAMME

6. As directed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence, the Canadian Forces will enhance the capability of Rangers to conduct arctic and coastal land patrols. Given the limited resources we can apply to do this, it has been decided that the bulk of the effort must be focussed north of 60°N where the requirement for an enhancement project is most acute and where tangible results will demonstrate a concrete implementation of Government policy.

7. While our capability in the North is being increased, we must rationalize our Ranger deployment south of 60°N. It may be argued that there is little military requirement for Rangers in the central part of Canada, however, the obvious benefits they can provide in the area of national development must be recognized. The 1994 White Paper on Defence notes that “... Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada’s national identity...”, therefore, it is desirable that the Corps be established throughout our country. Nonetheless, the Rangers’ presence can only be justified in those areas where other components of the Forces or other government departments cannot conveniently or economically provide either presence or service. We must recognize that in order to enhance the Corps' capabilities where it is most beneficial, we must identify offsets from within the present structure. Consequently, some changes to the Rangers' order of battle will need to be implemented.

8. To assist in the rationalization of the southern structure the recommendations of the LFC “Canadian Rangers South of 60° Study” (reference B) are in general supported within the caveats found below:
   a. offsets from within LFC Rangers must be identified and existing patrols that are in areas serviced by other government agencies must be reduced to nil strength before new patrols are stood up;
   b. priority for the establishment of new patrols should be given to those to be located on the coasts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and James and Hudson bays; and
   c. while every attempt will be made to establish and maintain the overall Ranger budget at a reasonable level, increases in the number of LFC patrols is to be accommodated within programmed O&M funds. Personnel costs should remain relatively stable since there will be no increase in LFC Rangers and funding to support temporary duty costs incurred by instructional staff establishing and visiting new patrols will
have to be found from within Ranger budgets; there is to be no transfer of dollars from either the Primary Reserve or Cadet movement allocations.

9. The Canadian Ranger personnel establishment is to remain at its present level (approximately 3250 members), plus the approximately 250 positions required to support the 11 new patrols authorized by the Ranger Enhancement Project.

10. **Establishment Control.** DGRC will confirm with LFC and CFNA the ceiling for the number of Rangers and patrols in each area. The authority to change personnel and unit ceilings once established, will be NDHQ/VCDS/DGRC. Reference C is still in effect; no new patrols will be authorized before redundant Patrols are stood down and it is confirmed that offsets (and funds) exist to support further expansion.

11. **Command and Control.** DGRC is to complete the Command and Control study directed at reference C. This work may be affected by the work of the MCCRT. In any event, a proper line of command and control is to be established so that matters such as discipline and powers of write-off are clear. The study due date is moved to end December 1995.

12. **Structure.** At present there is no uniformity between Ranger units across Canada. In the Atlantic and Quebec areas there are platoons and companies. In the West, there are patrols of various sizes. DGRC, with advice from LFC and CFNA, is to develop a standard unit model for approval. The model will be simple, and will rationalize the organization, size, rank structure, and if appropriate, a unit scale of equipment. DGRC is also to continue the development of Ranger Patrol Groups as detailed in reference D, in support of future command and control arrangements.

13. **Policy.** Policy for the Canadian Rangers Program will be designed by DGRC and approved by VCDS. DGRC will also monitor the application of policy. It will include such items as training standards, organizations, roles and tasks, equipment, etc.

14. **Junior Ranger Programme.** There is at present a Junior Ranger Programme trial on-going in Paulatuk. It is important for the youth of Canadian Forces Northern Area that such a programme be successful. Its potential application within LFC's AOR will only be reviewed once the outcome of the CFNA trial is known. D Cdts expertise will be tapped as well as the support of other government agencies.

**TASKS**

15. In order to refocus the Ranger programme, the following tasks are given/reaffirmed:
a. **DGRC** is to:
   (1) implement the Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project;
   (2) prepare for approval and monitor Ranger programme policy as required;
   (3) assist LFC as required in the implementation of the restructure of their Ranger assets;
   (4) confirm the ceiling for the number of Rangers and patrols in each area;
   (5) complete the Command and Control study by end December 1995; and
   (6) propose a structure for Ranger patrols and patrol groups by end January 1996.

b. **Comd CFNA** is to:
   (1) implement the Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project; and
   (2) continue with the Junior Ranger Programme trial.

c. **Comd LFC** is to implement the Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project.

d. **Comd AIRCOM** is to support the implementation of the Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project.

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L.E. Murray  
Vice-Admiral  

Enclosure: 1  
Distribution List
1. Pursuant to reference A, a coordinating conference was held on 26 February 1997 at HMCS CHIPPAWA, on the national direction of the two subject activities. National Defence Headquarters, Canadian Forces Northern Area, Land Force Command and its four areas were represented by senior staff involved with the Ranger and Junior Ranger programmes. A list of attendees is attached as Annex A.

2. The agenda for the conference (attaches as Annex B) was based primarily on those points raised by Major-General Forand at reference B. An added dimension that affected the matters at hand was the recent advice received from the Judge Advocate General’s staff that the Rangers were operating in a legal vacuum in that contrary to the order-in-council that established the Corps (P.C. 1644, 23 May 1947) the Minister had NOT issued instructions on their organization, composition and duties.

3. Agreement from a national perspective was reached in the following areas:

   a. **Command and Control.**

      (1) the Canadian Rangers should be organized into “patrol groups”. These groups would be formations embodied in the Reserve Force and would each require a Ministerial Organization Order and Canadian Forces Organization Order. Patrol Groups should be organized in CFNA and each Land Force area (total of five groups) and each should be placed under command of the appropriate area commander;

      (2) the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, through Director General Reserves and Cadets, should retain control over Ranger national policy issues; and
(3) each patrol group should have a full-time command, instructional and administrative cadre. A draft establishment for CFNA has been developed and is attached as Annex C. This model can be applied to the four proposed LFC area patrol groups with positions being restricted to reflect the number of assigned Rangers and tasks allocated. There is a requirement for some additional Regular Force personnel to support LFC Rangers. A submission for the approval of VCDS accruals is attached as Annex D;

b. **Equipment.** After a lengthy discussion, the decision of the initial Ranger Enhancement Project conference held in January 1995 was re-confirmed. In brief, environmental clothing is not to be issued except for operations. There was no support for any change to this policy once the costs of a national programme were identified;

c. **Training.** Major-General Forand’s letter raised a number of points with reference to the relationship of the Rangers to search and rescue activities. The following decisions were reached:

(1) the draft Ranger training standards circulated in December 1995 will be reviewed by areas and recommendations are to be made to improve the proposed standards for ground search and rescue techniques and procedures;

(2) the revised Ranger course training standard is to be approved at the national level; and

(3) it is recommended that the VCDS send a letter to the appropriate search and rescue authorities requesting that points of contact be established to better coordinate Ranger assets within national activities. A letter to this effect will be prepared on direction; and

d. **Junior Rangers.** The conference agreed that the established limit of 15 Junior Ranger patrols for the first phase of the programme must be maintained. The matter of cost-sharing and how funds from outside the Department could be used was reviewed. It was acknowledged that the Junior Rangers could possibly be significantly expanded using these unforecasted monies. At the same time all concurred that the size of the programme must be maintained at a level which can be sustained using only CF resource. This scenario will be more easily confirmed during Phase II (eg, 2000) and beyond.

4. Should you approve of these recommended courses of action a letter authorizing their implementation is enclosed for your signature.
E.W. Linden  
Major-General  
Chief of Reserves and Cadets

Enclosure: 1  

Annexes:  

A  List of Attendees: Canadian Rangers / Junior Canadian Rangers Coordinating Conference  
B Agenda: Canadian Rangers / Junior Canadian Rangers Coordinating Conference  
C Draft Establishment: 1st Canadian Rangers Patrol Group, Yellowknife  
D Request for VCDS Accruals: Land Force Command Canadian Rangers

Distribution List (page 4)
23 February 1998

SUBJ: CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATION ORDER 3685 - 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP (1 CRPG)

1. THIS ORDER, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE, IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION ORDER FOR THIS UNIT. CFAO 2.8, QR O 3.295, 102.01, 105.06, AND 108.27 SHALL BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS ORDER
2. THE INTENTION OF THIS ORDER IS TO STATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP. THIS IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENT AND IS NOT INTENDED FOR USE AS AN AUTHORITY FOR OTHER THAN ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER 97068 DATED 24 NOV 97, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ORGANIZATION OF 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP, ORG ID 03685, AS A UNIT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES EMBODIED IN THE RESERVE FORCE

4. TO IMPLEMENT THE MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER, THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF ASSIGNS 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP TO CANADIAN FORCES NORTHERN AREA FOR CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION AND ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

ROLE

5. THE CANADIAN RANGERS PROVIDE A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPARSELY SETTLED ISOLATED AREAS OF CANADA. THE ROLE OF 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RANGER PATROLS IN THE NORTHWEST AND YUKON TERRITORIES, AND NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA, ALBERTA, AND MANITOBA. DETACHMENTS OF 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 12

6. THE OFFICER APPOINTED TO COMMAND 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS A COMMANDING OFFICER

7. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THOSE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS REQUIRING THE AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER COMMANDING A COMMAND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDER, CANADIAN FORCES NORTHERN AREA COMMUNICATION

8. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION SHALL FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH ASSIGNED SUPPORT BASES ON MATTERS OF SUPPORT AND WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVE AND CADETS ON MATTERS CONCERNED WITH THE RANGER PROGRAMME AND POLICY
9. 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS DESIGNATED AN UNSPECIFIED LANGUAGE UNIT SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

10. 1ST CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY CANADIAN FORCES NORTHERN AREA HEADQUARTERS AND UNITS DESIGNATED TO SUPPORT THAT HEADQUARTERS. SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL RANGER PATROLS SHALL BE AS SHOWN IN THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM

11. THIS ORDER IS ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF DETACHMENTS

12. THE FOLLOWING ARE DETACHMENTS OF 1 CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP: (UP TO DATE DETACHMENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM)

ORG ID 00783 BAKER LAKE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 00784 GJOA HAVEN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 00785 TALOYOAK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 00786 RANKIN INLET RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 00788 CHURCHILL RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 01621 OLD CROW RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 01665 IGLOOLIK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03637 FORT LIARD RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03638 RAE LAKES RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04659 YELLOWKNIFE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04661 RAE/EDZO RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04662 WHA TI RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04664 CORAL HARBOUR RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04665 REPULSE BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04669 ARVIAT RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04672 HOLMAN ISLAND RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04673 SACHS HARBOUR RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04676 FORT MCPHERSON RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04677 AKLAVIK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04688 BROUGIITON ISLAND RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04689 PANGNIRTUNG RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04691 KIMMIRUT RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04692 CAPE DORSET RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04693 CLYDE RIVER RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04694 POND INLET RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04696 ARCTIC BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04700 CAMBRIDGE BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04702 COPPERMINE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04703 GRIZE FIORD RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04705 RESOLUTE BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04708 PAULATUK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04709 TUKTOYAKTUK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04713 FORT CHIPEWYAN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04812 WHALE COVE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID
04813 CHESTERFIELD INLET RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04814 SANIKILUAQ RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04815 PELLY BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04816 INUVIK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04817 IQUALUIT RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04818 MAYO RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04820 HAINES JUNCTION RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04821 CARCROSS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04822 HALL BEACH RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04829 ROSS RIVER RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04830 DAWSON CITY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04831 WHITEHORSE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04836 TSIIGHETCHEC RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04837 FORT SIMPSON RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04838 FORT RESOLUTION RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04839 FORT SMITH RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04840 PELLY CROSSING RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04841 WATSON LAKE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04855 ARMACKS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04864 LUTSELKE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04868 AITLIN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 3780 FORT GOOD HOPE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 3781 TULITA RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 3782 FORT SEVERN RANGER PATROL [(sic)]

END OF ENGLISH TEXT
23 February 1998

SUBJ: CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATION ORDER 3686 – 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP (2 CRPG)

1. THIS ORDER, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE, IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION ORDER FOR THIS UNIT. CFAO 2.8, QR O 3.295, 102.01, 105. 06, AND 108. 27 SHALL BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS ORDER

2. THE INTENTION OF THIS ORDER IS TO STATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL
GROUP. THIS IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENT AND IS NOT INTENDED FOR USE AS AN AUTHORITY FOR OTHER THAN ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER 97069 DATED 24 NOV 97, THE MINISTER OF NA’fiONAL DEFENCE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ORGANIZATION OF 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP, ORG ID 03686, AS A UNIT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES EMBODIED IN THE RESERVE FORCE, ALLOCATED TO LAND FORCE QUEBEC AREA

4. TO IMPLEMENT THE MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER, THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

ROLE

5. THE CANADIAN RANGERS PROVIDE A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPARSELY SETTLED ISOLATED AREAS OF CANADA. THE ROLE OF 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RANGER PATROLS IN THE UNGAVA PENINSULA AND LOWER NORTH SHORE. DETACHMENTS OF 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 12

6. THE OFFICER APPOINTED TO COMMAND 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS A COMMANDING OFFICER

7. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THOSE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS REQUIRING THE AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER COMMANDING A COMMAND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDER, LAND FORCE QUEBEC AREA

COMMUNICATION

8. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION SHALL FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH ASSIGNED SUPPORT BASES ON MATTERS OF SUPPORT AND WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVE AND CADETS ON MATTERS CONCERNED WITH RANGER POLICY AND PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT

9. 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS DESIGNATED AN UNSPECIFIED LANGUAGE UNIT
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

10. 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY CANADIAN FORCES BASE MONTREAL AND UNITS DESIGNATED TO SUPPORT THAT BASE. SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL RANGER PATROLS SHALL BE AS SHOWN IN THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM

11. THIS ORDER IS ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

DETACHMENTS

12. THE FOLLOWING ARE DETACHMENTS OF 2ND CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP: (UP TO DATE DETACHMENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM)

ORG ID 00846 AUPALAK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04599 AKULIVIK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04613 HAVRE ST PIERRE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04614 HARRINGTON HARBOUR RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04615 LOURDES DU BLANC SABLON RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04630 POVUNGNITUK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04631 IVUJIVIK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04632 SALLUIT RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04633 KANGIQSUJUAQ RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04634 QUAQTAQ RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04635 KANGIRSUK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04636 TASIUJAQ RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04637 KUUJJUAQ RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04638 KANGIQSUALUJJUAQ RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04819 INUKJUAK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04884 SAINT AUGUSTIN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04885 KEGASKA RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 06104 KUUJJARAPIK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 06277 UMIUJAQ RANGER PATROL

END OF ENGLISH TEXT
23 February 1998

SUBJ: CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATION ORDER 3687 – 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP (3 CRPG)

1. THIS ORDER, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE, IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION ORDER FOR THIS UNIT. CFAO 2.8, QR O 3.295, 102.01, 105.06, AND 108.27 SHALL BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS ORDER
2. THE INTENTION OF THIS ORDER IS TO STATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP. THIS IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENT AND IS NOT INTENDED FOR USE AS AN AUTHORITY FOR OTHER THAN ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER 97070 DATED 24 NOV 97, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ORGANIZATION OF 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP, ORG ID 03687, AS A UNIT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES EMBODIED IN THE RESERVE FORCE, AlLOCATED TO LAND FORCE CENTRAL AREA

4. TO IMPLEMENT THE MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER, THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

ROLE

5. THE CANADIAN RANGERS PROVIDE A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPARSELY SETTLED ISOLATED AREAS OF CANADA. THE ROLE OF 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RANGER PATROLS IN JAMES AND HUDSON BAY AND THE INTERIOR OF NORTHERN ONTARIO.

DETACHMENTS OF 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 12

6. THE OFFICER APPOINTED TO COMMAND 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS A COMMANDING OFFICER

7. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THOSE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS REQUIRING THE AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER COMMANDING A COMMAND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDER, LAND FORCE CENTRAL AREA

COMMUNICATION

8. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION SHALL FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH ASSIGNED SUPPORT BASES ON MATTERS OF SUPPORT AND WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVE AND CADETS ON MATTERS CONCERNED WITH RANGER POLICY AND PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT
9. 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS DESIGNATED AN UNSPECIFIED LANGUAGE UNIT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

10. 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY CANADIAN FORCES BASE KINGSTON DETACHMENT TORONTO AND UNITS DESIGNATED TO SUPPORT THAT DETACHMENT. SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL RANGER PATROLS SHALL BE AS SHOWN IN THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM

11. THIS ORDER IS ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

DETACHMENTS

12. THE FOLLOWING ARE DETACHMENTS OF 3RD CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP: (UP TO DATE DETACHMENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM)

ORG ID 03495 MOOSE FACTORY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03496 ATTAWAPISKAT RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03497 PEAWANUCK RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03498 FORT ALBANY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03499 SANDY LAKE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03500 ENGLISH RIVER RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 03501 BEARSKIN LAKE RANGER PATROL

END OF ENGLISH TEXT
23 February 1998

SUBJ: CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATION ORDER 3688 – 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP (4 CRPG)

1. THIS ORDER, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE, IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION ORDER FOR THIS UNIT. CFAO 2.8, QR O 3.295, 102.01, 105.06, AND 108.27 SHALL BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS ORDER
2. THE INTENTION OF THIS ORDER IS TO STATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP. THIS IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENT AND IS NOT INTENDED FOR USE AS AN AUTHORITY FOR OTHER THAN ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER 97071 DATED 24 NOV 97, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ORGANIZATION OF 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP, ORG ID 03688, AS A UNIT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES EMBODIED IN THE RESERVE FORCE, ALLOCATED TO LAND FORCE WESTERN AREA.

4. TO IMPLEMENT THE MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER, THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

ROLE

5. THE CANADIAN RANGERS PROVIDE A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPARSELY SETTLED ISOLATED AREAS OF CANADA. THE ROLE OF 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RANGER PATROLS THROUGHOUT BRITISH COLUMBIA. DETACHMENTS OF 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 12.

6. THE OFFICER APPOINTED TO COMMAND 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS A COMMANDING OFFICER.

7. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THOSE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS REQUIRING THE AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER COMMANDING A COMMAND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDER, LAND FORCE WESTERN AREA.

COMMUNICATION

8. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION SHALL FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH ASSIGNED SUPPORT BASES ON MATTERS OF SUPPORT AND WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVE AND CADETS ON MATTERS CONCERNED WITH THE RANGER PROGRAMME AND POLICY.
9. 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS DESIGNATED AN UNSPECIFIED LANGUAGE UNIT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

10. 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY CANADIAN FORCES BASE EDMONTON AND UNITS DESIGNATED TO SUPPORT THAT BASE. SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL RANGER PATROLS SHALL BE AS SHOWN IN THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM

11. THIS ORDER IS ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

DETACHMENTS

12. THE FOLLOWING ARE DETACHMENTS OF 4TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP: (UP TO DATE DETACHMENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM)

ORG ID 04726 GRANISLE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04727 MACKENZIE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04729 MCBRIDE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04747 VANDERHOOF RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04748 FRASER LAKE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04749 BULKLEY VALLEY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04750 TUMBLER RIDGE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04824 PORT HARDY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04825 LAX KW ALAAMS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04826 UCLUELET RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04827 KITKATLA RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04828 TAHSIS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04833 PORT MCNEILL RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04834 ZEBALLOS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04835 GOLD RIVER RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04842 PORT CLEMENTS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04843 TERRACE RANGER PATROL

END OF ENGLISH TEXT
MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER 97072

I, Arthur C. Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, with an effective date to be determined by the Chief of the Defence Staff, do hereby:

a. pursuant to subsection 17(1) of the National Defence Act, organize 5th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group as a unit of the Canadian Forces;

b. pursuant to subsection 17(2) of the National Defence Act, direct that 5th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group be embodied in the Reserve Force; and

c. pursuant to article 2.08 of the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, allocate 5th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group to Land Force Atlantic Area.

ARRÊTÉ MINISTÉRIEL D'ORGANISATION 97072

Je soussigné, Arthur C. Eggleton, ministre de la Défense nationale, à la date qui sera déterminée par le Chef d'état-major de la Défense, par la présente :

a. en vertu du paragraphe 17(1) de la Loi sur la défense nationale, autorise la constitution du 5e Groupe de patrouille des Rangers canadiens comme unité des Forces canadiennes;

b. en vertu du paragraphe 17(2) de la Loi sur la défense nationale, ordonne que le 5e Groupe de patrouille des Rangers canadiens soit incorporé dans la Force de réserve;

c. en vertu de l'article 2.08 des Ordonnances et règlements royaux applicables aux Forces canadiennes, affecte le 5e Groupe de patrouille des Rangers canadiennes au Secteur de l'Atlantique de la Force terrestre.

Le ministre de la Défense nationale,

Arthur C. Eggleton
Minister of National Defence

Given at Ottawa, Canada
this 23rd day of February, 1997

Fait à Ottawa (Canada)
cet 23e jour de février, 1997

23 February 1998

SUBJ: CANADIAN FORCES ORGANIZATION ORDER 3689 – 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP (5 CRPG)

1. THIS ORDER, EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ISSUE, IS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION ORDER FOR THIS UNIT. CFAO 2.8, QR O 3.295, 102.01, 105.06, AND 108.27 SHALL BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS ORDER
2. THE INTENTION OF THIS ORDER IS TO STATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP. THIS IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENT AND IS NOT INTENDED FOR USE AS AN AUTHORITY FOR OTHER THAN ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER 97072 DATED 24 NOV 97, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ORGANIZATION OF 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP, ORG ID 03689, AS A UNIT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES EMBODIED IN THE RESERVE FORCE, ALLOCATED TO LAND FORCE ATLANTIC AREA.

4. TO IMPLEMENT THE MINISTERIAL ORGANIZATION ORDER, THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

ROLE

5. THE CANADIAN RANGERS PROVIDE A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPARSELY SETTLED ISOLATED AREAS OF CANADA. THE ROLE OF 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS TO CO-ORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RANGER PATROLS THROUGHOUT NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR. DETACHMENTS OF 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP ARE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 12.

6. THE OFFICER APPOINTED TO COMMAND 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS A COMMANDING OFFICER.

7. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THOSE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS REQUIRING THE AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER COMMANDING A COMMAND SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDER, LAND FORCE ATLANTIC AREA.

COMMUNICATION

8. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION SHALL FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH ASSIGNED SUPPORT BASES ON MATTERS OF SUPPORT AND WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVE AND CADETS ON MATTERS CONCERNED WITH THE RANGER PROGRAMME AND POLICY.
9. 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP IS DESIGNATED AN UNSPECIFIED LANGUAGE UNIT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

10. 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY CANADIAN FORCES BASE HALIFAX AND UNITS DESIGNATED TO SUPPORT THAT BASE. SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL RANGER PATROLS SHALL BE AS SHOWN IN THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM

11. THIS ORDER IS ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

DETACHMENTS

12. THE FOLLOWING ARE DETACHMENTS OF 5TH CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP: (UP TO DATE DETACHMENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM THE ENTERPRISE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM)

ORG ID 00797 GOOSE BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04600 CARTWRIGHT RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04601 PORT HOPE SIMPSON RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04602 RED BAY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04603 BURGEO RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04605 IIERMITAGE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04606 MILLTOWN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04607 MARYSTOWN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04608 CHANNEL RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04609 ST GEORGE’S RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04611 HOPEDALE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04612 NAIN RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04616 ST ANTHONY RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04617 RODDICTON RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04618 SPRINGDALE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04619 LEWISPORTE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04620 BONAVISTA NORTH RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04621 BONAVISTA SOUTH RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04622 TERRA NOVA RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04623 CLARENVILLE RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04628 PORT SAUNDERS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04629 ROCKY HARBOUR RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04801 CHURCHILL FALLS RANGER PATROL, ORG ID 04802 LABRADOR CITY RANGER PATROL

END OF ENGLISH TEXT
The 1994 White Paper on Defence stated that "the Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada's national identity and the Government will improve their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols." In response to this, a proposal was submitted by Director General Reserves and Cadets in May 1995 that outlined the requirements for the enhancement of the Canadian Rangers. The primary focus of the proposal to achieve this policy was to increase the number of Ranger patrols in the north and to provide equipment and O&M support for the Rangers. The focus of the proposed enhancement was to be north of 60° (patrols in CFNA and SQFT) where the requirement was most acute. This decision was based on the fact that sovereignty issues and requirements were met by other means south of 60°.

Apart from the inherent inability to provide ground coverage in areas other than in the immediate vicinity of the larger communities, the Ranger program suffered from three basic equipment deficiencies:

a. The Rangers, even when equipped with maps, had difficulty in accurately reporting locations in a mode that was understandable to others. It was felt that global positioning system (GPS) receivers would address this concern.

b. Rangers observing a reportable event often had no way of reporting it until they returned to a location where communications were available. To address this deficiency, Ranger patrols tasked to visit the North Warning System (NWS) sites were equipped with HF radios. While this arrangement catered to planned tasks or patrols, it was felt that each patrol should be equipped with the means to communicate with their home base and HQ. To meet that requirement, each patrol would require two radio sets.

c. Lack of identifying Canadian Ranger accoutrements/uniform: Recognition as a member of a Ranger patrol was thought to be very important to the morale of the Rangers and their standing in the community. It was also felt that the Rangers should be identifiable for training and operational purposes. Equipping them with accoutrements that were suitable for both summer and winter wear was considered appropriate as the items could be worn with the individual's personal clothing while still ensuring that the person was identifiable as a Ranger. This was felt to be appropriate,
essential and a cost effective alternative to issuing the Rangers combat clothing.

It was therefore proposed that each patrol north of 60° be issued two HF radios and one GPS receiver and that identifying accoutrements consisting of a Ranger sweatshirt, Ranger t-shirt, Ranger tuque and Ranger sleeveless safety vest be issued to all Rangers in addition to the baseball cap and brassard that was currently on the scale of issue.

It was decided to avoid equipment that would generate high capital costs followed by high training and maintenance costs (ie: long range snow machines). All equipment and clothing was to be purchased "off the shelf". The following table outlines the proposed acquisition schedule for the new items and the associated costs. The proposed project was to commence during FY 95/96 and to end in FY 99/00. Approval was requested to amend the equipment scales and to acquire the new items at a total capital cost, for FY 95/96, of $1.225M. This was to be a one-time expenditure in that fiscal year. It was also proposed that the National Procurement Estimate (NPE) be increased to include the maintenance purchases of clothing for the next four FYs (96/97 to 99/00).

**TABLE 1 - P9175 FIN ESTIMATES AND INCREMENTAL COSTS — EQUIPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>95/96</th>
<th>96/97</th>
<th>97/98</th>
<th>98/99</th>
<th>99/00</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 80 GPS</td>
<td>80K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 160 HF Transceivers</td>
<td>480K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>480K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 4000 Sweatshirts (initial purchase)</td>
<td>200K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 2000 Sweatshirts (maintenance)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 4000 tuques</td>
<td>25K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 4000 t-shirts (initial purchase)</td>
<td>40K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 2000 t-shirts (maintenance)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20K</td>
<td>20K</td>
<td>20K</td>
<td>20K</td>
<td>80K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire 4000 Ranger vests</td>
<td>400K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,225M</td>
<td>120K</td>
<td>120K</td>
<td>120K</td>
<td>120K</td>
<td>1,705M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On 30 June 1999, the Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project received PCB approval, and on 23 July 1995, Ministerial approval was granted to proceed. This meant:

a. approval for the Canadian Ranger Scales of equipment and clothing at a total five year incremental cost of $3.888M (FY 99/00);

b. approval to direct an increase in the NPE, CFNA and LFC Vote 1 baseline O&M allocations related to the increase in Ranger patrols in the amount of $425K (FY 96/97), $600K (FY 97/98), $790K (FY 98/99) and $795K (FY 99/00) reaching steady state in FY 99/00; and

c. the acquisition of new scaled items for the Canadian Rangers at a total Vote 5 capital cost of $1.278M (FY 95/96) to be funded from the VCDS Reserve.

In September 1995, DGRC, Comd CFNA, Comd LFC and Comd AIRCOM were directed by the VCDS to implement the Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project as outlined above.

Equipment Acquisition

**GPS and Radios:**

CFNA and SQFT were authorized to locally procure GPS and SBX-11A radios in February 1996. CFNA was allocated $452K for the purchase of 140 radios and $28K for the purchase of seventy GPS. SQFT was allocated $30K for the purchase of twenty radios and $4K for the purchase of twelve GPS. All procurement was completed by 31 March 1996. Of the total allocation ($486K), $165K was not expended.

The GPS and SBX-11 A radios were the only items acquired during FY 95/96, despite the fact that all capital procurements were to have taken place in that timeframe. Project funds were either carried forward, or funds were re-allocated by Director Soldier Systems Program Management (DSSPM) (TBC). Common practice at the time saw DSSPM as the primary funds manager for projects. *Project funds that could not be expended during 95/96 may have been spent in their entirety on other purchases that could be completed by the end of the FY. If this was the case, DSSPM would have then set aside/re-allocated the required funds in 96/97 and subsequent years for the completion of P9175.*

It was noted by the Project Manager (Maj Sutherland) that personnel cuts in Director Procurement and Supply Land (DPSL), the re-organization and combination of Director Ammunition, Clothing and Material Engineering (DACME) and selected DPSL personnel into DSSPM and further personnel cuts impeded the process of identifying, developing and sealing the clothing and
equipment items. The matter of resolving the design of the Ranger insignia added to the time it took to acquire sample patterns and to proceed with the contracting process. By October 1996, it was hoped the procurement could still be completed by the end of FY 96/97, but due to the above-mentioned problems, the last of the items were not delivered until summer 1998.

2. Ranger Safety Vests:

The P9175 Project Manager coordinated the acquisition of a Ranger safety vest during FY 96/97. 1,200 vests were acquired by DSSPM during the latter part of 1996 for initial allocations and to establish a national depot holding. The item was sealed and added to the Ranger scale of issue (it should be noted that this item was to be added to the Ranger Instructor scale of issue at the same time, but this did not take place). Although only 4,000 vests were to be acquired initially, the Areas were authorized in February 1997 to acquire an additional 3,950 vests (total allocation: $112.5K) through a national standing offer.

1 CRPG identified problems with the vests once they were distributed to the Rangers for wear:

a. Black lettering on the back of the vest: Printing stuck together and pulled off the yellow reflective material when pried apart (this rendered the writing illegible). This problem was identified in a high percentage of the vests. However, since it was a new piece of kit, the Rangers took them anyway and filled in the missing letters using a black marker;
b. a number of the vests did not have the Ranger crest sewn on the front;
c. the vests were one size fits all. In many instances, the vests would not fit over parkas;
d. the elastic found on the sides and on the front buckle had a tendency to break when it was cold or over-stretched;
e. the yellow reflective tape cracked and broke when cold;
f. the front buckle was very difficult to undo when wearing mitts; and
g. the vest did not have any pockets (when the vest was worn over a coat or parka, it was very difficult to access the pockets underneath).

Personnel from 1 CRPG predicted at that time that the vest would not stand up to any amount of normal wear and tear. In November 1997, action was initiated by DSSPM personnel to recall the vests and to outline the above-mentioned problems. A message was sent to CFNA in February 1998 requesting sizing information to support improvement of the product. This information was requested again in October 1999, and the CRPGs were asked to submit their
recommendations for a replacement vest (recommended improvements will be discussed in a follow-up section of this report).

3. Ranger sweatshirts/t-shirts:

Contracts were awarded for the acquisition of 4,000 each of Ranger sweatshirts and t-shirts in June and July 1997, respectively. As was mentioned earlier, the re-organization of Director Procurement and Supply Land (DPSL), the combination with the Director Ammunition, Clothing and Material Engineering (DACME) into DSSPM, and the associated personnel cuts impeded the process of identifying, developing and sealing the clothing and equip items. Due to the length of the contracting process, the quantities ordered were increased to 6,000 of each item during the fall of 1997. Delivery of the clothing to the depots was not completed until March 1998.

Although the initial proposal submitted in 1995 called for an initial buy of 4,000 sweatshirts and t-shirts during FY 95/96, with maintenance purchases of 2,000 of each item during FYs 96/97, 97/98, 98/99 and 99/00 (for a total of 12,000 of each item), no maintenance buys took place during FYs 98/99 and 99/00 even though the National Procurement Estimate (NPE) was increased to accommodate these acquisitions.

4. Ranger tuques:

4,000 Ranger tuques were procured during FY 97/98 and placed in the depots and the item added to the Ranger scale of issue. It was noted by representatives from 1 CRPG during the Ranger Working Group Meeting of 26/27 November 1998 that the tuques were not warm enough, and as a result, the Rangers were not wearing them.

5. Ranger flags:

During the Ranger Working Group Meeting of 13/14 November 1996, all Areas agreed that the Rangers should have a common camp flag. The point was raised that the Rangers fly this flag in tandem with the Canadian flag during sovereignty patrols and while engaged in North Warning System duties. D Res personnel staffed a request to the VCDS to amend the scope of the Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project to allow for the acquisition of 200 camp flags. VCDS approval to amend scope of project was given on 06 March 1997. The 200 flags were acquired and distributed to the Areas in October 1997. The camp flag was subsequently added to the Ranger patrol scale of issue.

6. Ballcaps:

Although not included in the original scope of the Ranger Enhancement Project, it was thought to be prudent to acquire more Canadian Ranger ballcaps
when there was sufficient funding available (this item was already on the Ranger scale of issue). As such, 4,000 ballcaps were acquired and delivered to the depots by 31 March 1998.

7. Junior Canadian Ranger sweatshirts:

During FY 96/97, $25K of P9175 funding was set aside for the development and procurement of 700 Junior Canadian Ranger sweatshirts. The contract was prepared in tandem with those for the Ranger sweatshirts and t-shirts, and delivery was completed during the same timeframe (FY 97/98).

Summary of Acquisitions and Associated Expenditures

The following table summarizes when each item was acquired, quantities and the total costs associated.

**TABLE 2 — P9175 REP EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>GPS-SQFT</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$3900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>GPS-CFNA</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>$26,785.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Radios-SQFT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$28,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Radios-CFNA</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>$334,952.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>$9,834.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Service charges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$120.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ranger vests</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>$296,798.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ranger vests (Area acquisitions)</td>
<td>3950</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ranger Sweatshirts</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ranger T-shirts</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ranger Tuques</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ranger Ballcaps</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>JCR Sweatshirts</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total expended on P9175</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$678,979.19</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All proposed acquisitions were completed by the end of FY 97/98, with the exception of the maintenance buys of sweatshirts and t-shirts for FYs 98/99 and 99/00. The project was determined to be complete, and the unexpended capital funds ($546K) were *re-allocated to other projects or returned to the VCDS Reserve (TBC)*.

Prepared by: Capt D.L. Gillan, D Res 2-3-2
Date: November 1999
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

1. The Canadian Rangers (Rangers) were formed on 23 May 1947 with an organizational base similar to that of the Pacific Coast Militia (PCM) Rangers of World War II (WW II). The primary role assigned to the PCM Rangers had been one of ensuring Canadian territorial security. This involved surveillance of the coastlines in sparsely settled areas of the country. As the atmosphere of emergency and threatened national security faded after WW II, so did the interest and support for a continued Ranger force. However, with the renewed interest in the protection of Canadian sovereignty that manifested itself in the early 1970s, initiatives were taken to rejuvenate the Ranger force in the North. Today, there are approximately 3,500 dedicated Rangers located in seven provinces and three territories.

2. In 1996, the MND announced the implementation of a youth programme called the Young Rangers (name subsequently officially changed to Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR)). The objective of the JCR Programme is to provide a structured and supervised youth programme, promoting traditional cultures and lifestyles in remote and isolated communities of Canada. JCR patrols are closely associated and co-located with Ranger patrols who, in conjunction with the community leaders, provide the youth with the requisite instructors and supervision. Current participation in the JCR Programme is approximately 1100 youth in 41 separate communities. Participation goals for the end of 2000/01 are 2130 youth in 71 communities.

3. In the spring of 1999, Secteur Québec Force terrestre (SQFT) submitted a request to expand their Ranger operations, principally for operational reasons, but also to facilitate JCR expansion. This was a reiteration of an expansion plan (Phase 2 and 3) originally proposed in the Ranger South of 60 Study. This more recent request resulted in a recommendation for a review of both the Rangers and the JCR Programme to ensure that expansion is desired, necessary and supportable. This review is thought to be timely in that the Ranger Enhancement
Project should have been completed by this time period as the last review of the Rangers was conducted five years ago. Consequently, the VCDS mandated this review which has been named CAN RAN 2000.

4. The CAN RAN 2000 review examines the overall relevance and impact of the Rangers with respect to the operations of the Canadian Forces as well as within the context of CF support for Canadian Government/National objectives.

Major Findings

5. Operational Issues: The value, contribution, role and tasks of the Rangers as an operational resource for the Canadian Forces has been reasserted throughout the review. From an operational perspective it has been determined that an increase in the Ranger manning ceiling would benefit the Canadian Forces. This expansion would also positively influence social behaviour at the community level, particularly with respect to a growing youth population who is deemed to be “at risk”.

6. Political and Social Impacts: From a national perspective, the ability of the CF to exercise sovereignty in remote and isolated regions of the country is partially maintained through the standing presence of the Rangers and also through the Sovereignty Patrols/Operations that they regularly conduct. From a domestic operations perspective, it has been noted that the value of Rangers today far exceeds that of being the ‘eyes and ears’ of the military in remote and isolated communities. Their communities have increasingly turned to the Rangers in times of disaster or stress, to guide them out of whatever dilemma or problem that has befallen them. This is indicative of the high esteem with which Rangers are held within their communities. Additionally, the Rangers have a significant role in the implementation of the Canadian Forces newest youth programme: the Junior Canadian Ranger (JCR) Programme. Various stakeholders have reported that the JCR Programme is having a significant and positive impact on their youth and consequently there has been an increasing demand by many community and regional authorities for an expansion of the programme into more communities.

7. Organizational Structure: Reorganization of the Rangers from the company/platoon structure to patrol group/patrols was directed in the 1995 Way Ahead paper. This reorganization allowed for the formation of the five Canadian Rangers Patrol Groups (CRPG). The CRPG HQs currently support both the Rangers and the JCRs at the field level. The success of these two programmes depends on the dedication of the CRPG HQ personnel. In order to conduct the Programme in its expanded mode, additional instructors will need to be hired to support the field requirements as well as support staff to manage the materiel
resources and conduct the required administration. Dedicated information technology/systems (IT) capacity will also need to be acquired. Additionally, to support personnel growth, there may be a requirement for further review of infrastructure requirements.

8. Personnel Issues: Currently there are a variety of personnel policies that impact on the Rangers and the CRPG HQ staffs. It appears that some of these policies may need to be reviewed to improve the quality of life of personnel from these organizations and also to reflect the unique nature of the Rangers and of the JCR Programme.

9. Equipment: The REP was initiated in 1995 with the aim of ensuring that the Rangers had the proper tools to fulfil their task (GPS, radios and uniforms). The REP was completed in 1999 but in light of various equipment deficiencies, problems with the quality and numbers of items purchased in the REP and emerging new requirements, it appears that a second enhancement project is needed. Concurrent to the implementation of the second REP, the current scales of issue will need to be reviewed and amended to reflect the current requirements of the Rangers and of the JCR Programme.

10. Overall Conclusions/Recommendations: The study proposes an increase of the Ranger personnel ceiling from 3500 to 4800 Rangers and an expansion of the JCR programme from 2130 to 3900 JCRs over a period of five years. To successfully achieve these targets, there is a requirement for increased resources to be expended upon the Rangers, not only for pay, training, instructors and equipment but also for minimal increases to CRPG staff. The management of personnel and training resources should be delegated to the Area/CRPG level; however, equipment management should be done nationally. The Director General Reserves and Cadets (DGRC) is the staff principal for Ranger issues at the national level and consequently, should manage Ranger equipment procurement in addition to previously assigned responsibility for Ranger establishment control and policy co-ordination (in collaboration with ADM HR (Mil)). Likewise, administration and co-ordination nationally of the JCR Programme should remain with the DGRC while recognizing implementation is the responsibility of the CRPGs. The creation of a distinct cell (Ranger/JCR) within DGRC would seem to be most timely to ensure that relevant issues are addressed expeditiously. A periodic review (five year period) of the Ranger programme would also seem to be a useful method of evaluating and reviewing the Ranger programme to ensure it can continue to meet operational requirements as well as provide the leadership requirements of the JCR Programme.
11. In order to achieve the expansion of both the Rangers and of the JCR Programme, it is forecasted that the following resources will be required:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Ranger funding</th>
<th>JCR funding</th>
<th>REP II</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 00-01</td>
<td>$9,024 M</td>
<td>$5,315 M</td>
<td>$1,181 M</td>
<td>$15,520 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 01-02</td>
<td>$10,226 M</td>
<td>$5,968 M</td>
<td>$52 K</td>
<td>$16,246 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 02-03</td>
<td>$10,637 M</td>
<td>$5,681 M</td>
<td>$142 K</td>
<td>$16,460 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 03-04</td>
<td>$10,868 M</td>
<td>$6,284 M</td>
<td>$100 K</td>
<td>$17,252 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 04-05</td>
<td>$11,100 M</td>
<td>$6,005 M</td>
<td>$142 K</td>
<td>$17,247 M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
(1) All figures in Current dollar years.  
(2) The figures do not include infrastructure costs as they will have to be assessed individually.

INTRODUCTION

Background

1. The Canadian Rangers (Rangers) origin stems from the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers who were created in 1942 as coastal watchers. They were formally established as a Corps of the Reserve Militia by an Order-in-Council in 1947. The role of the Rangers as stated in 1947, was to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which could not conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the military. This role remains valid today.

2. Since their creation, command and control of the Rangers has shifted several times within the Canadian Forces, between staff branches and elements and between components within the Land Force. Since the early 1990s, the Rangers have been assigned to Land Forces Command (LFC) and Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA).

addressed certain deficiencies in the Ranger capabilities. The Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) and Program Control Board (PCB) approved the project and it received ministerial approval in July 1995. In September of 1995, concomitant with the approval of the REP, the VCDS issued further guidance on improvements to the Rangers via a Strategic Overview/Way Ahead document. This document confirmed Ranger roles and tasks and also addressed manning levels, reorganization, relocation and establishments. The REP was to have been completed by 1999, as were many of the recommendations/direction issued under the Way Ahead document.

4. In 1996, the MND announced the implementation of a youth programme called the Young Rangers (name subsequently officially changed to Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR)). The objective of the JCR Programme is to provide a structured and supervised youth programme, promoting traditional cultures and lifestyles in remote and isolated communities of Canada. This Programme had modest targets at the outset, but they have been significantly increased due to the infusion of financial support through Youth Initiatives proposed under the Federal Government’s Youth Employment Strategy. Current participation in the JCR Programme is approximately 1100 youth in 41 separate communities. Participation goals for the end of 2000/01 are 2130 youth in 71 communities.

5. Under the current criteria for establishing a JCR patrol, Rangers are used as the principal instructors in the Programme. Thus, a Ranger patrol must exist in, or be situated in close proximity to, the location where it is intended to establish a JCR patrol.

6. In the Spring of 1999, Secteur Québec Force terrestre (SQFT) submitted a request to expand their Ranger operations, principally for operational reasons, but also to facilitate JCR expansion. This was a reiteration of an expansion plan (Phase 2 and 3) originally proposed in the Ranger South of 60 Study. This more recent request resulted in a recommendation for a review of both the Rangers and the JCR Programme to ensure that expansion is desired, necessary and supportable. This review is thought to be timely in that the REP should have been completed by this time period as the last review of the Rangers was conducted five years ago. Consequently, the VCDS mandated this review which has been named CAN RAN 2000.

**Aim**

7. The aim of the CAN RAN 2000 is “to review the Canadian Rangers (programme), based both on its own merits and the requirements of the Junior Canadian Rangers.”
Scope

8. The CAN RAN 2000 review examines the overall relevance and impact of the Rangers with respect to the operations of the Canadian Forces as well as within the context of CF support for Canadian Government/National objectives. Additionally, the review examines the linkage between the Rangers and the JCR Programme. Initially, the Rangers and the JCR Programme were to be examined in the context of operational, social and political impact, however, as the review progressed, it became evident that long standing issues such as organizational structure, command and control, equipment and a myriad of personnel issues needed to be included within the review. The review is as comprehensive as possible given the time constraints but it should be noted that further work/analysis will be required in certain areas.

Methodology

9. The review, due to short timelines for its completion, was conducted by the DGRC, D Res 2-3 and D Res 2-3-2 (the Review Team). A review of all pertinent documents held within Chief of Reserves and Cadets (C Res & Cdts) was conducted, and subsequently, an action plan was developed. It was decided to adopt a consultative approach for the review, consisting of the development of a series of questions which were posed to all Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPG) and their respective headquarters (HQ) as well as Director Land Force Readiness (DLFR) of the Chief of Land Staff (CLS) to focus their attention on specifics of the review. Additionally, the Review Team visited each of the stakeholders. Moreover, advice was also sought from experts within the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) matrix. A draft report was circulated by mid-November 1999 and CAN RAN 2000 was a major agenda item at the annual Canadian Ranger Working Group (RWG) meeting which was held at the end of November 1999. A second draft of the review was circulated for additional comments by mid-December and thereafter, the final report was written and submitted to the VCDS by 31 January 2000.

Assumptions

10. The following assumptions have been made prior to the commencement of this review:

a. Both the Rangers and the JCR Programme will continue to exist and evolve for the foreseeable future;

b. Once a Ranger patrol or JCR patrol is established, provided they remain effective and of good conduct, there can be no withdrawal of those patrols from the communities without serious repercussions to the overall organizations;
c. The costs for the maintenance of the Rangers and the JCR Programme will increase yearly in accordance with normal economic trends and thus funding will need to be adjusted accordingly;

d. A pre-condition to the establishment of a JCR Patrol is the existence, for a suitable period of time, of a Ranger Patrol; and

e. Current baseline funding for the Canadian Rangers and for the JCR Programme will continue and increase.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Existence/Operational Need

11. The 1994 Defence White Paper stated that “The Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada’s identity and the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols.” By virtue of that statement, the Government and the Canadian Forces reaffirmed the requirement for the existence of the Rangers and indicated that they had a role to play in Canada’s Defence. The 1995 VCDS Strategic Overview/Way Ahead document gave further support to the Ranger concept, while also placing certain limitations/constraints upon the size of the component and on the location of Rangers.

12. The status and value of the Rangers was considered during the deliberations of the Special Committee on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR). In the Committee’s report in October 1995, Recommendation #19 commented upon the Rangers, specifically recommending (accepted by the Department of National Defence (DND)) “…that the Canadian Rangers Program be continued and enhanced.”

13. Recently released documents restate a Canadian Forces commitment to the Rangers’ current posture and into the future. For instance, Defence Strategy 2020 speaks of the Canadian Forces as “a visible national institution” and of the requirement for long term security and sovereignty; the Rangers must certainly be viewed as contributing to this vision of the Canadian Forces, given their composition (male/female/aboriginal/non-aboriginal) and physical location. Additionally, Defence Strategy 2020 indicates that the CF must contribute to the achievement of the Government’s priorities and assist other federal departments in the delivery of their programs. The implementation and conduct of the JCR Programme certainly falls well within this scope.

14. Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) 2000 contains several statements indicating a continuing operational need for the Rangers. Defence Objectives 2, 5, 6 and 7 are directly applicable to the Canadian Rangers and these are
reinforced in the corresponding tasks assigned to Chief of Land Staff. Tasks assigned to Commander Canadian Forces Northern Area in DPG 2000, specifically mention “…enhancing the Ranger, Junior Ranger and Cadet programs.”

15. In statements or interviews with the various commanders (LFC, CFNA, LFAs, CRPGs) all have reiterated a strong support of the Rangers and a continuing need for this resource to support their military operations. The Commander CFNA, in correspondence with the CDS, has expressed particular concern with his ability to protect and project sovereignty in his area of operations, thus reiterating continuing need for a military (Ranger) presence.

16. The value of the Rangers as an operational resource for the Canadian Forces cannot be disputed. They continue to perform their tasks exceptionally well, whether as per their original mandate or more recently assigned tasks (i.e. Northern Warning Site (NWS) patrols, Search and Rescue (SAR) assistance). Some significant recent examples of Ranger activities are:

a. Reporting of unidentified vessels within Canadian waters off the northeast coast of Quebec (Bay of Salluit);

b. Participating as observers/guides on the west coast countering illegal immigration;

c. Responding to aircraft crashes in the far north;

d. Participating in ground search and rescue (Fort Severn, Ontario);

e. Responding to natural disasters such as the avalanche in northern Quebec (Kangiqsualujjuaq); and

f. Rangers and personnel from 1 CRPG have taken part in a total of 164 volunteer Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR), one medevac and one emergency rescue during FY 99-00. The Kimmirut Patrol provided relief in the form of work crews following an avalanche in the community in March 99.

The Rangers also had a vital role to play in all Land Force Areas (LFA) and in Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA) during the transition to the year 2000 (Operation ABACUS).

Role

17. The role of the Rangers, as stated in the 1995 Strategic Overview/Way Ahead document, is “to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces”. The tasks assigned the Rangers are:
a. Provide a military presence in support of sovereignty:
   (1) Report unusual activities;
   (2) Collect local data of significance in support of military operations; and
   (3) Conduct surveillance/sovereignty patrols as tasked;

b. Within capabilities, assist CF activities in areas including:
   (1) Providing local expertise in terms of guides and advice;
   (2) Conducting NWS site patrols as tasked; and
   (3) Providing local assistance and advice to SAR activities.

18. There is consensus amongst stakeholders that this role statement remains valid, however, the creation of the JCR Programme has, in effect, expanded the role of the Rangers. The JCR Programme requires that a community fully supports the establishment of a JCR patrol and facilitates the delivery of two thirds of the Programme (Traditional Skills and Life Skills). The last third of the Programme, Ranger Skills, requires that a Ranger act as the principal instructor. Consequently, as mentioned in paragraph five, a Ranger patrol must exist in the community or be in close proximity. This linkage between the Rangers and the JCRs is a natural and logical bond between respected members of the community and their youth. It would seem prudent, therefore, to formalize this new task, which Rangers have performed since 1996, in their tasking list.

**Canadian Rangers - Patrol Location and Personnel Ceiling**

19. The perception by most personnel in the Canadian Forces is that the Rangers are located in small pockets in the Far North of the country. A review of the current deployments on the map at Annex A indicates that this is not true and that Rangers are located along all coastlines, as well as in some interior areas. Maps found at Annexes B and C illustrate current JCR patrol locations and combined Ranger/JCR patrol locations. The LFC Canadian Rangers South of 60 Study attempted to rationalize Ranger structure within LFC and proposed a slight reduction in overall numbers of LFC Rangers by the 1999 period while also recommending a shifting of numbers and relocation of patrols. Staff work within NDHQ opined views contrary to those of LFC, particularly with respect to Ranger locations, and thus, the 1995 Strategic Overview/Way Ahead document supported the LFC Study findings in general, but placed some caveats on the relocation of Rangers. For the most part, those caveats were concerned with numbers versus locations, and provided guidance that Rangers should not be located in areas which contained other government agencies (economy) as well as indicating a preference for new patrols to be on the coasts of the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans and Hudson and James Bays. Based on resources available, the VCDS directed, in the Way Ahead document, that “…the bulk of the effort must be focussed north of 60°… and priority to the establishment of new patrols should be given to those to be located in James and Hudson Bays”.

20. The caveats of the Way Ahead document, have been taken by some to be as caste in concrete, never to be re-examined, thus leaving the perception that Rangers could never be located in interior areas. This perception was further proliferated by selective acceptance of some of the recommendations from the LFC the Ranger South of 60 Study for implementation via the Way Ahead document. A more interpretive view of the Way Ahead document leads one to believe that interior patrols could/should exist particularly if they support national development and increase the capacity of the CRPGs to assist civil authorities. Although the proposals put forth in the LFC the Ranger South of 60 Study addressed the relocation of Rangers while indicating that there was no need, at that time, to increase their numbers, the view today is somewhat different. LFC Areas/CRPGs propose to increase both their patrols as well as their overall numbers.

21. A review of the responses of the LFC patrol groups indicates a desire to create new patrols in all LFAs in order to close some existing gaps in ground surveillance coverage (James Bay) as well as to enhance their local domestic operations capacity, particularly in areas away from the coastline. The largest increases are proposed for SQFT and LFCA. SQFT’s proposal, which is in concert with their submission in the Ranger South of 60 Study, is to create 10 patrols on the James Bay coast and in the interior of Quebec. Aside from the surveillance and domestic operations rationale, this expansion will result in greater Ranger and CF involvement in the Cree and Neskapi Nations. In the case of LFCA, 3 CRPG proposes to increase patrols from their current nine to 20, primarily focussed in the Northwest Ontario/Eastern Manitoba area. It should be noted that the 3 CRPG proposed expansion (Annex D) into Eastern Manitoba is based on using the traditional boundaries of the Cree and Ojicree in that area vice using political boundaries. It should be noted that homogeneity is an important factor in the creation of Ranger patrols amongst some native peoples but hopefully this would be less so with time. The LFCA/3 CRPG proposal is significantly larger than that proposed in the the Ranger South of 60 Study (total 12 in Ontario), particularly when considering that LFWA, in that same study, had proposed only three patrols in the eastern part of Manitoba into which 3 CRPG wishes to expand. The 3 CRPG proposal may be ambitious, but its value should be viewed in the context of enhancing the ability to provide local and rapid response to civil authorities as well as support of national development.
goals. The LFCA/3 CRPG proposed expansion requires that the Commanders of LFCA and LFWA accept a change in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) for their respective CRPGs.

22. The Rangers current personnel ceiling is a total of 3500 Rangers. CFNA has been allocated 1330 positions with the remaining 2170 split amongst the LFAs. There are two arguments for an increase in the personnel ceiling: first, an increase in patrols requires an increase in numbers and second, the present allocation does not take into account the manning model for patrols. The Ranger Working Group (RWG) meeting in December 1995 agreed to adopt as a general rule that patrols should be no smaller than 12 and no larger than 30 personnel. This was amended at the RWG in November/December 1999 to no less than eight with no maximum number, but accepting that 30 Rangers per patrol is a logical figure to use for planning purposes. Manning patrols at 30 Rangers would allow the Patrol Group Commanding Officers a level of assurance that they will have sufficient Rangers available for training or operations at any one time, remembering that Rangers are volunteers who are not obligated to undergo annual training or operations except if called to active service by Governor-in-Council.

23. The correlation between the manning ceiling and the number of Ranger patrols has never been exact, nor should it be, given the number of variables at play. Controlling Rangers by concentrating on overall numbers, rather than by location would allow Area Commanders the flexibility to establish patrols within their designated AOR based on local conditions (changing demographics) and in response to operational and national objectives. In the case of CFNA, they will reach their ‘authorized’ patrol limit of 60 during FY 00/01, but due to the ceiling restriction, they will still have gaps (see Annex E) in their ground surveillance capacity. Their patrols will also be manned at less than desirable levels although there is strong interest in the communities to participate more fully in the Rangers.

24. Accepting the requests from the LFAs and CFNA to increase personnel ceilings would result in raising the Ranger ceiling to 4800. This increase would cater to the proper manning of existing patrols (i.e. CFNA) and would allow for the expansion of patrols into new areas (LFAs, CFNA), thereby increasing the effectiveness and enhancing the operational capability of Commanders. Correspondingly, the increase in total numbers of Rangers and locations where patrols are situated would blend well with national objectives. The increase in the personnel ceiling should be phased-in over five years and ceiling control should remain with VCDS/DGRC and be reviewed periodically (five-year period).
25. The following graphics demonstrate the proposed increase in Rangers:

**Current Distribution of Rangers per CRPG**

- 5 CPRG: 790 Rangers (23%)
- 4 CPRG: 650 Rangers (19%)
- 3 CPRG: 205 Rangers (6%)
- 2 CPRG: 525 Rangers (15%)
- 1 CPRG: 1330 Rangers (37%)

**Proposed Distribution of Rangers March 2005**

- 5 CPRG: 790 Rangers (16%)
- 4 CPRG: 740 Rangers (15%)
- 3 CPRG: 600 Rangers (13%)
- 2 CPRG: 870 Rangers (18%)
- 1 CPRG: 1800 Rangers (38%)

**Note:** Reflects an expansion of 1300 Rangers (3500 to 4800)

**Junior Canadian Rangers – Patrol Location and Participation**

26. The JCR Programme is offered to communities in the remote and isolated areas of Canada providing that there is no Cadet corps or squadron in existence, that the community desires the Programme and will support it and that there is a Ranger patrol in the vicinity. Currently, there are approximately 1100 youth participating in the JCR Programme in 41 communities in CFNA, SQFT and LFCA. LFWA and LFAA have expressed interest in the Programme and will establish some patrols in this fiscal year. The growth of this Programme during its short life span has been tremendous, demonstrating a strong desire for this type of initiative as well as indicating the full acceptance by the communities of their responsibilities within the Programme.

27. The JCR Programme has had an orderly expansion based on funding available and patrols have been created in concert with the establishment criteria/guidance. There are no restrictions on the total number of patrols other than what is affordable within the current funding envelope. Equally, there is no
restriction on the number of youth in each patrol as this will be dependant upon the number of youth in the community who fall within the required age bracket of 12-18 years and the size of the community; however, the figure of 30 is used for planning purposes. The linkage between JCR patrols and Ranger patrols has been discussed in previous paragraphs (5 and 18) thus, it would seem logical that further expansion of the JCR Programme would follow Ranger expansion, providing the establishment criteria is followed.

28. Increases in the personnel ceiling of Ranger patrols will positively affect the JCR Programme as more Rangers equates to more JCR instructors. Additionally, the flexibility of Commanders to create patrols within their areas based upon need, whether for operational imperatives or support of national objectives, will allow the creation of JCR patrols in new areas and thus access to the Programme by more communities.

Recommendations

R1. Ranger numbers should be increased to a ceiling of 4800 from the current ceiling of 3500 as follows:

a. 1800 for CFNA,

b. 3000 for LFC:
   1) LFWA – 740
   2) LFCA – 600
   3) SQFT – 870
   4) LFAA – 790

This increase should be phased in over a five-year period and the allocation should be managed by VCDS/DGRC with periodic review. Area Commanders should have flexibility within these numbers to establish adequate numbers of patrols at appropriate locations.

R2. Ranger patrols, as a principle, should be manned at no less than 8 personnel with no upper limit. Geography and demographic factors will dictate patrol strength and thus smaller or larger groupings should/will not be precluded. For planning purposes, 30 personnel per patrol should be used.

R3. Location of Ranger patrols should be at the discretion of the Area Commander based upon operational and national objectives, including support to the JCR Programme. Previous criteria for establishing, disbanding and relocating patrols should continue to guide local commanders, however, no one factor (i.e. isolated, northern, coastline, economics, other government
agencies) should negate consideration for the establishment of a patrol in a certain area.

R4. The support and conduct of the JCR Programme should be formally included into the stated Ranger tasks.

SOCIAL IMPACTS

29. Diversity is the keynote word in describing Canada. At 9,970,610 square kilometres, Canada is the world’s second-largest country, spanning six time zones, with tremendous ranges in geographic and climatic conditions from frozen icecaps north of the 70th parallel to luxuriant vegetation on the west coast to avid fruit producing areas on the 49th parallel. The population of over 30 million people reflects the same diversity as the physical landscape of the country. Forty-two percent of Canadians, including Aboriginals, claim heritage other than British or French and it is predicted that this number will rise to 56 percent within the next decade. Canada has two official languages but the variety of languages and dialects spoken reflect the demographic composition of the country. Canada has a long-standing policy of multi-culturalism and our Constitution considers every individual equal before and under the law, extending the right of equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination.

30. The composition of the Rangers and of the JCRs reflects the multi-cultural dimension of Canada. Both organizations are open to all Canadians, however, over half of the participants are Aboriginal (there are approximately 1.1 million Aboriginal people -Status Indians, Metis, non-status Indians and Inuit - in Canada).

31. The Aboriginal population of our country is a population at risk. The latest federal-provincial Report on the Health of Canadians, released in September 1999, states that suicide among First Nation’s people is two to seven times more frequent than in the population at large. The study also found a suicide rate of 79 per 100,000 among the Inuit. The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples states the Aboriginal people’s living standards have improved in the past 50 years, but they do not come close to those of non-Aboriginal people:

- Life expectancy is lower.
- Illness is more common.
- Human problems, from family violence to alcohol abuse, are more common.
- Fewer children graduate from high school.
• Far fewer go on to colleges and universities.
• The homes of Aboriginal people are more often flimsy, leaky and overcrowded.
• Water and sanitation systems in Aboriginal communities are more often inadequate.
• Fewer Aboriginal people have jobs.
• More spend time in jails and prisons.

**Canadian Rangers**

32. By their nature, the Canadian Rangers are having a tremendous impact on the lives of the people and communities in which they are located. There are a significant number of Rangers who are in leadership positions within their communities. Whether they are mayors or Chiefs or simply known as ‘the Ranger Sergeant’, they are active community members who are in a position to have a positive influence on their local environment. Rangers, in those communities where there is no other federal presence, are often perceived to be the elite of the community and are held up as role models for others. Frequently the Rangers represent the only identifiable and formed group that is readily available to the community in times of need. Although they are volunteers, their training has enabled them to take the lead in community activities. For instance, the Rangers have performed a variety of voluntary tasks ranging from guides, preservation of property, first aid training, flood evacuations, funeral attendance, Remembrance Day participation and participation in SAR activities as citizens.

33. The social impact of the Rangers transcends community boundaries. For instance, as the situation warrants, Ranger patrols have come together as one to help each other. A very recent example of this was the avalanche at Kangiqsualujjuaq, Quebec on 01 January 1999, where 11 patrols (11 of 14 Nunavik patrols in 2 CRPG) physically responded to the emergency while material support was provided from as far away as the Coral Harbour Patrol (1 CRPG) who harvested and shipped fresh caribou to the disaster site. This extraordinary effort resulted in the awarding of the Canadian Forces Unit Commendation to 2 CRPG.

34. The Rangers have now taken on a new role – they are educators and role models for over a thousand youth that participate in the JCR Programme. Consequently, there is beneficial value in the presence of Rangers in a community both from the perspective of enhancing the community environment as well as adding to the image of the federal government and the Canadian Forces.
**Junior Canadian Rangers**

35. The JCR Programme enables young people to become involved in meaningful activities and experiences not usually offered in isolated communities. These activities foster good citizenship, community responsibility, personal health and welfare, and self-esteem, which build a stronger, healthier community for all.

36. The following poignant statement reflects a common perception about the JCR Programme:

“The Canadian Rangers have always been (a) role model for many Inuit youth who for a long time have been looking forward (to) the day that they will be old enough (to) become a Canadian Ranger. The creation of the Junior Ranger units, piloted (by) the Canadian Rangers, now provides for a structured framework in preparing the youth for the future.

As you know, there are very few structured activities that the youth can participate in throughout Nunavik and the (Junior) Rangers is one activity that can teach a variety of skills that will be helpful to those boys and girls for the rest of their lives. Also, it is important to mention that Nunavik has the highest suicide rate in the country and especially so for youth. Junior Rangers provides learning and developing life skills that will definitely help in reducing this situation”. *(Source: “Junior Rangers Nunavik”, Kativik Regional Government, 27 February 1998).*

37. Although the implementation of the JCR Programme is fairly recent, it is deemed to be a success. Various testimonies, such as the one above, comment positively on the Programme’s impact on both the youth and the community. The JCR Programme, catering to the 12-18 age group, is often the only organized youth programme in many of these remote and isolated communities. The acceptance of the JCR Programme at the national level and its potential for positive social change can be summed up by the following comment:

“Ethel Blondin-Andrews (Secretary of State for Children and Youth) noted that the most successful youth program in the North is the Junior (Canadian) Rangers, where Inuit kids come into the programme. If you compare their social behavior to those who are outside, in terms of social problems, its virtually zero; its clearly a very therapeutic programme.” *(Source: “We’re doing things nobody else can do”, Ottawa Citizen, 05 April 1998, A7)*
Recommendations

R5. The creation of a Ranger patrol for national/social fabric reasons should be considered to be legitimate. The overall guiding principle for establishment of a patrol should be the benefit to the country as a whole.

R6. The JCR Programme has proven during its short period of existence to have a positive and meaningful impact on the lives of youth in the remote and isolated parts of our country. It would be prudent to continue to expand the JCR Programme into receptive communities. An expansion plan should be developed, taking into account resource and support capabilities of the CF as well as other government departments and concerned agencies.

POLITICAL IMPACTS

A National Perspective

Sovereignty in the North

38. The protection of the sovereignty of Canada continues to be a pillar of Canada’s foreign and defence policy. There are concerns over the ability of the Canadian Forces to exercise our sovereignty in the remote regions of the country and perhaps the threat today is more diverse than the military threat during the years of the Cold War. We exercise our sovereignty regularly with deployments of forces from the south to the north, through over-flights and with the standing presence of the Rangers.

39. The Government remains committed to the exercising of sovereignty over our northern and other remote areas. This is quite evident in the following excerpt from the Government response to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Report concerning demilitarization of the Arctic:

“The Government does not support the demilitarization of the Arctic as this would entail an abandonment of the Canadian military presence in the North. Our military has had a long and distinguished history of Arctic operations. The present-day communication, navigation and transportation networks are just some of the products of a military presence in the North.

Demilitarization of the Arctic would make it more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, for our military personnel to provide defence services available to Canadians in other parts of the country. The Canadian Forces, for example, would be unable to conduct operations to protect our sovereign territory (thereby contradicting the thrust of Recommendation 14) or to provide humanitarian assistance, including rescuing people from
downed aircraft. (It might be added, in this context, that Canada, the United States and Russia are currently negotiating an agreement for search and rescue co-operation in the Arctic.)

Additionally, the cultural inter-play of service people serving in our North has an intangible benefit in promoting a sense of national awareness among the military and those northern residents who come in contact with the military. A military presence in the North also provides Canada’s Aboriginal peoples with an opportunity to serve their country and community through participation in the Canadian Rangers.”

(Source: Government Response to Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Report “Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Co-operation Into the Twenty-First Century”, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999 - Recommendation 15/Demilitarization in the Arctic)

40. Other published papers and draft documents also cite the importance of the Rangers as key elements of sovereignty projection. The following passages reflect the disproportionate positive impact that the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups have in comparison to their relatively small size and financial cost:

“Although the ending of the Cold War has seen a discernible waning of public attention to the threats to Arctic sovereignty that made headlines in the 1970s and 1980s, Canada has continued a variety of sovereignty support activities, such as patrols by long-range patrol aircraft, the Ranger program and operation of the North Warning System. At the same time, northerners have remained concerned that Canada should possess the will and capability to monitor and enforce its laws and regulations with respect to wildlife, pollution, the behaviour of tourists toward northern archaeological sites, and so on. Thus, exercising full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago will remain a central element of Canada’s northern foreign policy.

Although the ending of the Cold War has produced a substantial lowering of military alert levels between the nuclear forces of the NATO alliance and Russia, enabled significant reductions in nuclear arms and conventional forces, and lessened military activity generally in the Arctic region, it has not led to the demilitarization of the region. Nor is there any real prospect of such a step in the foreseeable future. In fact, the Government does not support the demilitarisation of the Arctic, as this would entail an abandonment of the Canadian military presence in the
north. In this context, strengthening and consolidating regional security will remain an important priority of Canada’s northern foreign policy.”

(Source: “Toward A Northern Foreign Policy For Canada, A Consultation Paper”, Department Of Foreign Affairs And International Affairs, September 1998)

**Domestic Operations**

41. Rangers are the only formed and organized group, in most of their communities, who are trained to act together in small party tasks. These communities expect Rangers to respond to local emergency situations. They regularly do so, often volunteering as a group. At times, due to the fact that they are the only trained organization in the community, the Rangers take on as volunteers and citizens the role of ‘leadership/law enforcement’. This personally imposed obligation that these citizen-soldiers feel toward their communities is very much a part of Ranger culture. The majority of the responses have been in the area of ground search and rescue. As the Rangers represent almost 90 percent of the Canadian Forces representation north of the 55th parallel, this expectation of response by the Rangers is imbedded in thinking both locally and at the national level and across federal department boundaries:

“While the risk from environmental emergencies has attracted considerable attention from Arctic countries, non-environmental accidents are becoming more probable as the volume of developmental and scientific activity and of travel grows within the circumpolar world. Given their possession of the requisite equipment and training, national military forces have a key role to play in aiding civil authorities to deal with such situations. Canada looks to the Canadian Forces to support the civil authorities in responding to natural and human-caused disasters, as well as search and rescue incidents. Co-operation with our circumpolar neighbours in this area will be an important element of Canada’s northern foreign policy. (Source: “Toward A Northern Foreign Policy For Canada, A Consultation Paper”, Department Of Foreign Affairs And International Affairs, September 1998)

**A Regional Perspective**

42. The Rangers, as a component of the Reserve Force, are funded by the Department of National Defence. Although there is strong regional support for their activities, materiel support, for the most part remains a national responsibility.
43. The JCR Programme, although a Canadian Forces initiative, has attracted supporters from different levels and departments of government. Currently, the JCR Programme is funded by the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). Other federal, provincial or territorial and local agencies have increasingly expressed interest in becoming involved in this Programme, with the Kativik Regional Government (KRG) in northern Quebec being the most proactive. The KRG has provided financial, materiel and personnel support to the JCR Programme as well as actively promoting the Programme through various communications venues. The interest and support within DND remains very strong as evidenced by this recent statement by the Deputy Minister National Defence, Mr. Jim Judd:

“I think that this is a terrific programme for youth in the North. If we can expand it effectively, we should do so”. (06 March 1999)

44. Staff work has commenced to prolong the relationship between DND and HRDC. Similar work should be initiated with other interested federal departments as well as at the regional/provincial level. The Nishnawbe-Aski Nation (NAN) in northwestern Ontario is a logical organization that should be approached to formalize support for the JCR Programme.

Recommendations

R7. Given the political intentions to exert our sovereignty in the north (and not de-militarize), increased military presence should be implemented by increasing the numbers of Rangers in concert with recommendation R1.

R8. As Rangers are de-facto, often the only trained organization in the community who can take on a ‘legitimate enforcement’ role, liaison should be effected with the proper legal authorities to establish recognition of this situation and for the development of joint operation procedures (SOP).

R9. Every effort should be made to engage a wide variety of national, provincial, territorial and regional governments, departments and organizations to support the JCR Programme while recognizing that the Programme is community-based and must not become too complex or bureaucratic.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Command and Control

45. The 1995 Strategic Overview/Way Ahead mandated DGRC to complete a command and control study. That study’s aim was to establish the proper lines
of command and control so that matters such as discipline and powers of write off could be clarified. This study was to be completed by end of December 1995.

46. In June 1995, DGRC produced a draft document titled *Service Paper on the Command and Control of the Canadian Rangers*, which recommended the following:

   a. A Ministerial Organizational Order (MOO) be completed as soon as possible to legally constitute the Canadian Rangers;
   
   b. The Canadian Rangers CFOO should be revised to reflect that the Rangers are NDHQ controlled, but that operational and administrative control has been assigned to LFC and CFNA;
   
   c. The Canadian Rangers should remain NDHQ/VCDS controlled units; and
   
   d. The VCDS should continue to exercise control over the Canadian Ranger programme and that NDHQ/Directorate of Reserves remain the responsible office within NDHQ for Ranger matters.

47. The recommendations emanating from this draft service paper have been partially implemented while some others have been overtaken by events. The MND signed MOO 97069, dated 24 November 1997, which authorized the formation of the five CRPGs as units of the Canadian Forces embodied in the Reserve Force. Additionally, individual CFOOs have been promulgated which defines the command and control of the CRPGs thus negating the requirement for any further work on draft CFOO 1.7. This was affirmed at the RWG in November/December 1999. However, there is a requirement to clarify the role of NDHQ staff with respect to the Rangers. The 1995 Way Ahead paper stated that the DGRC, as the staff principal for the VCDS, would be responsible for establishment control. Additionally, DGRC was assigned responsibility for policy development and monitoring the application of that policy as well as the management of the Ranger Enhancement Project. As the actual Ranger resources are split amongst LFC and CFNA, it would seem prudent that DGRC should continue to execute this role and to monitor all Ranger issues in the same vein as other Reserve Force issues. DGRC should continue to develop Ranger policy (in collaboration with ADM HR (Mil)) and manage equipment issues in conjunction with the CRPGs/various commanders in the Ranger chain of command, using the Ranger Working Group as the main venue for consultation. Direct liaison by DGRC with the CRPGs, in this regard, is recommended recognizing, however that parent headquarters must be kept informed.

48. The advent of the JCR Programme brings a new twist to the issue of Command and Control. At present, the Programme is administered and co-
ordinated through the office of the DGRC with each CRPG implementing the Programme in their area. Channels of communication have been direct to the CRPGs on day to day issues, however, CFNA and LFA HQs have been involved in major decisions, particularly with respect to the more recent expansions. As the JCR Programme is a new national youth programme and as funding for this Programme is allocated to the DGRC for his dispersion, the office of the DGRC should remain the focal point for co-ordinating all aspects of the Programme. This will ensure consistency and some necessary standardization in the important early stages of this programme as well as maximizing the limited resources currently allocated to it.

**Establishments**

49. The reorganization of the Rangers from the company/platoon structure to patrol group/patrols was directed in the 1995 Way Ahead paper. A draft standard unit model was developed to guide this reorganization, with the understanding that local conditions might cause some variances. As CFOOs, for each CRPG, have been approved only recently, progress by groups/patrols on creating proper establishments has lagged and there has been a distinct lack of uniformity amongst the CRPGs’ interim organizations. This has had a negative impact on planning and management of resources.

50. At the recent RWG meeting in November/December 1999, all CRPGs agreed to adhere to a functional organization of the CRPG based on the model at Annex F. The standard unit model takes into account that each patrol group should have full-time command, instructional and administrative cadres. Additionally, the CRPGs’ establishments should be true “Total Force” organizations. A balance should be sought to achieve representation by members of the Regular Force and Reserve Force, who would serve on both a full-time and part-time basis, in the most economical manner, to ensure that an experienced, knowledgeable core would support the Ranger patrols and the JCR Programme. To date, 1, 3 and 5 CRPGs have formalized their establishments in PeopleSoft and it is anticipated that 2 and 4 CRPGs’ establishments will have been completed in the near future.

51. CFNA is unique in its climate, physical area and the composition and size of its civilian population. To properly support their Rangers, CFNA requires proportionally more Regular Force personnel than the LFAs, primarily because there are few Primary or Supplementary Reservists available in CFNA to accept employment opportunities on a full-time basis. Currently, Regular Force personnel occupy all of the command and instructional staff positions in CFNA. To address an immediate shortage of staff, the VCDS has given approval in
principle for an increase to the CFNA establishment, and staffing of the Establishment Change (EC) has commenced with funding yet to be determined.

52. In keeping with executing national level responsibilities for the Rangers and JCR Programme, there is a requirement to have dedicated staff appointed within DGRC to carry out these duties. This requirement was recommended in the Chief of Review Services (CRS) Study of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Branch and Armed Forces Council approved this concept in October 1999. DGRC has included the creation of the Directorate of Rangers/Junior Canadian Rangers (D Rgr/JCR) in his Business Plan for 2000/2001 on direction from the VCDS. The proposed structure for D Rgr/JCR is found at Annex G. An EC should be submitted as soon as possible and appropriate administrative actions should be submitted/completed rapidly to formalize the existence of the new Directorate.

**Canadian Ranger Expansion/Ranger Instructors**

53. As mentioned previously, the Ranger numbers should be increased to a ceiling of 4800 from the current ceiling of 3500, as demonstrated in the chart below. A phased increase is proposed and thus costs will vary each year, however, it is estimated that this proposed increase would result in a total increase in Ranger “P costs” after five years of $1.5M. Detailed calculations can be found in the financial section of this document.

**Proposed Canadian Ranger Expansion**

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<td><strong>4800</strong></td>
<td><strong>165</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. Expansion of the Rangers at the field level (number of patrols vice numbers of Rangers) will require a proportional increase in staff/instructors at the CRPG HQ level to manage that expansion. The draft standard CRPG unit model,
produced in 1995 (Ref: 1901-260/0 (DGRC), Ranger Working Group Meeting, 12/13 Dec 1995 Meeting Minutes) included a ratio of one Ranger Instructor for every six Ranger patrols. This ratio has been used in all resource planning, albeit, slight adjustments have been necessary from time to time due to geographic considerations. Consequently, the proposed expansion of the Rangers to 4800 personnel and roughly 165 patrols will require an increase to a total of 28 Ranger Instructors. This will require the addition of $326K funding ($1.174M - $848K) to the Ranger budget.

**JCR Expansion/JCR Instructors**

55. The aim of the JCR Youth Initiative is to increase the number of patrols from 31 (July 1998) to 71 and the number of Junior Canadian Rangers from 583 to 2130 by FY 2000-2001, as detailed below:

**Youth Initiative Expansion of the JCR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRPG</th>
<th>FY 97-98</th>
<th>FY 98-99</th>
<th>FY 99-00</th>
<th>FY 00-01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stand up</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Stand up</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CRPG</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CRPG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CRPG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CRPG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CRPG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** 4 CRPG and 5 CRPG will start implementing the JCR Programme in their respective areas as of February 2000 and thus the anticipated end state in 2001 is in excess of 71 JCR patrols or more than originally forecasted under the Youth Initiative plan.

56. The expansion of the JCR Programme is on target. It is anticipated that there will be 2130 youth participating in the JCR Programme by March 2001. As mentioned in paragraph five and 25, the criteria to establish a JCR patrol are the presence of a Ranger patrol in close proximity to the location where it is intended to establish a JCR patrol, the absence of a Cadet corps or squadron and strong community support. The current JCR expansion plan is based on these criteria.

57. To assess the ability to expand the JCR Programme, areas to be precluded from consideration needed to be identified. The first chart below indicates that there are 35 Cadet corps or squadrons co-located in Ranger communities thus, removing them for consideration for the establishment of a JCR patrol. The chart
also indicates that there are an additional 50 communities which do not have a youth programme (Cadets or JCRs) but which could be offered the JCR Programme. The second chart indicates a phased expansion of the JCR into these identified 50 communities which would result in a total of 130 JCR patrols (equates to 3900 youth) by FY 2005. Based on the acceptance of the JCR Programme by communities and the number of requests for a structured youth programme to address a variety of social problems (suicides, drug abuse) in these areas, it would be prudent to consider expansion of the JCR Programme into these identified communities in the FY 2001-05 time frame.

### Potential JCR Patrol Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRPG</th>
<th>Number of Canadian Ranger Patrols (1)</th>
<th>Number of Cadet units co-located with Can Ran Patrols</th>
<th>Number of planned JCR locations</th>
<th>Potential new JCR locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CRPG</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CRPG</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CRPG</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CRPG</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CRPG</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>165</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>91</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The number of Ranger patrols is based on approval of the Rangers’ new manning ceiling, which represents approximately 165 patrols by March 2005.

### Possible JCR Patrol Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRPG</th>
<th>FY 00-01</th>
<th>FY 01-02</th>
<th>FY 02-03</th>
<th>FY 03-04</th>
<th>FY 04-05</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CRPG</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CRPG</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CRPG</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CRPG</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CRPG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>111</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for administering the JCR are being developed, however, current guidelines state that a new JCR patrol should be visited five times in its first year of existence and three times in the following years. As the Programme caters to youth that live in remote and isolated communities, the visits normally last an average of 10 days. In light of the responsibilities and level of supervision/guidance required for the JCR Programme it is recommended that the ratio of instructors to patrols be one
instructor per five patrols vice the ratio used for the Ranger patrols. This recommendation is consistent with the recommendations found in 1901-260/5 (D Res 2-3), Expansion of the JCR Programme, 17 May 1999.

**Canadian Ranger/JCR Relationship**

59. The CRPG HQs currently support both the Rangers and the JCRs. The success of these two programmes depends on the dedication of the CRPG HQ personnel. The implementation of the JCR Programme has significantly increased the workload of the existing personnel. Despite this increased work, the establishment of a parallel structure to support the JCR Programme, within the CRPG HQ, is deemed not to be feasible due to costs and the cumbersome work environment it would create. It is thought that modification of the current CRPG HQ structure could be accomplished without too much difficulty and still meet the logistical, training and operational needs generated by both the Ranger patrols and JCR patrols.

60. The JCR Programme has expanded rapidly over the first two years with close to 1100 youth participating in 41 patrol locations at this time. It is anticipated that there will be 2130 JCRs in the Programme by the end of FY 00-01. In order to conduct the Programme in this expanded mode, additional instructors will need to be hired to support the field requirements of the Programme as well as support staff to manage the materiel resources and conduct the required administration. Dedicated information technology/systems (IT) capacity will also need to be acquired.

61. To cope with this increased level of activity at each of the CRPG HQs, the following positions should be permanently established:
   a. JCR OIC;
   b. JCR Training (Officer or Senior NCM based on CRPG requirement);
   c. JCR Co-ordination Support (Officer or NCM based on CRPG requirements);
   d. JCR Administrative support (NCM); and
   e. JCR Logistical support (NCM).

62. The cost to support this structure is detailed at Annex M. This figure is based on current salary figures and may need to be adjusted based on annual increments.

**Infrastructure**

63. The CRPG HQs are located on Canadian Forces property and their infrastructure needs are met through a variety of support arrangements with their
Support Bases. CRPGs indicate that they did not receive any funding increases during the devolution of support infrastructure/capital requirements funds to units, and consequently, all support costs must be covered from their current O&M funding. The JCR Programme, as a new organization, has been ‘tagged onto’ the CRPG HQs without a corresponding increase in infrastructure support. All devolved funding has centred on personnel and consumable materiel support and not on facilities. Currently, 1, 2 and 3 CRPGs have managed to incorporate their JCR staff within their existing facilities; however, decisions regarding optimum use of space at the Megaplex in St. Jean (OPD 2020 project) may produce infrastructure requirements for the entire 2 CRPG in the near future. 4 and 5 CRPGs do not have spare capacity for their JCR cells and thus they will require additional facilities (space, furniture, equipment etc). This will be a one-time expense to provide facilities with a periodic maintenance cost. The maintenance cost should be applicable to all CRPGs. Funding for facilities provision and maintenance should be identified and provided in addition to the current JCR Programme funding.

**Recommendations**

**R10.** DGRC should continue to monitor Ranger issues in the same vein as other Reserve Force issues.

**R11.** DGRC should continue to develop Ranger policy (in collaboration with ADM HR (Mil)) and equipment issues in conjunction with the CRPGs/various commanders in the Ranger chain of command using the Ranger Working Group as the main venue for consultation. Direct liaison by DGRC with the CRPGs, in this regard, should be authorized recognizing the need to keep parent headquarters informed.

**R12.** DGRC should remain the focal point for co-ordinating all aspects of the JCR Programme to ensure consistency and standardization (as appropriate) and maximizing use of resources. DGRC should have direct access to CRPGs for day to day activities but should consult with CFNA and LFA HQs on major issues. The Ranger/JCR Working Group meetings should continue to be used as the forum for consultation on policy and provision of guidance on Programme management.

**R13.** CRPG should complete the creation/implementation of their establishments within PeopleSoft as soon as possible and these should be based upon the agreed functional organization model (Annex F), including the necessary requirements to support the JCR Programme

**R14.** ECs for Regular Force staff augmentation (six personnel) to 1 CRPG, for the creation of JCR cells (five personnel) within the five CRPGs and for the new
Ranger/JCR Directorate (5/7 personnel) in DGRC should be submitted as soon as possible.

R15. The number of instructors for the Rangers and for the JCR Programme on the establishment should be increased to a total steady state of 45 instructors (28 for Rangers and 17 for the JCR Programme). Additional funding should be provided to the Ranger/JCR budgets to facilitate these establishment changes.

R16. CRPG budgets should be augmented to provide sufficient funds to cover infrastructure/capital support costs (costs yet to be determined).

R17. Based on the acceptance of the JCR Programme by communities and the number of requests for a structured youth programme in these areas to address a variety of social issues (suicides, drug abuse), it would be prudent to consider expansion of the JCR Programme (3900 youth in 130 patrols) into these identified communities in the FY 01-05 time frame.

R18. A facilities provision and maintenance plan should be developed for the support of the JCR staff within the CRPG HQs. Funding for facilities support needs to be identified and provided in addition to current funding for the JCR Programme.

PERSONNEL ISSUES

Unit/Individual Status

64. Ministerial Organization Order 97069, dated 24 November 1997, established the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups as formed units of the Canadian Forces embodied in the Reserve Force. CRPGs are manned by Rangers (at the patrol level) and by a mixture of Regular and Reserve Force members at the CRPG Headquarters (CRPG HQ) level. There is confusion regarding the status of the individual members of the CRPG HQs. In creating establishments, CRPGs were advised to code headquarters positions as “R”, indicating Ranger. Under Total Army Establishment (to be replaced by the Army Reserve Establishment – ARE) guidance, when a Primary Reservist (P Res) takes a long term call-out, he is transferred to the employing agency’s establishment, thus, for those P Res members employed with CRPGs, they are in effect transferred to the ‘Ranger component’. This practice may make sense for tracking and accounting purposes but it has a negative impact on P Res members who are seeking employment as well as causing problems in manning positions in the CRPG HQ.
65. Rangers were precluded from the Reserve Force Retirement Gratuity (RFRG) and thus it is believed that the time that a P Res member is employed with the CRPGs does not contribute toward any RFRG benefit. ADM HR (Mil) staff have commented on this issue and have stated that if a member belongs to the P Res, the location of employment is not of concern and thus it would qualify for the RFRG benefit purposes. Additionally, the location of service does not impact on the members other P Res benefits. The recommendation that flows from this is that P Res members seeking employment with the Rangers should be attached posted to the CRPGs establishments which would solve the loss of benefits problem; however, they would block a line serial in the unit’s establishment which would be contrary to Army policy as stated above. These conflicting instructions and rather bureaucratic process, as well as a rather narrow interpretation of benefit regulations and the definition of what constitutes ‘a Reserve Unit’, negatively impacts the ability to attract and retain quality personnel for employment with the Rangers. The following solutions are proposed:

a. CRPG HQ establishments should not list staff as Rangers but rather, if possible, they should reflect the component origin of choice; alternately, P Res personnel employed with CRPGs should/could be held on parent Command PRL, Area PRL or on a national PRL. If the PRL solution is deemed most appropriate, then CFNA should be assigned a PRL similar to other Commands; and

b. ADM HR (Mil) should promulgate a clear statement regarding P Res benefits and any conditions/caveats that apply with respect to benefits and types/location of employment.

Annuitants

66. The issue of the length of contract and employment conditions for former members of the Regular Force (annuitants) in support of the Rangers has been contentious since at least 1993. The following statement made by Commander LFCA illustrates the importance of annuitants, in his view, with respect to providing support to the Canadian Rangers:

“1. The practice of employing former members of the Regular Force (Ref F) in support of the Primary Reserves and of the Canadian Cadet Organization (CCO) is essential to the continued success of these aforementioned components of our military. This is clearly acknowledged in CANFORGEN 046/95 ADM (PER) 049 051430Z JUL 95. What is not acknowledged is their contribution to the Canadian Rangers. These former members provide extremely valuable expertise. The knowledge and experience they bring is critical to the
survival of these organizations, especially for the Cadet programme and the Canadian Rangers. (…).

2. The Canadian Rangers are a unique organization who provides an invaluable service to the remote communities and sparsely populated regions of this nation. They are a truly multi-purpose component of the military that handles a myriad of tasks and acts in a variety of capacities for the people of the North and other isolated areas. We have, in the past, employed them in support of Reg Force operations, in particular in evacuations of civilians from their homes in the event of forest fires, avalanches, floods and other natural disasters. In order for the Canadian Rangers to continue to succeed and operate at the expected level of proficiency and capability, we must provide them with strong organizational leadership. Personnel hired in support of the Canadian Rangers are required to spend an inordinate amount their job striving to gain the trust and co-operation of the communities they must operate in and from whom they draw their membership. They must also take the time to understand and acclimatize themselves to the difference to the people and their ways. (…). The 180-day restriction placed on the length of contract allowed for former Reg Force members (annuitants) who are employed in support of Rangers detracts from this process of acceptance and trust. It does not allow enough time for support staff to familiarize themselves with the community and gain a level of mutual comfort and trust that is necessary for the success of the programme. In addition, the 180-day restriction results in an excessive turnover of personnel who deal with the native communities (Canadian Rangers). This can be alleviated by allowing for longer periods of service for members employed in support of the Rangers.” (Source: “Review of Limitations On Reserve Service By Canadian Forces Annuitants - Canadian Rangers”, 1110-7 (G1 Pers), 28 September 1999).

67. Some of the details in the above statement may not be totally accurate, however, the overall sentiment of the statement is what is of importance. The guidelines for the employment of Reservists are found in NDHQ Instruction ADM (PER) 2/93. These instructions are lengthy and complicated and it would be difficult to try and explain them in detail in this document. The key aspect of these regulations that pertain to annuitants and support to the Rangers is the matter of restrictions on length of employment and the financial implications that these policies have on the member. From the CRPG perspective, the regulations are not conducive to proper manning of their HQs and result in a manpower shortage or a continual turn-around of personnel.
In looking for a solution to the CRPG manning problems, the employment regulations governing the Cadet Instructors Cadre were examined. Many parallels can be drawn between the personnel support requirements of the Canadian Rangers and the Canadian Cadet Organizations. Neither organization has an abundance of personnel with the required skill sets (administration, logistics, tactical training etc) to conduct their programmes in isolation and therefore, they draw upon other components of the CF for support. An attractive personnel pool for the CCO has been CF annuitants who have received special dispensation regarding their employment as CIC. As the JCR Programme has been formed as a cadet organization under section 46 (1) of the National Defence Act, this waiver applies to their instructors and staff support personnel, however the ‘ranger staff’ are not included in the waiver.

68. The CRPG HQs are unique organizations made even more so by this recent addition of the responsibility to conduct the JCR Programme. The segregation of staff into pure Ranger or JCR cells appears feasible when constructing organizational diagrams but the reality of overseeing the diverse operations of the Rangers/JCR Programme dictates that the COs of the CRPGs should have the flexibility to utilize all their staff to accomplish their mandate. The difficulties in attracting and retaining quality personnel for employment in support of the Rangers has been mentioned previously and strict adherence to the current annuitant policy would only exacerbate this problem. Quality and experienced staff are leaving positions with the Rangers to seek other full time employment due to the restrictions of the annuitant policy thus, Ranger operations suffer at this time and the JCR Programme will suffer in the future. It is strongly recommended that the staff/instructors with the CRPGs HQs be granted the same waiver as those personnel employed in support of the CCO, based on the uniqueness of their service and the fundamental need for the expertise that they bring to the Ranger organization.

**Manning Policy in Support of the Canadian Rangers/JCR**

69. In light of the unique nature of the Rangers and of the JCR Programme, there is a requirement to ensure that establishment positions be filled by personnel with the appropriate background and skills sets. As such, there should be as few restrictions as possible regarding the military occupation classification/speciality for a position or the Canadian Forces component from which personnel originate. The deciding factor must be their qualification to fulfil the job requirements. Based on this philosophy, establishments should be annotated to reflect those personnel from the Regular Force or the Reserve Force (Primary Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, Canadian Rangers and Cadet
Instructors Cadre) that could be employed in CRPG HQs or in the Directorate of Rangers/Junior Canadian Rangers.

**Length of Contracts (Class B)**

70. Current policies prescribe that Class B service is performed by a Reservist serving for a duration of 12 or more consecutive days of paid service in support of the Reserve Force, the Cadets, or the Regular Force. The work involved is usually of a temporary nature, such as in an instructional or administrative staff position in a training school, or during a period when the member themselves proceeds on training or lastly, when it is not practical to employ members of the Regular Force on those duties. Class B service is also used to provide continuous support to Reserve Force Headquarters units. Personnel in Class B/A positions (positions established only for Reservists in support of Primary Reserve or Cadet activity) can fill these positions for a continuous service period of 365 days per year. These members are paid on the same basis as Class B reservists.

71. As mentioned previously, the CRPG HQs under the responsibly of the LFAs are mostly staffed with Reservists. Retention of these members has been difficult, as CRPGs believed that staff could only be offered yearly contracts. ADM HR (Mil) has stated that multiple year contracts can be offered to personnel by the appropriate authority, providing that funding can be guaranteed. The route letter must, however, be reissued yearly. It is recommended that CRPGs consider multiple year contracts, as appropriate to their situation.

**Movement Costs**

72. CFNA employs more Regular Force members than the LFAs, primarily because there are very few Primary or Supplementary reservists available in the North. In addition to the situation of short-term contracts, the high cost of moving at their own expense from the “South” to Yellowknife is a deterrent to Reservists seeking employment opportunities in CFNA. However, the ability to fund cost moves of reservists to CFNA does exist. Funding for these moves can be funded from unit resources or, on a case by case basis, from corporate resources.

**Recommendations**

R19. **CRPG HQ establishments should not list staff as Rangers; rather, they should reflect the component origin of choice; P Res personnel employed with CRPGs should/could be held on parent Command PRL, Area PRL or on a national PRL. If the PRL solution is deemed the most appropriate, then CFNA should be assigned a PRL similar to other Commands.**

R20. **ADM HR (Mil) should extend P Res benefits to all P Res personnel, regardless of the CF component with which they are employed.**
R21. **CRPG HQ and D Rgr/JCR establishments should not be too restrictive regarding the CF component origin of personnel, unless there is need of a specific MOC. Most positions could be classified as “open any” to allow full utilization of the talents of personnel in the Regular Force or all sub-components of the Reserve Force.**

R22. **The annuitant staff instructors employed with the CRPGs should be granted the same waiver as those personnel employed in support of the CCO, based on the uniqueness of their service and the fundamental need for the expertise that they bring to the Ranger organization.**

R23. **CRPGs should consider offering multiple-year contracts to staff as appropriate to their local situation and providing funding is secure for the period in question.**

**EQUIPMENT**

**Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project (REP) - P9175**

73. The aim of the Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project was to increase the number of patrols north of 60° and to enhance the capability of the Canadian Rangers to conduct arctic and coastal land patrols as directed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. Three main capability deficiencies were identified:

a. The inability to accurately report locations;

b. The lack of communications capabilities (timeliness in reporting); and

c. The lack of distinctive Canadian Ranger identification.

Although these deficiencies were common to all Rangers, the project did focus on Rangers north of 60°. Consequently, one Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and two HF radios were purchased and issued to each patrol north of 60° while a distinctive Ranger ‘uniform’ (sweatshirts, t-shirts, tuques, high visibility vest, ball caps and brassard – last item was already on issue scale) was acquired and issued to all Rangers. CFNA and SQFT were instructed to procure GPS and radio systems locally, while the Ranger clothing was procured nationally by Director Soldier Systems Program Management (DSSPM).

74. The approved five year incremental funding for the REP, commencing in 1995, was $3.835M ($2.61M in Vote 1 and $1.225 in Vote 5) with estimated recurring P, O&M costs after 1999 at $795K. However, the total capital equipment expenditures under the project have only been $683K, with the last expenditures occurring during FY 98-99. All items that were identified for purchase were acquired, with the exception of maintenance buys of clothing in 1998/99 and 1999/00. The project was deemed completed in November 1999.
with $542K of project funds unspent. Annex H provides a detailed breakdown of the project expenditures.

75. It is apparent that the REP was not well managed from the perspective of material acquisition. CRPGs were not adequately consulted on requirements and consequently, some of the clothing items did not meet the quality required for the harsh conditions in which Rangers work. Additionally, many of the items were classified as one-time expenditures without regard for maintenance or replacement. Had there been better management of the REP, the unexpended funds at the end of programmed expenditures could have been utilized to make additional equipment purchases or to rectify the problems that had been identified. A synopsis of items purchased under the REP is at Annex I.

76. The decision to use the 60th parallel as the dividing line for enhanced support to the Rangers was contentious at the time and continues to be a discussion point today. There is great geographic/climatic diversity amongst the areas in which the CRPGs operate and resultanty, some differences in clothing requirements/scales should be expected. However, the deficiencies in capabilities (navigation and communication) are common to all CRPGs and thus redressing this shortfall in operational capability should have been a priority within the REP. In light of this continuing deficiency, problems with the quality and numbers of items purchased in the REP and emerging new requirements, it is recommended that a second enhancement programme is needed.

**Ranger Enhancement - Phase II**

77. A second enhancement would accomplish the following (as detailed at Annex J):
   a. Redress the equipment problems from the first REP;
   b. Enhance the capabilities of the Rangers operating south of 60°;
   c. Provide equipment for all new Rangers (once new manning ceilings approved);
   d. Establish a common Ranger uniform, including limited combat clothing; and
   e. Establish an equipment/clothing replacement/maintenance system.

78. The most significant problems emanating from the REP were the poor quality of the high visibility vest, the rapid deterioration and obsolescence of the GPS and uncertainty regarding the maintenance/replacement of the SBX-11A radio. Annex I includes comments upon the deficiencies of this equipment. Recent discussions at the RWG have also focussed on these equipment problems, resulting in the following recommendations:
   a. A new Ranger vest should be developed. Sufficient quantities are
required to provide a vest to each Ranger and each Ranger instructor, and to create additional depot holdings;

b. A new GPS should be purchased on a scale of two for each patrol, for all CRPGs. Procurement should be national; and

c. It has been determined that there are sufficient SBX-11A (or variants) available for purchase which should meet short-term needs (replace/maintain radios in existing patrols) and deficiencies (procure radios for CRPGs excluded from first REP and for new patrols). However, DTSES will develop a statement of requirement (SOR) for the eventual replacement of this radio.

79. Ranger dress was based on the original concept of Rangers being outdoors people, well equipped and able to survive in their environment. This concept is more or less still valid today and Rangers are issued only minimal Canadian Forces equipment and clothing, according to established scales (see next section). One of the main objectives of the REP was to improve the visibility and morale of Rangers through the issue of a distinctive uniform. This new uniform consisted of a one-time purchase and issue of the red Ranger sweatshirt, T-shirt, ball cap, brassard, vest and toque. The vest has been discussed previously as not being of a suitable quality while the toque has universally been rejected as not being required. The other items have all been well received, however, all also need replacement with a better grade of material.

80. The issue of combat clothing has continually dominated discussions regarding Ranger apparel. Each CRPG has from time to time issued combat clothing to their Rangers for training periods and then withdrawn the items after completion of the event. Rangers, however, feel that they should have limited amounts of combat clothing issued to them for training and ceremonial purposes. Indeed, many Rangers have purchased items from Army Surplus outlets so that they would present a more military image. There is a general feeling among Rangers (and others – Area Commanders, CF CWO) that their ‘uniform’, at present, is not complete and that a modest issue of combat clothing (pants and boots) would rectify this problem, thereby measurably improving morale.

81. Ranger clothing, similar to clothing for other CF members is subject to wear and tear and thus needs to be periodically replaced. Ranger clothing (and other distinctive items i.e. flags) should be included in CF clothing scales/scales of issue or provisions made for wholesale replacement. If the wholesale replacement option is chosen, then sufficient funds need to be identified in set cyclical periods to purchase the items and sufficient depot stocks to maintain Rangers in the intervening procurement period.
JCR Equipment

82. The JCR Programme clothing and equipment scales have intentionally been kept at a minimal level. JCR clothing consists of T-shirts, sweatshirts, sweatpants and ball caps. Additionally, an Adult Volunteer T-shirt has been procured. Equipment holdings consist of flags, compasses, radios, GPS, first aid kits, air rifles and .22 calibre rifles (and associated equipment). There are also numerous small items (i.e. lapel pins, camp badges) that support the conduct of the Programme. There has been consensus that the JCR participants will not be issued any combat pattern clothing. As this programme expands, additional resources will be required to purchase these limited, but essential clothing/equipment items.

83. There is currently some central support costs for the JCR Programme. These are the purchase of .22 calibre weapons and .22 calibre ammunition as well as Individual Meal Packs (IMPs), for use by the JCR patrols during their exercises onto the land. Any increase in JCR participants will increase support costs, however, these are not considered to be that significant.

Recommendations

R24. There should be a second Ranger Enhancement Project.

R25. REP II should include: GPS and HF radios (SBX-11A or variant – must be interoperable with those currently held by patrols) should be procured nationally and distributed to all CRPGs as the deficiency in navigation and communications is common to all CRPGs and not specific to one geographic area. Scale of issue should be two radios and two GPS per patrol. In addition, a small pool of both of these items should be issued to CRPG HQs to hold as replacements and for training purposes. All items must be added to Patrol and Patrol Group Scales of Issue;

R26. REP II should include a new Ranger high visibility vest should be developed to replace the one currently in use. Once a new vest is developed, the current model should be removed from the Scale of Issue and the replacement vest added to the Ranger and Ranger Instructor Personal Scales of Issue.

R27. REP II should include the maintenance purchases for Ranger clothing which have not been made since the initial procurement in 1998; consequently, all items require replacement and should be re-supplied from the national level. Additionally, new purchases will need to be made should increases to the Ranger personnel ceiling be approved. Ranger clothing (and other distinctive items i.e. flags) should be included in CF clothing scales/scales of issue or provisions made for wholesale replacement. Sufficient funds need to be set aside to facilitate either option.
R28. REP II should include a Statement of Requirements for the sweatshirt, T-shirts and ball caps that should be revised to ensure improvements in the quality of the items procured.

R29. REP II should include that combat pants and combat boots be included in the Ranger clothing scale.

R30. Additional resources should be allocated to the JCR Programme to purchase limited, but essential, clothing/equipment items in accordance with expansion plans.

CANADIAN RANGER SCALE OF ISSUE (SCALE D13-105)

84. Prior to 1993, only Rangers in CFNA were entitled to winter warfare clothing as it was determined that conditions in the other Areas did not warrant issuing of these clothing items. This opinion was reversed in May 1993 and the Scale of Issue was amended accordingly. The REP, in 1995, was the first revision of the Ranger Scale of Issue since the 1993 amendments. In addition to the clothing and equipment that was to be acquired under the REP, two other significant changes were made to the Scale:

a. Approval was granted in June 1995 to amend the Scale to allow personnel posted to CFNA or LFC/SQFT and assigned the duty of being a full-time instructor to Ranger units north of 60° to purchase locally appropriate winter clothing (i.e. caribou fur parka and pants, mukluks, fur mitts and hat, thinsulate snow pants, fleece clothing). The Commanders of CFNA and SQFT were to authorize payment on a one-time basis only (per instructors tour) from the applicable Canadian Ranger O&M account not to exceed $1,505.00; and

b. As a cost saving measure, it was decided prior to 1994, that winter warfare clothing would no longer be issued to the Rangers on an individual basis. In July 1995, a scale amendment notice was released that restricted the issue of winter warfare kit “for operations only”.

85. In 1997, Directorate of Supply (DSUP) conducted a review of all Canadian Forces Scales of Issue. The Ranger Scale reflected the two changes outlined above, but did not yet include any of the clothing acquired as part of the REP. The 1997 version of the Scale saw the first distinction between scales for Rangers and Ranger Instructors, although all equipment appeared on the same scale.

86. In 1998 and 1999, all CF Scales of Issue were revised to include divisions into sub-scales. As such, the Ranger Scale of Issue was divided into four scales, as follows:

a. D13-105AA Miscellaneous Personal Equipment – Canadian Rangers;
b. D13-105AB Miscellaneous Personal Equipment – Canadian Rangers – Instructors;
c. D13-105AC Miscellaneous Equipment – Canadian Ranger Patrol; and
d. D13-105AD Miscellaneous Equipment – Canadian Ranger Patrol Group HQ.

87. Clothing procured as part of the REP was not added to the Ranger Scale of Issue until July 1999. This version of the Scale did not address the distinction that had been made between the Ranger Instructors employed north or south of the 60th parallel. CFNA and SQFT were granted the authority in 1995 to locally procure clothing items specific to their environment. However, in some cases (for instance in northern Ontario) the climatic conditions are just as severe south of 60° as they are north of 60°. There should be differences between scales of clothing for Ranger Instructors, based upon the environment in which the individual works, but it must also be recognized that each of the five CRPG areas are distinct in their own right and that a special clothing allowance is a simple and economical method to address the shortcomings of some of the standard Canadian Forces clothing items. Thus, the special clothing allowance should be made available to all Ranger Instructors (including JCR Instructors) in all CRPGs, based on a three year cycle (life expectancy of some of the natural product clothing). Items should be purchased centrally by the CRPG QM and issued to the Instructors, thus reducing overall costs.

88. A number of items were added to the Scales in 1999 (JCR sweatshirts, first aid kits, barrack boxes, camp flags) and various other items were transferred from the Personal Scales to the Patrol or Patrol Group Scales. Additionally, CRPGs have stated that certain items that have been removed are required while other items on the Scales are no longer required. The four Ranger related Scales of Issue were reviewed during the RWG (Nov/Dec 99) and Annex K outlines required revisions to the scales.

89. In October 1999, DSSPM issued instructions that the Clothe the Soldier Improved Environmental Clothing System (IECS) as well as the cold wet weather glove (CWWG) and lightweight thermal underwear (LWTU) are to be issued to CFNA (land uniform only) and to all Ranger Instructors. As such, these items are to be added to the Ranger Instructor Scale of Issue.

Miscellaneous Equipment Issues

Liability

90. The original Ranger concept envisioned outdoors people in the remote and isolated parts of the country observing and reporting on unusual events while
carrying out their normal daily activities. In that concept, Rangers would obviously be wearing their personal clothing and using their personal equipment. For the most part, this scenario is still applicable today and Rangers are expected to be able to transport themselves, provide tools necessary to complete a task and clothe themselves except for the small number of clothing and equipment items provided to them by the Canadian Forces. This arrangement has been seen to be the most logical and economical and Rangers who provide their personal equipment (skidoos, boats) are eligible to receive an Equipment Maintenance Grant to compensate them for wear and tear on the equipment. Recently, there have been instances where Rangers who have been requested to carry out a task, using their own equipment, were not reimbursed for damage to that equipment. This has caused grave concern for both the Rangers and the CRPG staff. If Rangers perceive that they will not receive reimbursement for damages to their property, they may begin to withdraw their services or refuse to use their own equipment. This would be a severe setback to a long established and proven method of operation. Thus, it is imperative that a proper policy be developed and implemented that would allow the continuation of the service support (Equipment Maintenance Grant) that the Rangers provide to their/CRPG normal operations/training or to the operations/training of other Canadian Forces units and provide fair compensation to Rangers whose property is damaged as a result of their participation in operations and training.

Ranger Rifle

91. Concerns have been raised by the CRPGs over the last five years regarding the lack of spare parts for the .303 calibre rifle currently issued to the Rangers. It has come to the point where Areas are cannibalizing other rifles to provide spare parts. In November 1998, DSSPM personnel stated that there are no more spare parts available, and that consideration should be given to procuring a new rifle for the Rangers. It was also noted that an additional quantity on .303 rifles had been acquired and placed in the depot, and currently, there are more than 6,000 rifles held in the depot. CRPGs were advised at the RWG in Nov/Dec 1999 to demand replacement weapons for those that are no longer easily repairable and return requisite portions of the older weapons (receiver, barrel, bolt) to the depot. Remaining parts of the older weapons can be held by CRPGs to effect local repairs (by trained Ranger Instructors, Small arms qualified). A rifle is essential equipment for a Ranger and unfortunately, the venerable .303 calibre Lee Enfield, although still a good and useful weapon, is becoming difficult to maintain. An SOR has been produced previously and it would be prudent to confirm the validity of that SOR with a view to replace the .303 rifle in the next 5-10 year period.
Canadian Forces’ Weapons

92. At the present time there is no Patrol Group entitlement to C7A-1 rifles, 9mm pistols or 5.56mm and 9mm ammunition, even though the Canadian Ranger qualification course and patrol leader qualification course require the Rangers to be familiar with in-service weapons and fire a familiarization shoot using the C7A1 and 9mm pistol during annual training. The requirement for this activity should be validated before the Patrol Groups are authorized training stocks of these weapons.

Recommendations

R31. The special clothing allowance ($1500 per Instructor) should be made available to all Ranger Instructors (including JCR Instructors) in all CRPGs based on a three year cycle (life expectancy of some of the natural product clothing). Items should be purchased centrally by the CRPG QM and held on their account for issue to Instructors, thereby reducing overall costs.

R32. Ranger Scale D13-105 (all four scales) should be revised in accordance with Annex K (as agreed at RWG Nov/Dec 1999).

R33. The IECS, CWWG and LWTU should be added to the Ranger Instructor Scale of Issue.

R34. It is imperative that a proper policy be developed and implemented that would allow the continuation of the service support that the Rangers provide to their/CRPG normal operations/training or to the operations/training of other Canadian Forces units and provide fair compensation to Rangers whose property is damaged as a result of their participation in operations or training.

R35. CRPGs should demand replacement .303 calibre rifles from DSSPM stocks for weapons beyond local repair, returning requisite portions of old weapons and retaining other parts for local repairs/maintenance by qualified individuals.

R36. DSSPM should review (in consultation with DGRC) the existing Statement of Requirement for a new Ranger weapon with a view to replace the .303 calibre Lee Enfield in the 5-10 year time frame.

R37. The requirement for Rangers to be familiar with in-service weapons and fire a familiarization shoot using the C7A1 and 9mm pistol during annual training should be validated before the Patrol Groups are authorized training stocks of these weapons.
TRAINING

Ranger Training

93. As per QR&O 2.034 d, the “Canadian Rangers are members who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, but who are not required to undergo annual training”. Nonetheless, in order to prepare the Rangers to fulfil their military duty, CRPGs conduct basic training, annual training and optional training. In light of this, a draft training package (Course Training Plan/Course Training Standards) was developed by CFNA/1 CRPG in 1997. The aim of this package was to standardize the Basic Ranger Qualification Course and the Patrol Leader Course. The Basic Ranger package is 10 days in duration, of which four are a field exercise. The Patrol Leader course is two days in duration. CRPGs are currently using the draft CTP/CTS (1997). CRPGs reviewed these drafts during the RWG Nov/Dec 99. It was been determined that the CTP/CTS would be amended and reformatted as “Training Guidance” manuals. This will allow individual CRPGs to adapt training to regional requirements but still provide them with general training direction. The “Training Guidance” manuals shall be completed and issued by summer 2001.

JCR Training

94. JCR patrols are taught traditional skills, life skills, and Ranger skills. The Ranger skills are the only standardized part of the Programme. With traditional skills and life skills included in the curriculum, the community can incorporate cultural norms, local language, regional skills, and social needs into the Programme. These skills are taught both in the classroom and in the field.

95. A National JCR Ranger Skill “Training Guidance” manual is presently being developed. For the traditional and life skills, an information/guidance package will be developed. For instance, a JCR Harassment and Abuse Prevention Program is being developed as part of the Life skills. This program will take into consideration the diverse backgrounds of the participants in the JCR Programme. The key messages of the JCR Harassment and Abuse Prevention Program will be to encourage respect for self and others, to develop an understanding of what constitutes harassment and abuse, to discourage inappropriate behaviour and to encourage healthy, positive relationships. DGRC (D Rgr/JCR) should pursue the development of the JCR Training Programme in consultation with the CRPGs.

Ranger/JCR Instructor Training

96. Human resources are limited in the CRPGs and thus the provision of additional training to all Ranger/JCR Instructor would improve their
employability (interoperability between the Rangers and JCRs) and provide the COs of the CRPGs with a greater degree of flexibility. Currently, each Area provides their instructors with various training opportunities, however, there is always room for improvement. The following non-exhaustive list are types of training that would be beneficial to all Ranger/JCR Instructors and particularly improve safety within both organizations (not all would be applicable to all areas):

- Native/Aboriginal Awareness training
- Communications
- Summer Indoctrination
- Winter Indoctrination
- All terrain vehicle courses
- First Aid instructors
- Watermanship safety
- Computer skills development
- GSAR instructor

97. There is currently no funding allocation within the JCR funding envelope to train instructors and it cannot be determined if there are funds included within the Ranger budgets for this purpose, however, the need to train staff exists. This situation needs to be clarified and appropriate resources (if not already included) identified. These training needs can be accomplished through a combination of military and civilian courses. As such, costs will vary from location to location based on current CRGP needs. It is recommended that $1,500.00 per instructor allocated yearly to each CRPG in support of Ranger/JCR Instructor training. Additionally, in light of the amount of time (and funding) required to train the Ranger/JCR Instructor, instructors should be hired at least six months before the actual APS. This will enable the members to be properly trained and ‘acclimatized’ before the commencement of training visits to the Rangers and/or JCR patrols.

**Recommendations**

R38. *The draft Ranger “Training Guidance” should be reviewed and approved, through the appropriate chain, as soon as possible with a view to promulgation by Summer 2001.*

R39. *DGRC (D Rgr/JCR) should continue to pursue the development of the JCR Training Programme in consultation with the CRPGs.*

R40. *Funds to train Ranger and JCR Instructors should be added/identified within applicable budgets. It is recommended that $1,500.00 per instructor*
be allocated yearly to each CRPG in support of Ranger/JCR Instructor training.

R41. In light of the amount of time (and funding) required to train the Ranger/JCR Instructor, it is recommended that instructors be hired at least six months before the actual APS. This will enable the members to be trained before the commencement of training visits to the Ranger and/or JCR patrols.

FINANCES

Finances Canadian Rangers

98. Funding for the Rangers is stove-piped to the CRPGs (through CFNA and the respective LFAs of LFC), as detailed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ranger FY 97-98</th>
<th>Ranger FY 98-99</th>
<th>Ranger FY 99-00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFNA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CRPG</td>
<td>$1,900,000</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>$2,198,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CRPG</td>
<td>$779,000</td>
<td>$1,116,000</td>
<td>$1,162,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CRPG</td>
<td>$379,000</td>
<td>$436,000</td>
<td>$468,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CRPG</td>
<td>$1,180,000</td>
<td>$1,230,000</td>
<td>$1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CRPG</td>
<td>$1,318,000</td>
<td>$1,489,175</td>
<td>$1,437,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total LFC</td>
<td>$3,656,000</td>
<td>$4,271,175</td>
<td>$4,467,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (LFC + CFNA)</td>
<td>$5,556,000</td>
<td>$6,271,175</td>
<td>$6,665,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The detailed breakdown for P, O&M are not available at this point in time. The increases in allocations are consistent with the pay increases that have been allocated during the last three years. Both 1 and 5 CRPG receive additional funding for NWS Patrols. I CRPG also receives extra funding for SOVPATs and SOVOPs.

99. It is anticipated that the following funding increases will be required should the proposed expansion of the Canadian Ranger strength (from 3500 to 4800 Rangers) be authorized. As such it is forecasted that the total funding allocation required would be as follows (further details on funding requirements are located at Annex L and supporting Appendices):
Ranger Funding Increases FY 00-01 to FY 04-05

[Table not reproduced]

100. Should the recommendation for a second Ranger Enhancement Project (as per R. 24) be approved, it is anticipated that the following funds will be required:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 00-01 Capital Procurement</td>
<td>$1,181,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 01-02 O&amp;M</td>
<td>$51,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 02-03 O&amp;M</td>
<td>$141,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 03-04 O&amp;M</td>
<td>$99,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 04-05 O&amp;M</td>
<td>$141,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$1,615,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Details of second Ranger Enhancement Project can be found at Annex J

Finances JCR

101. Funding for the JCR Programme is a joint venture between the Department of National Defence (DND), the Department of Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) and also by the Youth Initiatives allocation. Current funding allocation for the implementation and development of the Programme is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>DND</th>
<th>HRDC</th>
<th>Youth Initiatives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>98-99</td>
<td>$323,000</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>$1.8M</td>
<td>$2.423M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99-00</td>
<td>$308,000</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>$1.6M</td>
<td>$2.208M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00-01</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$2.4M</td>
<td>$2.7M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. The rapid development and expansion of the JCR Programme has been made possible by the additional funding provided by the Youth Employment Strategy. When developing the parameters for the Youth Initiatives, the aim for the JCR Programme was to implement additional patrols (up to 71 JCR patrols) and to procure equipment to sustain these patrols. In addition to establishing new patrols, the way ahead for the JCR Programme was to reflect its rapid evolution and take into consideration new Programme requirements or initiatives. For instance, it was recommended that when preparing the next Youth Initiative submissions, new initiatives should be included, i.e. the Harassment and Abuse Programme or similar Life Skills development
programmes, Advanced Summer Training Sessions for all CRPGs and/or new training initiatives. As we are still in the development stages of the JCR Programme, the way ahead should be re-assessed every five years to ensure that the JCR Programme is IAW guidelines established by the SRBs.

103. Funding support from HRDC will expire at the end of FY 99-00. HRDC has been approached to consider renewing and increasing their level of support. This initiative is in keeping with the philosophy of involving other Government departments and agencies, organizations, as appropriate, at all level in our national youth programmes.

104. The expansion aim of the JCR Programme, as detailed in the Youth Initiatives, is to increase the number of patrols from 31 to 71 and the number of Junior Canadian Rangers to 2,130 by FY 2000-2001. Unfortunately, 2 CRPGs proposed stand-up of 29 JCR patrols was predicated on their ability to increase their Ranger patrols. The increase of Ranger patrols was not authorized, pending the results of this study, and thus it was decided to re-approach LFWA and LFAA regarding interest in the JCR Programme, to which both areas responded positively. A recommendation that the JCR Programme be expanded into the 4 and 5 CRPG AOR was approved and this will enable the JCR Programme to expand beyond 71 patrols. Moreover, the expansion of the JCR Programme into British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador will give the JCR Programme a truly National participation and influence. CFNA has expressed some concern regarding the increasing ‘southern flavour’ of the JCR Programme and their view is noted, however, the JCR Programme is for all youth in all remote and isolated areas of Canada which fall under the criteria set out for the establishment of JCR patrols.

105. Expansion beyond 71 JCR patrols in FY 00-01 will have repercussions on the funding required to support the JCR Programme, as there will be more participants than initially forecasted (approximately 210 additional participants). Additionally, the implementation of the JCR Programme has generated additional work at the CRPG level (including Instructors and HQ staff) and in DGRC beyond current capacity of the staff. As such, should the decision be that there will be no expansion of the JCR Programme, additional funding will be required solely to support the personnel requirements (increase in CRPG HQ staff, increase in instructors (1:5 ratio)). The funds required to support staff increase would be as follows (for 77 JCR patrols):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>FY 00-01</th>
<th>FY 01-02</th>
<th>FY 02-03</th>
<th>FY 03-04</th>
<th>FY 04-05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCR HQ Cell</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
106. If the recommendation to increase the number of participants (2130 to 3900) in the JCR Programme and number of patrols (from 71 to 130) is approved, it is anticipated that the total cost to support this expansion would be as follows (details found at Annex M):

… [Tables not reproduced]

107. VCDS has confirmed that there will be a baseline funding allocation to support the JCR Programme of $2.4 M as of FY 01-02. Baseline funding will need to be adjusted to reflect expansion of the JCR Programme beyond FY 00-01. As such, steady state for the JCR Programme is estimated to be $6.1M after FY 04-05.

Recommendations

R42. Conditional to the approval of the recommendation to increase the Canadian Ranger strength from 3500 to 4800, funding should be adjusted accordingly.

R43. Conditional to the approval to conduct a second Ranger Enhancement Project, it is recommended that funding be allocated accordingly.

R44. Conditional to the approval of the recommendation to increase the number of JCRs and number of patrols from 2130 to 3900, funding should be adjusted accordingly.

R45. Conditional to the refusal to increase the number of JCRs and the number of patrols beyond FY 00-01, additional funds should be allocated to support personnel increase (JCR HQ Cell and JCR instructors)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

108. According to DAOD 2008, Canadian Forces members have a responsibility to keep their colleagues informed of how their activities impact on their unit, base or section. Commanding Officers, in turn, have a responsibility to inform Canadian Forces members of corporate policies, programs and services that have a broad impact on the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence. As such, DGPA has been working closely with DGRC in developing and implementing a strategic communication’s approach for the JCR Programme. The main difficulty in supporting a strategic communication’s approach is the lack of funds.
109. The CRPGs have been supporting the Public Affairs mandate regionally, thus promoting the Rangers/JCRs (where applicable). These regional campaigns appear to be successful in the local communities. Again, the main difficulty remains the lack of funding.

110. From a corporate perspective, there seems to be a lack of knowledge/understanding within the department of the Rangers and their role. This should be addressed in a Rangers strategic communication’s approach.

**Recommendations**

R46. A JCR strategic communication’s approach should be completed and implemented and funding be allocated to support Ranger/JCR PR.

R47. A National Ranger strategic communication’s approach should be developed and implemented in collaboration with all stakeholders. Linkage should also be formed with appropriate government and non-government agencies.

R48. Funding should be allocated to support Ranger Public Affairs Including HR, training and communications activities.

R49. The Areas/CRPGs should be encouraged to maintain pro-active public affairs activities.

**FUTURE ISSUES**

There are a number of issues that have not been explored within the CAN RAN 2000 study that will need attention in the near future.

**Age of Participants in the JCR Programme/JCR in Urban Areas:**

111. In certain areas, particularly northern Ontario, children in aboriginal communities are sent out of the community for schooling. This results in the majority of the children who remain in the community at an age level below the entry point for the JCR (less than 12 years of age). The social conditions that affect youth in these remote areas, which were part of the rationale for creating the JCR Programme, affect this younger age group. Consequently, to affect/change behaviour, would it be advantageous to reduce entry age levels for the JCR Programme in those communities where it makes sense to do so (note that the Navy League, which is a civilian organization that does not fall under the responsibility of the CF, sponsors a group of youth aged 9-11)?

112. An ancillary part to the external schooling issue is the fact that if the child is outside the community for most of the year, how will the child be able to continue his/her affiliation with the JCR Programme while in a more urban environment? An easy answer is that the child could be affiliated with a local
Cadet corps or squadron, but that would defeat the basis for the JCR Programme in their home community. Another factor to be considered is to what lengths would/should the department go to implement a youth programme?

**Rangers/JCRs in the Prairies:**

113. The issue of Rangers in the Prairie area was mentioned as part of the SCRR, who thought that there was a natural linkage between the Rangers and the Bold Eagle programme. 3 CRPG’s proposal to expand into eastern Manitoba opens the door for this possibility as well. Equally, there have been a number of overtures from native groups in the Prairie area for information/involvement in the JCR Programme. Again, to what extent would/should the CF become involved in expanding into these areas, noting that this type of expansion would not fully cater to the isolated and remote factors of Ranger/JCR deployment?

**Emeritus Status for Senior Rangers:**

114. The culture of the Rangers indicates that although Rangers will get older, they do not need to leave the patrol as long as they continue to be useful. However, this effectively blocks the entry of new Rangers and progress of JCR patrol members. Should/could an “emeritus” status be implemented, thereby catering to cultural sensitivities as well as opening opportunities for younger community members to take part in the Rangers?

**CONCLUSIONS**

115. The CAN RAN 2000 study has confirmed the valuable contribution that the Canadian Rangers have made and continue to make to the Canadian Forces and to Canada. The Ranger concept, first introduced in the 1940s, remains valid today. However, it has been noted that the value of Rangers today far exceeds that of being the ‘eyes and ears’ of the military in remote and isolated communities. Their communities have increasingly turned to Rangers in times of disaster or stress, to guide them out of whatever dilemma or problem that has befallen them. This is indicative of the high esteem with which Rangers are held within their communities.

116. The Ranger programme is a very cost effective manner in which to exercise sovereignty in the remotest regions of Canada and to demonstrate a federal government authority in those areas. The minimal amounts of pay, training funds and equipment that are provided to Rangers are inversely proportional to their impact in our vast, under-populated areas. That being said, there remain many areas where an increased Ranger presence would not only enhance pure military operational capability but would also very positively
influence social behaviour, particularly with respect to a growing youth population that is deemed to be at risk.

117. The study has proposed an increase of the Ranger personnel ceiling from 3500 to 4800 Rangers. Additionally, it has proposed that the deployment of Rangers within a specified area of operations should be at the discretion of the local commander. This seems to be a most logical approach, given the diversity between the areas where Rangers are deployed. Area Commanders must have the flexibility to accomplish their mission and the establishment of patrols, whether for purely military or social reasons, must be viewed in relation to the accomplishment of their assigned tasks as stated in departmental guidance documents.

118. A Way Ahead for the Rangers was published in 1995; as well, an equipment enhancement project was implemented. In the intervening five years, many of the initiatives were completed, however some items lagged due to a lack of focus by some staff. A renewed focus on Ranger issues is required to ensure that the Ranger Programme remains vibrant and that the resources allocated to the Rangers are expended in the most economical manner as possible. The creation of the Directorate of Rangers/JCR within DGRC would seem to be most timely to ensure that relevant issues are addressed expeditiously. A periodic review (five year period) of the Ranger programme would seem to be a useful method of evaluating and reviewing the Ranger programme to ensure it can continue to meet operational requirements as well as provide the leadership requirements of the JCR Programme. Additional resource needs should be part of such a review.

119. The study has identified a requirement for increased resources to be expended upon the Rangers, not only for pay, training, instructors and equipment but also for minimal increases to CRPG staff. It would seem prudent that these additional personnel and training funds be allocated to the CRPGs for their management. However, resources for equipment should be managed nationally through DGRC who, in addition to managing equipment procurement, should continue his role as NDHQ staff principal for Ranger issues, policy co-ordination and establishment control. National equipment management will allow best use of resources as well as allow harmonization with other CF equipment requirements/purchases.

120. The JCR Programme, which has been received most favourably by all communities in which it was introduced, has had a tremendous growth spurt during its short time in existence. The provision of Youth Employment Strategy funds has allowed this Programme to advance from a proposed nine patrol
structure to a current 41 patrol organization with approximately 1100 youth participating. Projected participation levels for the end of FY 2001 are 2130 youth.

121. Although the JCR Programme has progressed rapidly, the supporting structure has not kept pace. The study has identified the requirement for additional staff resources at the patrol group and national levels. Additionally, resources are required for completion of the actual training guidance, for more and new equipment and for new activities such as summer training sessions. Current funding sources (DND, YI) will allow the Programme to meet the FY 2001 participant goal but expansion beyond that number will require additional resources. Initiatives with other interested agencies should be pursued, however, increased DND funding may be required should no other sources be forthcoming with support. Withdrawal or reduction of this Programme in any of the communities in which it is currently established, for financial or administrative reasons, would severely damage the reputation of the CF and the Government, but more importantly, would be disastrous for the youth in these communities.

122. The JCR Programme should continue to be supported and it should be expanded. Expansion of the Programme, should be carefully orchestrated, ensuring that communities are consulted to ensure that false expectations are not seeded. The Programme should remain open to all youth, regardless of ethnic origin and it should continue to be co-ordinated with the Cadet programme, and the Ranger programme. A periodic review of the Programme should occur (five year time frame similar to Rangers) to ensure that it remains focussed on its aim, that priority for resources within the Programme are given to areas with the greatest need and that the overall Programme receives the appropriate resources to allow it to succeed.

123. The JCR Programme is a national programme that is delivered via the CRPGs in five very distinct and diverse areas of the country. To ensure best use of resources, as with Ranger equipment, the office of the DGRC should continue to disperse funding to the CRPGs for their management/implementation of the Programme. DGRC should also continue to provide guidance on JCR policy and training issues. The Ranger/JCR Working Groups should continue to be a main vehicle for consultation although direct liaison between DGRC staff and the CRPG should also continue for day to day staffing purposes.

124. This study has been most worthwhile in assembling a variety of data and proposing numerous recommendations that would improve the Rangers, as well as put the JCR Programme on a sounder footing. Both Programmes contribute
significantly to the fabric of Canadian society and both should continue to be funded. Expansion of the programmes in an orderly fashion will only serve to improve the impact of the CF in these remote and isolated regions of Canada and will provide invaluable assistance to the communities in which Rangers and JCRs reside.

CONSOLIDATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been prioritized based on the approval in concept of the various increases (Rangers and JCRs). Within the priority, the recommendations are sequenced as per their order of appearance in CAN RAN 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation number</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Priority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Ranger numbers should be increased, over a five year period, to a ceiling of 4800 from the current ceiling of 3500 as follows: 1800 for CFNA and 3000 for LFC (LFWA – 740, LFCA – 600, SQFT – 870, LFAA – 790)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R6</td>
<td>A JCR expansion plan should be developed, taking into account resource and support capabilities of the CF as well as other government departments and concerned agencies.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R17</td>
<td>JCR numbers should be increased, over a five year period to include 3900 youth in 130 patrols into these identified communities in the FY 2001-2005 time frame.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R24</td>
<td>There should be a second Ranger Enhancement Project.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R14</td>
<td>ECs for Regular Force staff augmentation (six personnel) to 1 CRPG, for the creation of JCR cells (five personnel) within the five CRPGs and for the new Ranger/JCR Directorate (5/7 personnel) in DGRC should be submitted as soon as possible.</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>R15</td>
<td>The number of instructors for the Rangers and for the JCR Programme on the establishment should be increased to a total steady state of 45 instructors (28 for Rangers and 17 for the JCR Programme). Additional funding should be provided to the Ranger/JCR budgets to facilitate these establishment changes.</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td>Complexity</td>
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<tr>
<td>R22</td>
<td>The annuitant staff/instructors employed with the CRPGs should be granted the same waiver as those personnel employed in support of the CCO, based on the uniqueness of their service and the fundamental need for the expertise that they bring to the Ranger organization.</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>R42</td>
<td>Conditional to the approval of the recommendation to increase the Canadian Ranger strength from 3500 to 4800, funding should be adjusted accordingly.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R43</td>
<td>Conditional to the approval to conduct a second Ranger Enhancement Project, it is recommended that funding be allocated accordingly.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R44</td>
<td>Conditional to the approval of the recommendation to increase the number of JCRs and number of patrols from 2130 to 3900, funding should be adjusted accordingly.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R45</td>
<td>Conditional to the refusal to increase the number of JCRs and the number of patrols beyond FY 2000-2001, additional funds should be allocated to support personnel increase (JCR HQ Cell and JCR Instructors)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5</td>
<td>The creation of a Ranger patrol for national/social fabric reasons should be considered to be legitimate. The overall guiding principle for establishment of a patrol should be the benefit to the country as a whole.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7</td>
<td>Given the political intentions to exert our sovereignty in the north (and not de-militarize), increased military presence should be implemented by increasing the numbers of Rangers in concert with recommendation R1.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9</td>
<td>Every effort should be made to engage a wide variety of national, provincial, territorial and regional governments, departments and organizations to support the JCR Programme while recognizing that the Programme is community-based and must not become too complex or bureaucratic.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R10</td>
<td>DGRC should continue to monitor Ranger issues in the same vein as other Reserve Force issues.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R11</td>
<td>DGRC should continue to develop Ranger policy (in collaboration with ADM HR (Mil)) and equipment issues in conjunction with the CRPGs/Various commanders in the Ranger chain of command using the Ranger Working Group as the main venue for consultation. Direct liaison by DGRC with the CRPGs, in this regard, should be authorized recognizing the need to keep parent headquarters informed.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R12</td>
<td>DGRC should remain the focal point for co-ordinating all aspects of the JCR Programme to ensure consistency and standardization (as appropriate) and maximizing use of resources. DGRC should have direct access to CRPGs for day to day activities but should consult with CFNA and LFA HQs on major issues. The Ranger/JCR Working Group meetings should continue to be used as the forum for consultation on policy and provision of guidance on Programme management.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R13</td>
<td>CRPG should complete the creation/implementation of their establishments within PeopleSoft as soon as possible and these should be based upon the agreed functional organization model (Annex F), including the necessary requirements to support the JCR Programme</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R16</td>
<td>CRPG budgets should be augmented to provide sufficient funds to cover infrastructure/capital support costs (costs yet to be determined).</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R18</td>
<td>A facilities provision and maintenance plan should be developed for the support of the JCR staff within the CRPG HQs. Funding for facilities support needs to be identified and provided in addition to current funding for the JCR Programme.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R20</td>
<td>ADM HR (Mil) should extend P Res benefits to all P Res personnel, regardless of the CF component with which they are employed.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R21</td>
<td>CRPG HQ and D Rgr/JCR establishments should not be too restrictive regarding the CF component origin of personnel, unless there is need of a specific MOC. Most positions could be classified as “open any” to allow full utilization of the talents of personnel in the Regular Force or all sub-components of the Reserve Force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R23</td>
<td>CRPGs should consider offering multiple-year contracts to staff as appropriate to their local situation and providing funding is secure for the period in question</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R25</td>
<td>REP II should include: GPS and HF radios (SBX-11A or variant – must be interoperable with those currently held by patrols) should be procured nationally and distributed to all CRPGs as the deficiency in navigation and communications is common to all CRPGs and not specific to one geographic area. Scale of issue should be two radios and two GPS per patrol. In addition, a small pool of both of these items should be issued to CRPG HQs to hold as replacements and for training purposes. All items must be added to Patrol and Patrol Group Scales of Issue.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R27</td>
<td>REP II should include the maintenance purchases for Ranger clothing which have not been made since the initial procurement in 1998; consequently, all items require replacement and should be re-supplied from the national level. Additionally, new purchases will need to be made should increases to the Ranger personnel ceiling be approved. Ranger clothing (and other distinctive items i.e. flags) should be included in CF clothing scales/scales of issue or provisions made for wholesale replacement. Sufficient funds need to be set aside to facilitate either option.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R29</td>
<td>REP II should include that combat pants and combat boots be included in the Ranger clothing scale</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R30</td>
<td>Additional resources should be allocated to the JCR Programme to purchase limited, but essential, clothing/equipment items in accordance with expansion plans.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R31</td>
<td>The special clothing allowance ($1500 per Instructor) should be made available to all Ranger Instructors (including JCR Instructors) in all CRPGs based on a three year cycle (life expectancy of some of the natural product clothing). Items should be purchased centrally by the CRPG QM and held on their account for issue to Instructors, thereby reducing overall costs.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R39</td>
<td>DGRC (D Rgr/JCR) should continue to pursue the development of the JCR Training Programme in consultation with the CRPGs.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R41</td>
<td>In light of the amount of time (and funding) required to train the Ranger/JCR Instructor, it is recommended that instructors be hired at least six months before the actual APS. This will enable the members to be trained before the commencement of training visits to the Ranger and/or JCR patrols.</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>The support and conduct of the JCR Programme should be formally included into the stated Ranger tasks.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R19</td>
<td>CRPG HQ establishments should not list staff as Rangers; rather, they should reflect the component origin of choice; P Res personnel employed with CRPGs should/could be held on parent Command PRL, Area PRL or on a national PRL. If the PRL solution is deemed the most appropriate, then CFNA should be assigned a PRL similar to other Commands.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R26</td>
<td>REP II should include a new Ranger high visibility vest should be developed to replace the one currently in use. Once a new vest is developed, the current model should be removed from the Scale of Issue and the replacement vest added to the Ranger and Ranger Instructor Personal Scales of Issue.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R28</td>
<td>REP II should include a Statement of Requirements for the sweatshirt, T-shirts and ball caps that should be revised to ensure improvements in the quality of the items procured.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R33</td>
<td>The IECS, CWWG and LWTU should be added to the Ranger Instructor Scale of Issue.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R34</td>
<td>It is imperative that a proper policy be developed and implemented that would allow the continuation of the service support that the Rangers provide to their/CRPG normal operations/training or to the operations/training of other Canadian Forces units and provide fair compensation to Rangers whose property is damaged as a result of their participation in operations or training.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R38</td>
<td>The draft Ranger “Training Guidance” should be reviewed and approved, through the appropriate chain, as soon as possible with a view to promulgation by Summer 2001.</td>
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<td>Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>R40</td>
<td>Funds to train Ranger and JCR Instructors should be added/identified within applicable budgets. It is recommended that $1,500.00 per instructor be allocated yearly to each CRPG in support of Ranger/JCR Instructor training.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R46</td>
<td>A JCR strategic communication’s approach should be completed and implemented and funding be allocated to support Ranger/JCR PR.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R47</td>
<td>A National Ranger strategic communication’s approach should be developed and implemented in collaboration with all stakeholders. Linkage should also be formed with appropriate government and non-government agencies.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R48</td>
<td>Funding should be allocated to support Ranger Public Affairs Including HR, training and communications activities.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R49</td>
<td>The Areas/CRPGs should be encouraged to maintain pro-active public affairs activities.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R32</td>
<td>Ranger Scale D13-105 (all four scales) should be revised in accordance with Annex K (as agreed at RWG Nov/Dec 1999).</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R37</td>
<td>The requirement for Rangers to be familiar with in-service weapons and fire a familiarization shoot using the C7A1 and 9mm pistol during annual training should be validated before the Patrol Groups are authorized training stocks of these weapons.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>Ranger patrols, as a principle, should be manned at no less than 8 personnel with no upper limit. Geography and demographic factors will dictate patrol strength and thus smaller or larger groupings should/will not be precluded. For planning purposes, 30 personnel per patrol should be used.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Location of Ranger patrols should be at the discretion of the Area Commander based upon operational and national objectives, including support to the JCR Programme. Previous criteria for establishing, disbanding and relocating patrols should continue to guide local commanders, however, no one factor (i.e. isolated, northern, coastline, economics, other government agencies) should negate consideration for the establishment of a patrol in a certain area.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SOURCES

**DND Correspondence**

- 1901-260/4 (DGRC), Canadian Ranger South of 60 Degrees Study, 16 February 1995
- NDHQ VCDS 017, Ranger Programme, 17 February 1995
- 1901-260/4 (DGRC), Ranger Enhancement Project, 30 May 1995
- 1901-260/4 (DGRC)/3136-5-P9175 (DGRC), Memorandum to PCBSC Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project P9175, 31 May 1995
- 4800-4-4 (G3), Service Paper on the Canadian Rangers, LFC HQ, 13 June 1995
- 3136-5-P9175 (DDAS 9), PCB Approval P9175 Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project, 30 June 1995
- 1901-260/4 (VCDS), Canadian Ranger Programme – A Strategic Overview, September 1995
- 1901 (DFPCC 3), VCDS Direction/Response to SQFT Letter/Expansion JCR Programme, 06 August 1999
- NDHQ D Res 340, Annuittants in Support of the JCR Programme, 13 September 1999

### Key Documents

| R8 | As Rangers are de-facto, often the only trained organization in the community who can take on a ‘legitimate enforcement’ role, liaison should be effected with the proper legal authorities to establish recognition of this situation and for the development of joint operation procedures (SOP). | 6 |
| R35 | CRPGs should demand replacement .303 calibre rifles from DSSPM stocks for weapons beyond local repair, returning requisite portions of old weapons and retaining other parts for local repairs/maintenance by qualified individuals. | 6 |
| R36 | DSSPM should review (in consultation with DGRC) the existing Statement of Requirement for a new Ranger weapon with a view to replace the .303 calibre Lee Enfield in the 5-10 year time frame. | 6 |
1110-7 (G1 Pers), Review of Limitations on Reserve Service by Canadian Forces Annuitants –
Canadian Rangers, 28 September 1999
1901-260/5 (D Res 2-3), BN on Alternative Methods of Expansion JCR Programme, 29 September 1999

**Key Documents**

*DAOD 2008 – Public Affairs Policy*
Defence White Paper 1987
Statement on Defence Policy 1991
NDHQ Instruction ADM (PER) 2/93
Defence White Paper 1994
Report on the Special Committee on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR)
Defence Planning Guidance 2000
Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020, June 1999
CRS, Review of Chief Reserves and Cadets Mandate and Organization, October 1999 (7055-44 (CRS)) (December Draft)

**Other Government Departments**

“Toward A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada, A Consultation Paper”, Department of Foreign Affairs And International Affairs, September 1998
Government Response to Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Report “Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Co-operation Into the Twenty-First Century”, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999

**Articles**

“We’re doing things nobody else can do”, Ottawa Citizen, 05 April 1998, A7

**ANNEXES**

Annex A
Current Canadian Ranger Patrol Locations
Annex B
Current Junior Canadian Ranger Patrol Locations
Annex C
Current Canadian Ranger/Junior Canadian Ranger Patrol Locations
Annex D  Map of 3 CRPG Expansion/Op Buffalo
Annex E  Geographical Locations Covered by 1 CRPG
Annex F  Ranger Patrol Group Headquarters
Annex G  Directorate of Canadian Rangers/Junior Canadian Rangers (D Rgr/JCR)
Annex H  Ranger Enhancement Project (P9175) – Vote 1 And Vote 5 Expenditures
Annex I  Ranger Enhancement Project – Synopsis of Equipment Acquisition
Annex J  REP II - Equipment Requirements
Annex K  Scale of Issue - Canadian Rangers
Annex L  Ranger Expansion - Total Costs
Appendix 1.  Canadian Ranger Expansion
Appendix 2.  Personnel Costs of Increase
Appendix 3.  Total Personnel Costs
Annex M  JCR Expansion - Total Costs
Appendix 1.  Junior Canadian Rangers Expansion
Appendix 2.  Average Patrol Costs
Appendix 3.  Cost of JCR Instructors Visits for JCR Expansion
Appendix 4.  Junior Canadian Rangers – CRPG HQ Staff Increase
Appendix 5.  Cost of Clothing per JCR Patrol (Expansion)
Appendix 6.  O&M Cost - JCR Programme FY 00-01 to FY 04-05

Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

5785-1 (D Res)
25 July 2003

Distribution List

CAN RAN 2000 STRATEGIC PAUSE

References: A. CAN RAN 2000 21 Jan 2000
B. VCDS Briefing 22 May 03

1. CAN RAN 2000 was produced by DGRC following a study conducted in 1999. CAN RAN 2000 examined the overall relevance and impact of the Canadian Rangers with respect to; the operations of the Canadian Forces (CF), the link between the Canadian Rangers and the Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR), and CF support to the Government of Canada national objectives. Today, we find ourselves mid-way through the implementation of CAN RAN and its 49 recommendations and I have just signed off on the third annual report.

2. When the original study was directed, we required a comprehensive, strategic overview of the Canadian Rangers and JCR, including a plan for expansion with assurance of adequate resources. The Ranger organization was disconnected as a national body with a lack of roles and responsibilities and while it was clear that the Canadian Rangers and JCRs needed to be linked, there was no guidance or direction to Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPGs) for either of these programs.

3. A consultative approach with key stakeholders including each of the Area Commanders was used to produce the recommendations. The study was presented to AFC, subsequently approved and promulgated in January 2000. Major findings of the study:

   a. there is unrealized potential for the Canadian Rangers as an operational resource for the CF. However, roles are not well defined;

   b. the presence of Canadian Rangers in communities has significant positive impact achieving Government of Canada objectives;

   c. there was a strong desire by stakeholders to increase the Canadian Ranger manning ceiling;
d. the JCR program has been readily accepted by communities and there continues to be high demand for additional patrols

e. to expand the JCR program and number of patrols, we need to expand the number of Canadian Rangers and location of patrols in addition to increasing the instructors and staff;

f. there continues to be a need to enhance and replace equipment; and

g. CF personnel policies require revision to take into consideration the unique service and needs of the Canadian Rangers.

4. CAN RAN 2000 was undertaken in 1999 and commenced [its] extended seven year implementation plan in 2000. Although we have conducted annual reviews, these have not taken into consideration the current realities and changing face of defence post 11 Sep 01. Specifically, I am concerned as to the validity of CAN RAN 2000 with respect to the following:

a. upon completion of year three of implementation we still lack clarity as to the mission, roles and tasks of the Canadian Rangers and we may have shifted our priority from operational impact to social impact.

b. the expansion plan as detailed in CAN RAN is not in fact what we have in reality and we may be overlapping with other Government agencies. Are the locations valid in accordance with the original concept for Canadian Rangers?

c. we have developed an extensive scale of issue and are now equipping the Canadian Rangers far beyond the original premise of self-sufficiency. What are we equipping them for and why? Who should be the OPI?

d. the recent CRS review of command and control may also impact on the way we conduct business with the Canadian Rangers and JCR in the future.

5. Although a strategic review of CAN RAN 2000 is schedule to take place in 2005, I believe this is too late in the process and will make it more difficult to align with changing CF requirements currently under review. DGRC has recommended and I have supported a strategic pause on further expansion and implementation of the original recommendations of CAN RAN 2000 during FY 03-04. This will allow time to conduct a study to re-assess the validity of CAN RAN 2000, address the items of concern and develop a new plan as required.

6. To that end, I have directed that DGRC conduct an immediate impact analysis to determine the effect of ceasing further implementation of CAN RAN 2000 including expansion and acquisition of equipment. This will be followed by
the production of a strategic plan and an updated study to consider current and future realities in terms of national priorities, CF Requirements and available resources to:

a. define and promulgate Canadian Ranger mission, roles, and tasks;

b. resolve command and control, training, financing and equipment;

c. confirm where the Canadian Rangers fit into the Total Force;

d. consider CRS recommendations on CFNA and command and control;

and

e. produce governance policy documents for Canadian Rangers and JCR.

7. Accordingly, my staff will be contacting the Areas and CRPG staff to provide input into the impact analysis and development of the strategic plan to determine a specific course of action during this pause and the pending study. Effective upon receipt of this letter, you are asked to cease Canadian Ranger expansion, addition of new tasks and further acquisition of new equipment. JCR expansion as defined in CAN RAN 2000 and program development may continue until we have determined the impact of a pause to the JCR recommendations in particular.

8. Due to the length of the initial CAN RAN 2000 project implementation and the lack of formal strategic review that has occurred with the evolution of contemporary defence priorities, a formal review of the relevancy of CAN RAN 2000 to present realities is considered both timely and necessary. It is my intention to ensure that appropriate consultation is done during the review and when it comes time to consider recommendations.

G.E.C. Macdonald
Lieutenant General

Distribution List
SYNOPSIS

This report presents the results of a review of command and control arrangements for the Canadian Rangers. The review was requested by the VCDS and CLS. In the performance of the review, the CRS study team conducted a document review, interviewed a number of senior staff in NDHQ, the Land Force Areas, and Canadian Forces Northern Area. The team also visited each of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group Headquarters.

The Canadian Rangers trace their heritage back to the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers of World War II. The organization has grown steadily over the years – today there are approximately 4,000 participants operating in seven provinces (all except Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and PEI) and three territories. The related Junior Canadian Ranger Program has approximately 2300 participants. Both the Canadian Rangers and the Junior Canadian Rangers are widely viewed as successful programs and are the subject of planned growth over the next five years.

The report discusses the degree to which the mandate for the Canadian Rangers is current and comprehensive; examines the lack of a centrally-approved list of Ranger tasks; looks at command and control from the perspective of “who owns the Rangers” and the roles of major program participants; and, explores issues of funding, training and establishment. The review describes the Rangers as having two aspects – the Rangers as operational members of the Canadian Forces embodied in the Reserve Force; and, the Rangers as a national program helping to connect the Government, Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces with First Nations peoples, remote communities and, through the Junior Canadian Rangers, supporting a vital youth program. With respect to the aspect of the Rangers as an operational component of the CF, the report suggests that current command relationships are appropriate and work well. With respect to the second aspect however, the report suggests that the program would benefit from a central authority with the ability to coordinate and oversee both recent and forecast program enhancement and expansion.

The report presents an analysis of options and concludes that formal authority and responsibility for policy and direction of the Ranger program be vested in the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff with the Director General Reserves and Cadets/ Director Reserves acting as executive agent and principle staff. Command of the Canadian Rangers themselves and responsibility for execution of the program and for Ranger operations would remain at the Area level. As suggested in the Responsibility Matrix
contained within the report, the national authority would work directly with the Area Commanders (assuming that current CLS delegations to the Areas on Rangers matters continue) to ensure standardization and centralized control over Rangers programmatic policy, budget and training. This would be similar to the current arrangements for the direction of the Cadet program, with operations being the obvious difference.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background
The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, formed during World War II to warn of, and help defend against possible incursions along Canada’s long and largely uninhabited Pacific coast, proved the utility of a lightly armed and modestly trained force as a supplement to the active duty military in sparsely settled areas of the country. Lessons learned from that organization were translated into the Canadian Rangers who were stood up in 1947. As interest in defending sovereignty claims increased, especially following the passage of the American tanker *Manhattan* through the Canadian Arctic archipelago in 1969, so did interest in the Canadian Rangers.

The organization was relatively static throughout the decades of the 60s, 70s and 80s and focused largely on the Pacific coast and the Arctic. Recent growth can be traced back to the 1987 White Paper and the concept of The Total Force. Increased reliance on the Reserves, of which the Canadian Rangers are a part, was a common theme of both the 1994 White Paper and the 1995 Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves. While expansion of the Ranger program was somewhat moderated by the re-engineering efforts of the mid-90s and governmental fiscal restraints, it progressed nonetheless. Significant enhancements were staffed and published in 1995. The enhancement program lasted four years and also saw the Rangers reorganize to their current form. As was the case following World War II, National Defence saw the clear operational benefits of providing modest training and equipment to residents of sparsely settled areas.

Benefits of the Canadian Rangers were also seen outside of support to operations. The 1995 Special Commission observed that the program might also support improved relations between National Defence and First Nations peoples in many areas south of the Canadian Rangers normal arctic operating areas. In 1999, Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre (SQFT) sought approval to establish a Ranger patrol in order to support the Junior Canadian Rangers, a program organized a few years earlier. This is widely acknowledged to be the first formal
expansion request made for non-operational reasons. The Canadian Rangers came to be recognized as having a role in providing a governmental presence in the remote areas of the country and, as such, a vehicle for provision of governmental support.

As the Rangers were expanding, the structures of the CF and Department were changing. The most significant impact upon the program affected the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups south of 60° North. Land Forces Command was being transformed into the Chief of the Land Staff and the Land Force Areas. In order to be better able to focus the new structure on force generation responsibilities, LFC delegated responsibility for executing the Canadian Rangers program to the Areas. It saw itself as being involved only in exceptional circumstances. North of 60°, relationships between the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group and its parent Headquarters did not change. Expansion of the program, in numbers, geography and mandate, together with a significant change in the structure of Army oversight mechanisms all prompted a major study by Director General Reserves and Cadets – CAN RAN 2000.

Tasks formally assigned to the Canadian Rangers have not changed significantly from those in 1947. As specified in CAN RAN 2000, Rangers are currently tasked to provide a military presence in sparsely settled areas by:

a. reporting unusual activity;
b. collecting local data of significance to military operations; and
c. conducting surveillance and sovereignty patrols as tasked.

Further, the Canadian Rangers are to assist Canadian Forces activities by:

a. providing local expertise, guidance and advice;
b. conducting North Warning System security patrols as tasked; and
c. assisting Search and Rescue efforts.

Today, there are approximately 4,000 Rangers located in seven provinces and three territories. If expansion plans are completed, that number will rise to almost 5000 by early 2008. While Patrols are still largely located in northern areas and along both Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the program is expanding into the country’s interior. There are five CRPGs (Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups) - one in Canadian Forces Northern Area and one in each of the Land Force Areas.

One guiding principle maintained over the life of the program is that Rangers receive the minimum necessary training to execute the task. Although initial
basic training is mandatory, annual training is on a strictly voluntary basis. Paid training days range between approximately ten to twelve days per Ranger annually. Aside from training, Rangers are only paid if called out specifically to support an operation. Each Ranger is initially issued with minimal clothing distinctive to the Rangers, an arm brassard, a Lee-Enfield 303 rifle and annually with 200 rounds of ammunition. Patrols have access to radios, GPS receivers, maps and, depending on location, special environmental clothing.

The Review

This review was initiated at the request of the VCDS and CLS to examine the Canadian Ranger Program. The purpose of the review is as follows:

Given the current mandate of the Canadian Rangers, to assess and validate the division of responsibilities of the key stakeholders and to examine the existing command and control arrangements.

Issues and Observations

An Evolving Mandate. The first areas addressed by the review are that of mandate and assigned tasks. The mandate is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada that cannot conveniently or economically be provided for by other components of the Canadian Forces. While the mandate itself has not formally changed over the years, it is now being interpreted more broadly. Operationally, the Canadian Rangers have taken on new tasks such as security patrols for the North Warning System. In the Atlantic area, Rangers routinely report suspicious activity that may relate to smuggling operations. A number of these new tasks are not common to all of the Patrol Groups. The Rangers have become much more visible in their representational role in such activities as forming a guard of honour for visits to the North by the Governor General, supporting the Arctic Winter Games and participating in the Military Tattoo in Halifax. Ranger Patrols have also assisted other communities in the Arctic following natural disasters. While valid tasks and certainly within the capability of the Rangers, these operational activities are clearly more complex than those originally conceived. These added tasks also bring forward requirements for increased equipment, training and support – these involve costs. The establishment of the Junior Canadian Rangers has also moved the program beyond the original concept by adding an element of nation building through a popular and extremely successful youth program. It is not entirely clear that some tasks reflecting the broader interpretation are in keeping with conscious national decision rather than regional decision or due to, for lack of a better term, mission creep. A nationally approved task list is needed to ensure that training
requirements, equipment needs and support are all managed, nationally supportable and in keeping with the program mandate. A suggested task list is contained within the main body of the report.

Roles and Responsibilities – “Who owns the Rangers?” Formal responsibilities, together with the definition of roles of the major program participants, are the central issue addressed in the study. In the words of DGRC, the question is, “Who owns the Rangers?” The answer depends upon whether or not one is asking about the Canadian Rangers as a program or about the Canadian Rangers as an operational component of the CF. The operational organization made up by the numbered Patrol Group Headquarters took its current form in 1997. Interviewed Area Commanders and Patrol Group Commanding Officers all reported command relationships reflecting those that would be expected between any unit and its superior formation. The answer to the ownership question is clear for the Rangers as established units – the Areas own the CRPGs and direct operations. The answer to the question is less clear if directed at the Ranger program. Four of the CRPGs are commanded by Land Force Area Commanders and one by the Commander, Canadian Forces Northern Area. There is no central executive above the Area level and no clear delineation of responsibility. The only central organization focusing on Ranger issues lies within Director Reserves who has had to assume many elements of the role of central authority but who is not empowered to set training standards, establishment levels or to provide direction to the Areas on policy or organization. If ownership implies at least some measure of control over the thing owned, there is no easily identifiable owner of the Ranger program. There is a lack of a central authority with the ability to direct the five separate elements of the Canadian Rangers program - the Patrol Group Headquarters assigned to Canadian Forces Northern Area and the four assigned to the Land Force Areas - and a corresponding lack of clearly defined roles for the major players in the program.

Funding. Except for initial basic training, annual or recurring training for the Canadian Rangers is strictly voluntary. Paid training days are the basic element of the current formula whereby funding is allocated to the Patrol Groups. While the costs of the program are under upward pressure with expansion and increased complexity, the funding model has not compensated. Increased cost for some items, like maps, is somewhat offset by decreased training days as are increases in staff to manage a geographically larger area. Transportation costs have increased across the country. One Patrol Group with significant transportation needs has sought and obtained increased offsetting funds while another has had to reduce training days. The funding model needs to be updated to allow for varying costs
across the program while protecting the basic element of the program – Ranger operations. This is best accomplished by a properly mandated central authority.

**Training Days.** Aside from differing numbers of training days, training itself differs between Patrol Groups and is an issue. While there is no evidence that the Canadian Rangers are poorly trained – indeed performance in exercises and during real operations indicates just the opposite – there currently is no national training program or standard. As mentioned above, the basic philosophy behind the Canadian Rangers has been provision of only essential/minimal training and equipment to accomplish the task. Without strong central direction to follow a nationally approved training scheme, there is a potential for five distinct training plans with differing standards, each of them potentially more resource intensive than necessary.

**Establishment.** This is currently an issue in only one Patrol Group and stems from a different interpretation of the criteria used as establishment ceiling. As expressed in the CAN RAN 2000 series of studies, establishment ceiling is expressed as both a maximum number of Rangers and a maximum number of Patrols. The different viewpoint argues that the only true ceiling should be numbers of Rangers and that the Area Commander should be able to establish as many patrols in as many locations as needed while staying within the individual ceiling. This approach potentially increases overall costs as additional training visits and equipment must now be programmed and funded (or conversely taken out of hide by reducing training days again impacting the overall program).

In the opinion of the review team, a common thread is the lack of central authority above the Area level. While the command arrangements need very little attention, different interpretations of directives, different levels of oversight and even different views of the program’s raison d’être, place what is generally accepted as a vital national program in some jeopardy, especially as the program becomes more complex as it inevitably will.

**Command and Control Options**

**Option 1.** The review compares the status quo and two alternate command and control arrangements. The first alternate arrangement is termed a Canadian Ranger National Authority. It differs from the status quo in that, while command of the Patrol Groups remains vested in the Land Force Areas and Canadian Forces Northern Area, a central agency is formally assigned specific responsibilities to issue national direction on elements of the Ranger program apart from those dealing with conduct of operations.
Option 2. The second alternate arrangement is termed Canadian Rangers National Headquarters. It would involve the formal establishment, by Ministerial Organization Order, of a formation to which command of the Ranger Patrol Groups would be transferred. While the Rangers would be under operational control of the current Area HQs, all other responsibilities would be centralized.

Our option comparison concludes that the best way to address command and control issues inherent in the status quo is to adopt the National Authority model.

**Recommended Course of Action**

The review suggests that a national authority could be established within one of four functional areas – VCDS, DCDS, CLS or CFNA. Arguments in favour of and against each option are addressed in the main body of the review. Factors such as resource implications, operational fit, familiarity with the Ranger program specifically and the Reserves generally, and span of control argue that the best option would involve formalizing the responsibilities that have been unofficially assumed by the Director of Reserves within the VCDS organization. The new office would direct and administer the Canadian Rangers program centrally with decentralized execution by the Areas in a way very similar to that currently seen with the Cadet program. A suggested breakdown of responsibilities is contained within the report.

**BACKGROUND**

**History**

The Canadian Rangers trace their roots back to WWII and the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. In June of 1942, two weeks following landings and attacks on Alaska, a submarine shelled the Estevan Point Light House in B.C. Canada had a vast and largely uninhabited Pacific coastline that, like Alaska, was directly threatened. The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers served throughout the remainder of the war with the primary roles of the provision of security, ensuring Canadian territorial sovereignty through surveillance of sparsely settled areas and, if possible, the prevention of penetration of sovereign territory. By war’s end, Ranger strength had reached 15,000 and, although the threat of invasion had not materialized, the benefits of an organization of that type were clear. Growing interest in the Canadian North and issues of national sovereignty saw the birth of the Canadian Rangers with their formal establishment as a Corps of the Reserve Militia by an Order-in-Council on 23 May 1947. As now, their official role was
to provide a military presence and surveillance in those northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada that could not conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the military.

In the late 1960s, oil was discovered in large quantities on Alaska’s North Slope. The final solution for transporting the oil south was not chosen when the Manhattan set sail on August 24, 1969. The ship navigated the Northwest Passage, accompanied by the icebreaker John A. MacDonald, arriving at Point Barrow on September 14 and returning to New York two months later. That voyage generated a renewed interest in sovereignty issues in Canada and contributed to a rejuvenated Canadian Ranger force as an effective and efficient vehicle for governmental display of presence in, and control over, the country’s remote and sparsely inhabited regions.

While reasonably static for the 1970’s and 80’s, the Rangers have grown since the early 1990s, particularly in the last few years. Departmental and Canadian Forces re-engineering and increased emphasis on the Reserves were both drivers in a number of studies and papers supporting Ranger expansion. Advantages were seen both in operations and in support of the social fabric of isolated communities. The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves voiced strong support and suggested the Canadian Rangers could also play a role in improving relations between the Canadian Forces and aboriginal peoples. Statements by the Special Commission, together with data gathered as part of the VCDS directed “Canadian Rangers South of 60°” study, both supported the modest expansion of the Rangers just as virtually all other areas of the CF and Department were seeing reductions. Although priority for new patrols was to go to arctic and coastal areas, there was a rationalization and modest expansion of the presence, begun earlier in the 1990s, in isolated communities in the country’s interior.

The next significant impact upon the Ranger program came with the Ministerial announcement in 1996 of a new youth initiative called the Young Rangers, subsequently renamed Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR). The JCR program was to support structured, supervised youth activity in remote and isolated areas of the country with an emphasis on promoting traditional cultures and lifestyles. Although modest as initially envisaged, the JCR program has been significantly increased due to the infusion of financial support through Youth Initiatives proposed under the Federal Government’s Youth Employment Strategy. The Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers are administered as separate programs; however, Rangers are used as the principal instructors for the JCR patrols and new JCR patrols can only be established in places where Ranger
patrols exist to provide support. Although administered separately, the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers are clearly linked.1

The most recent focus on the Canadian Rangers can be traced back to a 1999, Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre (SQFT) request to expand their Ranger operations both for operational reasons and to support JCR expansion. While previous studies and expansion plans acknowledged the Rangers as a national investment and as a significant boost to their communities’ social fabric, this was the first time that a Ranger Patrol was being actively sought for reasons other than purely operations. This request resulted in a series of reviews starting with CAN RAN 2000, which looked at both the Rangers and the JCR Program to ensure that further expansion was desired, necessary and supportable. What started out in the late 40s as a minimally trained force able to provide surveillance and a military presence took on, in the late 60s and early 70s a key role in sovereignty projection and in the 90s, aspects of support to youth and nation building.

Organization and Administration

The Ranger organizations have taken a number of forms over the years. The three original organizations – those Rangers in the North, along the Atlantic coast and the Pacific coast – were all different in their own way reflecting their natural environment and organizational heritage. Likewise, command and control of the Rangers has been executed by a number of organizations since 1947. At various times, portions have been the responsibility of staff branches or various components of the Maritime or Land Staff and by CFNA or its predecessors. Since the mid 1990s, command of the Rangers has been the responsibility of the Land Force Areas and Canadian Forces Northern Area.

Today, there are approximately 4,000 Rangers located in seven provinces and three territories. If expansion plans are completed, that number will rise to almost 5000 by early 2008. In keeping with VCDS guidance issued in the mid-90s, patrols are largely located in northern areas and along both Atlantic and Pacific coasts. There are five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups – one in Canadian Forces Northern Area and one in each of the Land Force Areas. The individual Rangers are formed into Patrols. Of the approximately 140 patrols currently established, roughly 41 per cent are commanded by CFNA, 13 per cent by SQFT, 6 per cent by LFCA, 20 per cent by LFWA and 20 per cent by LFAA. A map showing the locations of both Canadian Ranger and Junior Canadian Ranger Patrols is attached at Annex B.

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1 This review focuses on the Canadian Rangers. The Junior Canadian Rangers will be addressed only as they have an impact upon the Rangers’ organization
Patrols are comprised of a minimum of eight and potentially up to 30 members. Each Ranger is initially issued with certain clothing distinctive to the Rangers, an arm brassard, a Lee-Enfield .303 rifle and annually with 200 rounds of ammunition. Patrols have access to radios, GPS receivers, maps and, depending on location, special environmental clothing. The provision of other supplies and uniform items is the subject of considerable internal discussion and review. One guiding principle maintained over the life of the program is that Rangers receive the minimum necessary training to execute the task. Although basic training is mandatory, annual training is on a strictly voluntary basis. Leaders and trainers can receive specialized additional training. There are significant differences between Patrol Groups and sometimes geographically within Patrol Groups with respect to how training is structured and administered. Paid training days range between approximately ten to twelve days per Ranger annually. Rangers are also compensated when called out specifically to support an operation. There are some significant differences between Patrol Groups with respect to how the patrols are organized. While most patrols are community based, one group organizes regionally, a reflection of its original organization based on regional companies and community-based platoons. While patrol leadership goes by different terminology in some of the groups, all patrols elect their leaders. Patrols generally operate by consensus. Many of the differences between current Patrol Groups can be traced back to the original, regionally oriented organizations.

**Ranger Operations**

Tasks formally assigned to the Canadian Rangers have not changed significantly from those specified in 1947. Currently, Rangers are tasked to provide a military presence in sparsely settled areas by:

1. reporting unusual activity;
2. collecting local data of significance to military operations; and
3. conducting surveillance and sovereignty patrols as tasked.

Further, the Canadian Rangers are to assist Canadian Forces activities by:

1. providing local expertise, guidance and advice;
2. conducting North Warning System security patrols as tasked; and
3. assisting Search and Rescue efforts.

While the Rangers were tasked in 1947 with helping prevent incursions of sovereign territory, the application of force is not now part of the Rangers’

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2 These tasks are as listed in CAN RAN 2000, a study of the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers initiated by DGRC. As this study and its subsequent update was briefed to and endorsed by the VCDS, it is generally recognized as authoritative.
mandate. The review team sees the Rangers as having two basic functions. The first is operational. In the course of their daily activities, Rangers collect and report data. They apply their significant local knowledge by provision of assistance to other units of the CF and to other government departments. The second, equally important function is representational. The Rangers’ program is focused on remote or isolated communities. Support for the establishment of new patrols is historically based, among other things, on the absence of any other federal agencies or programs. As such, they are often the only visible linkage to the Government of Canada on a daily basis. In many communities, Ranger leadership and community leadership are indistinguishable. In the recent past, Rangers have acted as observers and guides on the west coast during operations to counter illegal immigration, have assisted with recovery operations following air accidents in the north, and reported suspicious activity in areas along the east coast frequented by smugglers. Canadian Rangers from 11 patrols in Northern Quebec and Nunavut received the CDS Commendation for their critical role in operations following the tragic avalanche in the town of Kangiqsualujjuaq on Ungava Bay on 1 January 1999. A unit commendation was awarded to 2 CRPG. Canadian Ranger participation in Ground Search and Rescue operations is common as, in many locations, they constitute the only trained, equipped and knowledgeable body readily available. Interestingly, Patrol Group staff have reported that significant Ranger support to community activities or in operations such as Ground Search frequently come to light only after the fact and without request for compensation.

THE REVIEW

Review Background

In the latter half of 2002, CRS conducted a study of the command and control relationships of Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA). During the conduct of this study, the CRS team noted that command and control of the Canadian Rangers was an issue that could benefit from further review. The CRS observations stemmed from differences observed between the command, control and administration of 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, looked at as part of the CFNA study, and the four patrol groups constituting the program in the rest of the country. A recommendation to that effect was included in the final report. Both the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of the Land Staff supported this recommendation and asked CRS to conduct the study.
Scope
Initially, CRS was tasked to conduct a review of the Command and Control of the Canadian Rangers. Following initial interviews with the major stakeholders, it was decided to expand the scope of the tasking to that contained in the CRS Letter of Notification:

Given the current mandate of the Canadian Rangers, to assess and validate the division of responsibilities of the key stakeholders and to examine the existing command and control arrangements.

...

ISSUES, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mandate
The mandate of the Canadian Rangers is to:

...provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada that cannot conveniently or economically be provided for by other components of the Canadian Forces.3

Today’s mandate reads very much like that originally assigned in 1947 yet the role being performed today is much more complex.

The mandate of the Canadian Rangers does not clearly reflect the roles and tasks being performed on behalf of the Canadian Forces, Department of National Defence and people of Canada.

The original concept was to provide personnel with the absolute minimum amount of training to perform a well-defined and very limited role. The original Rangers were truly the “eyes and ears” of Canada’s defence organization. While going about their daily business in sparsely settled areas, they were to report any suspicious activity seen. Armed intervention was, in the case of the Pacific Militia Rangers, only to occur if feasible and only until such time as regular troops could respond. As an exercise in risk management, the establishment of the Rangers was a sound and well thought out mitigation strategy. Although the likelihood of invasion was not high, the consequences of a successful invasion were significant. Rangers needed very little support while providing a reasonable likelihood of detection of an incursion before an enemy foothold was established.

3As detailed in CAN RAN 2000 and on the Canadian Rangers official web site on the world-wide web -- http://www.rangers.forces.gc.ca/pubs/rangers/intro_e.asp
Contributing to the defence of sovereignty claims has always been an important part of the mandate. In addition to “eyes and ears”, the Rangers also provide feet on the ground. Although the review team was unable to find two opinions with the exact same view of what constitutes control over an area, clearly even the most remote locations must be visited or at least surveyed from the air from time to time by the government claiming sovereignty. The government must have reasonable knowledge of what’s going on and be able to demonstrate a physical presence when required. Evaluations of the Ranger program and of expansion plans over the years all come to the conclusion that Ranger sovereignty patrols are an effective and efficient method of discharging requirements together with over flight of surveillance aircraft and maritime visits when possible. To effectively execute this responsibility for the federal government though, the Rangers must conduct specific operations that are outside of their routine, daily business. That extra responsibility comes with a cost, especially in the more remote areas of the North where chartered aircraft or 440 (Transport) Squadron are the only means of moving a patrol of Rangers and the significant amount of equipment needed to conduct a patrol of several days duration several hundred kilometres away from established communities. While still more economical than a series of Aurora flights or naval patrols, Ranger sovereignty operations represents significantly increased investment over a ball cap, 303 rifle and a couple of hundred rounds of ammunition.

The social impact of the Canadian Rangers in their respective communities, a role seen by some as beyond the provision of a “military presence” has been widely acknowledged. Some areas of that relationship receive active, concrete support. One of those areas is the Junior Canadian Rangers, an organization widely accepted as providing structured activities in areas of the country where they would be otherwise unavailable. Junior Canadian Rangers programs have been established in a number of areas that have proven to be at relative risk based on certain social indicators. The JCR program has been credited with providing necessary life skills to children at risk. Establishment of a Junior Canadian Ranger patrol requires the support of the community and the local Ranger patrol. Indeed, new Junior Canadian Ranger patrols can only be established in communities with an existing Ranger patrol. The discussions that began formally in 1999 with an SQFT proposal to establish a Canadian Ranger patrol to, in part, facilitate the establishment of a Junior Canadian Ranger patrol, will most likely become more frequent. At the same time, socially oriented support to existing communities’ Rangers and JCR patrols may increase. The review team was told of an incident involving a sizable suicide pact in a local community that swept up one of the Junior Canadian Ranger Patrols. In providing assistance to the patrol with grief counseling, the CF was, in effect, providing a social service to the entire
community – something well beyond the provision of a mere “military presence”. However one sees social support as a component of military presence, it is clearly a component of governmental presence that is extremely difficult to reduce once provided. Further, a well supported and properly administered JCR program potentially provides a recruiting base that significantly contributes to sustaining the Canadian Rangers and CF as a whole, just as the Cadet program helps sustain the CF in other parts of the country. Any social support provided can be directly linked to operational support.

Support to the Rangers is becoming more complex. Some of the increased complexity comes from expanded scales of issue with new requirements for distribution, storage, maintenance and replacement. Global Positioning System receivers and HF radios were considered necessary to increase both accuracy and speed of Ranger reporting. The provision of combat clothing and combat boots, while not necessary, is seen by many (although not all) as appropriate and as contributions to identity and esprit de corps. New federal requirements, such as firearms regulations add complexity. New initiatives and directives for federal employees may be much easier to comply with in urban centers than in many of the places that Rangers and the JCR operate. Other complexities come about as regulations and directives are rewritten and as the unique nature of Ranger operations is lost in documents directed at the Primary Reserve.

The Rangers began with a very simple concept – minimally trained and equipped local experts providing a military presence that cannot be provided conveniently or economically by other means. Military presence is no longer the only thing that Rangers provide and regulatory requirements sometimes strain the definition of convenient. While still economical compared to alternatives, the costs of the program may increase significantly over time unless managed.

With the planned expansion of the program to 4800 over the next five years, strong central direction will be required to ensure that, while allowing for regional operational requirements, national operational, regulatory and social service obligations are properly determined, planned for, funded and discharged. Each patrol established must be viewed on our part as a long-term commitment that, while supported locally, is made nationally.

**Tasks**

Tasks assigned to the Rangers would flow out of a clear mandate. A list of tasks to be performed is key to efficient and cost-effective training, unit business

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There is no nationally approved and recognized list of common or region-unique tasks for the Canadian Ranger program.
planning and national procurement. An understanding of the capabilities of the Rangers is essential for operational planning and tasking. Canadian Rangers’ strategic documents provide little guidance in the actual conduct of Ranger activities at the tactical level.

This is not to say that there does not currently exist documentation outlining Ranger tasks. Indeed, the review team found several documents that laid out a series of Ranger tasks in sufficient detail to provide guidance to major stakeholders; however, it is difficult for those not in the Ranger program (and for some within the program) to ascertain with any degree of certainty which document and which task list is the official version. The most recent task lists are below.

The following task list is included in CAN RAN 2000:

a. **Provide a Military Presence in Support of Sovereignty:**
   - report unusual activities
   - collect local data of significance to the support of military operations
   - conduct surveillance/sovereignty patrols as tasked

b. **Within Capabilities, assist CF activities in area including:**
   - providing local expertise in terms of guides and advice
   - conducting NWS patrols as tasked
   - providing local assistance and advice to SAR activities

The following task list is included in draft DAOD 5003-The Canadian Rangers, and other Canadian Ranger documents produced as the result of discussions between Patrol Groups:

a. **Support Canada’s Defence Mission:**
   - assist in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending arrival of other forces
   - assist RCMP/Provincial/Territorial police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs

b. **Provide a Military Presence in Support of Sovereignty:**
   - conduct territorial and/or coastal surveillance
   - report suspicious and unusual events
   - conduct North Warning site inspections as applicable
c. **Assist CF Activities Within Capability:**
   - provide local knowledge and Ranger expertise
   - participate in CF operations and exercises
   - provide liaison within boundaries

d. **Assist Other Government Departments in Peace and War:**
   - SAR, emergency, humanitarian
   - Aid of the Civil Power

e. **Instruct and Supervise the Junior Canadian Rangers Program.**

Some Patrol Groups have added tasks with the result being that there is, in practice, no national task list approved by a senior authority within NDHQ. We also note that in many instances, Patrol Group COs have added or deleted tasks without seeking or receiving the requisite authority from their senior headquarters. Clearly there are tasks that may be valid in the area of operations of one or more Patrol Groups but not all. The development of a secondary or Regional Canadian Ranger Task List may be the best mechanism to deal with this. If such a Regional Task list were to be developed, national authority approval should be sought and received through the chain of command before promulgation.

| CRPG COs should obtain chain of command authority to add or delete assigned tasks. |

We would envision that a national task list would, as a minimum, include the following:

a. **Conduct and Provide Support to Sovereignty Operations:**
   - conduct surveillance and sovereignty patrols as tasked
   - report suspicious and unusual activities

b. **Conduct and Provide Assistance to Canadian Forces Domestic Operations:**
   - collect local data of military significance
   - provide local knowledge and Canadian Ranger expertise in terms of guides and advice
   - conduct territorial, coastal and inland water surveillance as required/tasked
   - participate in CF operations, exercises and training
• conduct North Warning Site security patrols as tasked
• provide assistance to Other Government Departments
• provide local assistance and advice to Ground Search and Rescue operations
• provide support in response to natural disaster and humanitarian operations
• provide liaison with local government authorities

c. Maintain a Footprint in the Local Community:
• conduct representational activities on behalf of DND with local authorities
• provide support to or assist community distress operations
• conduct or participate in ceremonial events

d. Instruct and Supervise the Junior Canadian Rangers Program

Some tasks being discussed within the Rangers community include specific tasks that have a tactical military connotation and that require tactical military training. These would require a level of training and assumption of liability far in excess of the Rangers’ current mandate. As such, tasks specifically not recommended include:

• assisting in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending arrival of other forces
• assisting RCMP/Provincial/Territorial police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs
• Aid to the Civil Power or assistance to other government department activities that may require the application of force such as riot control

The inclusion of responsibility for the conduct of Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) was deliberate. IAW the National Search and Rescue Manual, DND has the following complementary search and rescue task:

…to provide search and rescue units where and when available, to assist in the prosecution of ground SAR and humanitarian incidents which occur within provincial or municipal areas of responsibility.

Operationally speaking, GSAR is performed by Rangers and Ranger Patrols as a matter of course. GSAR is a provincial or territorial police responsibility and one that patrols only formally support when officially requested. When patrols do provide support they are organized under and directed by the appropriate police organization. Despite this, Rangers have often supported search and rescue on a
volunteer basis and sometimes only report that activity after the fact. There are most assuredly unreported SAR activities. We must recognize that the Canadian Rangers provide in many places, trained, organized and experienced people that are available whereas police services may be thinly manned and several hours away. Given that Canadian Rangers routinely perform GSAR and that the activity is a complementary task assigned to the CF, its inclusion in the task list will confirm its legitimacy.

The inclusion of a national task to maintain a footprint in the local community also recognizes the prominent position in the community enjoyed by many Canadian Rangers. There are significant numbers of Canadian Rangers in leadership positions within their community and the distinction between Canadian Ranger, RCMP Auxiliary Constable, elder or chief are often blurred. Frequently the Canadian Rangers represent the only identifiable and formed group that is trained and readily available to assist the community in time of need. As such these communities expect the Canadian Rangers to respond to local emergency situations. Including this in the National Task List would recognize what is an important task already being performed by the Canadian Rangers.

There is one aspect of Canadian Ranger tasks outside of the parameters of this review that should be addressed. There are tasks performed by the Rangers for which they are not remunerated. As a member of the Reserve Force, Rangers mainly serve on Class A service. The normal method of authorizing pay for reservists on Class A is prior authorization and the physical signing of a pay sheet. In the event that a Canadian Ranger notes an activity that is considered to be unusual as per the current task list, the Ranger will proceed to the closest method of communication and report the incident to his Patrol Leader or to Patrol Group Headquarters. Rangers do not normally get paid for this activity. En route to report such an activity, should they have an accident causing injury or equipment damage, what liability does the CF/DND incur?

**Command and Control**

The Canadian Rangers are unique within the Canadian Forces. They comprise their own component of the Reserve Force and are not associated with any of the Army, Navy or Air Force. They select and de-select their own local leadership and are not required to train (although going for long periods without training can result in a very strong recommendation for resignation). When looking at command and control issues, the review team came to the conclusion that there

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There is no central authority empowered to direct and coordinate non-operational aspects of the Canadian Rangers program.
are two facets to the Canadian Rangers. The first is as the operational members of the Canadian Forces who perform their duties daily and can be tasked to participate in domestic operations under the command of the appropriate Area Commander. The second facet is as a national program providing a channel for governmental presence in remote communities, a bridge between the Canadian Forces and aboriginal peoples, and participating in a vital and successful youth program. The command and control of the CRPGs – the operational element of the Rangers – is well defined and needs no modification. Control of the national program though, suffers from the lack of a central authority empowered to deal with the non-operational aspects, coordinate and standardize essential programmatic elements from a headquarters point of view, and deal with the regulatory and administrative arrangements unique to the Rangers.

There have been a number of command and control arrangements of the Rangers over the years. Most recently, the Ranger units in the North have been assigned to Canadian Forces Northern Area (or its predecessor Northern Region) and those in the south to Land Forces Command. As Land Forces Command Headquarters was being reengineered into the Chief of the Land Staff, responsibility for the Ranger units was devolved to the Land Force Areas so that CLS could focus on force generation issues. The Canadian Rangers are currently organized into patrols. Each patrol elects a leader who serves at the pleasure of the patrol. The patrols are divided between the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPG). These, in turn, are allocated to Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA), Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre (SQFT), Land Forces Central Area (LFCA), Land Forces Western Area (LFWA), and Land Forces Atlantic Area (LFAA). The Patrol Groups were established in 1997 by Ministerial Organization Order as formed units of the CF embodied in the Reserve Force. The organization and establishment of Patrol Group Headquarters vary. Regular Force officers and NCMs fill the billets in 1 CRPG while members of the Reserve Force staff the other CRPGs. Two of the five Commanding Officers also fill positions on the Area staff. A Major in a dedicated position commands each of the other three. Staff composition varies between Groups but an officer second-in-command, Sergeant Major, small training staff and support for administration and supply are the norm. Staffs supporting the Junior Canadian Rangers are generally separate. Two of the Groups have Detachments.

The Commanding Officers of the Patrol Groups all report to the respective Area Commander. Routine matters are normally handled through the Chief of Staff. Area Commanders and Patrol Group Commanding Officers reported professional relationships that one would consider normal and direct communications between them on important matters. Three of the Patrol Group
Commanding Officers are located in the same geographic area as their parent Area Headquarters; one is located about an hour away by car; one is separated by more than 1300 kms.

Northern Area Headquarters maintains close oversight of 1 CRPG activities. As a Level 1 Advisor, Northern Area has always communicated directly with D Res. Involvement by CLS staff in that portion of the Canadian Ranger program overseen by the Land Force Areas is by exception only. In 1996, Land Forces Command announced that day-to-day responsibility for the Rangers was being devolved to the Areas in preparation for the stand-up of the Chief of the Land Staff. Since that time, CLS has maintained an officer responsible for Rangers matters, usually within the staff assigned responsibility for Reserves and Militia. That staff officer has attended Rangers Working Groups on behalf of CLS, has centrally staffed the allocation of funds between the VCDS and the Areas and generally monitored routine staffing that was authorized to go directly between the Director of Reserves (D Res) and the Areas.

Director Reserves has both an official role and an unofficial role with respect to the Rangers. In the official capacity, the D Res staff fulfills the normal functions of generating policy, staff advice and acting as the Rangers’ champion. The D Res Staff sees its role as “advise, assist and warn”. The D Res unofficial role is much more involved. In the absence of a single authority at the national level, D Res has assumed many of the responsibilities of a national authority, mediating between CFNA and the other areas, staffing issues of establishment and scales of issue and dealing at the national level with such operationally oriented topics as firearms registration.

Projects initiated by D Res as a result of studies like CAN RAN, or as chair of the national level Rangers’ Working Group, often lead to ownership of issues, policies or tasks.

The main issue in this area, as expressed to the review team by DGRC, is one of “Who owns the Rangers?” At the Area level and below, command and control is clear. The Patrols have leaders; the patrol leaders recognize the CO of the Patrol Group as their superior; the Patrol Group COs have no question as to the authority of the Area Commanders or about the appropriate way to staff things through the Area or to NDHQ where authorized. The source of authority and tasks in support of Domestic Operations is well understood by all. The problem exists outside of operations and above the Area level. In its 1996 message announcing the devolution of authority for Ranger issues to the Areas, Land Forces Command Headquarters saw “…little requirement for coordination or arbitration between LFAs with respect to Ranger activities.” Further, they
assessed that “…most costs associated with the program are steady and predictable”. Unfortunately, Ranger expansion, a widening mandate, increased costs and regulatory complications all contributed to a situation not foreseen in 1996. Had there not been devolution within the Army on Rangers issues, a central agency would need to coordinate between the Army and Northern Area. With the devolution, D Res now must coordinate the policies and establishments and the setting of scales of issue for five formations. In the absence of executive authority, D Res has assumed a central role through the chair of the Rangers’ Working Group. In the final analysis though, a working group chair has no executive authority. The simple answer to DGRC’s question is that ownership and direction of the units of the Canadian Forces that constitute the Rangers is clear – the CRPGs are allocated to the Areas. With respect to the overall program, there is no easily identifiable owner. While DGRC is the most visible champion at the National level they are lacking authority to issue direction and enforce policy or standards.

Division of Responsibilities

Given that there is no clear ownership of the non-operational aspects of the Canadian Ranger program, it follows that responsibilities of the major elements of the program are not clearly laid out and understood.

A formal division of responsibilities is required to clarify major stakeholder responsibilities.

The oversight and direction provided to the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups varies. This inconsistent level of oversight and direction has, in essence, led to the establishment of five different Canadian Ranger programs. While D Res has most admirably assumed certain functions out of default, these have never formally been assigned to D Res or to DGRC. We believe that the Canadian Rangers is a national program that satisfies national DND/CF and governmental objectives. As such, national direction is required. This division of responsibility issue has been central to the consideration of options and report recommendations. A final division of responsibilities very much depends on the option chosen and in this regard we have detailed the division of responsibilities for the recommended option, at Annex C. The key aspect is that authority for the Canadian Ranger Program must be formally vested in a National Ranger authority and then all stakeholders must conform to the resultant matrix and chain of command.

There is a requirement for a revised, national funding formula.
Funding

The funding model, whereby programmed Ranger funds are divided among the Areas, has not changed since 1997. This model does not take into account additional tasks undertaken by the CRPGs, aside from those mentioned above, or incremental infrastructure and personnel costs. Although recent equipment and clothing enhancements have been funded, the maintenance, storage and transportation of those enhancements have generally not been. As resources have become more constrained over the years, an increasing number of support costs have been passed from host bases to lodger Patrol Groups. Some Patrols now have to expend funds for things previously provided centrally or by the host base such as maps and IM support. This situation has had the biggest impact on funding available for Ranger training days.

Funding for the program originates with the VCDS and is apportioned to CFNA for 1 CRPG and to CLS for the other Patrol Groups. The basic funding components include Ranger pay for the 12 days of training programmed each year and a component for operations and maintenance. The four southern Patrol Groups also have a component for the pay of the Reserve Force members that make up the Patrol Group staff (the staff of 1 CRPG is comprised of Regular Force officers and NCMs). Both 1 and 5 CRPGs receive additional funding for the execution of Sovereignty Patrols over and above programmed training and for the North Warning System security patrols contracted for. In addition, CFNA has recently received additional funding for aircraft charter to augment the transportation that can be provided by 440 Sqn. A significant portion of that allocation is in support of 1 CRPG.

The funding model is based upon 12 days of training multiplied by the established membership ceilings for each Patrol Group including authorized expansion. If a Patrol Group, therefore, is significantly below its ceiling, 12 days training per Ranger might still be within the Patrol Group’s capability as empty billets are funded and can be used to defray increased costs. If the Patrol Group is at or close to its authorized membership, the likely result is reduced training.

All in the community acknowledge the need for a new funding model. That model must reflect unique regional needs with respect to O&M while ensuring that the basic elements of a national program are truly available nationally. Again, strong central direction will be needed to forge consensus on model elements and to ensure that expenditures are in keeping with program aims.

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4 The customer funds some specific activities such as orientation training for foreign militaries at Goose Bay. The Junior Canadian Rangers receive a significant portion of their funding from the Youth Initiatives Programme.
As discussed elsewhere in this review, the review team sees two aspects to the Canadian Rangers, the operational aspect and the national program aspect. This distinction is also relevant in any funding discussion. The funding model is intended to produce the number of trained Rangers authorized and the funds from various enhancement projects are intended to enhance and modernize the entire program. Funds for actual operations, though, must be dealt with separately through the normal business planning process and would reflect those operations conducted in each area that meet the operational needs of the Area Commander. North Warning System security patrols, for example, are naturally conducted only by those CRPGs with North Warning System sites in their area of responsibility. Funds to execute operations need not be the concern of the program authority. Funds to support, sustain and modernize the program should be.

Training

With a nationally mandated mission, roles, tasks, and training requirements can be developed and promulgated that will, when executed, develop individual Rangers and Patrols capable of carrying out assigned duties. Training is another area where there are differing requirements amongst the five Patrol Groups. Training standards imposed upon the Ranger program must consider the need for both national standards and Patrol Group uniqueness. However, since the Canadian Rangers are a national program, training standards should be developed and monitored by a NDHQ national authority. In May 01 representatives from each Ranger Patrol Group and D Res met to commence the development of a Ranger training policy document. Additionally, 1 CRPG produced a detailed training plan in Oct 00. Together, both of these documents have laid the basis for current Canadian Ranger training policy.

| There is a requirement for national training standards that are authorized and amended by a national Ranger authority. |

For most Canadian Rangers, the first training undertaken is basic training, similar in intent to CF recruit training. There is also more advanced training for potential leaders, designed to enhance these basic skills. This basic training should be standard across the program and thus must be set by the national authority. We recognize, however, that there are training requirements that are unique to Patrol Groups, especially in the area of collective training. For example, boating and maritime safety are important to several Patrol Groups. These additions as well as suggestions for amending these training standards should be approved only after they have been staffed through the chain of command to the national authority.
Collective training is that medium whereby Canadian Rangers gather and train as a unit or patrol. The current funding formula provides funding for 12 days training per Canadian Ranger. Once again Patrol Group uniqueness results in different collective training philosophies. Some Patrol Groups train 12 days in a row while others train on weekends. There are other variations, all deemed to be valid by the review team. The actual number of funded collective training days is frequently less than 12 days due in part to the requirement to use training funds on other expenses. As previously noted, the requirement to charter civilian aircraft is an expense that all Patrol groups have not recouped through increased baseline funding. Additionally, support bases frequently devolve various expenses such as IT support and CE support to the Patrol Group. When considering a new funding formula, the national authority will have to develop mechanisms that allow Patrol Groups to recoup expenses over which they have no control, in order to protect the 12-day collective training requirement.

**Establishment**

CAN RAN 2000 is generally considered to be the authoritative document with respect to establishment. This document outlines an approved level of growth in both individual Rangers and Patrols with end states for FY 08/09. Over this seven-year period of time, the Ranger ceiling would increase from 3,500 to 4,800 and the number of patrols from 140 to 165. This level of growth is overseen by D Res and the appropriate Area Headquarters. While CAN RAN 2000 provides for meaningful and needed expansion, we note that there are Patrol Groups that interpret the document differently. Some Patrol Groups see the number of individual Rangers as the establishment control while others consider the number of patrols. Other Patrol Groups conform to both ceilings.

There is some debate on where Ranger Patrols should be established. Patrols are confined to North of 60 for very good reasons. The inception of the Junior Canadian Rangers and the requirement to be sponsored by a Ranger Patrol Group has been used as the sole criterion to establish a Ranger Patrol in a specific community. The criteria used in determining priorities for Ranger expansion should be reviewed to ensure that it conforms to the vision for the national program and is not just in support of regional interests or desires.

The growth of both individual Ranger and patrol strength needs to be monitored and approved by the NDHQ national authority, through the chain of command. CAN RAN 2000 has been in effect for several years and the rationale for
expansion, and the establishment ceiling should be reviewed in light of changing requirements. Requests to increase the number of individual Rangers or patrols should be staffed through the chain of command with final authority resting with the NDHQ national authority.

### Canadian Ranger Expansion - Status as at 31 Mar 03

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### Uniqueness

Differences between Patrol Groups are commonly cited as a problem and the review team did observe significant differences between units, many detailed above, during visits to the Areas and Patrol Groups. The differences stem from two major sources. The first and largest group is historical. Over its 60-year existence, the Rangers have spent longer as a number of regional entities than as a national program. Patrol Groups were simply set up to suit their own natural environment, cultural makeup, operational needs and political situation at the time. Many of these carry over to the present and are perfectly valid and should, especially for those cultural differences, be accommodated. The second, smaller, group can be thought of as evolutionary. Since formal organization of the

**While many of the unique features of each Patrol Group should be retained, more oversight is required to ensure that these differences contribute to program objectives.**
Canadian Rangers in their present form in 1997, some differences have developed as the Patrol Groups have taken different paths to achieve an end or have interpreted guidelines or even directives differently. Some of these can be corrected with strong central oversight.

Summary

There are a number of differences between the five components of a national program. Many of those differences stem from historical or environmental sources and have no more impact on the program’s well being than do differences in dress between regiments or in routines between ships. Some of those differences, though, stem from different interpretations of directives, different levels of oversight and even different views of the program’s raison d’être. Ultimately, they reflect a lack of central authority coordinating the efforts of five components of the Canadian Rangers program into a true national whole. With respect to the Canadian Rangers as an operational element of the Canadian Forces, the review team suggests that the command and control arrangements need very little attention. The Rangers are a portion of the Force dedicated to domestic operations and as such, are properly under the command of the Area Commanders. While it could be argued that anything can be improved, the current command relationships within the Canadian Rangers fit the CF model and works. If, however, the Ranger program is to continue to grow, central control of the program must be vested in one body to ensure that both local and national needs and requirements are met. The current lack of standardization and programmatic control is the issue that this study intends to address.

OPTIONS

Command and Control Options

Analysis of the major issues has led to the development of three options for the Command and Control of the Canadian Rangers. The review team considered:

- retention of the status quo
- establishment of a Canadian Ranger National Authority
- establishment of a Canadian Ranger National Headquarters

Option Analysis

Status Quo

The major features of the status quo are:

- Command of the Canadian Rangers remains with CFNA, LFWA, LFAA, SQFT, and LFCA who provide day to day oversight and direction to the CPRGs assigned to them
• CLS involvement in Ranger issues is minimal
• D Res acts as a national coordinator for most issues less force
generation and employment although the division of
responsibilities amongst the major stakeholders is not well
understood. Central authority has not been formally assigned to/DDRC, D Res or to any other NDHQ organization. D Res has
assumed this role by default as a result of the Directorate’s pan-
Reserve responsibilities
• D Res chairs the Canadian Ranger National Working Group.
CLS and CFNA senior staff participation varies depending upon
the agenda
• D Res conducts varying degrees of coordination and liaison with
staffs in CLS, CFNA, LFAA, SQFT, LFCA and LFWA
• there is direct, two way liaison and coordination between D Res
and each of the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups, frequently
bypassing CLS Areas and CFNA in the process
• Canadian Ranger funding is allocated by the VCDS directly to
CLS, CFNA and DGRC. CLS Areas and CFNA do on occasion
allocate additional funds to the Ranger Patrol Groups for specific
operations or local enhancements

The following factors favour retention of the status quo:
• command of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups rests with the
appropriate authority
• key force generation responsibilities rest with the Areas

The following factors argue against retention of the status quo:
• the division of responsibilities for Canadian Ranger issues is
fragmented and not clearly understood by any of the major
stakeholders
• the potential for problems created due to variations from a
national standard significantly increases if oversight and direction
from the Area Headquarters is weak
• direct communications between CRPGs and D Res can result in
Area command being unaware of critical issues
• there is no central authority able to intervene in decisions made at
the CRPG level that negatively impact the national program
The establishment of a Canadian Ranger National Authority within NDHQ would see the formal assignment of specific responsibilities to the National OPI. The major features of this option are:

- there is no change to the current command arrangements; command of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups remain with the appropriate CLS Area and CFNA
- in order to ensure that the requisite degree of oversight and accountability were to be provided to CLS CRPGs, increased staff effort would be required. CLS Areas would have to become more involved in the day-to-day operations and administration of the Patrol Groups
- the routine, day-to-day staffing of Ranger issues would be CRPG to Area Headquarters who, in turn, would staff issues to the national authority as appropriate. Direct liaison with D Res would be by exception.
- major responsibilities for force generation and total responsibility for force employment rests with the appropriate CLS Area and CFNA. Responsibility for common policies and standards related to force generation would reside with the national authority
- executive authority for the Canadian Rangers program is formally vested in the national authority

The following factors favour the creation of a Canadian Ranger National Authority:

- command of the CRPGs remains within the operational chain
- overall command and control arrangements are very similar to the Cadet program – a system well understood by both the headquarters program authority, other NDHQ staffs and the field program executors
- responsibility for force generation and employment remains with the field formations
- Area Headquarters remain cognizant of issues affecting their units
- CRPGs receive increased oversight and direction
- current ambiguous command relationships are clarified
- requires minimal increase to the existing personnel resource base
- does not require changes to existing CF organizational structure

The following factors argue against the creation of a Canadian Ranger National Authority:
from the CRPG perspective, a layer of bureaucracy is added
requires increased staff efforts at Land Force assigned Area Headquarters

**Canadian Ranger National Headquarters**
The major features of a Canadian Ranger National Headquarters within NDHQ are:

- command of the Canadian Rangers is withdrawn from the CLS Areas and CFNA, and assigned to the Canadian Ranger National Headquarters
- the National Headquarters assigns operational control of the appropriate Canadian Ranger Patrol Group to CLS Areas and CFNA who would be responsible for day-to-day force employment (similar to the CFNA/440 Sqn relationship)
- executive authority for everything except force employment would be formally vested in the Canadian Ranger Headquarters

The following factors favour the establishment of a Canadian Ranger National Headquarters:

- command and control arrangements are simplified
- simplifies Area/CFNA Headquarters responsibilities
- staff requirements simplified and maintained largely within NDHQ
- development and enforcement of national policies simplified

The following factors argue against the establishment of a Canadian Ranger National Headquarters:

- requires additional resources at the Rangers national HQ
- requires the formation and allocation of a new unit or allocation of the CRPGs to the CDS for command
- places force generation responsibilities within NDHQ
- potential impact on Junior Canadian Rangers through separation from the Rangers

**Option Recommendation**
It is recommended that option two, the establishment of a Canadian Ranger National Authority, be implemented and responsibility be assigned to a Level One Advisor. When addressing the issue of who should be assigned this responsibility, CRS considered:

- Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
- Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
The following factors support the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within DCDS:

- **Domestic Operations**- The DCDS has responsibility for domestic operations and this is consistent with one of the Ranger program’s major responsibilities (the other being representational)
- **Jointness**- facilitates joint aspect of Ranger operations

The following factors argue against the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within DCDS:

- **Experience within Canadian Ranger Program**- The DCDS currently has no responsibility for day to day Canadian Ranger issues
- **DCDS Span of Control**- Responsibility for the Canadian Rangers would add to an already complex span of control
- **Core Responsibilities Not Consistent**- The DCDS functions as the chief operator of the CF and not as a policy maker in the area of national programs such as the Ranger program
- **Resource Implications**- This option has the highest resource bill. DCDS currently has no staff dedicated to the Canadian Rangers and would require additional staff to maintain current initiatives and provide national policy especially if currently dual-hatted JCR staff remained in D Res
- **Reserve Force Issues**- experience with Reserve issues is not readily available within DCDS Group and this represents an additional staff burden

The following factors support the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within the VCDS Group:

- **Familiarity With the Ranger Program**- VCDS currently has formally assigned responsibilities for aspects of the Ranger program and D Res staff has assumed additional responsibilities by default. As a result, the highest degree of familiarity rests within VCDS Group. This option provides continuity.
• **Resource Implications**- Of all the options this requires the least increase in resources. D Res already has staff dedicated to the Canadian Ranger Program

• **National Program**- As with the Cadet program, the Canadian Rangers is a national program. There may be advantages to both programs reporting to the same Level One Advisor

• **Reserve Force Fit**- Reserve Force matters fall within VCDS mandate and are assigned to C Res and Cdts/D Res. The Rangers, a unique Reserve Force organization, would be a logical fit

The following factors argue against the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within VCDS:

• **Resource Implications** – Will require additional resources. For example, we believe that the principal staff officer responsible for Ranger issues should be at the LCol rank, an increase from the current establishment

**Chief of the Land Staff**

The following factors favour the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within CLS:

• **Experience within Canadian Ranger Program**- CLS currently has responsibility for four of the five CRPGs

• **Experience with Reserve Force Issues**- CLS has in-house experience and expertise in Reserve Force issues

The following factors argue against the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within CLS:

• **Resource Implications**- CLS is not currently involved in the day-to-day administration, operations or policy formation for the Rangers. Therefore, this option has significant resource implications and would require additional staff to maintain current initiatives and provide national policy. There is currently one major in CLS responsible for Ranger issues, amongst other duties.

• **Operational Fit**- The assignment of responsibility for the national Ranger program could be seen as inconsistent with the
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

CLS mission of providing trained and equipped *combat forces* for land-based operations

- **Ranger Identity**-This option would inevitably result in the Canadian Rangers assuming some measure of Army identity and culture. While there are those who feel the Rangers as they now exist are solely army oriented we believe that the Rangers are a national, joint asset

**Canadian Forces Northern Area**

The following factors support the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within CFNA:

- **Ranger Experience**-has an excellent level of experience with all aspects of the Ranger program. Of all the superior headquarters responsible for CRPGs, CFNA is the most actively involved in day-to-day Ranger activities

The following factors argue against the establishment of the Canadian Ranger National Authority within CFNA:

- **Resource Implications**- This option has resource implications and it may be difficult to recruit staff to relocate to CFNA Headquarters in Yellowknife. Support costs would be higher. Additionally, this option would require additional staff to maintain current initiatives and provide national policy

- **Span of Control**-would increase the span of control of CFNA by adding responsibility for units significantly separated geographically. This span of control has a related resource implication in that transportation costs in the North are the highest of any region

**Responsibility Recommendations**

It is recommended that the VCDS be formally appointed as the national authority for the Canadian Ranger program. We further recommend that the responsibility be assigned to D Res, given the resident expertise and staff knowledge, to act as the primary spokesman and staff agency authorized direct liaison with the Area Commanders (given that CLS devolutions to the Areas for Rangers matters continue).

…
REVIEWS RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. Responsibility for the Canadian Ranger program be formally assigned to VCDS.

2. Command and control of the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups remain with Canadian Forces Northern Area and the four Land Force Areas.

3. The national authority review and, if appropriate, update the mandate of the Canadian Rangers to reflect the wide range of activities currently undertaken in the national interest.

4. A standardized National Canadian Ranger Task List be formulated by the national authority, in consultation with the major stakeholders. Changes to the National Canadian Ranger Task List be made only by the national authority upon staffing and recommendation from the chain of command and other major stakeholders.

5. The mostly unpaid contribution Canadian Rangers provide in the conduct of GSAR be recognized by inclusion in the National Task List

6. National training standards be formulated and promulgated by the national authority, in consultation with major stakeholders. Changes to the training standards be made only by the national authority upon staffing and recommendation from the chain of command and other major stakeholders.

7. A revised, national funding formula be developed and promulgated by the National Authority.

8. The establishment be controlled by the National Authority

CONCLUSION

The review team concludes that Command and Control of the Canadian Rangers works well between Ranger Patrol and Patrol Group Headquarters, however, the chain of command above Patrol Group is at times less structured than we might have hoped. With the formal appointment of a Canadian Ranger National Authority, with ability to make and monitor policy, we believe that the Ranger program will be enhanced so long as the division of responsibility is clarified and respected. We also conclude that in the process of improving the day-to-day operations and administration of the Ranger program, care must be taken to
foster those unique aspects of each patrol that contribute to its value in the overall program.

...
ROLE, MISSION, TASKS OF CANADIAN RANGERS

Refs: A. 5785-1 (DRes) VCDS letter of 22 December 2003
B. AFC Meeting 25 March 04

1. The paper on the proposed Ranger Roles, Mission and Tasks has been reviewed at all levels from NDHQ to the local Canadian Ranger Patrol Group over the past six months. At reference A, the VCDS asked the CLS to review the proposal and to provide comments to the DGRC Ranger staff by 26 Jan 04. The proposal was also discussed at the Ranger National Working Group, which was held in Victoria, BC from 27 to 29 Jan 2004. As a result of this broad consultation, we have now received and incorporated the comments of all stakeholders from the local (CRPG) level, the Area HQ level and of various NDHQ staffs including DGSP, DCDS, ADM (Policy) as well as CFNA.

2. At reference B, it was decided that the Canadian Rangers would come under command of the DCDS Group effective 01 Apr 2005. As part of this process, there is a need for all of us to use the same guidelines in effecting the transfer of Ranger responsibilities from the VCDS to the DCDS. The final version of the Role, Mission and Tasks of the Canadian Rangers enclosed at Annex A is the result of the consultation that has taken place over the past six months. The changes that have been made with your input will help us to continue to improve on the great contribution the Rangers are making to CF operations. It will also guide us in the yearlong transfer of responsibility process as we make decisions on Ranger equipment, locations, training and establishments.

3. I would like to thank all of you for your input in the process of producing this document. Please forward any comments to DGRC and his staff.

G.J. Macdonald LGen
for R.R. Henault
General
Chief of Defence Staff

Distribution List (next page)
ROLE, MISSION AND TASKS OF CANADIAN RANGERS

INTRODUCTION

1. The AFC of 25 March 2004 recommended that the DCDS become the national authority in charge of Ranger issues as of 01 April 05. As that authority, DCDS will provide strategic direction on the role, mission and tasks of the Canadian Rangers.

BACKGROUND

2. The Defence mission is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security. Within this mission, Defence is responsible to

   a. provide strategic defence and security advice to the Government of Canada;

   b. conduct surveillance and control of Canada’s territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction;

   c. respond to requests from provincial authorities for Aid of the Civil Power;

   d. participate in bilateral and multilateral operations with Canada’s allies;

   e. assist Other Government Departments and other levels of government in achieving national goals;

   f. provide support to broad federal government programs; and

   g. provide emergency humanitarian relief.

3. The two tasks highlighted are the ones which the Canadian Rangers should assume as the major part of their mandate and the ones to which they could make the most meaningful contribution as members of the CF. The majority of their effort would be centered on the surveillance task as that has always been the raison d’être of the Rangers while their work with the Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR) Program does assist in achieving national goals. In this manner the Rangers, although operating at the tactical level, could play their part in helping to achieve two of the strategic level tasks assigned to DND.

DISCUSSION

4. QR&O Article 2.034 sets out the sub-components of the Reserve Component of the CF and their terms of enrolment. One sub-component is, "the Canadian Rangers, which consists of officers and non-commissioned members who have undertaken by terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and
training as may be required of them, but who are not required to undergo annual training."

5. The Canadian Rangers (Rangers) were formally established as a Corps of the Reserve Militia by an Order-in-Council in 1947. The role of the Rangers as stated at that time was, "to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which could not conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the military." This role remains valid to this day. In many cases the Canadian Rangers are the only CF presence in some of the least populated parts of Canada, especially in the north. Canadian Rangers undertake their assigned role in concert with their normal daily routine. As such their service is unpaid service except in situations where they are formally tasked.

6. The mission of the Canadian Rangers is "to provide lightly equipped, self sufficient, mobile forces in support of the CF's sovereignty and domestic operation tasks." We emphasize the light scales, as that will guide future equipment acquisition decisions. This reinforces the concept that we depend on Rangers to utilize their own personal equipment and supplies. The CF will provide them weapons and ammunition (300 rounds per year), as well as rations, communications and navigation equipment in support of operations. There is no intention to develop significant equipment entitlement scales beyond their present allocation. Rangers will only be asked to operate within Canada so only need equipment to perform that task.

7. The National Canadian Ranger Task List includes the following:

   a. Conduct and Provide Support to Sovereignty Operations:
      1) conduct surveillance and sovereignty patrols as tasked.
      2) participate in CF operations, exercises and training.
      3) report suspicious and unusual activities.
      4) conduct North Warning Site patrols as tasked.
      5) collect local data of military significance.

Notes: Rangers could assist with local area preparations for the arrival of other CF elements for exercises or operations. 'Unusual' activities refer to new events that are out of character with the routine of the area. Some examples would be the sighting of an unusual ship, unknown low flying aircraft, unknown personnel, etc. Data of military significance refers to the availability of local assets a military commander might require to conduct operations in the area.
b. **Conduct and Provide Assistance to CF Domestic Operations:**

1) conduct territorial, coastal and inland water surveillance as required/tasked
2) provide local knowledge and Canadian Ranger expertise (guides and advice).
3) provide assistance to Other Government Departments
4) provide local assistance and advice to Ground Search and Rescue operations.
5) provide support in response to natural disasters and humanitarian operations.

c. **Maintain a CF presence in the Local Community:**

1) instruct and supervise the Junior Canadian Rangers Program.

Note: In conducting the JCR Program, the Rangers are contributing to national goals by significantly improving the quality of life of young people across the country, especially in the most isolated areas of Canada.

8. The provision of local assistance and advice to the conduct of Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) is a task, which will have to be clearly defined. It may be necessary to separate the 'search' task from the 'rescue' task. Rangers, as citizens of isolated communities often participate in ground searches for lost individuals or groups without the prior knowledge of their CRPG Headquarters. Rangers are not equipped to conduct all aspects of GSAR by themselves but they can assist with local knowledge and advice on the terrain, weather and local conditions to SAR specialists. We must recognize that the Canadian Rangers provide in many places, trained, organized and senior people who are available whereas police services may be thinly manned and several hours away. Canadian Rangers may routinely assist in GSAR operations but it is not an activity assigned specifically to them.

9. The inclusion of a national task to maintain a 'presence' in the local community also in part recognizes the prominent position in the community enjoyed by many Canadian Rangers. Frequently, the Canadian Rangers represent the only identifiable and formed group that is experienced and knowledgeable in local requirements, and readily available to assist the community in time of need. As such these communities expect the Canadian Rangers to respond to local emergency situations. When they perform these tasks the Rangers may be wearing the Ranger "uniform" but they are performing the task on behalf of the community and not as Canadian Rangers. In these cases, they are acting as...
private citizens and not as Rangers. In some emergencies, they can be employed as CF assets when the Solicitor General asks for CF assistance.

10. Several studies have cautioned against including any tasks that have a tactical military connotation and that require tactical military training. As such, tasks specifically not recommended as Ranger duties in peacetime include:

   a. assisting in immediate local defence by containing or observing small enemy detachments pending arrival of other forces;

   b. assisting RCMP/Provincial/Territorial police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs; and

   c. Aid to the Civil Power.

CONCLUSION

11. In making a direct link to the DND mission in designating the role, mission and tasks of the Canadian Rangers, we can assist the CF in trying to improve its operational capability. The alignment of missions from the strategic to the tactical level in a logical sequence should also assist in framing the argument of what tasks we want the Rangers to perform. Now that the roles, mission and tasks have been agreed to by the chain of command, the issues of structure, organization, training, locations of CRPGs, and equipment can be dealt with more easily.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUPS: SUPPORT TO CANADA COMMAND

References: A. Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations (Interim)  
B. 3350-1 (J2 Ops) 9 May 2006 (Commander, Canada Command CCIR)  

INTRODUCTION

1. As discussed in Ottawa during your Commander’s conference, it is my belief that there should be a concerted effort to operationalize the Canadian Ranger Patrols Groups as a critical enabler and capability for operations in Canada's North. The over 160 patrols throughout Canada represent a significant force in place and are a tremendous source, particularly in the critical first 24-36 hours, of knowledge, expertise and manpower in the isolated, coastal and remote regions of Canada. Your CCIR/FFIR at reference B clearly elucidates the requirement for collective situational awareness with respect to the continent of North America and, in a northern context, I believe that the Canadian Rangers are the key CF contributors.

AIM

2. The aim of this letter is to outline ways to enhance the capabilities of the Canadian Rangers to act and react for domestic operations.

OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF RANGERS IN DOMOPS

3. Situational Awareness. As reference A states, the Canadian Rangers possess a unique capability to enhance the abilities of the Canadian Forces to conduct domestic assistance operations in special circumstances. A key area of ongoing assistance is situational awareness. By their very location and through their ongoing leadership within their communities Canadian Rangers are aptly placed
to provide continuous and ongoing information during routine and contingency situations. Within HFC, 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (3 CRPG) provides weekly updates on issues or conditions within the fifteen patrol bases and the surrounding regions. This proactive approach to information allows for timely planning or reaction as exemplified by our ability to lean forward on the water situation in KASHECHEWAN in 2005. In effect, the presence of Canadian Rangers in these fifteen communities in northern Ontario is my only real means of responding to your CCIRs in this region.

4. **Liaison.** The best form of liaison north of 50 degrees in Ontario is 3 CRPG HQ and associated patrols. Their ongoing interaction with the local communities and other governmental agencies such as the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ontario Provincial Police, regional Emergency Measures Ontario offices and regional First Nation councils provides us with a tremendous source of interface with the key players in regions of adverse climate and adverse terrain. This 'leg-on-the-ground' not only increases situational awareness of northern Ontario issues it also allows us to build bridges with the appropriate regional players and create a level of understanding that can be harnessed during contingency operations. In this case, they meet your Centre-of-Gravity of comprehensive civil-military cooperation in a northern Ontario context. Enhanced training, additional funding and dedicated communications support would enhance this capability.

5. **Search and Rescue.** As you are keenly aware, the issue of Search and Rescue (SAR) and Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) in an ongoing fact of life in northern regions and one that will increase as climatic change and resource needs open the north to greater activity. 3 CRPG have proven their value in the area of GSAR and would provide greater contribution with modest additional funding to deliver specific training and to provide additional equipment to more Canadian Rangers. In many cases in the north, the Canadian Rangers are not only the sole federal presence they are also the sole formed body capable of assisting in these types of crises. I fully expect local police authorities to increase their requests for GSAR support north of 50 degrees in Ontario and I believe that this is a task in which the Canadian Rangers could continue to provide value added, while potentially enhancing the image and contribution of the Canadian Forces and the federal government in these remote areas.

6. **Pre-Positioned Equipment.** At present, I keep limited quantities of equipment and controlled stores within each Patrol location and at one other location in northern Ontario. While these commodities are primarily for ongoing training they do represent a source for immediate use, including such items as tentage and rations. Enhanced or enlarged storages facilities in defined locations would
provide the Canadian Forces with the tools to assist certain operations in a timely manner and, when routinely supplied, would mitigate the cost, use of aircraft and time involved with the movement of supplies during contingency operations as witnessed by the CF-130 requirements of OPERATION CANOPY.

7. **Humanitarian Assistance.** Through my line tours in northern Ontario, I am keenly aware of the frailty or absence of the infrastructure required to provide immediate support in times of crisis, particularly within the first 24 to 36 hours. Fires, floods, health related issues and evacuations are a reality and one in which OGD may not possess the capability to react effectively under shortened timelines. It is in situations such as these that the Canadian Rangers may act as a force in place or as first responders to the benefit of the people of Canada and of the Canadian Forces. As present, I provide only rudimentary training to certain individual Canadian Rangers but it is an area worth exploring for its potential.

**CONCLUSION**

8. The Canadian Rangers, outside of their traditional roles of local expertise and advice are, in my opinion, an under-valued and under-used element of the Canadian Forces for domestic operations. Clearly, they are of limited use in certain situations and in certain regions; however, in line with their stated Role, the Canadian Rangers are an organization that can add significant value to heighten situational awareness and as part of the overall Canadian Forces response to natural and man-made disasters or similar situations.

9. Given the pending transfer of the Canadian Rangers to the Chief of the Land Staff, I believe that the time is right to review the role, mission and tasks of the Canadian Rangers in light of the Government’s “Canada First” policy and focus on the North. I know that funding pressures are real but with a modest additional investment in the Rangers I believe that we could mutually enhance our situational awareness and operational response capabilities in the North.

G.R. Thibault  
Brigadier-General  
Commander  
Distribution List
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

1950-3 (1901-260/4 D Res)

31 May 2007

Distribution List

CANADIAN RANGER NATIONAL AUTHORITY TRANSFER INSTRUCTION — VICE-CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF TO CHIEF LAND STAFF

1. AIM

1.1 The aim of this Transfer Instruction is to record the transfer of functions, personnel, financial (in-year and baseline) resources, materiel, and current significant issues from the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Director General Reserves and Cadets (DGRC) to the Chief Land Staff Director General Land Reserve (DGLRes). In addition to outlining the accountabilities and resource management for the remainder of FY 06/07, this document will result in adjustments to the notional funding of both the losing and gaining organization and their FY 07/08 business plans. Issues related to internal L2 restructuring that result from the transfer will not be addressed.

2. FUNCTIONAL TRANSFER

2.1 Effective 1 April 2007, the Commander Land Force Command (Comd LFC) will be assigned all aspects of authority for the command and control of the Canadian Rangers and become their national authority in accordance with direction issued by the Transition Steering Group (TSG) on 22 February 2006. The establishment of this National Authority is intended to provide direction and clarity to the Canadian Rangers and Commanding Officers of Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups. The Comd LFC will exercise command and control of the Canadian Rangers for Force Generation through the applicable Land Force Area (LFA) Comd and be responsible for establishing national policy for force generation issues such as funding, allocation, equipment, dress, administration and training to generate the capabilities required by Canada Command in accordance with the Comd Canada COM Force Employment concept for Canadian Rangers and the CDS authorized Role, Mission and Tasks. This will include the responsibility to fulfill training requirements in support of the Junior Canadian Ranger program in consultation with Director Cadets. Within the
Land Staff, the DGLRes has been assigned the function of operating the Canadian Ranger National Authority.

2.2 The Canadian Ranger National Authority Cost Centre, CC 47845A, will be linked to the PAA sub-sub activity “Land Effects - Fixed Support” as the new org/structure pertains to a HQ and links to the definition of a nationally based support capacity capable of developing and sustaining assigned forces.

3. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND ESTABLISHMENT (PERSONNEL AND SWE)

Figure 3.1: Losing Organization:

![Diagram of Losing Organization]

Figure 3.2: Gaining Organization:

![Diagram of Gaining Organization]

3.1 No Regular Force positions will be transferred from DGRC to DGLRes. There are no Regular Force positions with the Canadian Ranger National Authority:
3.2 The following Reserve Force positions will be transferred from DGRC to DGLRes:

[Canadian Ranger Policy] Maj
[Canadian Ranger Training & Equipment] Capt
[Canadian Ranger Human Resources] Capt
[Canadian Ranger Finance] Capt

...

9. CONTRACTS / SLAs

9.1 DGRC will provide accommodation to a maximum of four office cubicles on a space available basis for the Canadian Ranger cell on the 7th Floor of 222 Queen Street to facilitate ongoing coordination with the Junior Canadian Ranger staff. Changes to this arrangement are to be coordinated through CFSU(O). Administrative and financial support for the CR Cell will rest with DGL Res /CLS.

10. CURRENT SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Creation of a Canadian Ranger sub-component:

10.1 The Canadian Rangers are currently part of the Reserve Force component of the CF. Because so many policies that are created for the Reserve Force do not apply to the Rangers, AFC directed in April 2006 that the Canadian Rangers form their own component outside of the Reserve Force. CMP was given this task and work is ongoing in this area.

Outstanding issue of purchase of canvas wall tents for the Canadian Rangers:

10.2 Purchase of tents in support of the Ranger Patrol Groups has slipped for past three years. V5 funding allocation in FY 07/08 for the Cdn Rangers will be sufficient to cover the existing order. Issues at the LCMM level have been resolved and the project is now with PWGSC to accomplish the purchase in FY 07/08. DGL Res Sec Cdn Ranger Training and Equipment will pursue the issue. A carry forward in the amount of $218K has been requested for funds that could not be expended in FY 06-07.

11. CONCLUSION

11.1 The effective date of the transfer of the responsibility for the listed functions, organization & establishment (personnel), financial resource, materiel and issues will be 1 April 2007.
Losing Li Organization:  
LGen W.J. Natynczyk  
Vice Chief of Defence Staff  
Approved  
Date: 14 May 07

Gaining Li Organization:  
LGen A.B. Leslie  
Commander Land Force Command  
Approved  
Date: 15 May 07

Acknowledged By:  
Cmdre J.G.V. Tremblay  
Director General Reserves and Cadets  
Date: 31 May 07

BGen G. O’Brien  
Director General Land Reserve  
Date: 30 May 06

Distribution List

3440-2 (J3 Plans 7)

20 March 2008

Distribution List

COMMANDER CANADA COMMAND
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE EXPANSION OF CANADIAN RANGER PATROLS

References: A. JTFC: Briefing Note for Comd. Canada COM, 4 Oct 06 - BC Ranger Patrols
B. JTFC: 4500-1 (COS) 16 October 2006 — Operationalization of Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups — Support to Canada Command
D. JTFC: 3000-1 (J5), 26 February 2007 — Canadian Ranger Enhancement
E. JTI.A: 7000-1 (JTFA J3), 6 March 2007 — Canadian Ranger Enhancements — JTFA
F. JTFA: 1901-1 (J3 Coord) 27 March 2007 - Request for Additional Canadian Ranger Patrols
G. JTFC: 3121-2-1 (J5), April 2007 — JTFC/LFCA Response: 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group Enhancements
H. 3000-1 (ACOS Ops) 12 April 2007 JFTN — Canadian Ranger Enhancements
J. Speech from the Throne 16 October 2007
K. VCDS Report on Plans and Priorities 07/08
L. Canada. COM: 24 Month Intelligence Look Ahead Jan 2008 — Jan 2010, 7 Jan 08

1. In the Speech from the Throne in October 2007, the Governor General reconfirmed the Government’s continuing intention of expanding the Canadian Rangers as announced by the Prime Minister On 10 August 2007. In addition, the VCDS’ Report on Plans and Priorities, Reference K noted the CF’s intent to increase the average paid strength of the Canadian Rangers to 5000 by fiscal year 2011/2012.

2. To assist you in your role as the Canadian Ranger National Authority I am providing you my recommendations for Canadian Ranger expansion. While I understand that other factors such as capacity and force generation considerations
will have a bearing on the expansion I, as the force employer of Rangers in Canada, recommend the following priorities based on operational requirements:

a. Priority I. Expansion of Canadian Ranger Patrols in the JTFP AOR (two new Patrols);

b. Priority II. Increase the number Canadian Ranger Patrols in, the JTFC AOR;

c. Priority III. Increase the number Canadian Ranger Patrols in the JTFN AOR; and

d. Priority IV. Increase the number Canadian Ranger Patrols in the JTFW AOR.

3. I look forward to further consultation with you on Ranger expansion. My staff remain available to continue working with your staff in implementing any expansions.

M.J. Dumais
Lieutenant-General

Distribution List

Chief of the Defence Staff

11 July 2008

Distribution List

REVISED — ROLE, MISSION AND TASKS OF CANADIAN RANGERS

B. CDS Letter (Role, Mission, Tasks of Canadian Rangers), 20 April 2004

1. The transfer of Canadian Ranger National Authority from the VCDS to the CLS as directed at Reference A is now complete. This authority provides the CLS the responsibility for Canadian Ranger standards of readiness and employment to meet the operational employment needs of Canada Command. The attached, revised version of the Canadian Ranger Role, Mission and Tasks is provided to guide future development and clarify the employment concept for Canadian Rangers.

2. Reference B is rescinded effective upon receipt of this document. Future revisions to the enclosed Canadian Ranger Role, Mission and Tasks will be coordinated by the Canadian Ranger National Authority and the LFC, COS Land Reserve is to be contacted if you have any suggestions or concerns in this regard.

W.J. Natynczyk
General

Annex A - Revised - Role, Mission and Tasks of Canadian Rangers

Distribution List

Annex A

REVISED — ROLE, MISSION AND TASKS OF CANADIAN RANGERS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Canadian Rangers, a subcomponent of the Canadian Forces (CF) Reserve, provide patrols and detachments for employment on national-security and public-safety missions in remote and sparsely inhabited parts of Canada. Until
the establishment of Canada Command (Canada COM), the Chief Reserves and Cadets (C Res & Cdts) was responsible for terms of service and concept of employment for all Rangers and for capability development of 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG), while readiness of 1 CRPG was a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) responsibility. When the new operational level of commands were formed, command of force generation of the southern-Canada Ranger patrols (2, 3, 4, and 5 CRPGs) remained with Land Force Command (LFC), while Canada COM was allocated 1 CRPG, the Patrol Group in the North. To increase the CF's operational capability in Canada’s North, 1 CRPG was transferred from Canada COM (specifically Joint Task Force North) to LFC. This transfer of force generation responsibility to LFC brings greater commonality to the Canadian Ranger organization as a whole to include a single approach to recruiting, training, equipping and administrative support. As part of the force generation responsibilities, the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) also assumed the National Ranger Authority responsibilities from C Res & Cdts. This authority provides the CLS the responsibility for Canadian Ranger standards of readiness and employment to meet the operational employment needs of Canada COM.

BACKGROUND

2. The 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) directs that “The Canadian Forces will continue to perform three broad roles: protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security.”1 The Canadian Rangers are mentioned by name twice in the DPS. In the section on Domestic Operations, the DPS speaks to the involvement of the CF in assisting civilian authorities to respond to natural disasters and other incidents, including floods, forest fires, hurricanes, plane crashes and the Year 2000 transition. The DPS goes on to explain that, “The Canadian Forces have played an important role in asserting Canadian sovereignty in the North. Today, their activities include the work of Northern Area Headquarters in Yellowknife (now JTFN), the operation of the signals facility at Alert, over flights by our long-range patrol and Twin Otter aircraft, and periodic exercises. The Canadian Rangers, Reservists who provide a military presence in remote isolated and coastal communities in the North, report unusual activities or sightings, and conduct surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required.”2 Yet again in the section on Protecting Canada and Canadians, one of the tasks assigned to the Land Force is to “support the Government's sovereignty and

2 Ibid., page 10.
security objectives in the North by: improving the ability of the Canadian
Rangers to communicate with the other components of the Canadian Forces and
government agencies, and increasing Regular Force patrols in the region.”³

3. The sovereignty task is the main effort of the Canadian Rangers and is the task
to which the majority of their effort must be focused. They are contributing to
the defence of North America by being experts in their own backyards. The
Canadian Rangers also “protect Canadians” in the broadest sense by helping their
relatives and members of their villages in times of disaster manmade or natural.
Their work with the Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR) Program, while not an
“operational” task, does assist in achieving national goals through nation
building. In this manner the Canadian Rangers, although operating at the tactical
level, play their part in helping achieve two of the strategic level tasks assigned to
the CF in the 2005 DPS.

DISCUSSION

4. The Canadian Rangers were formally established as a Corps of the Reserve
Militia by an Order-in-Council in 1947. The role of the Canadian Rangers as
stated at that time was, “to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled
northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or
economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces.” This role
remains valid to this day. In many cases the Canadian Rangers are the only CF
presence in some of the least populated parts of Canada, especially in the North.
Canadian Rangers undertake their assigned role in concert with their normal
daily routine. As such, their service is unpaid except in situations where training
has been authorized or a format task has been assigned by the Commanding
Officer of their CRPG.

5. The mission of the Canadian Rangers is “to provide lightly equipped, self
sufficient, mobile forces in support of the CF’s sovereignty and domestic
operation tasks in Canada.” The emphasis on light scales will guide future
equipment acquisition decisions by emphasizing that the CF depends largely on
the Canadian Rangers to utilize, where possible, their own personal equipment
and supplies in the execution of their duties. The CF will provide them weapons
and ammunition as required, as well as rations, communications and navigation
equipment in support of operations. To assist the Canadian Rangers in the
performance of their tasks, the Army may continue to develop equipment
entitlement scales beyond the present Canadian Rangers allocation. The
Canadian Rangers will only be asked to operate within Canada and will not be
employed within the continental United States in the context of the broader

³ Ibid., page 20.
“domestic” operations task but will contribute to the defence of Canada task through work in their AOR.

6. The National Canadian Ranger Task List is as follows:

a. Conduct and Provide Support to Sovereignty Operations:

(1) Conduct, participate in and provide support to sovereignty and surveillance patrols and training in Canada as tasked;

(2) Conduct North Warning Site patrols as tasked;

(3) Report suspicious and unusual activities;

(4) Collect local data of military significance;

(5) Notes:

(a) Canadian Rangers could assist with local area preparations for the arrival of other CF elements for sovereignty exercises or operations;

(b) ‘Unusual’ activities refer to new events that are out of character with the routine of the area. Some examples would be the sighting of an unusual ship, unknown low flying aircraft, unknown personnel, etc.; and

(c) Data of military significance refers to the availability of focal assets and key contacts a military commander might require to conduct operations in the area.

b. Conduct and Provide Assistance to CF Domestic Operations in Canada:

(1) Conduct coastal and inland water surveillances as required/tasked;

(2) Provide local knowledge and Canadian Ranger expertise (guides and advice);

(3) Participate in search and rescue (SAR) operations as required;

(4) Provide support in response to natural or man-made disasters and humanitarian operations; and

(5) Provide assistance to Federal, Provincial/Territorial or Municipal authorities as tasked.

c. Maintain a CF presence in the Local Community:

(1) Instruct, mentor and supervise the Junior Canadian Rangers;
(2) Participate in/support events in the Pocal community (such as Yukon Quest, Canada Day, Remembrance Day, etc.); and

(3) Note: When assisting with the conduct of the JCR Program, the Canadian Rangers are contributing to national goals by significantly improving the quality of life of young people across the country, especially in the most isolated areas of Canada.

7. Participation in the conduct of SAR operations does not mean that the Canadian Rangers will become expert in this task. Canadian Rangers are not equipped to conduct all aspects of SAR by themselves but they can assist SAR specialists by providing them with local knowledge and advice on the terrain, weather and local conditions in the search area. The Canadian Rangers provide, in many places, the only trained, organized and senior people who are available whereas police services may be thinly manned and several hours away. Canadian Rangers may routinely be tasked to assist in SAR operations and will be provided SAR training to facilitate their assistance to SAR organizations.

8. The inclusion of a national task to maintain a 'presence' in the local community also in part recognizes the prominent position in the community enjoyed by many Canadian Rangers. Frequently, the Canadian Rangers represent the only identifiable and formed group that is experienced and knowledgeable in local requirements, and readily available to assist the community in time of need. As such, these communities expect the Canadian Rangers to respond to local emergency situations.

9. There is no intention to assign any tasks to the Canadian Rangers that have a tactical military connotation or that require tactical military training. However, Canadian Rangers may be tasked to provide support, within their role, to other CF components conducting military training. As such, specific tasks that will not be assigned to Canadian Rangers in peacetime include:

a. Tactical military training;

b. Immediate local defence tasks such as containing or observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces;

c. Vital Point Security (dams, mines or oil pipelines etc.);

d. Assisting Federal/Provincial/Territorial/Local police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents, saboteurs, criminals or terrorists; and

e. Aid to the Civil Power.
CONCLUSION

10. This paper has made a direct link to the three broad roles assigned to the CF in the DPS in designating the role, mission and tasks of the Canadian Rangers. The Canadian Rangers can assist the CF in improving its ability to conduct sovereignty operations especially in the more remote and isolated areas of Canada. They can also assist in “protecting Canadians” through their work in times of disaster and their assistance in running the JCR Program. This alignment of missions from the strategic to the tactical level in a logical sequence should also assist in prioritizing the tasks the CF wants the Canadian Rangers to perform.

1950-3 (CRNA)

15 October 2008

Distribution List

TRANSFER INSTRUCTION — 1st CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP FROM CANADA COMMAND / JOINT TASK FORCE NORTH TO LAND FORCE COMMAND

References: A. JTFN 1000-1-1 (J6 Plans & Policy) 18 February 2008 (enclosed)
B. 1901-1 (CDS) Role, Mission, Tasks of Canadian Rangers, dated 20 April 2004
C. CANFORGEN 012/06 CDS 007/06 3119002 JAN 06

1. AIM

The aim of this Transfer Instruction is to record the transfer of functions, personnel, financial (in-year and baseline) resources, materiel, and current significant issues of 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (1 CRPG) from Canada Command (Canada COM) / Joint Task Force North (JTFN) to the Land Force Command (LFC) effective 1 December 2008. In addition to outlining the accountabilities and resource management for the remainder of FY 08/09, this document will present information to adjust the funding of both the losing and gaining organization and their FY 09/10 business plans.

2. FUNCTIONAL TRANSFER

2.1 The Canadian Rangers are a sub-component of the Reserve Force. Canadian Ranger patrols and detachments provide a Canadian Forces presence in remote and sparsely inhabited parts of Canada. In accordance with reference B, the Canadian Ranger mission is, “to provide lightly equipped, self sufficient, mobile forces in support of the Canadian Forces’ sovereignty and domestic operation tasks.” As a result of Transformation, 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG) was transferred from the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) to Commander (Comd) Canada Command (Canada COM). Currently all other CRPGs are under the authority of Land Force Command (LFC). Comd LFC commands these CRPGs through the Land Force Areas, whose role it is to Force Generate Canadian Rangers. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) intends to bring greater commonality to the Canadian Ranger organization as a whole to include a single approach to recruiting, training, equipping and administrative
support by transferring 1 CRPG from Canada COM (specifically Joint Task Force North) to LFC effective 1 December 2008.

2.2 IAW reference C, whenever required for Force Employment in the Canada COM AOR, these 1 CRPG forces are assigned OPCOM to Comd Canada COM. Comd Canada COM will transfer these elements OPCON to JTFN within whose AOR these assets will conduct Force Employment activities. Comd LFC will detach 1 CRPG under OPCON of Comd Joint Task Force North (JTFN) effective 1 December 2008. This will permit Comd JTFN the authority to conduct Force Generation activities required to train 1 CRPG to the National Canadian Ranger Task List on behalf of the Comd LFC. This command/Force Generation relationship and associated resource requirements are articulated in the formal written Service Level Agreement (SLA) between Commander Canada COM and Commander LFC attached as Annex B.

2.3 Key milestones for the transfer are as follows:

... d. 15 Jul 08 — MOO and CFOO approved by MND;
... g. 15 Oct 08 — TIP and SLA approved by VCDS (OPI DFPPC, OCIs — LFC and Canada COM);
... i. 15 Nov 08 — 1 CRPG OPCON directive issued by CDS (OPI CDS);
   j. 30 Nov 08 — Transfer completed (less financial);
   k. 1 Dec 08 — Transfer of Command (TOC); and 1.1 Apr 09 — ICCT Completed with transfer of financial authority.

3. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND ESTABLISHMENT
(PERSONNEL AND SWE)

3.1 1 CRPG, Automated Establishment Review (AER) Dept ID 3685 will be transferred in its entirety (Regular, Primary Reserve, Canadian Ranger, and Civilian) to Land Force Command. An organization chart and AER for 1 CRPG is contained in Annex A.

3.2 Establishment Change (EC) action to transfer the Dept ID 3685 from Canada COM / JTFN to Land Force Command will be undertaken by the Canada COM EC OPI upon signature of this transfer agreement.

3.3 The transfer of the funding required for the Primary Reserve positions detailed in Annex C will be actioned by Canada COM J8. …
4. O&M and FOA/CLDA

4.1 1 CRPG will manage its own funding with assistance from JTFN. Any shortage or surplus will be communicated to LFC for proper processing. Any new requirements placed on 1 CRPG by LFC that are not covered in the 1 CRPG current baseline, will become a LFC responsibility to resource and fund. To support the transfer of 1 CRPG, Canada COM / JTFN will continue to manage in-year L116 and L114 funds for FY 08/09. …

…

10. CONTRACTS/SLAs

10.1 SLA between the Directorate of Aerospace Equipment Program Management (Radar and Communications Systems) (DAEPMRCS) and Canadian Force's Northern Area (CFNA) concerning the North Warning System (NWS) Site Security Patrols:

   a. This SLA governs the requirement and process for Type 2, NWS Patrols conducted by 1 CRPG for NWS sites in the Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Originally negotiated with CFNA, this SLA requires revision to reflect recent terminology changes. JTFN will continue to be the POC with DAEPMRCS regarding the application of this SLA. Additionally JTFN will liaise with appropriate CLS staff to ensure the tasks remain within capabilities of 1 CRPG to perform.

10.2 SLA between Joint Task Force North and 17 Wing Winnipeg for the use of the Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Yellowknife, NWT, dated October 2007:

   a. JTFN currently utilizes the FOL to accommodate 1 CRPG. The continued use of this FOL space by 1 CRPG is required and the continued application of this SLA must continue; and

   b. IAW with the Annex B agreement for JTFN to provide infrastructure to house 1 CRPG, JTFN will continue to be the POC with 17 Wing regarding the application of this SLA.

…

12. CONCLUSION

12.1 The effective date of the transfer of the responsibility for the listed functions, organization & establishment (personnel), materiel and issues will be 1 December 2008. The effective date of transfer of financial resources will be 1 April 2009.
Losing Command:  
VAdm P.D. McFadden  
Commander Canada Command  
Approved  
Date: 07 Nov 08

Gaining Command:  
LGen A.B. Leslie  
Commander Land Force Command  
Approved  
Date: 10 Nov 08

Vice Chief of Defence Staff Review:  
MGen R.P.F. Bertrand, C Prog  
For VAdm J.A.D. Rouleau  
Vice Chief of Defence Staff  
Approved  
Date: 17 Mar 09

Acknowledged By:  
BGen D.B. Millar  
Commander JTF North  
Date: 7 Oct 08

BGen GJP O’Brien  
Chief of Staff Land Reserve/Canadian Ranger National Authority

Annexes

Annex A — JTFN Analysis Report
Annex B — SLA between JTFN and 1 CRPG
Annex C — Draft CDS OPCON Directive

Distribution List
1. Considerable change has occurred since the formalization of Canadian Ranger expansion in June of 2008. From a start point of 3940 Canadian Rangers and 161 Patrols, the organization now stands at 4150 Canadian Rangers in 169 Patrols as of 1 Jan 2010. The initially slow growth picked up momentum in 2009 with at least one Patrol opened by each of the CRPGs, introducing Canadian Rangers into eight new communities:

a. 1 CRPG: Faro Yukon - 15 Nov 09;

b. 2 CRPG: Chisasibi Quebec — 20 July 09, Iles-de-la-Madeleine Quebec — 20 July 09;

c. 3 CRPG: Eabametoong Ontario — 30 Apr 09, Kasabonika Lake Ontario — 15 Nov 09 and Kingfisher Lake Ontario — 15 Nov 09;

d. 4 CRPG: Fort Nelson British Columbia — 30 Apr 2009; and

e. 5 CRPG: Hamilton Sound Newfoundland and Labrador — 17 Sep 09.

2. Based on the growth achievements to date, the growth targets from the original plan (ref A), and discussion at the 2009 Canadian Ranger National Working Group (ref B), the following updated growth targets are assigned for the CRPGs:

a. 1 CRPG:

   (1) FY 10/11 — 59 Patrols (2 new), 1680 CRs

   (2) FY 11/12 — 60 Patrols (1 new), 1800 CRs.

b. 2 CRPG:

   (1) FY 10/11 — 25 Patrols, 700 CRs
(2) FY 11/12 — 25 Patrols, 740 CRs.

c. 3 CRPG:
   (1) FY 10/11 — 19 Patrols (1 New), 500 CRs
   (2) FY 11/12 — 20 Patrols (1 New), 575 CRs.

d. 4 CRPG:
   (1) FY 10/11 — 40 Patrols (2 New), 860 CRs
   (2) FY 11/12 — 41 Patrols (1 New), 975 CRs.

e. 5 CRPG:
   (1) FY 10/11 — 31 Patrols, 820 CRs
   (2) FY 11/12 — 32 Patrols (1 New), 910 CRs.

f. Canadian Ranger Organization:
   (1) FY 10/11 — 174 Patrols (5 New), 4560 Total CRs
   (2) FY 11/12 — 178 Patrols (4 New), 5000 Total CRs.

3. In 2007, the Prime Minister indicated (ref E) that Canadian Ranger expansion would “ensure that the necessary Command and Control systems are in place to manage the expanded force.” Following this intent, major establishment changes for the CRPG HQs were completed in 2009 (ref D), providing the staff power and flexibility to continue Canadian Ranger expansion. In order to support the expanded CRPG HQs and remaining growth in FY 10/11 and FY 11/12, ref C has allocated the necessary resources, a substantial increase compared to pre-expansion allocations.

4. The establishment of the CRPG HQs and the resourcing of the Canadian Ranger organization have been developed for the end state of 178 Patrols and 5000 Canadian Rangers. Recruitment of Canadian Rangers or opening of Patrols in excess of the identified targets in para 2 are not authorized; a rebalancing of growth targets will be considered prior to the start of FY 11/12.

5. Canadian Rangers are to form one of the cornerstones from which the Land Force Arctic Strategy will be built. They represent the Army and the CF in some of the most remote and isolated regions of Canada and are charged with protecting Canada’s sovereignty by reporting unusual activities or sightings, collecting local data of significance to the CF, and conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required. I am confident that with your leadership and support, your CRPGs will continue their remarkable work of expanding the
Canadian Ranger force and will achieve a strength of 5000 Canadian Rangers by the end of FY 11/12.

6. Questions regarding Canadian Ranger expansion or requests for Patrol openings may be directed to the undersigned.

G.J.P. O’Brien
Brigadier-General
Canadian Ranger National Authority

Distribution List
Doc. 70: LFCO 11-99: Canadian Rangers, 1 December 2010

LFCO 11-99
CANADIAN RANGERS

APPLICABLE TO: LFC Areas, JTFN, CRPG

References:
A. CLS 1901-5 (CRNA) 25 November 2008 1 CRPG OPCON Document
B. CDS RMT Letter dated 11 July 2008
F. CF Leave Manual - http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgc-b-dgras/pd/lea-
    con/doc/cflpm-mprlcf-eng.pdf
G. LFCO 11-65 - http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/CLS/143000440000464/11_65_E0.DOC
CFCDDTI_apr_04.doc
I. LFCO 11-60 - http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/CLS/
D143000440132038.asp
J. CBI 210.01
K. 7200-1 (CRHR) 16 May 2008 http://vcds.mil.ca/clsdmc/FilesO/DMCS-
    53627.pdf
M. CANFORGEN 090/99 ADMHRMIL 061 151600Z OCT 99
N. LFCO 11-27
P. CFAO 202-2
Q. CMPI 20/04
R. CCDDO Chapter 3 -
http://canadacom.mil.ca/en/ccddo_TOC_e.asp?cat=3#TOC3
S. 1380-1 (NDIS) 8 June 2009
T. JCR Screening - http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pol/index-eng.asp
U. CANRAN 2000 http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/Common/AllDocs.asp?
   UnitID=143000440031356
V. Meal Expense — Reserve Force Members on class A or B Service -
   http://hr.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/dgc-b/dcb-draengraph/ReserveMeal_Expense
   _e.asp?sidesection=2&sidecat=7

526
AIM

1. Due to the unique and diverse organization and responsibilities of the Canadian Rangers (CR), many existing directives do not provide adequate guidance or Standard Operating Procedures do not apply. This order amplifies or provides specific guidance that applies to the Canadian Ranger organization.

INTRODUCTION

2. In support of the references, this LFCO was prepared to provide additional direction on the administration and operation of the Canadian Rangers to supplement or amplify existing orders and regulations. Additionally, DAOD 5100-Canadian Rangers and DAOD 5511-0 Promotion, Seniority, Reversion and Relinquishment (to be issued) will provide national direction on the day-to-day operations and advancement criteria for the Canadian Rangers, and the A-PM-245 is undergoing amendment to include direction on CR in Chapters 10, 11 and 15.

ORGANIZATION

3. Chain of Command. The LFC Commander divests control through his Area Commanders, and IAW reference A Joint Task Force North (JTFN), for all matters pertaining to the daily operation of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPG).

4. Command and Control. Command is the authoritative act of making decisions and ordering action; control is the act of monitoring and influencing this action. Consistent with the Army tradition, the Land Staff (LS) is “command-centric” (as opposed to staff-led), where the role of the CLS in generating land forces is pre-eminent, and his experience and professional judgement are paramount. However, the size and complexity of the LS preclude the CLS from making every decision himself.

5. Canadian Ranger National Authority (CRNA). The CLS is the Canadian Ranger National Authority. The CLS divests control to LS General Officers (GO) who are entrusted with the promulgation of CLS decisions, guidance and
intent, with subsequent supervision and adjustment of staff execution to ensure compliance. The COS Land Reserve is delegated as the Canadian Ranger National Authority, authorized to set priorities, manage uncertainty and risk and have oversight of the use of resources pertaining to all Canadian Rangers on behalf of the CLS. The COS Land Reserve aids staff planning by articulating CLS intent and information requirements. While each CRPG has been placed into the respective Land Force Area (LFA) or JTFN Chain of Command, the Canadian Ranger National Authority Staff exist both as an advisory chain to the CLS, and to provide guidance and advice to the LFAs/JTFN. Specifically, the Canadian Ranger National Authority (COS Land Reserve) is delegated authority by the CLS for the development and consistent application of the following for Canadian Rangers:

a. Structure and Organization;
b. Policy;
c. Human Resource Management;
d. Training;
e. Equipment; and

6. Canadian Ranger Role Mission and Task. In all matters pertaining to Canadian Ranger employment, the Role Mission and Task document provided by the CDS at reference B (Annex A), provides the guiding principles.

7. Canadian Forces Organization Orders. Reference C contains the Canadian Forces Organization Orders that have been prepared for the CRPG Headquarters. Reference D provides the Position Management Process (under recommended reading) to be followed whenever a unit position or establishment change is proposed. As directed at paragraph 6, above, any proposal that will change or amend the present structure, or organization, of a Group or Patrol will be passed through the Area Chain for CRNA review before being submitted to the Land Staff for finalization.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

8. Canadian Ranger Website. Reference E is the link to the Canadian Ranger website. This website will be maintained by DAPA with assistance from the CRNA and CRPGs.

9. Leave Policy. Reference F outlines the CF policy for the granting of leave. Furthermore, as outlined at reference G, the granting of short leave for extended exercise or training periods in addition to special leave relocation is at the Commanding Officer's discretion.

12. The CFTDTI (reference II) directs the rates to be paid when members are on Temporary Duty. Per Diem rates for meals will not be altered unless specifically directed by the Exercise or Operation Order and only during pre-planned events when meals are “officially” provided. Casual Land Duty Allowance (CLDA), as directed at reference I, will be paid when members are on exercise or operation in a field environment. In field conditions, exception to any compensation or benefit regulations must be staffed through the chain of command to Compt LFC/G1 for approval by DCBA. The following points are provided as amplification, of existing regulations, as they apply to CRs:

   a. When training, entitlement to CLDA will not be granted if rations (fresh or IMPs) cannot be provided. Otherwise, CRs will be considered to be on TD and meal rates will be IAW the CFTDTI;

   b. The definition of workplace for a CR is their home. Therefore, a CR is on TD when departing from the home to a meeting area (the 16 km radius applies). Inside the 16 Km radius, the direction on receipts (up to the TB per Diem) for meals purchased shall apply; and

   c. Reference V provides direction on the Reserve Meal Expense and could apply should a Patrol be parading, over one meal hour, at a set location. Furthermore, that meal rate can be increased up to the TD Per Diem meal rate if a receipt is provided. Otherwise, that expense shall not be applied as that rate does not provide proper compensation for meals due to CR location, environment and nomadic work conditions. In all other circumstances, the Per Diem Meal Rates shall be used.

13. **Loss or Damage Claims.** Reference J provides the authority in cases of loss or damage to Canadian Ranger personal equipment when compensation is not otherwise payable. Despite anything in this section, the Minister may authorize the payment as considered appropriate, having regard to the circumstances. CRPGs are to follow the direction provided at reference K (Annex B) for all Loss or Damage Claims citing the CBI as the authority.

14. **Equipment Usage Rates (EUR).** The Vehicle Maintenance Agreement, provided to compensate CR for use of their personal equipment was recently replaced by an Equipment Usage Rate Table that permits CRPGs to allocate set
amounts to CR for use of their personal equipment in the performance of set tasks. This EUR is not meant as a means to “rent” equipment from CR and is provided as compensation for use, wear and tear of the equipment.

15. The EUR table, authorized by the CLS in accordance with CBI 210.81, is effective on the date of issue of this LFCO and is attached as Annex C. These approved rates shall not be adjusted locally.

16. Rank on Enrolment. Due to the unique skill sets the Canadian Ranger brings to the CF, an applicant shall be enrolled for an indefinite period of service in the substantive rank of Private (Trained), Pay Increment (PI) 1. The substantive rank of a non-commissioned member CR is Private (Trained) and they may only be promoted to higher acting ranks. Particular attention must be given to A-PM-245. In all instances, the PI will be directed by the Commanding Officer on the Promotion/Reversion Proforma Sheet.

17. Elective Process for leadership positions. Through guided election, the Patrol selects their Sgt, MCpls and Cpls for the applicable CR positions. This requires concurrence by the Community (as appropriate) and the Group Commanding Officer.

18. Cpl Reversion. On completion of an appointment of Cpl. the CR shall be reverted to the rank of Pte with the PI in line with the CR’s time in rank.

19. MCpl Reversion. On completion of an appointment of MCpl, the CR shall be reverted to the rank of Pte with the PI in line with the CR’s time in rank.

20. Sgt Reversion. On completion of an appointment as the Patrol Sgt, the CR shall be reverted to the rank of Pte, and will have immediate entitlement to the highest Pte pay increment (PI).

21. Honours and Awards. Reference M outlines the criteria and ordering procedures for the Special Service Medal for CRs. CR are entitled to the Canadian Forces Decoration and an annual call letter will seek submissions for higher awards (i.e. OrMM submissions). All submissions will be forwarded, in the applicable format, as outlined at reference N.

22. Weapons Storage. The OPI for all matters related to the physical security, storage and transport of rifles used by the Canadian Rangers, Cadets and JCR is DPM Secur 4. To standardize the storage requirements and provide safety and security, the direction provided at section 65 of reference 0 shall be followed. 2115-11-2 (DPM Security/Rgr-JCR Coord) Firearms Policy Review - Canadian Rangers dated 11 Aug 2003, will be read in conjunction with NDSI 65 as interim policy direction. This firearms policy for CRs is to remain effective until superseded by the issuance of an amended NDSI 65.
23. **Handling of Money during Trg. Ex, and Ops.** When transporting or handling large sums of cash in the performance of Canadian Ranger duties the direction provided at reference P “may” not always be practical or appropriate. In all cases where the need to travel with cash in excess of the amounts authorized under that reference, the Area/JTFN comptroller is to be consulted to ensure the handling procedures are appropriate for the situation. Whenever possible, public funds are to be secured at an RCMP, or equivalent, facility. If not possible, the Public funds shall be personally retained in the custody of the person responsible for the Funds.

24. **Non-Effective.** A Canadian Ranger is considered to be Non-Effective when:

   a. The CR no longer patrols their AOR in the process of their individual normal routine. i.e. hunting, fishing, work or hobbies (canoeing - kayaking - hiking - camping etc); or

   b. The CR does not reflect good credit upon their community, their patrol and the CF; or

   c. The CR is not accepted as an equal and participating member within their respective CR Patrol; or

   d. The CR no longer provides tangible advice and guidance which is grounded in experientially based traditional knowledge to the CR Patrol.

When a CR is considered as Non-Effective within their Patrol, the Patrol Commander will conduct a meeting of the patrol membership. The Patrol Comd, with input from the Canadian Ranger Instructor, will chair a discussion on the shortcomings of the CR in order to reach an acceptable resolution. The outcome of the meeting, with patrol consensus and recommended administrative action, shall be forwarded to the CO. If the consensus indicates that the member is considered as not being an effective member of the patrol, the CO will direct the necessary administrative or release action IAW section 3 of reference Q.


26. **Funding Model/Business Planning Guidance.** In cooperation with the LFC Compt, the CRNA has developed a Canadian Ranger Funding Model (CRFM) on which the CRPGs shall develop their Business Plan (BP). Annual CRPG allocations will be sent to the respective LFA and JTFN through the annual SORE and any subsequent amendments or requests for additional support must be forwarded through the Chain of Command.
27. **Translation Services.** Translation services are clearly defined when dealing with our official languages and it is also recognized that there may be additional translation services that are unique to CR requirements. While identification of these requirements, in the CRPG Annual BP would be prudent, it may not always be possible. These additional translation requirements can be requested through the Area/JTFN for CRNA consideration.

28. **Funding for Promotional Items.** The Directorate of Army Public Affairs (DAPA) and the CRNA coordinate national procurement for Canadian Ranger promotional items jointly. While this permits the bulk purchase of certain items and is more cost effective, local procurement at the CRPG level is also encouraged. Funding shall be forecasted in the annual CRPG and CRNA BPs.

29. **ID Card Processing.** Reference S provides authorization for the issue of a five year ID card for all CRs. The card expiry date will correspond with the CR date of birth.

30. **Employment of JCR Full Time Staff in CRPG HQ.** As directed in the Army Establishment Report, COATS General Service Officers and CIC working in the CRPG HQ “may” fill the position of JCR O and Trg O. Other CRPG HQ “JCR” positions may also be considered for fill by COATS personnel, however substantiation is required, and a request is to be submitted through the Area/JTFN HQ to the CRNA, before DCdts and JCR auth will be considered.

31. **JCR Planning Guidance.** Reference L provides the Junior Canadian Ranger Program Planning Guidance up to FY 2013.

32. **Screening process for work with the Junior Canadian Ranger program.** CR and CRPG personnel who are tasked to work with the Junior Canadian Ranger Program shall comply with the screening procedures outlined at reference T (JCR Policy - JCRATO 63-02).

**REPORTS AND RETURNS**

33. **SITREPs.** The CRPGs will provide a unit SITREP, on a two-month cycle that is generated by the Group to the Area. After review, the Area will forward the SITREP to the CRNA where a consolidated return will be prepared for COS Land Res review.

34. **Historical Reports.** See DHH website for direction on reports required by the end of the Fiscal Year to be sent NLT 31 Mar for the previous year activities. A copy of the report shall he sent to the CRNA.
35. **Contact Lists**: CRPG HQ Contact Lists will be provided to the CRNA at least twice yearly (April and September) or as required when substantial amendments are made.

36. Carbon copy of reports shall be sent to the CRNA mailbox +Canadian Rangers National Auth@DGLRes@Ottawa-Hull

**OPERATIONS**

37. **CRPG HQ Organization.** Annex D contains the Organization Charts for the CRPG Headquarters establishments. Requests for establishment changes shall be forwarded through the chain of command to the CRNA.

38. **Patrol Organization.** Annex E contains the Organization Chart applicable for all CR Patrol establishments. Requests for establishment changes shall be forwarded through the chain of command to the CRNA.


40. **Equipment.** The CFSS Materiel Authorization identifies the Clothing and Personal Issued items authorized for CR and members of the CRPGs. There are four applicable Scales of Issue as follows:
   a. CRPG HQ - D13105AD;
   b. CR Patrol - D13105AC;
   c. CR Instr -D01301; and
   d. CR - D01301AE.

   Note: The applicable CFSS MA Doc Numbers are D13105CFS and D01301CFS.

41. Members of the CRNA, personnel posted or employed at a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG) as Instructors and other CRPG personnel tasked to support training, exercises or operations, may be provided up to $1500 (JAW CAN RAN 2000 - reference U) for special clothing and equipment. These items shall be purchased and issued by the respective clothing stores or through the QM. For the CRNA, the SO Equipment position will be responsible for issue and control of this kit. DGL Res Sec ACOS Ops and CRPG Commanding Officers are responsible for the authorization of purchase or replacement of these items.

42. The OPI for this LFCO is the Canadian Ranger National Authority Human Resources Staff Officer.

Effective: 1 Dec 2010
Next amendment: 1 Dec 2011

Annexes:

Annex A - CDS Revised - Role Mission and Tasks of Canadian Rangers
Annex B - Submission of Loss or Damage Claims for Canadian Rangers
Annex C - DCBA Table on Compensation Rates for use of Canadian Ranger equipment
Annex D - CRPG Headquarters Organization Chart
Annex E - Canadian Ranger Patrol Structure
Annex F - Canadian Ranger National Authority Organization Chart

**Annex C to LFCO 11-99**

Canadian Ranger Equipment Usage Rate Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Item/Description</th>
<th>Daily Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>LOSV/ATV</td>
<td>$200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Sled/Komatik/ATV Trailer</td>
<td>$50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>TRUCK – Full Day</td>
<td>$200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRUCK – Half Day (Less than six hours)</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>CANOE/ROW BOAT/KAYAK</td>
<td>$50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Powered Water Craft (0-12 ft)</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Powered Water Craft (13-15 ft)</td>
<td>$150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Powered Water Craft (16-18 ft)</td>
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<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Powered Water Craft (19-25 ft)</td>
<td>$300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Powered Water Craft (26-40 ft)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Powered Water Craft (41 ft or more)</td>
<td>$900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Communication means</td>
<td>$50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various communication means, HF Radios, Sat</td>
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</table>
### Annex E – Canadian Ranger Patrol Structure

![Diagram of Canadian Ranger Patrol Structure]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Small engine equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>$30.00</td>
<td>Ice Auger; Chain Saw, Generator, Air compressor, Portable welder, pump, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Power Tools</td>
<td></td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>Drills, Saws, Ratchets, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Dog Team with Sled</td>
<td></td>
<td>$300.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pack Horse/Mule with Tack</td>
<td></td>
<td>$200.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Riding Horse with Tack</td>
<td></td>
<td>$200.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Trailer</td>
<td></td>
<td>$100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Walled Tent/Bell Tent</td>
<td></td>
<td>$30.00</td>
<td>Seldom required. Tents are normally issued.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The purpose of this letter is to inform Canadian Army Divisions and Joint Task Force North (JTFN) senior leadership on the role of the CRNA. The letter also highlights the working relationship between the Canadian Rangers Patrol Group’s (CRPG), their chain of command and the CRNA.

2. The Comd CA is the Canadian Ranger National Authority and delegated this role to COS Army Reserve authorizing him to set priorities, manage uncertainty and risk and maintain oversight of the use of resources pertaining to all Canadian Rangers (CR) on his behalf. The COS Army Reserve aids staff planning by articulating the Comd CA’s intent and information requirements. While each CRPG has been placed in their respective CA Division chain of command or JTFN control, the CRNA Staff exists both as an advisory chain to the Comd CA, and to provide guidance and advice to the CR chain of command.

3. Specifically, the CRNA is the delegated authority for the development and consistent application of the following elements for the CR and CRPG:

   a. **Structure and Organization.** Reference B details the expansion plan, structure and organisation of the CR. The main intent of this plan is achieved; therefore, it is expected that a new plan or follow-on will be issued shortly.

   b. **Policy.** The newly appointed Dir Army Res 4 is responsible for CR policies which include the development of Patrol Type Matrix, managing CRPG establishment, updating of the CR expansion plan and the Role Mission and Tasks of the CR, among others.

   c. **Human Resource Management.** The Dir Army Res 4-2 position is vacant. This position is responsible for Loss and Damage claim procedures, CR
sustainment/hunting using service rifles, CR badge, Honoraries and the Regimental March, amongst others.

d. **Training & Equipment.** Newly appointed Dir Army Res 4-3 is responsible for both training and equipment aspects of the CR. His main equipment projects are currently the new CR rifle and the development of a CR communication suite. On the training side, his focus will be on specialised/regional training such as SAR and avalanche control.

e. **Financial Management.** Dir Army Res 4-2-2 is responsible to develop and manage the funding model which provides the budget allocation to CRPGs. She's also responsible for all admin related issues for the CR in coordination with the Army Gl.

5. LFCO at reference A contains more details on the CR organisation. …

D.A. Patterson
Colonel
Acting Director of Army Reserve
Distribution List
Doc. 72: Commander Canadian Army Master Implementation Directive – Canadian Ranger Organization, 27 April 2015

Commander Canadian Army

1901-1 (CRNA)
27 April 2015

Distribution List

COMMANDER CANADIAN ARMY MASTER IMPLEMENTATION DIRECTIVE (MID) - CANADIAN RANGER ORGANIZATION

References: A. 1920-1 (CRNA) Canadian Ranger Expansion Update, 20 April 2010
B. 1920-1 (ACOS Ops DGLRes Sec) Canadian Ranger Expansion Plan, 20 June 2008
C. Canadian Army Order (CAO) 11-99
E. DAOD 2020-CR (draft)
F. 3000-3 (G33 Continental Ops) Canadian Rangers Patrol Types Matrix for Operations and employment, 3 Oct 2013
G. NDSI 65
H. CFJP 3-2 Joint Publication on Domestic Operations
I. CMP Instr 20/04
J. Service Level Agreement between Joint Task Force North (JTFN) and Land Force Command (LFC) concerning OPCON of 1 CRPG, 10 November 2008
L. 7000-1 (COS Land Res Sec) Control Measures for Class A Expenditures, 9 December 2011
M. 1901-1 (CRNA) Role of the Canadian Ranger National Authority (CRNA), 14 August 2013
N. Annex to 5000-1 (DFPPC 3-4) VCDS Manning Priorities, June 2006
O. Treasury Board Directive on Equipment Usage Rate (EUR)
P. CAO 23-20
Q. DHH Website: http://cmp-cpm.forces.mil.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/ahri-rhai-eng.asp#for-pre
SITUATION

1. General

a. The Canadian Rangers (CR) are a unique sub-component of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Reserve (Res) that is commanded on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) by the Canadian Army (CA) Commander. Since 1947, the CR have provided a CAF presence in sparsely settled northern, coastal or isolated areas of Canada. Individual CR Patrols are composed of locally-based individuals with extensive knowledge of the land who are independently self-sufficient within their home environments. The mission of the CR is to provide lightly-equipped and self-sufficient mobile forces in support of CAF sovereignty and domestic operations in Canada. It is essential that all levels of the CAF and the CA Chain of Command understand the CR Roles, Missions, and Tasks and interpret policy and guidance through this lens. This MID supersedes refs A and B;

b. Since 2008, the CAF has been seeking to expand the CR to 5000 serving CRs. While this goal has now been met, a review of the current disposition of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPGs) shows an uneven development and application of policy stemming from the lack of implementation direction in the original expansion plan. It is acknowledged that many of the inconsistencies stem from the interpretation of policies that, in many cases, did not consider the uniqueness of the CR in their development;

c. Concurrent with the CR expansion, the Directorate of Cadets and Junior Canadian Rangers (D Cdts & JCR) has sought to expand the JCR program. While the program itself resides with D Cdts & JCR, the CA delivers it through the CRPGs and additional resourcing is required to ensure that the JCR program is not delivered at the expense of the CR organization;

d. A policy review is required to ensure that the CR are managed fairly and effectively, and to ensure that the unique risks of CR training and employment are acknowledged explicitly; and

e. CRPGs are Reserve units under the Command of the CA. To that effect, the same policies including administration, finance and employment apply to their staff. However, Headquarters (HQs) of 2, 3, 4 and 5 CRPG are staffed by Class B personnel while the HQ of 1 CRPG is staffed with mainly Regular Force (Reg F) personnel. Flexibility must be
provided to allow Commanding Officers (COs) to manage their staff effectively through career progression within their unit.

2. Assumptions

a. CR are considered to be fully trained, self-sufficient, lightly-equipped, and fully clothed to operate in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) upon enrolment;

b. CR will not be directed to expand beyond its current target. Any increase will be managed internally through position offsets;

c. No JCR expansion will occur into locations that cannot be viable and supported by a CR Patrol/local community; and

d. The generation of domestic response capabilities for deliberate or planned operations may include support from the CR.

3. Limitations

a. Time and space factors vary with the terrain, the climate, and the season. More time must be allowed for movement of supplies and troops because of the environment. Distance is measured in time rather than space; additional time incurs additional cost;

b. CR do not conform to the principle of universality of service and are deemed trained on enrolment based on their knowledge of the land and not their knowledge of the military or soldiering skills (ref C). Commanders at all levels are to keep this reality in mind when tasking CR;

c. With the exception of “Life and Limb” situations and North Warning System (NWS) Inspections, CR will not likely be the lead agency for any Domestic Operations;

d. The only approved acting ranks of CR are Sgt, MCpl and Cpl. Except for CR Officers commissioned prior to 2007 no other acting ranks are authorized for CR; and

e. CR possess a unique set of specialized skills prompting numerous requests to conduct exchanges with foreign nations. The CR can provide guidance and instruction on survival and living in harsh conditions. Employment outside Canadian borders is not part of their mandate. Exchanges with nations having similar requirements and geographical challenges have been extremely positive and are encouraged IAW CAO 23-20 at ref N, which requires CDS approval.
AIM

4. Review the organization and structure of the CR for the conduct of sovereignty and domestic operations in remote, coastal and sparsely inhabited parts of the country.

EXECUTION

5. Concept of Operations

a. Intent. My intent is to ensure the long term relevance and sustainability of the CR by ensuring that their command and control structures, policy guidance, and personnel meet the unique requirements of the organization in a resource efficient manner.

b. Scheme of Manoeuvre

(1) To date, as currently structured and resourced, CR have shown that they are capable of conducting the operations and training that have been asked of them. Questions, however, have arisen as to their ability to sustain their level of activity over the longer term. As such, the CR organization must be reviewed with a view to identifying and confirming sustainable Command and Control (C2) structures, relevant policy guidance, and personnel while at the same time recognizing and preserving the uniqueness of the CR. This MID will therefore identify key areas of review and assign responsibility and timelines for developing revised guidance and direction to the CR;

(2) Under the direction of COS Army Reserve (ARes) as the CRNA, the process to bring this MID to completion will be conducted in the following four review phases:

(a) Phase 1 — Organization and Policies. During this phase, a detailed review of the training and policies affecting CRPGs and the CR will be completed based on feedback from COs, Army and Division (Div) staff;

(b) Phase 2 — Command & Control and Manning. CRPG HQ structures will be re-evaluated IOT ensure they enable COs to properly complete mandated tasks;

(c) Phase 3 — Financial and Personnel Administration. In the current financial environment, it is important to review the CR Funding Model (CRFM) to confirm funds are properly allocated. This phase will also look at areas of concern in
regard to administration to ensure data integrity before the new HR system comes online in 2016; and

(d) Phase 4 — Resource and Infrastructure. Reviews completed in the previous phase will most likely lead to a requirement to change and/or amend resource allocation amongst CRPGs. Furthermore, there is a requirement for the CR organization to review its infrastructure IOT address manning issues and improve cost effectiveness of CRPGs.

c. Main Effort. The main effort will be on Phase 2 to set the conditions for long-term sustainability of the organization.

d. End state. The CR have the structures and policies in place to sustain their operations and training over the long-term. This end state will be met when:

(1) CR C2 structures and manning levels are confirmed as appropriate for the needs of the organization;

(2) CR personnel are administered JAW basic CAF requirements within the original purpose and intent of the CR organization; and

(3) There are no internal CAF policy impediments to the long-term sustainability of the CR organization.

e. Criteria for Success

(1) CR external Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) and internal (Army/JTFN) C2 structures are effective across the CR and account for regional differences;

(2) CRPGs are manned to at least 85% of their required structure IAW VCDS Maiming Priority 5 (Support to the Reserves);

(3) Policies negatively impacting the CR due to lack of consideration have been identified and either modified or the risk has been explicitly accepted;

(4) CR Patrols are able to support deliberate or contingency operations within their AOR in all weather conditions;

(5) All communities with CR Patrols are visited at least twice a year by their respective CRPG;

(6) The JCR Program is adequately resourced, minimizing the impact on CR training and operations; and
(7) JCR Patrols are viable and a cooperative relationship is maintained between JCR Instructors, CR and Adult Committees.

f. Force Employment (FE)

(1) CJOC is responsible for employment of all CR in Canada through the RJTFs. Ref K outlines the directives governing FE of CR;

(2) At this time, CRPGs do not have HQ tasks for FE; however, it is expected that their staff could be asked to support the respective RJTF for domestic operations; and

(3) Other than for “Life & Limb” instances, CR Patrols/Detachments shall be authorized explicitly by the CO of the respective CRPG before deploying with other Government Departments (OGDs) on training or operations when a CR Instructor is not present.

g. Command Structure. Acknowledging regional differences, CRPG HQ structures may not always be symmetrical. Final allocation of CR manning can be found at Annex B.

(1) 1 CRPG

(a) 1 CRPG is detached OPCON from the CA HQ to JTFN. The Service Level Agreement (SLA) with JTFN signed in 2008 (ref J) covers the division of responsibilities in administration and support for 1 CRPG;

(b) Their HQ is located in Yellowknife, NWT. 1 CRPG AOR includes Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, Nunavut Territory and parts of Northern British Columbia.

(2) 2 CRPG is under the Command of 2 Div with their HQ located in St-Jean, QC. 2 CRPG AOR covers the Province of Quebec.

(3) 3 CRPG is under the Command of 4 Div with their HQ located in Borden, ON. 3 CRPG AOR covers the Province of Ontario.

(4) 4 CRPG is under the Command of 3 Div with their HQ located in Esquimalt, BC. 4 CRPG AOR covers the Provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.

(5) 5 CRPG is under the Command of 5 Div with their HQ located in Gander, NL. 5 CRPG AOR covers the Province of Newfoundland & Labrador.
(6) **CR Patrols.** Subordinate to the CRPG is the CR Patrol. A CR Patrol is comprised of sections of 10 individual CR. The minimum size of a Patrol is one Section plus a Patrol Commander (Comd) and 21C. A CR Patrol will have a maximum of five sections. A CR Patrol will have an additional JCR Comd (MCp1) and 21C (Cpl) position for every JCR Patrol under its control (Annex C).

... 

**SERVICE SUPPORT**

8. **Concept of Support in Garrison.** Standard affiliations should prevail for support of the CRPG and CR Patrol Detachments in Garrison. Any MOU/SLA required for support of CRPGs and CR Patrols shall be identified and coordinated by the Divs and Army Staff for JTFN.

a. **Supply.** Entitlement does not necessarily mean that an item has to be issued. In the CR/remote access context, the distribution of a minimal amount of equipment is preferred. COs are expected to allocate items accordingly:

(1) CR Patrols have been provided a sub-scale of issue of individual items that form the basic CR entitlement; and

(2) The CR CFFET outlines equipment entitlements for use by CRPGs and Patrols.

b. **Maintenance**

(1) Support to CRPGs and CR Patrols will be tailored to their location and equipment being supported; and

(2) CRPGs are entitled to a sufficient number of light vehicles and trailers for their Instructor Cadre and Support staff. Maintenance is to be part of the support base Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/SLA.

9. **Concept of Deployed Support**

a. CRPG Instructors and CR Patrol deployment to a CR AOR will be treated as deliberately planned domestic operations. Deployed elements will be tasked to the Div or JTFN for training and training support and/or CJOC for FE tasks. Early liaison and planning with CJOC will be necessary to ensure the appropriate level of operational support is provided and to ensure local domestic operations are sustainable;
b. Any logistic support provided to the CR is to be inline with the CR mission and within CR capabilities to accept; and

c. Maintenance Support. Maintenance of equipment deployed to remote locations will be the responsibility of the FE and/or the supporting base in accordance with the MOU/SLA direction.

10. **Administration Review**

a. While all direction pertaining to CAF personnel administrative shortcomings directs that every case will be administered within set operating procedures, it is recognized these procedures cannot be systematically applied when dealing with CR cases. Depending on the geographical location, it may be feasible to apply some procedures; however, most locations do not have the professionals who can deal with individual cases. Therefore, the CR are commonly assessed by gauging their personal dedication to the Patrol and when applicable, the Patrol Commander along with the community, will make submission to the CRPG CO recommending administrative or release procedures when a CR no longer meets the requirements, and is considered to be noneffective; and

b. The description of “non-effective” status of a CR is clearly defined in CAO 11-99 (ref C);

11. **Finance**

a. In conjunction with the ArmyComptroller, CRNA manages the CRFM. Using this model, annual allocations of funds are provided to all CRPGs through their respective Div staff;

b. The CRFM is based on 12 days of training per Patrol per year (for FG). It includes both salary and O&M funds, and is based on an average strength of 28 CR per Patrol;

c. The ongoing review of the CRFM will take into account the Goose Bay mandate which includes the Labrador expansion (rebalancing of positions within the organization). It will also take into consideration the difference in the cost of travel across CRPGs and CR Patrol average strength; and

d. IAW ref C, the EUR governs what a CR can claim for military duty use of their personally owned equipment. Rates will remain fixed; however, they will be reviewed annually by the COs in conjunction with CRNA, with new rates being implemented as required. This item is not taxable.
IAW ref M. It is important to note that EUR will only be paid if the equipment has been previously requested/directed by the CRPG or Patrol Comd.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

12. Command

   a. Comd CA is the FG authority for all CAmision elements, including the CR;

   b. COS ARes has been delegated as the CRNA and is therefore responsible for the implementation of this MID; and

   c. CJOC is the FE for all CR employment.

... 

J.M.M. Hainse
Lieutenant-General

Annexes
Annex A — CRPG HQ Organizational Chart (TBI)
Annex B — CRPG Manning Targets
Annex C — CR Patrol Structure
Annex D — Annual Public Affairs (PA) Plan

Distribution List

Annex B
1901-1 (CRNA)
27 April 2015

CANADIAN RANGER PATROL GROUP (CRPG) TARGETS

1. There is currently no more expansion of the CR expected. Although the JCR Renewal Plan signed by the VCDS in 2014 calls for an expansion of the JCR Program, the overall number of CR should remain at approximately 5000. With an average CR Patrol size of 32 CR plus two in support of a JCR Patrol, the current number of established positions is 6086. The intent is not to reduce or augment that number, and use it to absorb any small/local initiatives that may arise, such as the Labrador CR expansion.

2. Table A indicates the current status of the CR/CRPG as of 15 December 2014, and their targets set by this MID. Table B indicates the current JCR
Patrols status and the possible targets in FY 17/18 as provided by D Cdts & JCR in January 2015 IAW with the JCR Renewal Plan.

Table A — CR/CRPG current status and targets per CRPG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRPG</th>
<th>Current CR</th>
<th>Current Patrols</th>
<th>Targets CR</th>
<th>Targets Patrols</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1738</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1210*</td>
<td>36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4994</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>5300</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including the CR Labrador expansion

Table B — JCR Patrol current status and possible targets per CRPG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRPG</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>FY 17/18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex C
1901-1 (CRNA)
27 April 2015

CANADIAN RANGER PATROL STRUCTURE

1. CR Patrols are Detachments established with a 10 person section structure. CR Patrol size depends mostly on the size of their community, ranging from 12 to 60 members. To provide the CRPG with flexibility to recruit, maintain their targets and their patrol effectiveness for FG, the CR Patrol structure will be based on sections of 10 CR. The following rules apply to ensure the integrity of each CR Patrol:
   a. Sections will remain at 10 CR, including the MCpl, Cpl and 8 CR;
   b. When a CR Patrol needs more positions, a full section has to be moved from another CR Patrol as there will be no creation of sections to accommodate;
c. CR Patrols will have a minimum of 12 CR: the Patrol Comd and his 2IC as well as 1 section of 10 CR;
d. For each JCR Patrol supported by the CR Patrol, an additional 2 positions will be created (MCp1 and Cpl) on top of the existing CR Patrol structure; and
e. Any movement of sections will be approved by CRNA staff before being implemented through an internal EC through DLFD. Sections have to be empty before they can be moved under a different CR Patrol.

Annex D
1901-1 (CRNA)
27 April 2015

ANNUAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) PLAN

SITUATION

1. As directed by the Government of Canada in 2008, there has been an increase in the size, presence and general awareness of the CR over the last seven years. Despite this, many Canadians and CAF members are not fully aware of the diverse make-up of the CR, their activities and their role in the CAF.

2. There are now over 5000 CR that reflect the diversity in the 179 Patrols and communities in which they serve. They are located in all provinces and territories except for Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. Their unique uniform, of a red sweatshirt and ball cap, has played an important role in advancing their recognition with Canadians. The goal of this PA Annex is to provide strategic guidance to Army Divs and JTFN on how CA PA can provide support to the CRPGs by increasing knowledge of their role, missions and tasks. By using this Annex as guidance, the Div and CRPG UPARs should formulate their own tactical level communication plans which best achieve the overall objectives.

EXECUTION

3. PA Approach. The PA approach will be active.

4. PA Objectives. The objectives are to:
   a. Increase awareness of the role of the CR within the CAF;
   b. Inform audiences of the diversity of the CR, their activities and the communities they serve; and
c. Promote support of the CR, especially in the communities in which they serve and dwell.

5. **Audiences.** The audiences are:
   a. **Stakeholders.** The community and national stakeholders play a vital role in enabling CR to complete their duties. Building a relationship with stakeholders, whether members of the communities within the CR AOR or Members of Parliament (MP), fosters a mutually beneficial partnership;
   b. **Canadian Public.** The Canadian public has a vested interest in the role of the CR, and a mutually beneficial partnership can be fostered through increased awareness of the organization; and
   c. **Internal DND/CAF.** CAF members, DND employees, military families and retired personnel are our greatest ambassadors since they live, work and interact with the public.

6. **Key Messages.** The key messages are:
   a. CR are dedicated, knowledgeable members of the CA and reflect the diversity of their communities;
   b. CR are invaluable members of their communities. They are integral members of the CAF who provide an essential service to the people of Canada;
   c. The CR serve in diverse terrain, that is sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada. They are located in all provinces and territories except for Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick;
   d. The CR instruct, mentor and supervise the JCR. This contributes to achieving national goals through nation building and significantly improving the quality of life for young people in the most isolated areas of Canada;
   e. CR hold the specific expertise for living close to the land and this knowledge is key to the success of the CAF;
   f. CR are the eyes and ears of Canada’s vast frontiers. They report unusual activities or sightings, collecting local data of significance to the CAF and conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required; and
   g. The CR provide lightly equipped, self-sufficient, mobile forces in support of the CAF’s sovereignty and domestic operations tasks in Canada.

...
1. Introduction

Date of Issue: 2015-05-21

Application: This DAOD is an order that applies to officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF members).

Supersession: Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) letter, Revised – Role, Mission, Tasks of Canadian Rangers, 11 July 2008

Approval Authority: Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS)

Enquiries:
- Commander, Canadian Army (Comd CA) (for force generation)
- Commander, Canadian Joint Operations Command (Comd CJOC) (for force employment)
- Chief of Staff Army Reserve (COS Army Res) as the Canadian Rangers National Authority (CRNA) (for Canadian Rangers (CR) policy)

2. Overview

Role of the CR

2.1 The CR is the sub-component of the Reserve Force (Res F) that provides a CAF presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the CAF.

Mission

2.2 The mission of the CR sub-component is to provide lightly-equipped and self-sufficient mobile forces in support of CAF sovereignty and other domestic operations.

Liability to Serve

2.3 Under QR&O subparagraph 2.034(d), Reserve Force – Sub-components, the CR sub-component consists of CAF members who have undertaken, by the terms of their enrolment, to perform such military duty and training as may be required of them, but who are not required to undergo annual training.

2.4 A CAF member of the CR sub-component (CR member) is liable to perform duties of a military nature, including any duty involving public service, only:

1. if called out on service in an emergency under QR&O paragraph 9.04(3), Training and Duty; or
2. if placed on active service by the Governor in Council under section 31 of the *National Defence Act*.

2.5 Paragraph 33(2)(a) of the *National Defence Act* provides that a CAF member of the Res F (including a CR member) may be ordered to train for such periods as prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council.

**Note** – To date, no regulations prescribing periods of training for CR members have been made.

2.6 A commanding officer (CO) of a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG) may authorize the attendance of a CR member on courses sponsored by the Regular Force (Reg F) or Res F.

### 3. Organization

#### Command

3.1 CR members are commanded by the:

1. CDS through the Comd CA for force generation; and
2. Comd CJOC for force employment.

#### Composition of CRPGs

3.2 The CR sub-component is organized into five CRPGs. Each CRPG is a unit comprised of a headquarters (HQ) element and a number of CR patrols that are detachments of the CRPG. The officer appointed to command a CRPG is a CO.

#### CR Patrol

3.3 A CR patrol is a sub-unit comprised of CR members. The establishment structure of a CR patrol and the associated ranks of the CR members within a CR patrol are determined by the CRNA.

#### Creation and Location of a CR Patrol

3.4 The creation and location of a CR patrol are based on operational and national objectives determined in consultation with CJOC and the provisions of this DAOD.

3.5 A CR patrol is stood up, disbanded or relocated, as required, to:

1. enhance CAF capability to fulfill the CAF mission;
2. enhance local and domestic operational capability; and
3. benefit the social fabric of Canada and the local community.
4. Tasks

CR Tasks

4.1 The tasks in the following table may be undertaken by a CR member on duty when authorized by their CRPG HQ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct and provide support to sovereignty operations</td>
<td>- Conduct and provide support to surveillance and sovereignty patrols, including training in Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct North Warning System site patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Report suspicious and unusual activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Collect local information of military significance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct and provide assistance to CAF domestic operations</td>
<td>- Conduct surveillance of Canadian territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide local knowledge and CR expertise (i.e. advice and guides).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Participate in search and rescue operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide support in response to natural or man-made disasters and support in humanitarian operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide assistance to federal, provincial, territorial or municipal government authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain a CAF presence in the local community</td>
<td>- Instruct, mentor and supervise junior Canadian rangers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Participate in and support events in the local community (e.g. Yukon Quest, Canada Day, Remembrance Day, etc.).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note – When assisting with the conduct of the activities of the Junior Canadian Rangers’ Programme, CR members are contributing to national goals of the Government of Canada by significantly improving the quality of life of junior Canadian rangers across the country, especially in the most isolated areas of Canada.

Tasks Not Assigned

4.2 The following tasks may not be assigned to a CR member, except when placed on active service under section 31 of the *National Defence Act*:

1. undertaking tactical military training;
2. performing immediate local defence tasks, such as containing or observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces;
3. providing vital point security (e.g. dams, mines, oil pipelines, etc.); 
4. assisting federal, provincial, territorial or local police in the discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents, saboteurs, criminals or terrorists; and
5. serving in aid of the civil power.

5. Patrols

Unusual Activities

5.1 In the course of their daily civil activities, a CR member may observe or be informed of unusual activities in their area, such as:
   1. the presence of an unknown ship or submarine;
   2. the movements of an unknown, low flying aircraft;
   3. the presence of unknown persons; or
   4. the flying of another nation’s flag on Canadian territory.

5.2 CR members are encouraged to report information about any unusual activities to their CRPG HQ, even though they may not be on duty at the time they observe or are informed of the unusual activity or when they make the report.

Information Gathering

5.3 CR members may be tasked to conduct patrols for the purpose of gathering information or for any other specified purpose. The following types of patrols may be conducted:
   1. sovereignty patrols;
   2. surveillance patrols; and

5.4 Information collected and any unusual activities observed by CR members during any of the above patrols must be reported to their CRPG HQ including a report of the route taken during the patrol.

Sovereignty Patrols

5.5 Sovereignty patrols are conducted to demonstrate that Canada is able to maintain a presence for a limited time anywhere asserted to be sovereign Canadian territory by the Government of Canada.
Surveillance Patrols

5.6 Surveillance patrols are conducted as part of the systematic observation of Canada’s air, land and ocean areas by all available and practicable means, primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and determining the unusual movements and activities of aircraft, ships, submarines, vehicles and unknown persons.

North Warning System Site Patrols

5.7 North Warning System site patrols are conducted to carry out an exterior and physical security inspection of a designated site. The CRPG HQ provides specific guidelines for the conduct of patrols to each type of site, whether:

1. a short-range radar site;
2. a long-range radar site; or
3. an abandoned Distant Early Warning Line site.

6. Administration

Enrolment

6.1 DAOD 5002-1, Enrolment, sets out the conditions for enrolment in the CR sub-component.

Promotion

6.2 The substantive rank of a CR member is private. A CR member may only be promoted to a higher acting rank.

6.3 A CR member may be promoted to fill an establishment position within a CR patrol either:

1. normally, by an elective promotion process involving the concurrence of their community and the approval of the CO of their CRPG; or
2. by exception, solely on the authority of the CO of their CRPG.

Pay

6.4 Annual pay increments that apply for a CR member holding acting rank are set out in the applicable tables in Compensation and Benefits Instructions for the Canadian Forces (CBI) Chapter 204, Pay of Officers and Non-Commissioned Members.

6.5 A CR member is entitled to be paid when participating in training authorized by the CO of their CRPG or when the CR member is tasked by the CO of their CRPG to perform a duty. See the tasks for CR members in paragraphs 4.1 and 5.3.
6.6 CBI Chapter 204 sets out the applicable rates of pay for periods of duty or training of a CR member on Class “A” or “B” Reserve Service and for days of Class “C” Reserve Service.

Classes of Service

6.7 A CR member may serve on Class “A”, “B” or “C” Reserve Service under Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction (CF Mil Pers Instr) 02/15, Supplementary Reserve.

Class “C” Reserve Service

6.8 Class “C” Reserve Service under QR&O article 9.08, Class “C” Reserve Service, for a CR member may only be authorized by or on behalf of the CDS. For the purpose of QR&O subparagraph 9.08(1)(b), a CR member is on Class “C” Reserve Service when the member is on full-time service and is serving on the following types of operations:

1. a routine operation in Canada;
2. a humanitarian assistance operation; and
3. an operation involving the performance of any duty involving public service.

6.9 The Application block in DAOD 5023-1, Minimum Operational Standards Related to Universality of Service, provides that a CR member is not required to meet the minimum operational standards unless attached, seconded or transferred on consent to the Reg F or Primary Reserve (P Res). Therefore, when authorizing a CR member to be placed on Class “C” Reserve Service, approval authorities should note that the minimum operational standards in DAOD 5023-1 do not apply.

Release Process

6.10 A CO of a CRPG must process the release of a CR member from the CAF in accordance with Chapter 15 of A-PM-245-001/FP-001, Military Human Resources Records Procedures.

Retirement

6.11 CR members do not have a compulsory retirement age and can serve as long as they are able to meet the requirements listed in paragraph 6.12.

6.12 To continue to serve, a CR member must be:

1. physically able to continue performing their duties; and
2. likely to promote, from an educational or administrative perspective, the general efficiency of their patrol, the CR sub-component and the CAF.
Employment Restriction

6.13 A CR member must not be employed in any P Res position.

7. Consequences

Consequences of Non-Compliance

7.1 Non-compliance with this DAOD may have consequences for both the CAF as an institution and CAF members as individuals. Suspected non-compliance will be investigated. The nature and severity of the consequences resulting from actual non-compliance will be commensurate with the circumstances of the non-compliance.

8. Responsibilities

Responsibility Table

8.1 The following table identifies the responsibilities associated with this DAOD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ...</th>
<th>is or are responsible for ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comd CA</td>
<td>• ensuring the force generation of CR members for employment to meet operational requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• determining the force employment requirements for the CR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comd CJOC</td>
<td>• developing CR policies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• carrying out CR personnel management, including administration, finance, training, equipment and supply; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS A Res, acting as the CRNA,</td>
<td>• coordinating the structure and organization of the CR, including the formation and location of CR patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• notifying the VCDS of any non-compliance with this DAOD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comds of land force areas and the Comd Joint Task Force (North)</td>
<td>• managing the CR members serving in their applicable areas of responsibility;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• providing the interface between the strategic level, the Comd CA, the tactical level and the CRPG, in commanding the CR; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• providing guidance to CRPG COs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. References
Acts, Regulations, Central Agency Policies and Policy DAOD

- *National Defence Act*
- *QR&O article 2.034*, Reserve Force – Sub-Components
- *QR&O article 3.295*, Command by a Member of the Canadian Rangers
- *QR&O Chapter 6*, Enrolment and Re-engagement
- *QR&O Chapter 9*, Reserve Service
- *QR&O Chapter 11*, Promotion, Reversion and Compulsory Remustering
- *QR&O Chapter 15*, Release
- *CBI 204*, Pay of Officers and Non-Commissioned Members
- *DAOD 2020-0*, Reserve Force

Other References

- *DAOD 2020-1*, Primary Reserve
- *DAOD 2020-3*, Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service
- *DAOD 2020-4*, Supplementary Reserve
- *DAOD 5002-1*, Enrolment
- *DAOD 5023-1*, Minimum Operational Standards Related to Universality of Service
- *A-PM-245-001/FP-001*, Military Human Resources Records Procedures
- *CFOO 3685*, 1 CRPG
- *CFOO 3686*, 2 CRPG
- *CFOO 3687*, 3 CRPG
- *CFOO 3688*, 4 CRPG
- *CFOO 3689*, 5 CRPG
- *CF Mil Pers Instr 02/15*, Supplementary Reserve
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2016, this Office launched a systemic investigation of the Canadian Rangers organization to identify any factors that could impact Canadian Rangers’ access to health care entitlements and related benefits.

Preliminary research of the Canadian Rangers organization found several areas of concern for further investigation, including: challenges in the determination of appropriate type of Reserve Service, concerns with the absence of a requirement for medical examinations for Canadian Rangers prior to enrolment, and a lack of awareness on the part of the Canadian Rangers with regard to their entitlement to Canadian Armed Forces health care treatment and to employment benefits.

Canadian Rangers reside in over 200 sparsely settled and isolated communities across Canada, many only accessible by air. As a result, medical services, especially specialized care, are not as easily accessible as in other parts of Canada. In some communities, doctors fly in once a month so Canadian Rangers requiring medical attention are not always seen.

The Canadian Armed Forces are responsible for providing health care to Canadian Rangers when an illness or injury is attributable to military service. Considering the often limited services available to Canadian Rangers in their communities, access to Canadian Armed Forces health care often requires travel to medical facilities outside of their communities. This acts as a barrier for many Canadian Rangers who spoke of a reluctance to leave their communities and their support network to seek treatment in southern hospitals.

The majority of commanding officers interviewed recommend a review of how mental health services are delivered to Canadian Rangers in their communities. Accessibility to mental health services was found to be a concern, because mental health service providers might not understand the context within which the Canadian Rangers work and live. Canadian Rangers can be exposed to traumatic situations, so access to mental health services is critical.

In addition, we found that many Canadian Rangers we interviewed were unaware of their health care entitlements and assumed they would be taken care of by the Canadian Armed Forces.
This includes Veteran Affairs benefits as well, which 89 percent of respondents who were injured on duty did not submit a claim for. It is vital that Canadian Rangers are aware of the benefits entitled to them if they experience a service-related illness or injury.

Canadian Rangers, similar to other Reservists, are failing to report or consistently track their illnesses and injuries. Several reasons were cited for this including: underestimating the severity of the injury, fearing removal from a particular activity, fearing long-term career implications, and finding health care through other sources. As access to entitlements may require proof of a service relationship, the implications of failing to track illnesses and injuries are evident.

This Office has maintained a strong focus on Reserves over the past decade, including our 2008 report, Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists where we looked at the provision of care, compensation and other benefits for ill and injured Reservists.

This is our first systemic investigation of the Canadian Rangers organization meant to assist the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in ensuring that Canadian Rangers are treated fairly.

With this in mind, our Office has made four recommendations to the Minister of National Defence:

**Recommendation 1**

We once again recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces eliminate ambiguity and inconsistency in language in the policy framework for Reservists, with a focus on health care entitlements, as soon as possible, and no later than spring 2019.

**Recommendation 2**

We recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces ensure compliance with the existing illness and injury reporting process so that Canadian Rangers are not inadvertently barred from accessing their health care entitlements and related benefits.

**Recommendation 3**

We recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces ensure the delivery of health care to Canadian Rangers to which they are entitled by:

3.1 Engaging with Canadian Rangers with the view of identifying the barriers to their access to Canadian Armed Forces health care, and their health care needs within their social and cultural contexts.
3.2 Identifying and implementing a service delivery model for Canadian Armed Forces health care that is responsive to the identified needs of the Canadian Rangers.

**Recommendation 4**

We recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces take concrete steps to ensure Canadian Rangers have a clear understanding of the importance of reporting injuries, and to improve their knowledge and awareness of the health care entitlements and related benefits available to them by:

4.1 Amalgamating information on Canadian Ranger health care entitlements and related benefits; distributing this information to Canadian Rangers in various languages and formats as necessary, by fall 2018.

4.2 Ensuring that this information is integrated into formal and any other relevant training offered to the Canadian Rangers, by fall 2018.

**SUMMARY OF IMPACT ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND CANADIAN ARMED FORCES CONSTITUENTS**

The Canadian Rangers are a sub-component of the Reserve Force, so it is reasonable to expect that they would have the same health care entitlements and related benefits as other Reservists on the same type of service, as well as comparable access to those entitlements. This Office found that this is not the case.

We identified key challenges that impact Canadian Rangers’ access to health care entitlements and related benefits, including: geographical location, level of awareness of entitlements, and the current practice in tracking and reporting Canadian Ranger illnesses and injuries.

Most Canadian Rangers live in remote, isolated areas where medical services, particularly specialized care, are not as easily accessible as in other parts of Canada. Our recommendation in this regard is intended to address some of these challenges and to help mitigate the impact of geography on Canadian Rangers. It is also to ensure that they receive fair access to the health care they are entitled to through the Canadian Armed Forces, following an illness or injury related to military service.

We also found that Canadian Rangers are unaware of their Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements and related benefits, and this is a barrier to their accessing these entitlements. It is important that Canadian Rangers understand
the different options available to them when they experience a service-related illness or injury, and our recommendation addresses the current deficit in this respect.

Finally, this investigation found that Canadian Ranger illnesses and injuries are not being consistently reported or adequately tracked for health care entitlements and related benefits purposes. The current practice negatively affects Canadian Rangers’ access to entitlements—such as compensation benefits—where proof of a service relationship may be required. Our recommendation addresses this problem.

Throughout the course of interviews conducted by this Office, the chain of command at the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group level demonstrated goodwill and a strong interest in supporting their Canadian Ranger members to the fullest extent possible within their authority. In terms of the management of the Canadian Rangers organization overall, the Canadian Armed Forces operates within the existing policy framework, which presents some challenges as the reality of the Canadian Rangers does not always fit within the cadre of conventional Reservist policies.

The recommendations made in this report, if accepted and implemented, will assist the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in ensuring the Canadian Rangers have access to the health care to which they are entitled, as well as improving their overall wellbeing.

**SECTION I—CONTEXT**

The Canadian Rangers provide “a Canadian Armed Forces presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Armed Forces”


The Canadian Rangers are a sub-component of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Force¹ and an important component of Canada’s overall defence strategy. The Canadian Ranger sub-component is a distinct military occupation, but is not considered a combat arms occupation. Canadian Rangers are recruited primarily

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¹ *Queen’s Regulations and Orders*, Volume 1, Chapter 2.034(d).
for their knowledge and ability to operate in extreme environments within their geographical areas of responsibility.2

The Canadian Rangers contribute to the protection of Canada’s sovereignty by:
- Conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols;
- Collecting local data of significance to the Canadian Armed Forces; and
- Reporting unusual activities or sightings.3

In addition, Canadian Rangers provide a range of specialized services in their geographical area of operation, including:
- Humanitarian assistance;
- Rapid response for disaster situations;
- Search and Rescue operations; assistance to federal, provincial/territorial or municipal authorities; and
- Support for evacuations in natural emergencies such as forest fires and floods.4

Canadian Rangers also regularly train in activities such as navigation, weapon safety, first aid, and other specialized skills.5

There are approximately 5,000 Canadian Rangers divided into five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups, each covering a distinct geographical area. Each Patrol Group is made up of Canadian Ranger patrols, many of which are located in remote areas. The number of patrols varies at each Patrol Group, with the highest being 60 at the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group.6

Each Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is led by a Commanding Officer who is responsible for administration and operations within the Patrol Group. Canadian Ranger Instructors supervise and train the Canadian Rangers, and are the link

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2 The guidance for sub-component selection for Canadian Ranger enrolment requires that the applicant “be intimately familiar with the local population, industries, terrain, weather and other conditions within their area” and further “possess useful skills, in the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, for duties in their area” Defence Administrative Order and Directive 5002-1, Enrolment: Component and Sub-Component Selection.


6 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group—Unit Brief to DND/CAF Ombudsman, April 2016.
between the Canadian Armed Forces and the communities in which the patrols operate. The responsibilities of Canadian Ranger Instructors are extensive, including the administration of finances and personnel, training on weapons and drills, ensuring dress and deportment, parade conduct, and developing youth community programs. Canadian Ranger Instructors are required to visit their patrols and communities 1-2 times per year in order to conduct training activities and supervise training operations. The ratio of full time staff-to-Canadian Rangers is as low as 1:53 in some Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups. For further information on the organizational structure of the Canadian Ranger patrols, including staff ratios, refer to Appendix A—Organizational Structure of the Canadian Rangers.

As with all Reservists, Canadian Rangers can be employed on a type of service (Class “A”, “B”, or “C”7) when training has been authorized or a task has been assigned to them.8 Additional information on types of service can be found in Canadian Rangers Tasks and Operations.

Many Canadian Rangers live and operate within diverse Indigenous communities. Canadian Rangers speak some 26 different languages and dialects, many of which are Indigenous.9 It is important to note the role that Elders play in some of the communities within which the Canadian Rangers live and operate. The definition of Elder varies from nation to nation, but broadly speaking, their function is to “ensure that traditional values, principles and other teachings are passed along.”10 Elders are role models, historians, spiritual leaders and counsellors, and play a vital role in First Nations, Métis and Inuit communities. Elders are not defined by age, but rather by the level of respect their community has for their teachings, and they are central in decision-making within their respective communities.

7 Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Volume 1, Chapter 9, Section 3—Types of Service. Deemed Full-time Service is defined as “a member of the Reserve Force who is serving on an operation of a type approved by or on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff under subparagraph 9.08(1)(b) (Class “C” Reserve Service) is deemed to be on full-time service”. As per the Chief of Reserves, Rangers serving on operations are “Deemed Full-time Service” and are placed on a period of Class “C” Service.

8 Standing Operation Order for Domestic Operations 3000-1, Reserve Force Employment by Sub-Component (j).


For further information, please refer to Appendix B—Members of the Canadian Ranger Organization, and Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers.

The Canadian Rangers are distinct from other components of the Canadian Armed Forces in many ways. Unlike Regular and Primary Reserve Force members, Canadian Rangers are exempted from meeting the minimum operational standards related to universality of service, including the operational standard for physical fitness.

Canadian Rangers also elect their patrol leaders and sergeants annually, as opposed to the Canadian Armed Forces promotion practices.

Unlike all other Canadian Armed Forces members, there is no compulsory retirement age for Canadian Rangers, who can continue to serve as long as they are physically and mentally capable of doing so.

SECTION II—INTRODUCTION

As international interest in the Arctic grows, so too will the role of the Canadian Rangers in providing surveillance in Canada’s North. The Minister of National Defence’s 2015 mandate letter identifies the renewed focus on surveillance and control of Canadian territory and the expansion of the Canadian Rangers organization as a priority. The central contribution of the Canadian Rangers to Canada’s sovereignty is further underscored in the Department of National Defence’s 2017-18 Departmental Plan, which describes the Canadian Rangers as “integral to northern defence.” Canada’s June 2017 Defence Policy speaks to enhancing and expanding the training and effectiveness of the Canadian Rangers, with the view to “enhance the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to operate in the Arctic and adapt to a changed security environment.”

Over the past decade, this Office has maintained a strong focus on Reserves, including on the provision of care, compensation, and other benefits to ill and injured Primary Reservists. In line with this focus, in the fall of 2015 the

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13 2017-18 Departmental Plan, National Defence, Planned Results, Program 1.0: Defence Combat and Support Operations.
14 Canada’s Defence Policy, page 80.
15 Since December 2008’s Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists.
National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman committed to conducting an investigation of the Canadian Rangers organization with an emphasis on health care provided by the Canadian Armed Forces. This is this Office’s first systemic investigation into the Canadian Rangers.

This Office completed preliminary research of the Canadian Rangers organization and found several areas of concern for further investigation, including: challenges in the determination of appropriate type of Reserve Service, concerns with the absence of a requirement for medical examinations for Canadian Rangers prior to enrolment, and a lack of awareness on the part of the Canadian Rangers with regard to their entitlement to Canadian Armed Forces Health care treatment and to employment benefits.

Subsequently, this Office set out to identify the impact of the following key issues on Canadian Rangers’ health care entitlements and related benefits:

- Assessing and monitoring the medical (physical and psychological) fitness of Canadian Rangers;
- Reporting of tasks operations;
- Reporting and tracking of illnesses and injuries; and
- Other relevant factors.

This Office did not examine or assess:

- The adequacy of health services not provided by the Canadian Armed Forces;
- Pay issues;
- Current enrolment eligibility criteria of Canadian Rangers; and
- Health care entitlements for dependents of the Canadian Rangers.

Of note, in April 2015, the Commander of the Canadian Army ordered a review of the Canadian Rangers organization and structure with the intent of ensuring its long-term relevance and sustainability. This review includes four phases: organization and policies; command, control and manning; financial and personnel administration; and resource and infrastructure. While we did not look at topics covered in the Commander of the Canadian Army’s review within this Canadian Rangers investigation, this Office is monitoring progress and has released a Progress Update on the Canadian Army’s review of the Canadian Ranger organization.

16 This is because the Canadian Rangers are exempted from meeting the minimum operational standards related to universality of service, including the operational standard for physical fitness.
Additional information on the data collected and interviews conducted is outlined in Appendix C—Investigative Methodology.

All Reservists, including Canadian Rangers, are expected to perform certain tasks while not on duty, including maintaining their uniforms and equipment, communications and planning associated with upcoming training or operations, and being prepared in the event they are called out on service. In addition to these tasks, Canadian Rangers are uniquely expected to observe and report suspicious or unusual activity and collect local information of military significance during the course of their daily routine. This is [intrinsic] to the role of the Canadian Ranger, but is not considered as duty status for the purpose of health care entitlements and related benefits.

SECTION III—FINDINGS

GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

Finding: Health care entitlements of Canadian Rangers are the same as Primary Reserve Force members employed within the same type of service.

As is the case with all Reservists, Canadian Rangers’ health care entitlements and related benefits are determined by type of service and are based on whether an illness or injury is attributable to military service. The type of Reserve Service under which a Canadian Ranger serves (Class “A”, “B”, or “C”) determines health care entitlements and related benefits.17

In 2009, the Surgeon General for the Canadian Armed Forces issued a directive to provide clarification to health services staff on Reservists’ entitlements to care by means of the Interim Guidance for the Delivery of Health Care to Reserve Force Personnel.18 In general, if a Reserve member becomes ill or is injured while on Class “A” or short-term Class “B” service (i.e. attributable to the performance of military duty) the member will be provided care to the extent practicable by the Canadian Forces Health Services Group until care can be safely transferred to the member’s civilian primary care provider.19 The Interim Guidance further stipulates that members on short terms of service (<180 days)20 are “best looked

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17 Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Volume 1, Chapter 9—Reserve Service.
20 The divide of Class “B” Reserve Service surrounding 180 days is a recurring threshold for benefits to Class “B” Reservists. The Injured Military Members Compensation Act expresses the divide as “more than 180 days” and “180 days or less”. However, Canadian
after by their civilian care providers.” Reserve Force personnel on long-term Class “B” Reserve Service (>180 days), and Class “C” Reserve Service will be treated as Regular Force members.

The Queen’s Regulations and Orders Chapter 34, “Medical Services”, is the governing document for Reservists’ entitlements to medical care. However, as this Office has previously found, the provisions of the Queen’s Regulations and Orders referring to entitlement to medical care are vague and this ambiguity “leads to different interpretations and applications of care.” This ambiguity persists to this day, and remains to be addressed.

Canadian Rangers interviewed during the investigation cited examples where they had sustained injuries while on duty and where Canadian Armed Forces medical personnel were present: first aid was provided by medics on site, and the civilian medical system provided follow-up care. Other Canadian Rangers described how the local community medical facility was the primary health source for minor illnesses or injuries, with more serious conditions requiring travel to the nearest city.

Armed Forces policies and regulations are inconsistent. Some refer to “more than 180 days” and “up to 180 days”, without addressing terms of service of exactly 180 days. Other policies and regulations are silent on the duration of period of service when on Class “B”.

The divide of Class “B” Reserve Service surrounding 180 days is a recurring threshold for benefits to Class “B” Reservists. The Injured Military Members Compensation Act expresses the divide as “more than 180 days” and “180 days or less”. However, Canadian Armed Forces policies and regulations are inconsistent. Some refer to “more than 180 days” and “up to 180 days”, without addressing terms of service of exactly 180 days. Other policies and regulations are silent on the duration of period of service when on Class “B”.

This Office’s report Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists found that a Primary Reserve member injured while off-duty could be eligible for Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements and related benefits in specific situations. In that report, we found that Primary Reserve members could be eligible for Canadian Armed Forces care for an injury sustained during fitness training and while off-duty. This is because Primary Reserve members are “expected to meet and maintain the same standards of fitness for employment as Regular Force members,” and must therefore meet the minimum operational standards related to universality of service. Canadian Rangers are not compelled to meet universality of service, but we found that, in the context in which they work, Canadian Rangers injured while practicing and maintaining Ranger-specific skills, without prior approval from the chain of command, would not be eligible for Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements and related benefits.

For further information, please see Health Care for Canadian Rangers.

**Finding: There is inconsistency and ambiguity in some policies, orders, and instructions that confer health care entitlements and related benefits and eligibilities to Canadian Rangers.**

Nearly a decade ago, this Office found that in the matter of the provision of health care to Reservists, “the current policies and regulations relating to the entitlement of medical care for Reservists are confusing.” To this day this confusion persists in policies, orders, directives, and instructions related to Reserve Force health care entitlements and related benefits. It is not always evident whether specific subcomponents of the Reserve Force, such as the Canadian Rangers, are included or excluded in these documents. This ambiguity can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application of policies, orders and instructions for the Canadian Rangers.

For example, in the Surgeon General’s Interim Guidance for Delivery of Health Care to Reserve Force Personnel, references are made to Reserve Force, Primary Reserves, and Class “B” Reservists. The document discusses guidance for care

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26 Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists, Special Report to the Minister of National Defence, April 2008, page 37.
27 Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists, April 2008.
28 These documents make reference to “Reservists” or “Primary Reservists” or specific types of service within the same document. It is not always clear whether or not a particular sub-component of the Reserve Force, such as the Canadian Rangers, was intentionally left out of the policy or directive, or if terms are being used interchangeably.
delivery for three types of Reserve service, but does not specify whether it is for members of the Primary Reserve, or all subcomponents of the Reserve Force.

**Recommendation 1:**

We once again recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces eliminate ambiguity and inconsistency in language in the policy framework for Reservists, with a focus on health care entitlements, as soon as possible, and no later than spring 2019.

* A Canadian Ranger who sustains an injury or illness while off duty is not eligible for Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements and related benefits, which are determined by type of service. This is the case for any off-duty Reservist. A Canadian Ranger injured in the course of observing and reporting suspicious or unusual activity would only be eligible for health care entitlements and related benefits if specifically tasked to do so or if the Minister of National Defence were to retroactively designate a Special Duty Area or Special Duty Operation.

- Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Chapter 34, Medical Services. Entitlement to the Reserve Force Death Gratuity is not affected should a Ranger become deceased while off-duty.

- Defence Administrative Order and Directive 2020-2, Canadian Rangers: Patrols, Unusual Activities. Additionally entitlement to the Reserve Force Death Gratuity is not affected should a Ranger become deceased in the process of conducting a non-compensated task. This benefit would still be payable whether a Ranger died on or off-duty. During the course of this investigation, some Canadian Rangers cited having undertaken Canadian Ranger activities for which they were unpaid, but these were often administrative tasks and none reported having sustained injuries as a result. While this Office was not made aware of injuries related specifically to the observing and reporting of suspicious behaviour, the potential exists for a Canadian Ranger to be denied Canadian Armed Forces health care and related benefits for performing a task intrinsic to the Canadian Rangers role.

- This authority is set out in the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act, sections 70-71.

**ASSESSING AND MONITORING OF MEDICAL (PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL) FITNESS OF CANADIAN RANGERS**

**Finding:** The chain of command and patrol leadership monitor Canadian Rangers’ fitness informally, but overall fitness is neither assessed nor monitored in an official capacity.
Defence Administrative Order and Directive 5002-1, “Enrolment” states that upon enrolment, Canadian Rangers must be physically and psychologically fit to perform foreseeable duties, and that a medical examination is not required. Following enrolment, Defence Administrative Order and Directive 2020-2, “Canadian Rangers” stipulates that Canadian Rangers must be physically able to continue performing their duties. The measure of “physically able” is subjective and dependent on circumstances.

Enrolment:

While overall fitness is not assessed and monitored in an official capacity, each patrol group undertakes some form of informal screening to assess the overall fitness of candidates prior to enrolment. This Office found that the informal assessment for recruitment is typically based on input received from various stakeholders including other Canadian Rangers, patrol leaders, and in some cases the band chief, council members, and the community.

Post-enrolment:

The fitness and well-being of Canadian Rangers is monitored for the purpose of mitigating risk to the patrol and to ensure the safety of the patrol overall. Patrol leadership select Canadian Rangers for exercises and tasks based on various criteria including the Canadian Rangers’ expertise and knowledge of a particular area, whether he or she has access to the required equipment, his or her ability to communicate in the local language, and previous experience. If it is determined that a particular Ranger would pose a threat to the safety of the patrol due to illness, injury, or physical limitations, that Ranger is given other tasks to support the operation. The chain of command recognizes that the unique reality of the Canadian Rangers requires different operating procedures. As such, the chain of command assumes a certain level of risk by allowing patrol leadership and Canadian Ranger Instructors to make these operational decisions.

While some respondents felt that pre-tasking medical clearance might be beneficial, concerns were raised at the possibility of imposing military fitness and medical standards. Respondents indicated that not all Canadian Rangers would meet these standards, designed for all other Canadian Armed Forces members, both for reasons of age and health. The imposition of these standards could

32 This was consistently reported across all five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups at all levels during the information gathering and interviews phase.
screen out candidates or current members, potentially resulting in a significant loss in knowledge, skills, and expertise that is held by Canadian Ranger Elders. Many Canadian Rangers were forthcoming about diabetes, heart conditions, and other ailments that affect members of their communities; conditions that would likely disqualify many of them from serving if they became subject to military fitness and medical standards. These standards, currently in place for the majority of the Canadian Armed Forces members, were not designed with Canadian Rangers’ required skills and tasks, or the environment in which they operate, in mind.

Members of the chain of command and Canadian Rangers alike indicated that, while not a perfect system, the current practice with respect to the assessing and monitoring of Canadian Rangers’ fitness works well overall. The lack of formal monitoring, reporting mechanisms and tracking for health and fitness provides leadership with the flexibility to enrol and assign tasks to Canadian Rangers based on factors not limited to their physical abilities. The absence of a baseline medical assessment does not affect access to Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements or related benefits: eligibility is solely determined by type of service being performed at the time of illness or injury, and not by the pre-existing state of Canadian Ranger’s health.

Canadian Rangers may also be eligible for a range of benefits and other services through Veterans Affairs Canada as serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces or as veterans once released. These benefits include compensation for service-related illnesses and injuries, support during the transition to civilian life, financial assistance, and support for health and well-being. The absence of a baseline medical examination upon enrolment36 does not preclude Canadian Rangers from accessing these programs.34

This Office previously recommended the development of a new framework governing the entitlement to, and provision of, medical and dental care for the various sub-components of Reservists. This recommendation was made with the view to achieve fair and appropriate treatment for Reservists.

33 As a Canadian Ranger does not have an enrolment medical upon enrolment as per Medical Standards, there is no need to create a health file. (Military Human Resources Records Procedures, Chapter 11).

34 Note that the determination of a service relationship for an injury for VAC benefits is made based on a variety of evidence including (but not limited to): the information contained in the Disability Benefits application, Service Health Records, and any medical reports or test results that are submitted with the application. Source: Email, Policy, Strategic Policy and Commemoration, Veterans Affairs Canada. For further information on Veterans Affairs Canada entitlements, please consult their website: www.veterans.gc.ca
REPORTING AND TRACKING OF TASKS AND OPERATIONS

Finding: The practice with regard to the tracking and reporting of tasks and operations is in accordance with departmental guidelines.

Canadian Rangers are considered on duty only when training has been authorized or a formal task has been assigned and they are placed on a class of service. They undertake other aspects of their Canadian Ranger role in concert with their daily civilian activities.

Canadian Rangers must be placed on the appropriate type of service for the tasks they perform to ensure they receive the health care entitlements and related benefits should they become ill or injured while on duty. The Canadian Armed Forces acknowledged that in the past “tasks were performed by Canadian Rangers for which the proper type of service was not applied.” As a result, in the fall of 2013, the Canadian Armed Forces created a framework to provide guidelines for the determination of class of service for the corresponding Canadian Ranger tasks and operations.

The current practice with respect to the tracking and reporting of Class “A”, short-term Class “B”, and “C” tasks and operations does not have a direct impact on Canadian Rangers’ health care entitlements and related benefits, nor on their access to these entitlements, provided the Canadian Ranger has been employed on the appropriate type of service.

For further information, see Canadian Rangers Tasks and Operations.

REPORTING AND TRACKING OF ILLNESSES AND INJURIES

Finding: Canadian Rangers’ illnesses and injuries are not being consistently reported or adequately tracked.

38 The divide of Class “B” Reserve Service surrounding 180 days is a recurring threshold for benefits to Class “B” Reservists. The Injured Military Members Compensation Act expresses the divide as “more than 180 days” and “180 days or less”. However, Canadian Armed Forces policies and regulations are inconsistent. Some refer to “more than 180 days” and “up to 180 days”, without addressing terms of service of exactly 180 days. Other policies and regulations are silent on the duration of period of service when on Class “B”.

572
In the event of an on-duty illness or injury, the Canadian Armed Forces is required to ensure that:

- all circumstances resulting in a military casualty\(^{39}\) are appropriately reported and documented;
- members and their families are made aware of the resources available in the event of a military casualty\(^{40}\) and
- transition assistance is provided to injured members who are subsequently released for medical reasons due to their injuries.\(^{41}\)

The proper documenting of illnesses and injuries is also a critical step in demonstrating a relationship between an illness or injury and a member’s military service.\(^{42}\)

The Report of Injury, Disease or Illness form (herein referred to as the CF 98) is the primary tool for reporting and documenting injuries, diseases, and illnesses\(^{43}\) and should be completed by any member of the Canadian Armed Forces whether or not an incident is attributable to military service.\(^{44}\) The Director Casualty Support Management is the authority responsible for verifying, approving and maintaining all CF 98s\(^{45}\) and should receive and retain all completed CF 98s. However, this Office found that only 70% (74 of 106) of Canadian Ranger CF 98s were transferred to Director Casualty Support Management within the timeframe of this investigation. This represents a gap in the tracking and reporting of Canadian Ranger illnesses and injuries, one which could pose

\(^{39}\) As part of this investigation, our Office only looked at illnesses and injuries, but not deaths.

\(^{40}\) As part of this investigation, our Office only looked at illnesses and injuries, but not deaths.

\(^{41}\) Defence Administrative Order and Directive 50180, Injured Members and Military Casualties.

\(^{42}\) Email from Director Casualty Support Management dated 12 April 2017.

\(^{43}\) Instructions for Completion of the CF 98 form Report of Injury, Disease or Illness.

\(^{44}\) This is done to protect the member (i.e. to ensure that there is documentation supporting a member’s claim or application for benefits), and to protect the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (i.e. member tries to attribute an injury to military service when in fact it happened off-duty and the member files a claim or application for benefits). It could also be important if an injury was aggravated by military service, and it is the basis for the majority of Veterans Affairs Canada decisions on benefits requiring the applicant to demonstrate a link between a medical condition and military service.

problems for some Canadian Rangers in the future, if proof of a service relationship is required to determine entitlement to benefits and services.

This Office also found that many Canadian Rangers do not consistently report their injuries. Of the Canadian Rangers interviewed who self-identified as having sustained an injury while on duty, 52% stated that they had not completed the required paperwork to report that injury. Canadian Rangers cited several reasons for this, including: they underestimated the severity of the injury, health care was available to them through other sources, or they feared immediate removal from a particular activity or long-term career implications if they reported a particular injury.

It should be noted that the under-reporting of injuries on the part of the Canadian Rangers is consistent with what this Office previously found with other Reservists. Stigma and career implications were previously cited as top impediments to coming forward with an injury. As this Office previously acknowledged, it is “difficult for the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence to assist an injured Reservist who does not first make their need for assistance known.”

For further information, see Health Care for Canadian Rangers.

Recommendation 2:
We recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces ensure compliance with the existing illness and injury reporting process so that Canadian Rangers are not inadvertently barred from accessing their health care entitlements and related benefits.

OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS

Finding: Canadian Rangers’ access to health care, particularly specialized medical services, is affected by the fact that most live in remote and isolated areas.

Canadian Rangers reside in over 200 sparsely settled and isolated communities across Canada, some of which are only accessible by air. The degree of isolation

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varies from one patrol to the next, even within the same Canadian Ranger Patrol Group.49

As Reservists typically serving on Class “A”, Canadian Rangers are largely dependent on local medical clinics, nursing stations and hospitals to meet their health care needs. Most Canadian Rangers reported that access to specialized medical care through territorial, provincial or federal health care programs is often challenging. Canadian Rangers described long wait times to see doctors, especially in isolated and remote communities serviced by rotational medical support staff. In some cases, doctors fly into these communities once per month and we were told that those requiring medical attention are not always seen during these visits. Access to continuing care for chronic medical conditions was also reported as a challenge.

Members of the chain of command and the Canadian Ranger community alike identified access to mental health services as problematic. The majority of the commanding officers interviewed recommended a review of the delivery of mental health services in this regard.50 In their support of Canadian Armed Forces operations, Canadian Rangers can be exposed to traumatic situations (for example, on Search and Rescue operations), and one senior leader stressed that “we need to have something in place to help them.”51 The greatest challenge raised with respect to mental health was the lack of access to psychological support services within isolated and remote communities. Indeed, many national psychological service providers might not understand the context within which the Canadian Rangers work and live.

The Canadian Armed Forces are responsible for providing health care to Canadian Rangers in specific circumstances as described in the Surgeon General’s Interim Guidance.52 Since most Canadian Rangers operate in geographically isolated areas, access to Canadian Armed Forces health care often requires travel to medical facilities outside of the Canadian Ranger’s home community. This geographic remoteness acts as a barrier for some Canadian Rangers, particularly those living in predominantly Indigenous communities. Many Canadian Rangers indicated that they did not pursue health care available to them through the Canadian Armed Forces because of this requirement to travel. These Canadian Rangers spoke of a reluctance to leave their communities, even temporarily, citing

49 Interviews with Canadian Rangers, when referring to access to medical services along the James Bay coast.
50 Interview with a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group Commanding Officer.
51 Interview with a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group Commanding Officer.
a general discomfort in seeking care in southern hospitals, and the absence of their support network while at these facilities. Members of the chain of command confirmed that there is reluctance on the part of Canadian Rangers to travel for medical treatment.

For further reading, see Appendix D—The Delivery of Health Services in Canada.

**Recommendation 3:**

Rangers consistently. The Interim Guidance for the Delivery of Health Care to Reserve Force Personnel further states that “we must... better educate our Reserve Force members with respect to their entitlements to care.”57

We recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces ensure the delivery of health care to Canadian Rangers to which they are entitled by:

3.1 Engaging with Canadian Rangers with the view of identifying the barriers to their access to Canadian Armed Forces health care, and their health care needs within their social and cultural contexts.

3.2 Identifying and implementing a service delivery model for Canadian Armed Forces health care that is responsive to the identified needs of the Canadian Rangers.

As this Office previously found, when Primary Reservists experience an illness or injury attributable to military service, they are eligible to apply for different compensation options. As Reservists, Canadian Rangers are also entitled to some of these options.

- “Compensation Options for Ill and Injured Reservists”, February 2016.
- For example: extension of Class “C” service for personnel whose injury or illness was sustained on Special Duty Service; Reserve Force Compensation; or for compensation pursuant to the Government Employee Compensation Act.

**Finding: Most Canadian Rangers are not aware of their Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements.**

The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff has affirmed that “the chain of command must ensure that all CF members are fully cognizant of their access and entitlement to care from the Canadian Forces Health Services...This is a leadership responsibility.”53 However, information on health care entitlements and related benefits is not clear, nor is it conveyed to Canadian Rangers consistently. The Interim Guidance for the Delivery of Health Care to Reserve

Force Personnel further states that “we must… better educate our Reserve Force members with respect to their entitlements to care.”

Knowledge transfer from the chain of command with respect to health care entitlements is neither standardized nor consistent across all patrol groups. Some patrol leaders and instructors reported that information on health care entitlements is informally passed down through casual conversation, or in the event of an injury if a Canadian Ranger requests specific information. Some instructors suggested that additional training would be beneficial and would better equip them to pass on this knowledge to patrol members. On average, a Canadian Ranger Instructor will visit a community 1-2 times per year, and only for the duration of a particular training exercise. This gives the Canadian Ranger Instructor limited time within which to complete their many tasks. Additionally, not all Canadian Rangers participate in exercises and training events, which creates challenges with regard to disseminating information to all Canadian Rangers in the patrol.

The Canadian Ranger Basic Military Indoctrination—a pilot course launched in 2016 set to replace the Developmental Period 1 course for new Canadian Ranger recruits—focuses primarily on reserve administration, compensation, and personal equipment responsibilities. The course’s curriculum does not include comprehensive information on health care entitlements and related benefits. In addition, this course is not mandatory and would not be offered to Canadian Rangers enrolled prior to its inception.

Canadian Rangers who were interviewed provided mixed responses when asked about their awareness of Canadian Armed Forces health care entitlements and related benefits. Most reported that they were not aware of their entitlements, and others simply assumed they would be “taken care of”.

It is important that Canadian Rangers understand their health care entitlements and related benefits in order to make informed decisions about options available to them. Their low level of awareness is a barrier to accessing their health care entitlements and related benefits.

Finding: Most Canadian Rangers are not aware that they may be entitled to Veterans Affairs Canada benefits and services as a serving member or veteran.

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55 Interviews with Patrol Leadership and Canadian Ranger instructors, across all 5 Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups. Many Patrol Leaders self-identified as being unaware of their own health care entitlements, much less those of their subordinate Rangers.
Veterans Affairs Canada offers a broad range of benefits and services available to serving members and veterans of the Canadian Rangers as well as to their families. These benefits and services are designed to compensate for service-related illnesses and injury, to support during the transition to civilian life, to offer financial assistance, and to help maintain health and well-being.56

Respondents interviewed who self-identified as having sustained an injury while on duty were subsequently asked if they had considered submitting a claim to Veterans Affairs Canada— the vast majority (89%) responded that they did not. The most common reason cited for this was a lack of awareness that they could be entitled to Veterans Affairs Canada benefits.

There are some Veterans Affairs Canada benefits and services that are only available to released members of the Canadian Armed Forces. This becomes problematic when applied to the Canadian Rangers context, since unlike all other Canadian Armed Forces members, Canadian Rangers have no compulsory retirement age. Canadian Rangers are permitted to serve until such time as they no longer meet employment requirements and, as we have seen, these do not include any medical or fitness standards.57 Between 2013 and 2016 an average of 3.8% of the total Canadian Ranger population released each year.58 We heard across all five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups that many Canadian Rangers continue to serve up until their death and do not voluntarily release.

Canadian Rangers’ lack of awareness of Veterans Affairs Canada entitlements and the impact of them not releasing is another impediment to their access to these benefits and services.

**Recommendation 4:**

*We recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces take concrete steps to ensure Canadian Rangers have a clear understanding of the importance of reporting injuries, and to improve their knowledge and awareness of the health care entitlements and related benefits available to them by:*

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56 Email from Veterans Affairs Canada dated April 4th, 2017.

57 “To continue to serve, a CR member must be: a) physically able to continue performing their duties; and b) likely to promote, from an educational or administrative perspective, the general efficiency of their patrol, the Canadian Ranger sub-component and the CAF”. “Physically able” is not defined. Defence Administrative Order and Directive 2020-2, Canadian Rangers.

58 Canadian Ranger National Authority statistics on Canadian Ranger releases.
4.1 Amalgamating information on Canadian Ranger health care entitlements and related benefits; distributing this information to Canadian Rangers in various languages and formats as necessary, by fall 2018.

4.2 Ensuring that this information is integrated into formal and any other relevant training offered to the Canadian Rangers, by fall 2018.

CONCLUSION

This investigation has identified specific challenges within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces that concern the health care entitlements and related benefits for the Canadian Rangers. Though they are entitled to the same health care entitlements and related benefits as other Reservists on paper, in practice Canadian Rangers face numerous barriers in accessing those entitlements, and this places them at a disadvantage.

Living in remote and isolated regions affects Canadian Rangers’ access to specialized health care, both in terms of care provided through local health programs and entitlements through the Canadian Armed Forces. Open and constructive dialogue between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Rangers to identify a mutually satisfactory solution on access to Canadian Armed Forces health care will be beneficial.

As an integral component of the Canadian Armed Forces, it is important that Canadian Rangers be fully aware of their Canadian Armed Forces entitlements as Reservists. Their lack of awareness of their health care entitlements and related benefits is an impediment to accessing these entitlements. We encourage the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces to make all information and communication products geared towards Canadian Rangers available in their various languages.

The investigation further identified a gap in the tracking and reporting of Canadian Ranger illnesses and injuries which affects the determination of a service relationship for health care entitlements and related benefits. This Office found that while the process for the reporting of injuries is adequate, it is not adhered to consistently for Canadian Ranger injuries.

This investigation also identified several concerns with inconsistency in language within the Canadian Armed Forces policies that confer health care entitlements to Reservists. The clarification of language in these policies will eliminate ambiguity and will help ensure that the Canadian Rangers are provided with the services and benefits to which they are entitled.

There is room for improvement on the part of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to ensure that Canadian Rangers have
better access to their health care entitlements. This Office’s recommendations are intended to address these gaps to improve the overall wellbeing of the Canadian Rangers.

Some of these findings are symptomatic of a larger problem within the Canadian Ranger organization, namely the under-resourcing of the Canadian Ranger Instructor cadre. The extensive administrative tasks required of the Canadian Ranger Instructors, coupled with low Instructor-to-Canadian Ranger ratios are fundamentally detrimental to their ability to fully educate and support the Canadian Rangers in their patrols. This Office is pleased to see that, as part of their review of the Canadian Ranger organization, the Department is looking to make changes to alleviate the overall workload of Canadian Ranger Instructors. While encouraged by this progress, work remains to be done in this regard.

APPENDIX A—ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CANADIAN RANGERS

1. Organizational structure of the Canadian Ranger organization
2. Organizational structure of Canadian Ranger patrols

3. Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit*</th>
<th>Number of Patrols</th>
<th>Total Rangers**</th>
<th>Total Full-time Staff</th>
<th>Staff to Ranger** Ratio</th>
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<tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>1248</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1:25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Canadian Ranger Patrol Group
** Including Junior Canadian Rangers
This information is accurate as of April 2016, as provided in 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group’s Unit Briefing presentation to the Ombudsman, on April 12, 2016.

APPENDIX B—MEMBERS OF THE CANADIAN RANGER ORGANIZATION

**Canadian Ranger National Authority:** The Commander of the Canadian Army is the Canadian Ranger National Authority. This authority is delegated to the Chief of Staff Army Reserve, The Canadian Ranger National Authority is responsible for developing Canadian Ranger policies and carrying out all Canadian Ranger personnel management (including administration, finance, equipment and supply management, and training).

**Canadian Joint Operations Command:** Conducts Canadian Armed Forces operations at home, across North America, and around the world. Canadian Joint Operations Command directs missions from planning to closing, and ensures national strategic goals are met. They provide rapid responses in their operations by:

- planning for contingencies; and
- establishing structures and processes for command-and-control, intelligence and support that can be activated or expanded at short notice.

**Director Casualty Support Management:** Provides support and services to ill and injured military personnel—both serving and retired—their families and the families of the deceased, through the Joint Personnel Support Unit.

**Canadian Ranger Patrol Group:** There are approximately 5,000 Canadian Rangers divided into five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups, each covering a distinct geographic area. Each Patrol Group is made up of Canadian Ranger patrols most of which are located in remote areas, north of the 60th parallel of latitude. Each Canadian Ranger Patrol Group has a Regular Force or Reserve member who is responsible for performing periodic reviews, visits and inspections of the patrols.

**Commanding Officer:** Each one of the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups is led by a Commanding Officer at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. They are responsible for all matters pertaining to the administration and operation of their Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups.

**Canadian Ranger Instructor:** Primarily responsible for the supervision and training of Canadian Ranger patrols. Canadian Ranger Instructors are normally
Sergeants or Warrant Officers drawn from the ranks of the Regular Force or the Primary Reserves, and report through the chain of command. As such, they are subject to the requirements for Universality of Service, unlike the Canadian Rangers whom they supervise. Canadian Ranger Instructors oversee the training of Canadian Rangers.

**Canadian Ranger Patrol:** Every Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is made up of numerous Canadian Ranger patrols that collectively cover their Area of Responsibility. A Canadian Ranger patrol consists of patrol leaders, as well as Canadian Rangers, who are trained and supervised by a Canadian Ranger Instructor.

**Patrol Leaders:** Patrol leadership is almost exclusively made up of community members who have previous Ranger experience. Patrol leadership consists of one Sergeant in command, a Master Corporal and a Corporal for each section. Patrol leaders are approved by the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, based on a recommendation from the leading members of the patrol’s community.

**Canadian Rangers:** The Canadian Rangers are a subcomponent of the Reserve Force within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). They provide “...a CAF presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the CAF.”7 They play an important role in assisting Canadian Armed Forces members by providing local expertise, guidance and advice, conducting Northern Warning System patrols, and providing local assistance to search and rescue activities.8

... **APPENDIX E—RANGER-RELATED POLICIES AND DIRECTIVES**

Some of these directives are only available on the internal Defence Information Network. Should you be unable to obtain further information through other sources, please contact the Office for assistance.

Queen’s Regulations and Orders (QR&O):
- QR&O Volume 1, Chapter 2.034 (d)
- QR&O Volume 1, Chapter 9—Reserve Service
- QR&O Volume 1, Chapter 34, Medical Services

Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD):
- DAOD 2020-2, Canadian Rangers
- DAOD 5002-1, Enrolment: Component and Sub-Component Selection
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

• DAOD 5023-1, Minimum Operational Standards Related to Universality of Service
• DAOD 5018-0, Injured Members and Military Casualties
• DAOD 5018-2, Report of Injuries and Exposure to Toxic Substances

Miscellaneous Guidance:
• Canadian Forces Health Services Instruction 4090-02, “Interim Guidance for the Delivery of Health Care to Reserve Force Personnel”
• Vice Chief of Defence Staff letter, Access to Medical Care—Reserve Force Personnel, 2 November 2011

APPENDIX F—RESPONSE FROM THE MINISTER

31 October 2017

Mr. Gary Walbourne
National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman
100 Metcalfe Street, 12th floor
Ottawa, ON K1P 5M1

Dear Mr. Walbourne:

Thank you for your letter of September 21, 2017 and for your advice and recommendations in the 2017 report, Canadian Rangers: A Systemic Investigation of the Factors that Impact Healthcare Entitlements and Related Benefits of the Rangers. I concur with the importance of the issues raised in the report and support the recommendations.

The health and well-being of the Canadian Rangers is of paramount importance; no obstacles must prevent our provision of care to the members of this organization. Consequently, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) will clarify its policies concerning Ranger entitlement to healthcare and subsequently, the Canadian Army will ensure these policy clarifications are well understood by all Canadian Rangers. This effort will be supported by effective instruction on illness and injury identification and reporting which will be integrated in all levels of Ranger training.

The CAF will continue to improve the instructional and reporting processes related to illness and injuries to ensure that all Rangers are acquainted with all pertinent procedures, while fully understanding their healthcare options. The CAF will also systemically review the cultural, geographical, economic, and social aspects of Canadian Rangers in order to minimize barriers to receiving healthcare.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that the CAF strives for excellence and will address the issues you have identified in an efficient, responsive, and timely fashion.

Again, thank you for sharing this report. I look forward to our future discussions.

Yours sincerely,

The Hon. Harjit S. Sajjan, PC, OMM, MSM, CD, MP
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

Doc. 75: Commander Canadian Army Planning Guidance - Canadian Ranger Enhancement, 13 January 2021

1901-1 (DCR)
13 January 2021

COMMANDER CANADIAN ARMY
PLANNING GUIDANCE -
CANADIAN RANGER ENHANCEMENT

References (refs): A. CDS Revised-Role, Mission and Tasks of Canadian Rangers, 11 July 2008
B. DAOD 2020-2, Canadian Rangers, 21 May 2015
C. 1920-1 (ACOS Ops DGLRes Sec) Canadian Ranger Expansion Plan, 20 June 2008
D. 1901-l(DLFD CI-4) Master Implementation Directive Canadian Ranger Patrol Group Expansion, 7 January 2019
E. 1901-1 (CRNA) CCA Master Implementation Directive Canadian Rangers Organization, 27 April 2015
F. Strong, Secure, Engaged (Canada’s Defence Policy), 7 June 2017
G. Canadian Army Order 11-99, 1 December 2011
H. 1920-1 (CRNA) Canadian Ranger Expansion Update, 20 April 2010
...

GENERAL

1. The Canadian Rangers (CR) are considered the eyes, ears, and guides for the Canadian Army (CA) in the remote, coastal, and northern areas in which they serve. They allow the CAF to maintain contact with Canadians in those communities, and they provide a critical and enduring presence on the ground. The CR are vital to routine surveillance, acting as guides, local cultural advisors, and interpreters when required. As part of the One Army Team, the CR form the core of local liaison capacity in many locations, all while remaining immediately available to support local government or other agencies in times of need. The CR will continue to serve as Canada’s early warning and will be a key component in assuring the integrity of Canadian sovereignty and our national resilience in
remote locations, both by their enduring presence on the ground but also as integrated participants in Domestic and Sovereignty Operations.

2. The formal Role and Mission of the CR was initially outlined in reference A by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), and since issuance has been superseded and amplified by DAOD 2020-2 (reference B):

   a. The Role of the CR is to provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the Canadian Armed Forces; and

   b. The CR Mission is to provide lightly equipped, self-sufficient, mobile forces in support of the CAF’s sovereignty and domestic operation tasks in Canada.

3. Since their creation as a Corps of the Reserve Militia by an Order-in-Council in 1947, CRs have been asked to observe and report unusual activities in their area, observed during the conduct of their daily civil activities. This generic mandate has evolved over time with tremendous success and CR now complete a spectrum of tasks for the CAF including:

   a. support to Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR);
   b. support to Domestic Operations (DOMOPS);
   c. support of sovereignty operations (SOVOPS);
   d. support to Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) exercises; and
   e. conduct of patrols to North Warning System (NWS) sites.

4. Over the years, the CR have been the focus of plans and concerted efforts to grow and enhance the organization. Previous direction has included the Canadian Ranger Expansion Plan (reference C) issued in 2008, looking to expand Patrol locations and revise the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG). Further growth efforts in 2019 (reference D), focused on expansion of Patrol locations and the requisite CRPG augmentation to support the additional footprint in their area of responsibility. In addition to these growth efforts, the 2015 Master Implementation Directive (reference E) for the CR organization sought to ensure the long-term relevance and sustainability of the CR by ensuring their command and control structures, policy guidance, and personnel meet the unique requirements of the organization in a resource efficient manner.

5. In 2017 the Government of Canada published Strong, Secure, Engaged Canada’s Defence Policy (SSE, reference F). SSE commits to enhance and expand the training and effectiveness of the Canadian Rangers to improve their functional
The Canadian Rangers @ 75

capabilities within the Canadian Armed Forces (SSE #108). To establish CA commitment and follow through I have included the CR in my direction to the Canadian Army leaders and staff in the forthcoming Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS) (reference J), ensuring that the CR are a fully capable and integrated component of the One Army Team. (CAMS, One Army Integration 3.3 Canadian Rangers).

6. In order to successfully achieve the SSE directed enhancement of the CR and to fully integrate the CR into the One Army Team, it is necessary and opportune to conduct a comprehensive review of the CR. This review will need to examine the role, missions, and tasks of the CR, and identify the clear shortfalls in staffing, administrative and financial frameworks. As required this review will mandate updates to the policies, processes and mechanisms which govern the personnel, and provision of equipment necessary for the CR to execute their mission now and into the future, including posturing the CR for their increased importance in the context of the evolving aspects of continental defence efforts.

PLANNING GUIDELINES

7. Aim. The aim of this planning guidance is to initiate the analysis of options for enhancing and expanding the training and effectiveness of the CR. The product of this analysis supporting the CR enhancement efforts may result in a single CA directive with phased implementation, but it may also take the form of CAF/DND level directive affecting different aspects of the CR governance, structure, force generation, employment and policy spectrum. I expect the Director CR to provide me with options for consideration on the way ahead to implement the full breadth of CR enhancements.

8. Assumptions

a. The concept that CR are considered to be fully trained, self-sufficient, lightly equipped, and fully clothed to operate in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) upon enrolment, may no longer be valid and needs to be reviewed;

b. The CA will continue to deliver the Junior Canadian Ranger (JCR) Program through the CRPGs. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) through the National Cadet and JCR Support Group will continue to be the authority for the JCR Program and approve and fund all approved JCR patrol activities and associated support positions;

c. The CR will assume an increasingly prevalent role in Continental Defence; and
d. There are CR policy authorities resident in the CA, these need to be identified and assessed to ensure CA scope to affect policy change.

9. **Constraints/Limitations (must do):**

   a. Review and validate policies, regulations, directives plans and orders, both internal and external to the CA, to ensure relevance to the current and future employment of CR, and ensure flexibility to incorporate the diversity of the CR communities;

   b. Validate CR roles, missions, and tasks to ensure relevance to current and future employment of CR;

   c. Examine the structure and governance of the CR, and ensure administrative requirements are included in HQ structures;

   d. Factor in community involvement when considering any changes to CR patrol locations;

   e. Consider the requirements of the JCR program that is delivered by the CA on behalf of the VCDS;

   f. Consider the interaction by CR with OGD and other stakeholders in the communities that they operate; and

   g. Consider the diversity of the environment and communities in which CR operate, ensuring policies and direction is sufficiently tailorable to local conditions.

10. **Restraints (must not):**

    a. This review must not change the nature of the CR as a unique sub-component of the Reserve Force.

11. **Comd CA Intent.** I intend to enhance the effectiveness of the CR by reviewing the role, mission, tasks, command and control, geographic laydown, staffing and administrative frameworks of the CR, and as required, update the policies, processes and mechanisms which govern the personnel, and provision of equipment necessary for the CR to execute their mission now and into the future. The opportunity exists at this time to conduct a comprehensive overhaul of the Canadian Rangers organization to execute the successful implementation of SSE Initiative # 108 and to ensure the CR are integrated into the One Army concept of Force Generation (FG) and CJOC’s intent for Force Employment. We will not be fixated upon the review, but rather the deliberate action that emanates from it. “Quick wins” will be aggressively implemented concurrent with longer-
term efforts to develop and maintain momentum in improving the operational relevance and effectiveness of the CR.

12. **Comd CA End State.** My end state will be achieved when the Canadian Rangers are trained, equipped, structured, staffed and supported by policies, directives, regulations and orders that enable the Canadian Ranger Organization to fulfill its Role, Mission and Tasks.

13. **Criteria for Success.** The following represent the criteria for success in CR Enhancement:

   a. CR command and control (C2) structures, locations and staffing levels of CR Patrols and CRPGs, are confirmed as appropriate in order to achieve assigned tasks, this includes assigning the right unit leadership supported by succession plans to ensure continuity;

   b. The CR organization is supported with the policies, directives, regulations and orders that reflect the

   c. The necessary training has been established for the CR organization to accomplish its assigned tasks;

   d. The CR organization is equipped to accomplish its assigned tasks;

   e. The CR organization has expanded to achieve SSE Initiative #108;

   f. There is a common understanding of the CR Role, Mission and Tasks within the DND and amongst external stakeholders; and

   g. The CR are considered as, and consider themselves part of the wider One Army and CAF Team.

**APPROACH**

14. This review process will be conducted in a timely fashion. While the pace of some aspects of the review will be governed by wider Continental Defence Policy work, others need to mature rapidly and proceed to implementation.

... 

21. **Conclusion.** As described in CAMS, the Regular Force, Army Reserve, Canadian Rangers, and the civilian work-force must come together as a single operating entity, as only One Army will be able to manage the array of concurrent operational demands. The full integration of the Regular and Reserve components, and respective capabilities, will be achieved where the optimum capacity of each component will enable meeting the readiness and operational output demands of the future. This comprehensive review of the Canadian
Ranger organization will ensure that the CR are a valued component of the One Army, are well positioned for the future, and will remain credible in the eyes of the CAF, our allies and defence partners, the GoC, and the people of Canada.

Le commandant de l'Armée canadienne,

[signed]

Lieutenant-general W.D. Eyre

Distribution List
Further Reading

Canadian Army. “Canadian Rangers.”


About the Editor

P. (Paul) Whitney Lackenbauer is Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and a Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University, Ontario, Canada. He also serves as network lead of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) and was Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group from 2014-2020. He has (co-)written or (co-)edited more than fifty books and more than one hundred academic articles and book chapters. His recent books include The Joint Arctic Weather Stations: Science and Sovereignty in the High Arctic, 1946-72 (co-authored, forthcoming 2022); The Canadian Armed Forces’ Eyes, Ears, and Voice in Remote Regions: Selected Writings on the Canadian Rangers (2022); Lines in the Snow: Thoughts on the Past and Future of Northern Canadian Policy Issues (co-edited, 2021); Debating Arctic Security: Selected Writings by Rob Huebert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, 2010-2021 (2021); On Thin Ice? Perspectives on Arctic Security (co-edited 2021); Breaking Through? Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic (co-edited, 2021); Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters (co-authored 2020); Custos Borealis: The Military in the Canadian North (edited 2020); Governing Complexity in the Arctic Region (co-authored 2019); Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World (co-edited 2019); and China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada (co-authored 2018). Previous books on the Rangers include Vigilans: The 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (2015), The Canadian Rangers: A Living History (2013), and Canada’s Rangers: Selected Stories, 1942-2012 (2013). He is co-editor of the Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) series, to which he has contributed fifteen volumes.
Often described as the military’s “eyes and ears” in remote regions, the Canadian Rangers have evolved over the past seventy-five years to represent a successful integration of national security and sovereignty agendas with community-based activities and local stewardship. As the seventy-five documents in this collection attest, the Ranger concept has been debated since the early postwar period. What should the Canadian Rangers be expected to do? Where should they be located? Who should participate? How should they be organized? And how does Ranger service fit with evolving military and civic identities?